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Foreword
Gunnar Myrdal published his magnum opus Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the 
Poverty of Nations in 1968. Described by one of his peers as a cheerful pessimist, 
Myrdal was deeply negative about Asia’s development prospects and this 
 pessimism was manifestly evident across the pages of his tome. However, the 
half-century since publication has witnessed a most remarkable social and 
 economic transformation in Asia that would have been difficult for Myrdal to 
imagine, let alone predict, at the time of his writing.
During discussions with Deepak Nayyar—a former Chair of the UNU-WIDER 
Advisory Board—he proposed an in-depth inquiry into the how and why of the 
dramatic transformations within Asia since Myrdal’s major work, looking at how 
nations can develop across time given their different national characteristics, 
political settlements, natural endowments, and starting points of development. 
As it turned out, that conversation pre-launched the UNU-WIDER research pro-
ject, Asian Transformations—An Inquiry into the Development of Nations. The 
project maps and analyses the story of progress and economic development in 
Asia, with the region’s transformed significance in the world economy, and 
reflects on what future decades might hold.
This book, with its comprehensive chapters by eminent economists and social 
scientists, is the distillation of the entire academic project, making it essential 
reading for economists, policymakers, and scholars and students of development. 
Valuable lessons can be drawn from the research—successes, failures, or mixed 
outcomes—that will help in thinking about the economic prospects of countries, 
whether leaders or laggards at the point of departure.
I sincerely thank the contributors for their studies, which share with us their 
individual expertise, and particularly Deepak Nayyar for bringing this very rich 
academic inquiry to full fruition.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and financial contributions 
to its research programme by the governments of Finland, Sweden, in this case 
particularly the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida, 
and the United Kingdom. Without this vital funding our research and policy 
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Preface
In early September 2016, I was browsing through the bookshelves in my study, 
when I spotted the three volumes of Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama, which I had 
read as a graduate student in economics at Oxford soon after it was published. 
I had returned to it off and on while working on development or on India. But 
this time around, it was after a decade if not longer. I decided to re-read Appendix 
3 on economic models, with its critique of capital–output ratios, in the context of 
development planning. This was, in fact, written by Paul Streeten, who was a part 
of the Myrdal team for Asian Drama. They were close friends for years, as Streeten 
had translated and edited Myrdal’s earlier work on economic theory and on 
methodological problems. Paul was also my supervisor as a doctoral student at 
Oxford. It was the beginning of our lifelong friendship. And I met Gunnar Myrdal 
once with Paul Streeten. The accidental browsing brought back memories from 
that time. It struck me that, in 2018, it will be fifty years since the book was pub-
lished. This led me to think that a study, which analyses the story of economic 
development in Asia, over this span of half a century, would be a wonderful idea.
As it happened, just a week later, I was participating in the WIDER Annual 
Conference at Helsinki. It occurred to me that UNU-WIDER, located in the 
Nordic world, with its focus on development would be the perfect institutional 
base for such a study. And I mentioned this adventurous idea to Finn Tarp, 
Director of UNU-WIDER. He said that he would think about it and explore 
 possibilities. Barely two months later, he was in touch with me to say that UNU-
WIDER would like to collaborate on such a study.
At a first step, I wrote a short concept note setting out the idea. In mid-February 
2017, this was discussed in an informal brainstorming meeting with Ernest 
Aryeteey, Ronald Findlay, Justin Lin, Frances Stewart and Robert Wade, in 
Helsinki—Finn Tarp and Tony Addison were also present and participated in the 
discussions. The comments and suggestions from all the participants were most 
constructive. The study was then conceptualized in terms of structure and con-
tents. The project began life in late March 2017 as authors were commissioned 
over the next three months. The complete first drafts of the papers written for the 
project were discussed at a workshop of authors at the Central Institute for 
Economic Management, in Hanoi, Vietnam, on 9–10 March 2018. The discus-
sions were rich, engaging, and productive. Revised versions of the papers were 
discussed further at a second workshop of authors at Fudan University, Shanghai, 
China, on 29–30 June 2017, where Guanghua Wan, a contributor to this volume, 
was our gracious host. This meeting provided valuable suggestions for the authors 
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and the editor. Selected aspects and highlights of the study were also presented at 
a plenary session of the WIDER Annual Conference in mid-September 2018, 
which was followed by a helpful discussion. I would also like to record my appre-
ciation of the work done by referees, who reviewed draft papers at different stages. 
Their evaluation and comments helped improve the quality of the volume. Above 
all, I am grateful to the contributors for their patience, understanding, and effort 
in putting up with my demands for successive rounds of revisions.
This book, and its companion volume, Resurgent Asia: Diversity in Development, 
are the outcome of the UNU-WIDER research project Asian Transformations. 
I am indebted to Finn Tarp for his acceptance of the idea and his commitment to 
what seemed an exceedingly difficult task at the time. Somewhat late in the lifecycle 
of the project, I also persuaded him to write a chapter on Vietnam for the volume. 
In the journey to completion, the unstinted support from Finn Tarp was invaluable.
I owe a special word of thanks to the staff at UNU-WIDER in Helsinki, who 
lent wonderful support throughout over two years even though I lived in faraway 
New Delhi. Tony Addison, with his perceptive and interesting ideas, was a lively 
participant and discussant at all our meetings and workshops. Paul Silfvenius 
provided us with quiet, efficient, administrative support. Janis Vehmaan-Kreula, 
the project secretary, our anchor in Helsinki, was a pillar of support, with tireless 
effort and complete dedication, for me and for all the contributors spread across 
the globe. Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen, super efficient at whatever she does, helped us 
at the Shanghai workshop, and, most importantly, prepared the final manuscript 
for publication. The authors alone know how hard she worked.
It is difficult for me to find the words to thank Rajeev Malhotra, who worked as 
my principal assistant on the project with a strong commitment that is worthy of 
praise. He was conscientious, meticulous, and efficient. It was multi-tasking in 
every sense of the word. He helped in preparing for our author workshops, mak-
ing presentations for authors who were unable to come, acting as a discussant, or 
summing up sessions, and then assisting with follow-up. And he was a careful 
reader of papers. In fact, Rajeev provided valuable assistance whenever, and in 
whatever form, it was needed. It was gracious of him to find the time for these 
tasks, given his own academic obligations—I owe him a debt of gratitude.
The object of this book is to analyse the development experience of Asia over 
the past five decades. There is no such study yet. And this is new. It should, at the 
same time, contribute to our understanding of the process of development. There 
are, perhaps, lessons that can be drawn from the Asian experience—successes, 
mixed outcomes, failures—which might help in thinking about economic pros-
pects of countries in Asia and elsewhere that are latecomers to, or laggards in, 
development. In this half-century, the world has witnessed profound changes in 
economic development, social progress, and living standards. And, contrary to 
Myrdal’s expectations, Asia has been transformed beyond recognition. These 
transformations have been uneven across countries and unequal among people. 
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Yet, Asia’s remarkable development over the past fifty years has also transformed 
its significance in the world economy. Thus, how the future unfolds in Asia over 
the next twenty-five years will have important implications for the world. Given the 
enormous diversity and massive size of Asia as a continent, this study is obviously 
an ambitious endeavour. It should come as no surprise that there are unexplored 
themes, unsettled issues, and unanswered questions. Even so, it is hoped that this 
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Gunnar Myrdal published his magnum opus, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the 
Poverty of Nations, in 1968. The fifty years since then have witnessed a remarkable 
economic transformation in Asia—even if it has been uneven across countries 
and unequal between people—that would have been difficult to imagine, let alone 
predict, when Myrdal and his associates completed their work. The present book 
analyses the story of economic development in Asia spanning half a century. This 
chapter explains the conception and design of the study for the reader. It begins with 
a discussion on Gunnar Myrdal, the author, and Asian Drama, the book, as a point 
of reference. It then sets out the rationale and the object of the study, to outline its 
structure and framework. This leads into a discussion, illustrative rather than 
exhaustive, of some important ideas and lessons that emerge, which might serve 
as a teaser. Thereafter, it provides a brief narrative on the contents and scope of 
the book, meant as a road map for readers.
2. Gunnar Myrdal and Asian Drama
Gunnar Myrdal was a man of many parts. The word polymath is an apt description, 
which might not suffice to describe a man who was a distinguished academic, 
policy practitioner, member of parliament, cabinet minister, international civil 
servant, political actor, public intellectual, and concerned citizen.1 This diversity 
of experiences shaped his work and thinking.
In academia, Stockholm University was his institutional home (1933–1950). 
He started as a brilliant theorist, a brash young academic,2 who went on to 
1 For accounts of Gunnar Myrdal, the person and his life, see Streeten (1990, 1998); Appelqvist and 
Andersson (2005); Bok (2005); Barber (2008); and Kanbur (Chapter 2, this volume).
2 Evidently, Gustav Cassel, whom he succeeded as Chair in Political Economy at Stockholm 
University (1933–1939), once warned him against his brashness, ‘Gunnar, you should be more respectful 
to your elders, because it is we who will determine your promotion’. Yes, the young Myrdal replied, ‘but it 
is we who will write your obituaries’. After Cassel’s death, he did indeed write his obituary (Streeten 1990).
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 question the methodological foundations and ideological underpinnings of 
 economics, returning to his ivory tower at Stockholm University (1962–1967) 
when he founded the Institute for International Economic Studies, and was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. In professional life outside aca-
demia, he turned to political economy and developed the idea of countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies in the early 1930s. There was an interregnum of four 
years (1938–1942) when he lived in the United States to study on the ‘Negro 
Problem’. He returned home to political institutions in the 1940s when he chaired 
a committee that outlined the elements of the post-war Swedish welfare state, to 
become a member of parliament, Chairman of the Planning Commission in 
Sweden, and Minister for Trade and Commerce. During the Cold War era, he was 
appointed Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission in 
Europe, where he served from 1947 to 1957. The next ten years were devoted to 
his study on Asia, of which he spent four years in New Delhi, where his wife, Alva 
Myrdal (sociologist, diplomat, and politician, who was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1982) served as Sweden’s Ambassador in India from 1955 to 1961.
There was also a remarkable intellectual journey that ran in parallel, with 
many milestones and some landmarks. Three deserve mention for their common 
purpose—critique of systemic biases and implicit values in economic thinking—
and for their diversity of subjects: politics in economics, race in society, and 
poverty in the world. The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory 
was published in Swedish in 1930, in German in 1932, and in English, translated 
by Paul Streeten, in 1953. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy, for which he spent four years in the US, was published in 1944.3 
Asian Drama, on which he worked in India for four years and in Sweden for six 
years, was published in 1968. Yet, the book also was influenced by the evolution 
of Myrdal’s thinking in economics and the social sciences over a lifetime.
In this magnum opus, the fundamental point of departure from conven-
tional thinking was the conviction that ‘economic problems cannot be studied 
in isolation but only in their own demographic, social and political setting’ 
(Myrdal 1968: ix). The book and its approach are best described in the author’s 
words from the preface:
It is not an altogether pretentious metaphor when I describe my endeavour to 
apply an institutional approach in this study as an attempt to analyse the devel-
opment problems of South Asia in a manner that Adam Smith studied England’s 
development problems two hundred years ago . . . The length is abominable. The 
question can, indeed, be raised why I did not break it up into five or six books . . . 
3 Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, published in 1957, was early thinking about devel-
opment, while Value in Social Theory, critical essays on methodology written earlier, translated into 
English and edited by Paul Streeten, was published in 1958. For a more detailed discussion on Myrdal’s 
academic writings, see Kanbur (Chapter 2, this volume). See also, Streeten (1998) and Barber (2008).
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But the central idea in the institutional approach is that history and politics, 
 theories and ideologies, economic structures and levels, social stratification, 
agriculture and industry, population developments, health and education, and 
so on, must be studied not in isolation but in their mutual relationships.
(Myrdal 1968: x)
The title, Asian Drama, was deceptive in terms of its country coverage. Its focus 
was on the erstwhile British India, made up of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, the 
sub-continent now described as South Asia. Burma and Indonesia were paid 
some attention. But Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand were grouped together 
as the rest of Southeast Asia, while Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were 
touched upon when some information of interest was available. It is interesting, 
although somewhat puzzling, to note that Myrdal described all these countries 
broadly as South Asia even if many of them are now seen as part of Southeast 
Asia.4 However, Japan, Korea, China, Formosa (Taiwan), Hong Kong, and 
Singapore were excluded. So was West Asia. And, it is no surprise that the central 
Asian economies, then part of the USSR, were also excluded.
Myrdal set out a conceptual framework and an analytical approach to study the 
constraints on, and possibilities of, development in Asia at an early stage of 
the  postcolonial era when experience in terms of outcomes was limited. Some 
important points of departure from studies of development at that time, which 
reflected his methodological concerns, are set out explicitly in the Prologue titled 
‘The Beam in Our Eyes’. It begins with a plea for the sociology of knowledge, to 
emphasize the importance of a multidisciplinary approach in social sciences, 
the recognition of many biases in the study of development, the critical role of 
institutions, and the necessity of making assumptions, priors and values explicit. 
The implicit critique of mainstream economics had three dimensions. First, the 
essence of the institutional approach is to use all relevant knowledge to analyse 
a problem, unconstrained by the boundaries of disciplines, because in an inter-
dependent social system there are only problems that are not simply economic, 
social, or political. Second, the garb of scientific analysis often conceals or dis-
guises values, priors or interests that are political, and the implied objectivity 
which is spurious must be replaced by explicit valuations. Third, development 
objectives should be formulated on the basis of the actual needs or valuations of 
people, instead of the narrow definitions or metaphysical concepts so characteristic 
of statisticians or economists.
In this worldview, development was a multidimensional process of circular 
causation and cumulative change in which economy, polity, and society interacted 
not only with each other but also with technology, history, and culture. Cumulative 
4 This description is illustrated by a map of South Asia in Myrdal (1968) which includes all the 
selected countries (volume 1: 4–5). The scope and coverage of the study is also set out in the text 
(volume 1: 39–41).
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causation could create vicious circles through negative feedbacks or virtuous 
 circles through positive feedbacks. This approach and conceptualization were both 
perceptive and correct. But his analysis of the prevalent situation in underdevel-
oped Asia sought to focus on output and incomes, conditions of production, levels 
of living, attitudes towards life and work, institutions, and policies. Taken together, 
these constituted a social system that represented a powerful constraint on devel-
opment, which meant that poor countries and poor people would remain poor.5 
The interaction of these conditions, Myrdal believed, would lead to ‘either an 
unchanged level of underdevelopment, which is to say stagnation, or else devel-
opment to a higher level or a regression to a lower level’ (1968: 1864). The chal-
lenge of development, then, was intervention in the form of policies and planning 
by governments to transform the process of cumulative causation so that it could 
create virtuous circles through positive feedbacks and spread effects.
In retrospect, it is clear that there were some valuable analytical insights, such 
as the concept of cumulative causation, that remain just as relevant now for an 
understanding of development process.6 The idea of operational controls over the 
private sector through trade policy, monetary policy, or fiscal policy, which could 
be positive and uniform (even if selective) or negative and discretionary—and 
their rational co-ordination—was also perceptive in its thinking about state 
intervention in markets.7 These were its strengths. But there were weaknesses too. 
The role of governments was recognized in the context of planning in market 
economies, which was also part of the Development Consensus at the time. Yet, 
this critical importance of governments was diluted by the notion of a ‘soft state’, 
where governments did not have the willingness or ability to do what was neces-
sary in the pursuit of development objectives because they could neither resist nor 
coerce powerful vested interests. Similarly, the possibilities that economic openness 
could also create development opportunities were simply not recognized, because 
the belief in export pessimism and the absence of capital movements were 
accepted as characteristics of the world economy that would remain forever.8
For these reasons, perhaps, Myrdal’s assessment of the possibilities in the coun-
tries studied led him to a deep pessimism about development prospects in Asia.9 
In sum, economic problems were intractable, political problems were formidable, 
while solutions that could transform the possible into the probable, or the desirable 
into the feasible, were exceedingly difficult if not elusive. Myrdal’s conception of 
5 For an elaboration of these ideas, see Myrdal (1968, volume III, appendix 2: 1843–78). For a 
critical evaluation, see Stewart (Chapter 3, this volume).
6 On cumulative causation, see Myrdal (1968, volume III, appendix 2: 1870–8).
7 On operational controls, see Myrdal (1968, volume II, chapter 19 and volume III, appendix 8).
8 See Myrdal (1968, volume I, chapter 13). Its discussion on foreign trade is based on the premise 
of export pessimism, while its discussion on capital flows argues that international capital movements 
could not be a source of investment in Asia.
9 For a detailed assessment of possibilities and constraints in the countries studied, see Myrdal 
(1968 volume I: on India, chapter 7; on Pakistan, chapter 8; on Ceylon and Southeast Asia, chapter 9).
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drama, speeding towards a climax in which economic, social, and political 
 tensions are mounting, captured the essence of this narrative (1968: 34).
The asymmetry between his optimism in American Dilemma and his pessimism 
in Asian Drama is striking indeed. There are three plausible reasons but only 
 conjectures are possible. First, he might have believed that the progressive, liberal 
and egalitarian values of people and democracy in the US would support progres-
sive change, while the mass of the population in South Asia did not share the 
modernization values of the elite and democracy could not suffice with a ‘soft 
state’. Second, when he started work on Asian Drama, there was an unbounded 
optimism about India, but a decade later, when he was about to finish the work, 
the future of India appeared shrouded in uncertainty. Third, in a conversation 
over dinner, Myrdal told Streeten that when he wrote American Dilemma he 
could identify with American ideals, but when he wrote Asian Drama, he saw the 
half-naked brown bodies in an Indian textile factory, who seemed utterly alien to 
him, and he could not find anything in common with them.10
3. Rationale and Objective
The reality of development that has unfolded in Asia since then has belied such 
pessimism about its prospects.11 The significance of Asia in the world economy 
has witnessed phenomenal change. But that is not all. Asian economies have also 
undergone a major structural transformation, while development indicators—
demographic, social, economic—suggest impressive progress. It is important to 
note that this transformative change has occurred in just fifty years, which is a 
relatively short time span in history.12
Between 1970 and 2016, the share of Asia in world GDP, in current prices at 
market exchange rates, more than trebled from less than one-tenth to three-
tenths, by as much as 21 percentage points, in almost equal parts at the expense of 
industrialized countries and transition economies (Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR). This was attributable to much higher GDP growth rates in Asia as 
compared with other parts of the world. As population growth rates slowed down, 
even growth in GDP per capita was significantly higher. Over the same period, 
10 The first explanation is put forward by Stewart (Chapter 3, this volume). The second explanation 
is hinted at by Siegel (2017). And the third explanation is narrated by Streeten (1990). In fairness, it 
might just have been an affinity with Americans. Streeten continues this story to write, perhaps tongue 
in cheek, that for Myrdal ‘In fact, the Americans came almost as high in the rank order of creation as 
the Swedes. Then came nothing for a long time; then the English, and only after them the Europeans. 
He called America his second home’ (1990: 1035).
11 Given the focus on developing countries, in this study, Asia excludes Japan and Israel, which are 
high-income industrialized countries.
12 The evidence on Asia, cited in the following paragraphs, draws on the author’s work in the 
companion volume. For a detailed discussion, see Nayyar (2019).
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GDP per capita in Asia, as a proportion of GDP per capita in the world economy 
rose from less than one-sixth to more than one-half, suggesting a significant 
convergence. But the ratio of GDP per capita in Asia to GDP per capita in indus-
trialized countries, in current prices at market exchange rates, increased far less 
from 1:20 in 1970 to 1:8 in 2016. The wide gap, which was large to start with, 
narrowed a little, so that the convergence was at best modest. The catch-up was 
more impressive in aggregates in the spheres of industrialization and trade. The 
share of Asia in manufacturing value-added in the world economy soared from 
4 per cent in 1970 to 41 per cent in 2016. Over this period, in current prices 
at  market exchange rates, the contribution of Asia to world merchandise trade 
quadrupled, as its share in world exports rose from 8 per cent to 36 per cent, and in 
world imports from 8 per cent to 32 per cent. The share of Asia in world exports 
of manufactured goods almost doubled in just two decades from 21 per cent in 
1995 to 39 per cent in 2016.
The structural transformation within Asia was just as striking. During the 
period 1970–2016, in Asia, the share of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry, and fishing) in GDP fell from 27 per cent to 8 per cent,13 
while the share of manufacturing value-added in GDP rose from 10 per cent to 
22 per cent, and the ratio of merchandise trade (exports plus imports) to GDP 
increased from 43 per cent to 70 per cent, all measured in current prices at mar-
ket exchange rates. In 1965, almost four-fifths of the total population of Asia lived 
in rural areas whereas, by 2016, this proportion was just over one-half, so that 
urbanization was rapid.
The demographic and social transformation of Asia, during the fifty years from 
1965 to 2016, was also remarkable. In terms of demographics, the population of 
Asia increased from 1.75 billion to 4.24 billion. Consequently, population density 
in a land-scarce continent almost trebled. Yet, birth rates (per 1000 population) 
fell from 40 to 17, while fertility rates (births per woman) dropped from 6 to 2. 
Social development in Asia was also impressive, as life expectancy at birth rose 
from 49 years to 72 years, literacy rates increased from 43 per cent to 82 per cent, 
while infant mortality rates dropped 160 to 23 per 1000 live births.
This transformation in terms of aggregates or averages might conceal as much 
as it reveals. It was characterized by uneven development in Asia. For one, the 
growth performance and rising shares in output, manufacturing, or trade were 
concentrated in a few countries. For another, demographic or social indicators are 
arithmetic averages that cannot measure the well-being of the poor. Development 
in Asia was most unequal between its constituent sub-regions and among people 
within countries. Consequently, the rapid economic growth was not always 
transformed into meaningful development that improved the well-being of 
13 For East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, taken together, the share of the primary sector in 
GDP dropped far more from 42 per cent in 1970 to 9 per cent in 2016 (Nayyar 2019).
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people. Of course, there was a significant reduction in absolute poverty that 
would not have been possible without rapid growth. But sustained rapid growth 
in Asia did not reduce absolute poverty as much as it could have, in part because 
the initial income distribution was unequal and in part because of rising income 
inequality. All the same, it is clear that Asian development in this era was driven 
by economic growth based on high investment–savings rates, and rapid industri-
alization, often export-led, associated with structural change in the composition 
of output and employment, which reinforced the process.14
It would seem that, during the past half a century, the Asian continent has 
 witnessed profound transformations, in terms of economic progress and living 
conditions, even if it has been uneven across countries and unequal between people. 
Yet, five decades ago, such change would have been thought of as imagination 
running wild. Indeed, at the time, the economic prospects of Asia were perceived 
as dim by most observers and analysts. In this sentiment, Myrdal was by no 
means alone in his pessimism about Asia. Of course, perfect foresight exists only 
as an abstraction in economic theory. But the benefit of hindsight does provide 
a good reason for an inquiry into the economic transformation of nations. The 
story of economic change and social progress in Asia since then deserves explor-
ation. It provides the rationale and the motivation for the present study.
The object of this study is to analyse the development experience of Asia and 
its associated transformations over the past fifty years. There is no such study yet. 
And this should be new. It would, at the same time, contribute to our understanding 
of the process of development. There are, perhaps, lessons that can be drawn from 
the Asian experience—successes, failures, or mixed outcomes—which might help 
in thinking about economic prospects of countries in Asia that are latecomers to, 
or laggards in, development, and suggest possibilities for countries elsewhere in 
the developing world. In this half-century, the world has changed almost beyond 
recognition. Thus, it would also be appropriate for the study to reflect, even if 
briefly, on how the next twenty-five years might unfold in Asia.
It needs to be said that Asian Drama is no more than a point of entry or 
 reference for this study. It is not meant to be a sequel. And it is hoped that this 
work will have an identity of its own. Clearly, a study in three volumes was just 
not feasible. A stand-alone single book would also have been a difficult if not 
formidable task, not only because it was bound to have become much too long 
but also because it could not possibly have had the depth in particular domains 
that some readers might search for. After much deliberation, I chose the middle 
path of two companion volumes that complement each other. Given the vast 
scope of the study, this is perhaps the most appropriate.
14 For a detailed discussion of these issues, with supporting evidence, see Nayyar (2013, 2017). See 
also, the companion volume, Nayyar (2019).
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It is perhaps instructive to invoke a historical fact here. Until around 1750, Asia 
accounted for almost three-fifths of world population and world income, while 
China and India together accounted for about one-half of world population and 
world income. These two Asian giants also contributed 57 per cent of manufac-
turing production and an even larger proportion of manufactured exports in the 
world. The Industrial Revolution in Britain brought about a radical transform-
ation of the situation over the next two centuries culminating in the decline and 
fall of Asia during the period from 1820 to 1950.15 The solitary exception was Japan 
after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The second half of the twentieth century 
 witnessed the beginnings of change once again. It began with South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, often described as the ‘East Asian Tigers’, 
in the early 1970s. Some Southeast Asian countries—Malaysia and Thailand—
followed in their footsteps in the late 1980s. China and India came next. Rapid 
economic growth, led by industrialization, has enabled Asia to narrow the gap. 
This momentous ongoing shift in world economic history has interested me for 
some time (Nayyar 2013). It needs to be explained and analysed. In this context, 
I was struck by the pessimism of Myrdal in Asian Drama, although he cannot 
be  blamed for not being able to foresee how reality would unfold in Asia over 
the next fifty years.
Asia is a vast continent, with so many countries distinctly different from each 
other as economies and societies. Given the enormous diversity, it was clear that 
such a study was well beyond the expertise of a single individual. This led me to 
the idea of an edited volume, one which could draw upon distinguished scholars 
with expertise in subjects, themes, countries, or sub-regions. Once the study was 
conceptualized, in terms of its approach and framework, I searched and commis-
sioned the authors for this volume. The result is a most valuable set of specialized 
in-depth studies by economists and social scientists who are among the best in 
their respective domains. This can, of course, stand by itself as a study. Even so, 
while necessary, it cannot suffice because it lacks a unified overview and vision. 
My introductory chapter also cannot provide such an overview.
This is the raison d’être for a separate authored book. It uses bold strokes on a 
wide canvas to sketch a picture of the economic transformation in Asia during 
the past fifty years and to analyse the underlying factors. It also seeks to highlight 
the similarities and differences between countries, country-groups or sub-regions, 
to focus on factors that shaped development outcomes. In this task, the edited 
book is an intermediate input but the authored book has its own identity, as the 
whole is sometimes different from the sum total of the parts. More important, 
15 For a detailed discussion on this sequence of developments, and on the factors underlying the 
decline and fall of Asia in the world economy, see Nayyar (2013). For a lucid historical analysis of 
Asia in the world economy, see Findlay (Chapter 4, this volume). See also, the companion volume 
(Nayyar 2019).
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perhaps, it provides a cohesive analytical narrative of Asian development over five 
decades to reflect briefly on future prospects. It can also stand by itself as a study. 
Thus, the two books are best described as companion volumes, which are com-
plements rather than substitutes for each other.
This edited book is divided into three parts. The first part sets the stage before 
the play begins. It situates the study in a broader context of ideas, space, and time. 
In doing so, it considers Gunnar Myrdal and Asian Drama, to focus on the 
author’s work as a social scientist thinking about development at the time, and 
revisits his approach to examine the methodology of the book in retrospect fifty 
years later. And, since Myrdal considered the past only with reference to the clos-
ing years of the colonial era, it also provides a much longer-term historical per-
spective on Asia in the world economy.
The second part comprises cross-country thematic studies. This is necessary 
because there is enormous diversity among countries in Asia which is embedded 
in history, geographical size, resource endowments, populations, initial condi-
tions, or income levels. It was so then. It is so now. Growth trajectories and devel-
opment models have been just as diverse. Outcomes have been different across 
countries and uneven over time. Therefore, however difficult the task, compara-
tive cross-country studies are essential not only for a continental perspective but 
also for understanding the story of Asia. In order to reduce the task to manage-
able proportions, it was clearly necessary to select themes, or subjects, for com-
parative pan-Asian analysis. In the context of Asia, ten themes in development 
almost select themselves: the role of governments, economic openness, agricul-
tural and rural transformations, industrialization, macroeconomics, poverty and 
inequality, education and health, employment and unemployment, institutions, 
and nationalisms. There are, of course, other themes that could have been inter-
esting, but a choice had to be made. This choice is inevitably based on a judge-
ment about where the important and the feasible coincide.
The third part is constituted by country studies and sub-region studies. The 
reason is almost obvious. It is necessary but not enough to consider similarities 
among Asian countries. It is just as important to recognize the differences. Thus, 
analytical narratives of development experiences that are country-specific or 
sub-region-specific are essential, as a complement to cross-country thematic 
studies. The development experiences of countries and of sub-regions differ. And 
the existing literature is often shaped by the purpose of enquiry. It would be far 
better if there were some questions, or an analytical approach, in common. Once 
again, a choice had to be made, where the desirable had to be reduced to the 
feasible. The three giant economies of Asia—China, India, Indonesia—with a 
total population of about 3 billion, which is 70 per cent of the total population of 
Asia, select themselves for country studies. In addition, there is a country study 
on Vietnam, a country of 100 million people, although medium-sized by Asian 
standards, which is rather different in both history and trajectory. These are 
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supplemented by country-cluster studies on each of three sub-regions: East Asia, 
including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (even though its 
geographical location is elsewhere, but these four were often studied together 
and  described as the ‘East Asian Tigers’);16 Southeast Asia including Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand plus Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar; South Asia including 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Japan, a high-income indus-
trialized country, is excluded from the study but is sometimes a point of refer-
ence. Even so, two sub-regions—Central Asia and West Asia—are missing from 
this coverage. Central Asia would have been a very difficult task as its constituent 
countries were part of the erstwhile USSR for half of the fifty-year period. West 
Asia is included in the companion book to complete the picture but not studied 
in depth.
4. Themes, Stylized Facts, and Lessons
This chapter does not even attempt a summary or a synthesis of the following 
chapters in the book. Given the space constraint, it would be an exceedingly diffi-
cult task. It would also serve little purpose as it might detract from the richness 
and depth of the analysis in the chapters. In any case, the companion volume 
(Nayyar 2019) seeks to provide a cohesive analytical narrative. Hence, the discus-
sion that follows simply touches upon some important themes to highlight some 
lessons about Asian development which emerge from the book. This is, at best, 
selective and illustrative. It cannot claim to be exhaustive.
4.1 Diversity in Development
The diversity of Asia is a recurring theme. There were marked differences between 
countries in geographical size, embedded histories, colonial legacies, nationalist 
movements, initial conditions, natural resource endowments, population size, 
income levels, and political systems. The reliance on markets and the degree of 
openness in economies varied greatly across space and over time. The politics, 
too, ranged widely from socialism through state capitalism to capitalism, from 
authoritarian regimes to political democracies, and from one-party states to 
multi-party systems. But that is not all. Outcomes in development were also 
16 There is an extensive literature and an intensive debate on this subject. For some, their success 
was attributable to markets and openness (World Bank 1993). But this view was always contested. Lee 
(1981) was among the first to emphasize the limitations of export-led industrialization. Subsequently, 
it was argued that their export orientation was not the equivalent of free trade, just as the visible hand 
of the state was more in evidence than the invisible hand of the market. See, for example, Amsden 
(1989); Lall (1990); Wade (1990); Chang (1996).
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diverse, ranging from success at one end, interspersed with mixed performances 
or muddling through, to failure at the other, which differed not only between 
countries at any point in time but also within countries over time. There were 
different paths to development, simply because there were no unique solutions or 
magic wands, as one-size-does-not-fit-all. Hence, there were choices to be made, 
and even the right choices did not guarantee outcomes, which were shaped by a 
complex mix of economic, social, and political factors in the national context, 
where history matters.17 Obviously, generalizations are difficult if not perilous. 
Even so, some stylized facts do emerge.
4.2 History, Context, and Conjuncture
It is clear that development trajectories of countries in Asia were shaped, in part, 
by their history, while the context and the conjuncture at the outset made a differ-
ence. Initial conditions were, of course, an outcome of history embedded in the 
past. The legacy of Japanese colonialism in South Korea and Taiwan included 
high levels of mass education, strong traditions of state intervention, a disciplined 
workforce and a nationalist zeal.18 The changed context after the Second World 
War meant that, in both South Korea and Taiwan, land reform was carried out 
under the supervision of occupation forces. In fact, the US came to exercise enor-
mous power and influence, not only in South Korea and Taiwan, but also in the 
other countries such as Indonesia, Malaya (including Singapore), Philippines and 
Thailand, which were occupied by the Japanese in the war. Soon after, the geopol-
itics of the Cold War era in Asia brought about a dramatic change in the conjunc-
ture, transforming this into an unequal relationship of dependence on the US for 
military and economic support. It began with the Korean War followed by the 
Vietnam War which continued for two decades. The quid pro quo for these front-
line states, which often had dictatorial or authoritarian regimes with an openly 
anti-communist stance, was development assistance, military support, and pref-
erential access to US markets. On the other side of the Cold War divide, China 
and Vietnam carried out land reforms soon after their respective revolutions. 
Of course, the USSR also provided military and economic support, but com-
munist governments in China and Vietnam were acutely conscious of their geo-
political vulnerabilities, which, together with political ideology, motivated them 
to address problems in their legacy of initial conditions. It is clear that embedded 
history, together with the conjuncture in the national and international context, 
17 For a lucid exposition of this argument, in a different context, see Kindleberger (1996).
18 Manchuria in northern China, or Manchukuo as the Japanese described it, experienced the same 
colonial legacy.
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influenced and shaped trajectories of development in many Asian countries 
 during subsequent decades.19
4.3 Economic Growth and Structural Change
The transformation of Asia was driven by rapid economic growth. Over a period 
that spanned almost five decades, 1970–2016, the GDP growth rate in Asia was 
more than double that in industrialized countries and almost twice that in the 
world economy. This gap widened progressively after 1990. This was associated 
with a dramatic change in the composition of output and employment. Economic 
growth drove structural change from the demand side as the income elasticity of 
demand for industrial goods was higher than that for agricultural goods, while 
the income elasticity of demand for services was even higher than that for indus-
trial goods. Structural change drove economic growth from the supply side by 
transferring surplus labour from low productivity employment in agriculture to 
higher productivity employment in industry and services. Structural change was 
a driver of economic growth in Asia, unlike Latin America and Africa where it 
was not. It was the equivalent of walking on two legs. The transformation was 
associated with a sharp decline in the share of the agricultural sector in output 
more than in employment with rising productivity and wages in the agricultural 
sector, and rapid industrialization with a marked increase in the share of the 
manufacturing sector, once again more in output than in employment. This was 
followed by a substantial rise in the share of the services sector in both output and 
employment in most Asian countries.20
4.4 Well-being of People
The rapid economic growth led to a sharp reduction in absolute poverty in Asia, 
but not as much as it could have, partly because the initial income distribution 
was unequal and partly because of rising income inequality. And inequality 
rose almost everywhere in Asia from the 1990s. Consequently, this rapid growth 
was not always transformed into meaningful development that improved the 
19 The importance of these historical and contextual factors in the subsequent development of 
South Korea and Taiwan is emphasized in this volume by Duara (Chapter 14), Bhaduri (Chapter 9) 
and Wade (Chapter 19). It is also recognized by Evans and Heller (Chapter 5, this volume) as well as 
Khan (Chapter 13, this volume). This argument is developed further, in its broader Asian context, by 
Nayyar (2019).
20 For a discussion, with supporting evidence, on economic growth in Asia compared with other 
parts of the world, see Nayyar (2019). For an analysis of structural change in Asia compared with Latin 
America and Africa, see McMillan and Rodrik (2011), and Nayyar (2013). On rural and agricultural 
transformations, see Vos (Chapter 7, this volume) and Timmer (2014). For an analysis of industrial-
ization in Asia, see Chang and Zach (Chapter 8, this volume).
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well-being of people, particularly in countries where employment creation was 
slow or where income inequality was high to start with. Economic growth had a 
greater impact on the living conditions of ordinary people where employment 
creation was rapid or where initial income distribution was less unequal. The 
well-being of people was also dependent on the social infrastructure that sup-
ported social consumption. The spread of education in society and the delivery of 
health services to people contributed directly to the well-being of people and 
were thus constitutive of development. But education and health were also drivers 
of economic growth insofar as they increased the productivity of the most 
abundant resource in Asian economies—labour—and were thus instrumental in 
development. It would seem that employment creation, combined with a public 
provision of education and healthcare, characterized countries that were success 
stories in Asian development with sustained growth and better distributional out-
comes. In contrast, countries that witnessed slow employment creation or jobless 
growth, with inadequate or poor public provision of education and healthcare, 
were laggards in Asian development.21
4.5 States, Markets, and Governments
The development experience of Asia during the past fifty years shows that the role 
of governments was critical everywhere, although this role differed significantly 
across countries. The developmental states in South Korea and Taiwan, with their 
embedded autonomy reflected in their capacity to pursue strategic objectives 
through the use of carrots and sticks, were a special case that could not be repro-
duced elsewhere with ease. Among other market economies, Singapore came 
close. But the erstwhile centrally planned economies, China and Vietnam, also 
evolved similar developmental states which came of age in their transition to 
market economies. Myrdal would have characterized these as ‘hard states’. 
However, even the ‘soft states’ in Southeast Asia managed to reach some under-
standing with business elites in the pursuit of national objectives. Governments 
in South Asia were, in Myrdal’s view, the classic ‘soft states’ that did not have the 
willingness or the ability to do what was necessary in the pursuit of development 
objectives because they could neither resist nor coerce powerful vested interests. 
Yet, as planning ceded space to markets, even these governments reached some 
21 Chapters in this volume provide a detailed discussion of the issues mentioned in this paragraph. 
On poverty and inequality, see Wan and Wang, Chapter 10. On employment, see Bhaduri and van der 
Hoeven, Chapters 9 and 12. On education and health, see Mundle, Chapter 11. The sub-region studies 
also confirm the propositions set out in this paragraph. See Wade, Montes and Osmani, respectively 
Chapters 19, 20, and 21. On pro-poor growth in Indonesia, see Timmer, Chapter 17.
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‘political settlements’ or ‘deals’ that were permissive if not causal in development.22 
Ultimately, efficient markets needed effective governments, so that success in 
development was, in important part, attributable to the effectiveness of state 
interventions which varied significantly across countries.23
In the pursuit of industrialization and development, the role of governments in 
evolving policies, nurturing institutions and making strategic interventions, 
whether as a catalyst or a leader, was central to the process everywhere.24 For 
countries that relied on markets it was about minimizing market failure and the 
emphasis was on getting-prices-right. For countries that stressed state intervention, 
it was about minimizing government failure and getting-institutions-right. But 
success in this quest was greater in countries that recognized the importance of 
two propositions.25 First, the state and the market are complements and not 
substitutes for each other. Second, the relationship between the state and the 
market cannot be specified once and for all but must adapt as circumstances 
and times change. In the earlier stages, it was about reconstructing initial condi-
tions through the creation of a physical infrastructure, the spread of education in 
society, and institutional reform, particularly in the agricultural sector. In the later 
stages, there was a change in the nature of this role, which had three dimensions. 
Functional intervention sought to correct market failure, whether general or 
specific. Institutional intervention sought to govern the market by setting rules of 
the game for players in the market, to create frameworks for regulating markets 
and institutions to monitor the functioning of markets. Strategic intervention 
sought to guide the market interlinked across sectors to attain the broader long-
term objectives of industrialization. Governments also fostered industrialization 
at the micro-level, through the nurturing of entrepreneurs, or through the creation 
of managerial capabilities in individuals or technological capabilities in firms in 
the private sector (Lall 1992; Amsden 2001). Governments often established large 
public sector firms, in petroleum, steel, telecommunications, or energy, going 
even further into commercial banks and development banks, which became a 
strategic form of support for industrialization in the private sector (Nayyar 2013). 
22 The notion of ‘political settlements’ is developed by Khan (Chapter 13, this volume). The idea of 
‘deals and development’, where understandings between governments and business explain the political 
dynamics underlying episodes of rapid growth in some Asian and African countries, is developed by 
Pritchett et al. (2018).
23 Some chapters in this book consider the role of the state in the process of development in Asia 
directly. See Evans and Heller (Chapter  5), Bhaduri (Chapter  9), Khan (Chapter  13), and Duara 
(Chapter 14). Some cross-country thematic chapters do so indirectly in relation to their respective 
themes: Vos (Chapter 7), Chang and Zach (Chapter 8), Mundle (Chapter 11), Kozul-Wright and Poon 
(Chapter 6), van der Hoeven (Chapter 12), and Wan and Wang (Chapter 10). The country studies and 
sub-region studies also discuss the role of the state: Lin (Chapter  15), Basu (Chapter  16), Timmer 
(Chapter 17), Wade (Chapter 19), Montes (Chapter 20), and Osmani (Chapter 21).
24 See Stiglitz (1989), Shapiro and Taylor (1990), Evans (1995), Lall (1997), Amsden (2001) and 
Nayyar (2013).
25 This argument is developed at some length in Bhaduri and Nayyar (1996).
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In retrospect, government intervention in the earlier stages turned out to be easier 
than in the later stages, while functional intervention was easier than the institu-
tional or the strategic. Countries in which states and markets were complements 
rather than substitutes, and their respective roles vis-à-vis each other were 
adapted to evolve over time, were the success stories, where the two institutions 
functioned in a manner that created mutual checks and balances. In this respect, 
East Asia was the best performer while South Asia was the worst with Southeast 
Asia in the middle.26 Yet, all governments in Asia were development oriented.
4.6 Economic Openness
Economic openness also played an important role in Asian development,27 possi-
bilities of which had not been recognized by Myrdal. The usual characterization 
of openness is in terms of international trade, international investment, and 
international finance. In this, there were significant differences between Asian 
countries,28 most of which were restrictive in terms of openness until around 1970. 
Things began to change thereafter. The reality that unfolded since then spanned 
the entire spectrum from almost unrestricted openness in Singapore, through 
moderated openness in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, or 
calibrated openness in South Korea and Taiwan, to controlled openness in China, 
India, and Vietnam. The differences are more than nuances. Unrestricted openness 
was almost uniform across trade, investment and finance. Moderated openness was 
largely open economies with selected restrictions but with some differences between 
trade, investment and finance. Calibrated openness was asymmetries in openness 
by design manifest in strategic trade policy that was open for the export sector, 
but restrictive for other sectors, with limits on openness to foreign capital and 
tight curbs on foreign brand names. Controlled openness was broader and more 
restrictive, not only in trade but also with respect to foreign investment and 
technology. Of course, South Korea and Taiwan have changed now, as have 
China, India, and Vietnam, but openness is not quite unrestricted. For most Asian 
countries, openness did not mean a passive insertion into the world economy. 
It was strategic in a few countries and selective in most countries.
There is also a broader characterization of economic openness in terms of the 
relative importance of the domestic and the foreign in markets, resources, and 
26 This geographical classification of sub-regions is useful for analytical purposes. Yet, it is worth 
noting that, in some important respects, Sri Lanka in South Asia resembled Southeast Asian coun-
tries, while Myanmar and Cambodia in Southeast Asia resembled South Asian countries. In some 
spheres, Philippines, with its Spanish colonial legacy, resembled Latin American countries.
27 See Kozul-Wright and Poon (Chapter 6, this volume) and Chang and Zach (Chapter 8, this 
volume).
28 The following discussion on economic openness draws upon earlier work of the author 
(Nayyar 2013).
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technologies. Some countries relied heavily on foreign capital, foreign technologies, 
and foreign markets—Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—
where their size ranged from small to large. This is a generalized characterization 
for there were domestic markets and domestic firms in these countries. South 
Korea and Taiwan relied on foreign markets but mobilized domestic resources 
and developed domestic technological capabilities.29 Turkey sought a blend of 
domestic and foreign in markets, capital, and technology. China, India, and Vietnam, 
for quite some time, relied mostly on domestic markets, domestic resources, and 
domestic technologies, but subsequently these countries joined the quest for 
external markets with a more open, yet selective, approach to foreign capital and 
foreign technology. These differences across countries were a function of geo-
graphical size or of strategic choice. Small countries sought to internalize external 
markets, while large countries sought to externalize internal markets, since 
exports were the beginning of the typical market expansion path for firms in the 
former, while exports were the end of the typical market expansion path for firms 
in the latter. Similarly, it was difficult for small countries to mobilize resources on 
a large-enough scale or develop technologies on their own, while it was easier for 
large countries. Yet, this was also a matter of strategic choices in the pursuit of 
development, for South Korea and Taiwan, as also Singapore, were small coun-
tries that developed their own technological capabilities.
4.7 Institutions and Policies
In Asian Drama, Myrdal stressed the importance of an institutional approach, 
and he was perhaps the first to provide a systematic analysis of the role of institu-
tions in development with reference to Asia. Yet, for quite some time, orthodox 
prescriptions sought to harmonize the role as well as form of institutions across 
the developing world irrespective of space or time. The underlying presumption 
that one-size-fits-all was wrong. There are specificities in space: institutions are 
local and cannot be transplanted out of context. There are specificities in time: 
institutions need time to evolve and cannot be created by a magic wand. Alas, this 
was not quite recognized. Economic reforms that sought to focus on policies but 
neglected institutions met with failure. Economic liberalization that moved from 
over-regulated to under-governed systems led to financial crises. Economic con-
ditionality of lenders or donors who attempted to harmonize institutions across 
countries ran into difficulties. Since then, there has been considerable work done 
29 In developing domestic technological capabilities, these countries imported technology through 
licensing rather through foreign direct investment an banned the use of foreign brand names to 
develop their own.
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by economists, both orthodox and heterodox.30 Yet, we do not know exactly what 
institutions in what forms are necessary, or at least useful for development and in 
what contexts. Even where we understand what role particular institutions can 
play in development, we often do not know how to build such institutions. The 
Asian experience poses a further puzzle. Why did some Asian countries perform 
so well with unorthodox institutions, and why did other Asian countries with 
very similar institutions not perform well? The answer might lie in the specific 
context where the distribution of organizational power affected the operation of 
these institutions through ‘political settlements’.31 Or why were good perform-
ances not sustained over time in countries? The answer might lie in the political 
dynamics of ‘deals’ between governments and business.32 It is clear the institutions 
were among the important determinants of success, muddling through, or failure 
at development in Asia.
The puzzle extended beyond institutions to policies. Similar economic reforms 
did well in some countries and did not perform well in other countries. Experience 
suggests that countries in Asia that modified, adapted, and contextualized their 
reform agenda—at the same time calibrating the sequence of, and the speed at 
which, economic reforms were introduced—did well in terms of outcomes. In sharp 
contrast, countries that introduced economic reforms without modification, 
adaptation, or contextualization, and did not pay attention to speed or sequence, 
often ran into problems. This was also the reason why strategy-based reform with 
a long-term view of development objectives, emerging from experience or learning 
within countries rooted in social formations and political processes, did sustain 
and succeed. But crisis-driven reform, often initiated following an external shock 
or internal convulsion, or imposed by conditionality of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, was always more difficult to sustain and less 
likely to succeed because its preordained template was neither contextualized nor 
sequenced. East Asia and South Asia provide respective examples of this contrast.33 
Reforms apart, there was a critical role for economic policies. Asian countries 
that were success stories in development used heterodox or unorthodox policies 
for orthodox objectives, such as strategic trade, industrial, and technology pol-
icies in the pursuit of industrialization.34 Similarly, they used orthodox policies 
for heterodox or unorthodox objectives, such as interest rates to guide the allocation 
30 The original contribution in the orthodox tradition is that of North (1990). See also Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012). For the heterodox perspective, see Khan (1995) and Chang (2007). For a discus-
sion on the role of institutions, and States, in development, which also provides a lucid, perceptive, 
critique of orthodoxy, see Bardhan (2016).
31 For a detailed discussion on political settlements, see Khan (Chapter 13, this volume).
32 On deals and development, see Pritchett et al. (2018).
33 This distinction between strategy-based and crisis-driven economic reforms, is made in Nayyar 
(1996). For a discussion of its implications and consequences, see Bhaduri and Nayyar (1996).
34 See Kozul-Wright and Poon, Chang and Zach, and Wade (respectively Chapters 6, 8, and 19, this 
volume).
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of scarce investible resources in a market economy, or exchange rates that were 
deliberately undervalued over long periods to break into the world market for 
manufactured goods. And they did not hesitate to use orthodox policies for ortho-
dox objectives, such as expansionary fiscal policies in an economic downturn 
despite orthodoxy which suggested the opposite in macroeconomic crises.35
5. Structure and Contents
The first part of the book, starting with this chapter, sets the stage. It considers 
Myrdal and Asian Drama by discussing their contribution to the debate on devel-
opment then, and by examining their approach and the methodology in retrospect 
now. It also situates the present study in its wider context by providing a long-term 
historical perspective on Asia in the world spanning the last millennium, and 
outlines the broad contours of the remarkable economic transformation of Asia 
over the past fifty years.
Chapter  2, by Ravi Kanbur, poses two central questions. How did Myrdal’s 
earlier thinking and experience influence Asian Drama? How did Asian Drama 
influence the subsequent development debate? In doing so, he explores how Myrdal’s 
conceptualization of the problems and prospects of development was shaped by 
his intellectual prowess as a brilliant economic theorist, distinguished social  scientist, 
and philosopher, and his rich professional experience as a policy practitioner and 
Swedish politician. This discussion is related to the development terrain in the 
mid-twentieth century and how Asian Drama lay on that terrain in the remaining 
years of Gunnar Myrdal’s eventful life.
Chapter  3, by Frances Stewart, highlights the major methodological innov-
ations in Asian Drama such as the critical role of values, the necessity of a 
multidisciplinary approach, the analysis of institutions and attitudes, and the idea 
that Western economic concepts are mostly inappropriate for an analysis of Asian 
development, to consider how far Myrdal’s perspectives have been adopted since 
then. Many of his ideas have been accepted by heterodox economics, but main-
stream economics has, in general, been the least responsive, particularly on values 
implicit in their concepts, theories, and policies. It is argued that new thinking is 
needed to question the appropriateness of some concepts even in advanced coun-
tries, and to incorporate environmental considerations into analytical frameworks.
Chapter  4, by Ronald Findlay, studies the political and economic evolution 
of  trade and international relations of countries and regions in Asia between 
themselves and the rest of the world during the second millennium. The focus 
is on: the Pax Mongolica and overland trade in the Middle Ages; the European 
35 For a discussion, see Nayyar (2011, 2013).
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intrusion into Asia at the turn of the fifteenth century and the impact of the 
 discovery of the New World; the spread of European imperialism, the rise of 
nationalisms, and independence from colonial rule. This is followed by a discus-
sion on the comparative evolution of Asia and Europe to consider why the 
Industrial Revolution did not first occur in Asia.
The second part of the book, on cross-country thematic studies, attempts to 
include and compare as many countries or sub-regions in Asia as possible, to 
highlight the similarities and differences between them, in relation to their respect-
ive themes. The constituent chapters analyse processes of change, recognize the 
diversity in paths and outcomes, and wherever possible try to situate their argu-
ments in the context of different theoretical or ideological perspectives. The dis-
cussion seeks to focus mostly on the past five decades but also reflects briefly on 
prospects over the next twenty-five years.
Chapter 5, by Peter Evans and Patrick Heller, explores the changing role of the 
state in Asia, from Northeast Asia and China through Southeast Asia to India, to 
discuss how states could promote economic and social transformations. The evo-
lution, emergence, and concept of the ‘developmental state’ is a central focus. So is 
the relationship of states to the politics of representation and redistribution. The 
chapter analyses the ways in which development (well-being of people) and 
democracy (accountability to society) have been facilitated or frustrated by state 
structures or state actions. The authors argue that a comparative history of the 
Asian state offers general lessons for theory and policy in development.
Chapter 6, by Richard Kozul-Wright and Daniel Poon, examines the experiences 
of increasing economic openness in three Asian countries (China, India, and 
Malaysia). Its focus is on the orientation of selected policy tools in trade, technology, 
investment, and finance that shaped the degree of economic openness, combined 
with the Myrdal idea of the ‘rational co-ordination of operational controls’, which 
is interpreted as the strategic use of selected policy tools similar to that in the 
earlier East Asian success stories (South Korea and Taiwan). The authors argue 
that the divergence in Asian growth experiences can be explained by differences 
in institutional capabilities to address market and firm-level (also government) 
failures in the catch-up process, and the pragmatic experimentation by policy-
makers in search of more effective institutional mechanisms—carrots, sticks, and 
competition—in pursuit of desired development outcomes.
Chapter 7, by Rob Vos, considers how rapid agricultural and rural transform-
ations in most Asian countries have helped jumpstart economic development 
over the past fifty years. But the nature and speed of change differed across 
sub-regions. In East and Southeast Asia, the Green Revolution led to agricultural 
productivity growth, facilitating the transfer of labour and savings, to promote 
industrial growth and foster urbanization, which in turn induced deeper agrarian 
change and food system transformations. South Asia lagged behind but has now 
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managed to overcome most of the earlier obstacles, though new challenges such 
as changing dietary patterns and pressing environmental constraints have surfaced. 
It is argued that, moving forward, the nature of agricultural transformations and 
structural change in forging economic growth and poverty reduction in the still 
disadvantaged parts of Asia will need to be different.
Chapter 8, by Ha-Joon Chang and Kiryl Zach, focuses on industrialization and 
suggests that the industrial transformation of Asia is perhaps the most surprising 
change in the global economy in the last fifty years. It outlines important trends 
and analyses selected national industrial policies that promoted this dramatic 
structural transformation. First, it describes crucial dimensions of industrializa-
tion in Asia, to highlight its historical trajectory and the subsequent industrial 
upgrading. Second, it uses four case studies—South Korea, Malaysia, China, and 
India—to describe some of the strategies that Asian economies used to induce 
industrial development. It is argued that the successful cases did not try to imple-
ment a golden policy template but pragmatically adapted their policies to overcome 
specific bottlenecks and meet strategic objectives.
Chapter 9, by Amit Bhaduri, provides a macroeconomic perspective on devel-
opment in Asia. Although macroeconomic strategies and policies have differed 
significantly across countries over fifty years, common issues recur despite their 
immense diversity in initial conditions, political systems, geopolitical situations, 
and natural resource endowments. The author examines issues such as unemploy-
ment, the role of states and markets, domestic and foreign markets, degrees of 
openness in trade, investment, and finance, industrial and technology policy, and 
socio-economic inequality, to explain why some countries have been more suc-
cessful than others in dealing with these issues through innovations in policies and 
institutions. This comparative perspective presents developmental choices and 
challenges as moving targets requiring flexible institutional policy responses at each 
stage of development, which makes uniform guidelines misleadingly oversimplistic.
Chapter  10, by Guanghua Wan and Chen Wang, outlines trends in poverty 
and inequality in Asia, its sub-regions, and selected countries during the period 
1965–2014. It seeks to explain the factors underlying these trends. It also explores 
the relationship between growth, poverty, and inequality. The evidence and analysis 
confirm that significant reductions in poverty across the board were due to fast 
growth, although the positive effect of growth on poverty was partly offset by a 
worsening income distribution in many countries. Looking ahead, Asia is expected 
to eradicate poverty but is likely to continue facing high inequality, particularly as 
technological changes on the horizon, such as artificial intelligence, are likely to 
displace labour.
Chapter 11, by Sudipto Mundle, analyses the amazing spread of education and 
healthcare in Asia over fifty years, while recognizing the large variations in this 
spread between and within countries. The nature of the state has been an important 
determinant of these variations, because social development has typically been 
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led by governments. But, in most countries, public resource constraints, with 
growing dependence on private provision and private spending, have generated a 
pattern of nested disparities in the access to education and healthcare between rich 
and poor regions, between rural and urban areas within regions, and between 
rich and poor households within these areas. However, as the better-off regions, 
areas, and households approach the upper limits of achievable education and 
health standards, a process of convergence is also underway as those left behind 
begin to catch up.
Chapter  12, by Rolph van der Hoeven, explores the interaction between 
employment and development in Asian countries, to argue that while Myrdal 
rejected the Western concept of employment to emphasize the role of informal 
employment, he underestimated the effects of the Lewisian development process. 
In countries that experienced rapid economic growth with better labour market 
development, initial conditions played some role, but Myrdal’s idea of cumulative 
causation provides a better explanation. Developmental states in these countries 
used interventionist policies in agriculture and industry, and in the macroeconomic 
sphere (combined with social policies to strengthen the position of women) making 
labour markets more conducive to employment creation. Many other countries 
were less successful despite rapid economic growth. Growing inequality, together 
with other development challenges are beginning to surface, and if not attended 
to, could become a problem in the future.
Chapter 13, by Mushtaq Khan, on institutions and development, argues that, 
while Myrdal emphasized their importance in Asian Drama, the role of institutions 
has been intensely contested ever since with later contributions from institutional 
economics and writings on the developmental state. Despite much progress in 
thinking, the dominant approaches do not agree about the institutions that mat-
ter nor do they explain why similar institutions delivered such different results 
across countries. Cultural norms and informal institutions clearly matter but the 
appropriate norms did not already exist in successful countries—they evolved 
over time. The author concludes that the distribution of holding power across 
 different types of organizations, the ‘political settlement’, can explain the diversity 
of experiences and help to develop more effective policy.
Chapter  14, by Prasenjit Duara, identifies historic patterns in the dialectic 
between nationalism and development across various East, South, and Southeast 
Asian countries. Nationalism is used by regimes as the rationale for development 
to achieve high levels of growth, but it also generates exclusivism and hostilities, 
often in order to integrate a political core. In fact, popular nationalisms have dia-
lectically reshaped the goals and patterns of development during the post-Second 
World War period. The Asian continent is divided into regions shaped by twentieth-
century historical and geopolitical conditions. Colonial and Cold War conditions 
were as important as internal political and ethnic circumstances. Turning points 
in the dialectical relationship were common within a region. More recently, a 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/07/19, SPi
24 Asian Transformations
common trans-regional pattern has emerged with neo-liberal globalization being 
accompanied by exclusivist nationalism.
The third part of the book is constituted by country studies and sub-region 
studies. It attempts, as much as possible, to consider initial conditions as a point 
of reference, highlight turning points in economic performance, assess how 
processes of change were managed (or mismanaged), discuss the influence of 
development strategies and economic reform, examine changes in engagement 
with the world economy, explore the roles of governments and politics, and 
analyse the factors underlying success or failure at development. The discussion 
seeks to focus mostly on the past five decades but also reflects briefly on prospects 
over the next twenty-five years.
Chapter 15, by Justin Lin, begins with the proposition that if Myrdal had studied 
China, which he did not, he would have been as pessimistic as he was about other 
Asian countries. But China has witnessed a miraculous transformation since 
1978. Six questions are posed to provide an analytical framework. Why was China 
trapped in poverty before 1978? What explains China’s striking performance after 
1978? How did China avoid the problems experienced by other transition econ-
omies? What price has China paid for its economic success? Can China continue 
its dynamic performance in the coming decades? What are the lessons other 
countries can learn from China’s development experience? The essential argument 
is that China exploited its advantage of relative backwardness as a latecomer. 
In doing so, gradualism and prudence in managing the process of change were 
the foundations of success.
Chapter 16, by Kaushik Basu, sketches a short history of the economy of India 
since 1968. India today is a changed country from what it was half a century ago, 
when Myrdal published Asian Drama. The stranglehold of low growth has been 
broken, its population below the poverty line has fallen markedly, and India has 
joined the pantheon of major players globally. The author analyses the economic 
policies and the democratic politics behind this transformation. This provides a 
backdrop to reflect on the huge challenges that lie ahead.
Chapter  17, by Peter Timmer, addresses the unrelenting pessimism in Asian 
Drama about Indonesia’s development prospects. This pessimism was based on two 
key realities: the poor level of governance demonstrated by the Sukarno regime 
(partly a heritage of Dutch colonial policies) and the extreme poverty witnessed in 
rural areas. Using historical and modern data on the Indonesian economy, the 
chapter explains the policy approach that resulted in three decades of rapid, pro-
poor growth during the Suharto regime. The Asian financial crisis in 1998 caused 
the Suharto regime to fall and introduced democratically elected governments. 
After a decade of stagnation, economic growth returned to the rapid rate seen dur-
ing the first three decades of the Suharto regime, but it is no longer pro-poor.
Chapter 18, by Finn Tarp, starts with a historical perspective on Vietnam. It 
argues that, when the dogged ideological approach to the economy adopted in 
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1976 did not produce the hoped-for results, in 1986 a radical course correction in 
the form of a comprehensive reform programme—Doi Moi—was introduced. 
And Vietnam has come a long way since then. The last three decades have 
 witnessed rapid economic growth, impressive poverty reduction, and significant 
strides in human development. There is a much greater reliance on market forces 
in resource allocation and price determination. In an economy once completely 
dominated by the state and co-operative sectors, the private sector and foreign 
investment both play key dynamic roles. There is a smooth transition from a cen-
trally planned to a market economy, based on institutional reform, without giving 
up the strategic leadership and influence of the state.
Chapter 19, by Robert Wade, begins with the proposition that few non-Western 
countries have reached the general prosperity of Western Europe and North 
America in the past two centuries. The unequal structure of the world economy 
created after the Industrial Revolution in Britain persists. So does uneven devel-
opment. The clearest exceptions, which have caught up with the industrialized 
world, are countries in capitalist East Asia, namely South Korea and Taiwan, to 
which the island states of Singapore and Hong Kong can also be added. The 
question posed is: how did they escape? The answer carries lessons for other late-
comers to development in Asia in earlier stages of the catching-up process.
Chapter  20, by Manuel Montes, examines Southeast Asia, particularly how 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, followed by Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, 
defied the pessimistic prognosis of Asian Drama about their prospects for devel-
opment. In the past half-century, these countries raised agricultural productivity 
faster than population growth and displayed sufficient state capability to direct 
change towards a respectable level of industrial development. The contrasts in 
achievements among the six countries can be understood from the differences in 
their initial conditions, socio-political contexts, international relations, and eco-
nomic policies. These contrasts are analysed across four areas: agriculture, industry, 
foreign trade–investment, and social development. By using an unconventional 
approach à la Myrdal, it is possible to understand how heterodox economic policies 
have been effective in overcoming developmental disadvantages. However, short-
falls in social development could make further progress difficult in the future.
Chapter  21, by Siddiqur Osmani, considers South Asia and the topsy-turvy 
story of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Soon after inde-
pendence from British rule, the region seemed to have a much better prospect 
than many other Asian countries. The prospects soon dimmed, however, as South 
Asia crawled while East and Southeast Asia galloped away. But a large part of the 
region seems finally to have turned a corner and is looking forward to a much 
better future—in terms of both economic growth and human development—than 
Myrdal thought possible in Asian Drama. The chapter describes and explains this 
story in terms of the economic strategies and political economy of the sub-region 
and also looks ahead to identify the major challenges that remain.
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Afterword
This book is divided into three parts. It situates the study in a wider context of 
ideas, space and time. Its cross-country thematic chapters seek to develop an 
understanding of similarities or patterns across the diversity of Asia. Its country 
studies and sub-region studies highlight the dissimilarities or differences between 
countries and among sub-regions. Even so, it cannot possibly cover everything. 
There are unexplored domains and unasked questions. And the whole might be 
different from the sum total of the parts. The companion book (Nayyar 2019), 
which attempts to address some of the issues not considered here, and endeavours 
to provide a cohesive analytical narrative of the Asian development experience 
spanning half a century, might thus be of interest to concerned readers.
Both books focus largely on the past fifty years. However, the books also reflect 
briefly on prospects over the next twenty-five years. Predictions about the future 
are always difficult if not hazardous. After all, the period 1968 to 2018 turned out 
to be so different from the expectations in Asian Drama. The analysis in this study 
suggests that Asia will continue to do well in terms of economic growth. There are 
obvious challenges within Asian countries, such as rising economic inequalities 
between people, emerging divergences among countries, poor infrastructure, 
underdeveloped institutions, inadequate education, unstable politics or unsus-
tainable political systems. There are also challenges in the world outside, such as 
the technological progress on the horizon of which artificial intelligence and robotics 
are mere examples, environmental consequences of rapid economic growth, the 
visible discontents with globalization attributable partly to the economic rise 
of  Asia, the populist and nationalist politics that has surfaced in industrialized 
countries, or major changes in the geopolitical situation which are beginning to 
surface. The response of Asian countries to these complex challenges will shape 
their future. Yet, this study suggests reasons for optimism rather than pessimism 
about Asia.
Gunnar Myrdal described himself as a cheerful pessimist (Streeten 1998), who 
hoped that Asia might do better but did not think that it was likely. In contrast, 
given the remarkable economic transformation of the continent over the past five 
decades, the authors of this study could describe themselves as cautious optimists 
who believe that an even better world is possible for Asia.
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Some years ago I was in Second Story Books, a well-known second-hand book 
shop in Washington DC, looking for the three volumes of Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian 
Drama. I had been a student in the 1970s, during the decade after its publication, 
and had read all of the reviews of it and parts of the book itself. It was required 
reading, or at least required dipping into, for all students interested in development, 
helped along by the fact that its author won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1974. A quarter century later, I searched for Asian Drama unsuccessfully in the 
Economics and International Sections, and went up to the desk of Second Story 
Books for help. The person at the desk looked it up, and led me to the volumes—
in the Theatre section of the bookshop.
It was perhaps apocryphal that the volume that had taken the development 
world by storm in the 1960s and 1970s, and shaped my thinking as a student, now 
languished in the Theatre section of a second-hand bookshop. The volume is still 
cited. It shows almost 5,000 cites on Google Scholar, an average of 100 cites for 
every year of its publication, and there are indeed recent citations. But these, 
I fear, are more in the nature of obligatory cites to a classic than a deep engagement 
with the book. Reading recent job market papers for recruitment of young devel-
opment economists for my university, I do not recall a mention of Asian Drama 
or of Myrdal. This is their loss because, although very much a product of its time, 
the insights it provides and the questions it raises are perennial in nature and, 
although they may not know it, the young development economists of today, 
many of them, are following in his footsteps.
This chapter will attempt to understand Asian Drama in the context of the 
development debates of its time, and in terms of the sensibilities that Gunnar 
Myrdal—the brilliant economic theorist and philosopher of knowledge, and 
Swedish politician—brought to the conceptualization of the problems and pros-
pects of development. The next three sections will cover: (i) what Myrdal brought 
to the analysis of development from his by then long, varied, and distinguished 
academic and practitioner career; (ii) the development terrain in the mid-twentieth 
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century; and (iii) how Asian Drama lay on that terrain and in the remaining 
years of Myrdal’s continued eventful life. The two central questions posed in the 
chapter are: (i) How did Myrdal’s broad experience and perspective influence 
Asian Drama? (ii) How did Asian Drama influence the development debate?
2. Gunnar Myrdal Before Asian Drama
Gunnar Myrdal was a polymath. He was a brilliant economic theorist in the 
Swedish tradition, turned iconoclast and questioning the methodological basis of 
economics; a founder of the Stockholm School with insights (published in 
Swedish) on macroeconomics which were later to be found in Keynes’s General 
Theory; one of the intellectual and political founders of the Swedish welfare state; 
author of the monumental An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy (Myrdal 1944), which played its role in laying the founda-
tions of the civil rights struggle in the USA; after the Second World War, tackling 
economic and political relations across the Iron Curtain as the head of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe; and of course the author of Asian 
Drama. But Asian Drama was by no means his last act. He lived for two decades 
after the publication of that magnum opus and, before his health faded in later 
years, was fully engaged in the debates on development. Indeed, his Nobel Lecture 
(Myrdal 1975) was devoted solely to that topic.
Thus, Myrdal brought a fully formed analytical perspective and a sense of 
political realities to Asian Drama. Indeed, more than a decade before, he had 
already published Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (Myrdal  1957; 
abbreviated from now on to Underdeveloped Regions). Although such claims are 
always problematic for an author as prolific as Myrdal, this is perhaps his first 
major sustained statement on development, and can be argued to have framed his 
thinking leading up to Asian Drama. I will come to Underdeveloped Regions pres-
ently as a precursor to Asian Drama. However, there were several lifetimes of 
Myrdal’s work before Underdeveloped Regions that set the frame for that work and 
subsequently for Asian Drama. I begin with a brief account of Myrdal before 
Asian Drama and before Underdeveloped Regions.
There are, of course, several biographies of Myrdal, which give an assessment 
of the early Myrdal and his contributions. I draw on many of these in shaping my 
account.1 Born in 1898 in the Swedish province of Dalarna, he began studying 
law at the University of Stockholm in 1918. In 1919 was the colourful meeting, 
1 The works include Dostaler et al. (1992), Appelqvist and Andersson (2005), Barber (2008), and 
Etzemuller (2014). There is also a volume of published and previously unpublished papers from before 
the mid-1970s, put together by Myrdal himself (Myrdal 1973).
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recounted many times, with Alva Reimer at her father’s farm.2 She was to become 
Alva Myrdal, his lifetime companion and in the years to come a powerful pres-
ence on the world stage and herself winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Their early 
discussions set the frame for the Gunnar Myrdal we came to know, as captured by 
their daughter Sissela Bok in a later memoir:
Gunnar also shared with Alva how he wanted to live. He had, first and foremost, 
a thoroughgoing belief in the value of rationality . . . Already in his gymnasium, 
or high school, years, he had decided to choose the Enlightenment thinkers 
as guides. And the thesis he adopted most unreservedly from some of them was 
what he would later call his ‘development optimism’: the belief that human con-
ditions would improve as soon as reason triumphed over misunderstanding and 
superstition . . . In Alva, Gunnar found someone with a similar belief that progress 
was possible but with more clearly delineated ideals and passion to put them 
into practice. (Bok 2005: 5)
He graduated in law in 1923 but realized that was not the career for him. Under 
the influence of Alva, who purchased for him Gustav Cassel’s Theoretische 
Sozialokonomie, he immersed himself in economics, reading through all issues of 
the Swedish economics journal Ekonomisk tidskrift since it started in 1899.3 In his 
doctoral dissertation Myrdal developed and went beyond Cassel’s work on price 
formation, bringing in expectations in an essential way. The role of expectations 
was to remain important to him throughout his analytical career, including in the 
coming decade when he turned to macro-monetary theory and made significant 
contributions in a vein that led eventually to Keynes’s General Theory. Interestingly, 
his biographer, Barber (2008), picks up on his methodological stance in these 
early years:
There was innovation in this procedure, but it should be noted that it was 
embedded in a neoclassical tradition that Myrdal was later to reject forcefully. At 
this early stage in his career, he was obviously comfortable with—and proficient 
at—abstract model building. Inherent in his intellectual style was hostility 
towards the institutionalist approach to the discipline with its suspicions about 
the usefulness of abstract theorizing. (Barber 2008: 8)
2 Myrdal and two friends were bicycling in the Swedish countryside and asked to sleep in the hayloft 
at the farm. Alva, then 17, met him at breakfast and they started talking. Here is how their daughter 
takes up the story: ‘When, summoning up all his courage, Gunnar asked her to do the unthinkable 
and come along on the bicycle trip, Alva amazed him by saying “yes”. She may never have acted so 
impulsively before. It was as if she knew this chance would never come again. Her mother was in a rest 
home, temporarily, and she had no trouble in duping her father with a tale of going to visit a friend for 
a few weeks’ (Bok 2005: 3–4).
3 Velupiilai (1992: 133–4).
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All this was to change in the coming decade as he launched a major attack on the 
core of neoclassical economics, and turned more and more to an institutional 
perspective. The opening salvo came in his The Political Element in Development 
Theory. It was published in Swedish in 1930 and in German in 1932, and in English 
only in 1954. So its initial impact was primarily on continental debates, especially 
within Sweden, where Barber (2008) and others give detailed accounts of the 
reception by the old guard. Myrdal’s central contention was that while the osten-
sible objective of economics was to be value free, as a matter of fact it was not:
The task of economic science is to observe and describe empirical reality and to 
analyse and explain causal relations between economic facts. Our scientific goal 
is to achieve a knowledge of the world in which we live, sufficiently adequate to 
enable us to forecast future events and thus to take precautions and to fulfil our 
wishes rationally. To determine what our fears and wishes ought to be, however, 
is outside the realm of science . . . We are only too well aware that throughout the 
past century economists, speaking in the name of their science, have been airing 
views on what they consider to be socially imperative . . . Even when the claim is 
not explicitly expressed, the conclusions unmistakably imply the notion that 
economic analysis is capable of yielding laws in the sense of norms and not 
merely laws in the sense of demonstrable recurrences and regularities of actual 
and possible events . . . Thus the theory of ‘free competition’ is not intended to be 
merely a scientific explanation of what course economic relations would take 
under certain specified assumptions. It simultaneously constitutes a kind of 
proof that these hypothetical conditions would result in maximum ‘total income’ 
or greatest possible ‘satisfaction of needs’ in society as a whole. ‘Free competi-
tion’ thus on logical and factual grounds becomes more than a set of abstract 
assumptions, used as a tool in theoretical analysis of the causal relations of facts. 
It becomes a political desideratum. (Myrdal 1954: 1–4, emphasis in original)
However, Myrdal’s conclusion was not that value judgements should be excluded, 
but that they should be made explicit. This is carried through into his American 
Dilemma, Underdeveloped Regions, and Asian Drama. American Dilemma famously 
ends with the word ‘enlightenment’, deliberately chosen by Myrdal to reflect his 
value system, about which he was explicit at the start of the volume. In Asian 
Drama, chapter  2 is entitled ‘The Value Premises Chosen’ and sets them out 
clearly and explicitly as a list of ‘Modernization Ideals’: Rationality, Development 
and Planning for Development, Rise of Productivity, Rise of Levels of Living, 
Social and Economic Equalization, Improved Institutions and Attitudes, National 
Consolidation, National Independence, Political Democracy in a Narrow Sense, 
Democracy at the Grassroots, and Social Discipline versus Democratic Planning.4 
4 These are laid out with a section devoted to discussion of each, in Myrdal (1968: 57–67).
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Myrdal recognizes that these are overlapping and perhaps even nested, but still 
thinks it important enough to be expansive in the interest of making clear the 
sweep and spread of value judgements and orientations which will inform and 
frame the positive economic analysis which will follow. Would that we were all as 
careful and explicit as this.
In the 1930s, Gunnar, along with Alva, became deeply involved in Swedish 
politics and economic and social policymaking. From 1933 onwards for a dozen 
years he served as a member of the commission on social housing. From 1935 to 
1938 he served as a member of the population commission in Sweden. He was a 
member of the Swedish Parliament from 1936 to 1938. The analytical underpin-
ning of much of this policy engagement is to be found in his 1934 book with Alva, 
The Population Problem in Crisis (Myrdal and Myrdal 1934), developed further in 
various commission reports, and culminating in his Godkin Lectures at Harvard 
University in 1938, Population: A Problem for Democracy (Myrdal  1940). It is 
remarkable to think that during this same period Gunnar was also engaged in his 
major contributions to macroeconomics and monetary policy, in analytics and in 
the policy arena. In 1932, he was the technical architect of the 1933 government 
budget proposal. He made the case for expansionist fiscal policy in a 45-page 
appendix to the 1933 budget statement to the Swedish Parliament.5
The central role of state intervention came through in this set of engagements, 
making the bridge between analytical constructs and felt political imperatives. 
Somewhat paradoxically from the perspective of Asian Drama, perhaps, the 
population-based motivation for intervention in Sweden of the early 1900s was 
too low a population! The Myrdals’ central policy prescription was to support child-
bearing and child-rearing among the poorer classes through income transfers, 
public housing, and the like. The proposals led to a great debate, but the conclu-
sion was clear:
The bulk of the legislative program was enacted in the 1937 session of the 
Swedish Parliament which became popularly identified as the ‘mothers and 
babies’ session. Most of the proposed benefits were approved with but minor 
modifications. A sweeping program of highly progressive taxation was also 
enacted. In addition, the 1910 statute outlawing discussions of contraception 
was struck down and discriminations against pregnant women in the labor force 
were banned. (Barber 2008: 59)
It is widely acknowledged that the modern Swedish welfare state was born out of 
these interventions in the 1930s, spearheaded by the Myrdals. But there are two 
elements of these engagements that are worth noting. First, it has to be said that 
there was a disturbing element of the population discourse, in keeping with the 
5 Barber (2008: 40).
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eugenics trend of the times. ‘Rational’ population policy was the touchstone and 
the provision and encouragement of the spread of contraception methods was the 
key instrument. But, unfortunately, the ‘rationality’ was extended: ‘A law enacted 
in May 1934 mandated compulsory sterilization of persons deemed incapable 
of consent—that is, the insane and imbecile’ (Barber  2008: 60). Secondly, the 
panoply of interventions relied on the capability of the state to implement them 
efficiently without, for example, corruption undoing the intent of the policymakers. 
The issue of whether the state could indeed intervene effectively came to the fore 
in Asian Drama’s discussion of the ‘soft state’.
Much else was also going on in the development of Gunnar Myrdal’s thinking 
in the 1930s. One key element of this was the major shift of stance from the hot-
shot young neoclassical theorist in the 1920s (and in his own 20s) towards institu-
tional economics, which he had disdained as being too atheoretical. He continued 
to argue that facts without theory were meaningless, and indeed this was and 
continued to be his critique of the German Historical School, but he came to have 
greater appreciation of the role of economic and other institutions in explaining 
observed phenomena, as opposed to abstract theorizing not rooted in reality.
Myrdal arrived in the US, on a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship, in 1929. 
It was a momentous time to be in the US, with the onset of the Great Depression. 
Myrdal’s macroeconomic and monetary track of thinking was clearly influenced 
by these events, but that is not the focus of this chapter. However, he also came 
into contact with Wesley Mitchell at Columbia and John Commons at Wisconsin, 
both leading institutionalists. It is perhaps difficult now to appreciate the chal-
lenge that the institutionalist school posed to the dominant neoclassical school in 
the USA—both Mitchell and Commons were former presidents of the American 
Economic Association. Myrdal could not but be engaged in these debates in his 
two years in the US.
One can guess at the tugs that Myrdal felt when faced with the challenge of the 
Institutional School. Adair (1992) sets out the unifying principles of the school as 
follows:
• Institutions and not value are the object of economics
• The analysis of process and social change requires a dynamic analysis
• To formulate realistic hypotheses, other social sciences (psychology, anthro-
pology) must be involved, and empirical case studies must be undertaken
• The rejection of the ‘laissez-faire’ policy as a principle of economic coordination 
and the necessity of social control and State intervention. (Adair 1992: 165–6)
Clearly, the caution on laissez-faire and the emphasis on dynamic analysis would 
have sat well with the young Myrdal. But the heavy emphasis on facts and case 
studies was a barrier to one who had started off as a theorist well versed in abstract 
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models. Even with his iconoclastic The Political Element in Development Theory, 
in which he skewered the unthinking value assumptions of his teachers, he never-
theless worried about the ‘facts before theory’ line of argument. Indeed, Political 
Element was welcomed by members of the Institutional and German Historical 
Schools as supportive of their side. However, despite his criticism of orthodoxy 
for being value laden, and actually because of this, he was critical of these schools 
as well. As he noted in his preface to the 1954 English translation edition of 
Political Element, his thinking had been evolving:
The implicit belief in the existence of a body of scientific knowledge acquired 
independently of all valuations is, as I now see it, naïve empiricism. Facts do not 
organize themselves into concepts and theories just by being looked at; indeed 
except within the framework of concepts and theories, there are no scientific 
facts but only chaos. There is an inescapable a priori element in all scientific 
work. Questions must be asked before answers can be given. (Myrdal 1954: xli)
And since questions have implicit values, he thus cycles back to his position that 
the best strategy is to be explicit and upfront about values.
This, then, was the Myrdal who in the 1950s began his deep and sustained 
engagement with the development discourse, which was to last for the rest of his 
life. The theoretical and methodological frameworks he took up, discarded, and 
developed, the cycles in thinking he went through in the eventful 1920s and 
1930s, his roles in establishing the Swedish welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s, 
all of these shaped the man who approached Asian Drama. But what was the 
development terrain he found? The next section takes up that part of the story.
3. The Development Terrain in Mid-twentieth Century
The story of Myrdal’s life up to the start of his work on Asian Drama is not yet 
complete. Of course in the late 1930s and early 1940s he worked on the massive 
project An American Dilemma, which helped to frame the civil rights debate in 
the US for a generation, and in which he displayed the depth and breadth of ana-
lytical capacity and moral clarity expected from him. The project also highlighted, 
and further sharpened, the methodological perspectives we discussed in the pre-
vious section. In the mid-1940s he returned to Sweden and served another stint 
as a member of parliament. But it was starting in 1947 that his engagement with 
the global economy intensified and his vision can truly be said to have turned to 
developing countries.6
6 Of course, always with Myrdal, there are precursors. Already in a publication in Swedish in 1944 
he had begun to discuss international co-operation—see Appelqvist and Andersson (2005: 188).
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From 1947 to 1957 Myrdal served as the Executive Secretary of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Similar Commissions were set 
up for Latin America and for Asia at about the same time, headed by Raul 
Prebisch and by P.  Lokanathan respectively. Myrdal’s institutional focus was of 
course on the war-torn economies of Europe and, increasingly in the 1950s, the 
East–West divide across the Iron Curtain. He is well known for having set up an 
excellent research group. The first director of the Research and Planning Division 
was none other than Nicholas Kaldor and the group was famously given the free-
dom to produce research without worrying about its political implications, which 
Myrdal would, and did, handle.
For our purposes, however, what is interesting is that the ECE period also led 
to increasing engagement with the problems of development in general, albeit 
initially in the international context. He gave many lectures on the topic and 
published widely, including for example An International Economy: Problems 
and  Prospects (Myrdal  1956). In 1955, Myrdal delivered the Anniversary 
Commemoration Lectures at the National Bank of Egypt, entitled Development 
and Underdevelopment: A Note on the Mechanism of National and International 
Economic Inequality. These Cairo lectures formed the basis of his book, Economic 
Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (Myrdal 1957), which came out as he began 
his leadership of the team working on Asian Drama, a project funded by the 
Twentieth Century Fund. Underdeveloped Regions was thus a precursor to Asian 
Drama and was, in effect, an early statement of the development terrain as Myrdal 
saw it before embarking on his monumental project.
But the development terrain, and the ideas bubbling in the discourse, had a life 
of their own before Myrdal shook the ground with Asian Drama. What did this 
terrain look like in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s? Much, but not all, of the answer is 
in Underdeveloped Regions itself. Since very few people nowadays read Myrdal in 
the original, I will take the liberty of quoting at length from this volume as neces-
sary, to establish Myrdal’s thinking as he approached the writing of Asian Drama.
The developing world as seen from the vantage point of the 1950s presented 
sharp and gloomy contrasts, which coloured the thinking of the development dis-
course. A very clear statement of this is to be found in Underdeveloped Regions:
. . . more than two-thirds of the people in the non-Soviet world live in countries 
where real income per head is only a very tiny fraction of what it is in the highly 
developed countries and, indeed, in most cases is much smaller than it was in 
those countries before they started to develop rapidly a century or more ago.
(Myrdal 1957: 3)
. . . there is a small group of countries which are quite well off and a much larger 
group of extremely poor countries; . . . the countries in the former group are on 
the whole firmly settled in a pattern of continuing economic development, while 
in the latter group progress is slower, as many countries are in constant danger 
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of not being able to lift themselves out of stagnation or even of losing ground so 
far as average income levels are concerned; and . . . therefore, on the whole, in 
recent decades the economic inequalities between developed and developing 
countries have been increasing. (Myrdal 1957: 6)
These words do not of course fully resonate with the realities of today. The dramatic 
growth of many Asian economies in the last three decades, led by China and 
India but also including countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam, does not sit 
well with the perspective that many countries are in constant danger of not being 
able to lift themselves out of stagnation or even of losing ground so far as average 
income levels are concerned. But that was the world that was, and it gave rise to the 
development doctrines of its time.
These development doctrines were also, of course, creatures of history. The 
world had just gone through a deep depression in the 1930s, rescued by public 
expenditures of the war. Faith in the efficacy and effectiveness of public action 
was strong. Keynesianism ruled the day. Expansion of the welfare state was 
unquestioned. As Myrdal (1956) said: ‘the concept of the welfare state, to which 
we are now giving reality in all the advanced nations, would have to be widened 
and changed into a concept of a “welfare world” ’.7 At the same time there were the 
income realities of the gap between the developed and developing worlds. 
Analysis and policy discourse naturally ran along two, sometimes related, 
tracks—a within-country focus and a global cross-country perspective.
The within-country-focused discourse on development in the mid-twentieth 
century had several strands, including the perennial one of balance between 
market and state. The need for the state was evidenced by market failures of different 
types, which held back economic growth. Perhaps the most prominent proponent 
of this perspective was W. Arthur Lewis, who became a dominant figure in devel-
opment economics in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, and indeed won the Nobel Prize 
in Economics in 1979, five years after Myrdal. Lewis’s contribution to development 
thinking through his famous surplus labour theory is well known and there is no 
need for us to rehearse that theory here (Lewis 1954). More important, in the con-
text of Asian Drama, is the strong conclusion on the role of state intervention in 
accelerating industrialization. Throughout the 1940s, Lewis fought a battle with 
market-oriented development specialists, especially on the Colonial Economic 
Advisory Committee. Here is how he characterized Sydney Caine, head of the 
Economic Division of the Colonial Office, in a 1944 memorandum:
. . . he is a religious devotee of laissez-faire, and his headship of the Economic 
Department at this juncture is fatal . . . [his approach] is fatal not only in the 
decisions he makes, especially on secondary industry, on marketing and on 
co-operative organisation, but also in the appointments he recommends to 
7 Quoted in Barber (2008: 112).
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important jobs in the Colonies, for which he chooses almost invariably people 
as laissez-faire as himself. (Quoted in Mine 2006: 335)
However, the tension between letting markets be free and an overly interven-
tionist state became clear when Lewis moved in 1957 to be the resident advisor 
to Kwame Nkrumah, leader of the newly independent Ghana. Lewis’s biographer 
Tignor (2006) quotes the following letter from Lewis in 1958 on the develop-
ment plan:
It makes inadequate provision for some essential services while according the 
highest priority to a number of second importance . . . Alas, the main reason for 
this lack of balance is that the plan contains too many schemes on which the 
Prime Minister is insisting for ‘political reasons’ . . . In order to give you these 
toys, the Development Commission has had to cut down severely on water 
supplies, health centers, technical schools, roads . . . It is not easy to make a good 
development plan for £100 million if the Prime Minister insists on inserting 
£18 million of his own pet schemes of a sort which neither develop the country 
nor increase the comfort of the people. (Tignor 2006: 167)
As argued by Kanbur (2017), the Ghana period in Lewis’s life merely revealed his 
struggles in balancing state and market, cognizant on the one hand of market 
failures, and on the other of state failures (Lewis 1965). This struggle is also seen 
in Underdeveloped Regions and in Asian Drama.
A second, and not unrelated, strand of development thinking in the mid-
twentieth century was on the need for a ‘big push’ for industrialization. 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) is commonly cited as the originator of the idea, but 
there were others who also espoused it. Here is how it was summarized half a 
century later in a well-known exposition:
According to Rosenstein-Rodan, if various sectors of the economy adopted 
increasing returns technologies simultaneously, they could each create income 
that becomes a source of demand for goods in other sectors, and so enlarge their 
markets and make industrialization profitable. In fact, simultaneous 
 industrialization of many sectors can be self-sustaining even if no sector could 
break even industrializing alone. This insight has been developed by Nurkse 
(1953), Scitovsky (1954), and Fleming (1955) into a doctrine of balanced growth 
or the big push, with two important elements. First, the same economy must be 
capable of both the backward preindustrial and the modern industrialized state. 
No exogenous improvement in endowments or technological opportunities is 
needed to move to industrialization, only the simultaneous investment by all the 
sectors using the available technology. Second, industrialization is associated 
with a better state of affairs. The population of a country benefits from its leap 
into the industrial state. (Murphy et al. 1989: 1004)
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Thus the idea that growth and industrialization were intimately linked, and that 
industrialization required significant state intervention, was deeply ingrained in 
the development discourse of the 1940s and 1950s. It is not surprising then that 
they were present in Myrdal’s Underdeveloped Regions, albeit that for him they 
flowed from a lifetime of thinking about economic processes and in engagement 
with the creation of the Swedish Welfare State. His thesis of ‘circular and cumula-
tive causation’ fits in well with arguments for a big push:
. . . my starting point is the assertion that the notion of stable equilibrium is 
normally a false analogy to choose when constructing a theory to explain the 
changes in a social system . . . In the normal case a change does not call forth 
countervailing changes but, instead, supporting changes, which move the system 
in the same direction as the first change but much further. Because of such 
circular causation a social process tends to become cumulative and often to 
gather speed at an accelerating rate. (Myrdal 1957: 13)
In keeping with these tenors of the times, and in light of the perceived success of 
growth in the Soviet Union, planning to accelerate growth was very much in 
vogue in the 1950s. A leading example is newly independent India, in many ways 
a crucible of the development discourse at that time. The first five-year plan, for 
the period 1951–1956, sets out the terms as follows:
Given these basic conditions of rapid and sustained progress, institutional as 
well as others, the key to higher productivity and expanding levels of income 
and employment lies really in stepping up the rate of capital formation. The level 
of production and the material well-being a community can attain depends, in 
the main, on the stock of capital at its disposal, i.e., on the amount of land per 
capita and of productive equipment in the shape of machinery, buildings, tools 
and implements, factories, locomotives, engines, irrigation facilities, power 
installations and communications.
(Government of India, Planning Commission 1951: chapter 1, para 15)
This plan, and even more so the second five-year plan for 1956–1961, emphasized 
the development of heavy industry with state investment. Myrdal in 
Underdeveloped Regions was already a convert to planning, of course:
. . . the matter is sometimes confused by an altogether unfounded counterposition 
of central state planning and “free enterprise” and by assuming that planning 
creates rigidities . . . It should be clear, however, that if an underdeveloped coun-
try really succeeds in starting and sustaining by its policy interferences an 
upward cumulative process of economic development, this will provide more 
not less space for what private enterprise such a country possesses or is able 
to foster. (Myrdal 1957: 81–2)
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However, as already alluded to, he was concerned about the nature of the state 
and what we would now call capture of the state by elite groups: ‘. . . most under-
developed countries are up against state institutions of social and economic 
 inequality which often cannot easily be broken. Frequently the state is itself initially 
in the hands of social groups which have an interest in preserving the traditional 
social chasms’ (Myrdal  1957: 83). The failure of state interventions was thus 
already a theme in his writings in the 1950s, a theme which was to emerge ever 
more strongly in the decade to come, culminating in the strong positions he took 
up in Asian Drama.
Alongside the country-focused development discourse, which led to discussions 
of surplus labour and the big push and economic planning, there was a second 
strand that exercised development thinkers and practitioners in the mid-twentieth 
century. This was the international dimension of trade between rich and poor 
countries. As we shall see, there was surprisingly little on this in Asian Drama 
itself, but Myrdal’s other writings, before and after, dwelt on this dimension in 
some detail. It was clear that he was greatly influenced by Raul Prebisch, the head 
of the sister institution to ECE, CEPAL. In his 1956 book, An International 
Economy: Problems and Prospects, Myrdal quotes Prebisch at length and approv-
ingly.8 Most famously, of course, Prebisch is known for the view that primary 
commodity-exporting developing countries were at a disadvantage because these 
commodities would be demanded less in relative terms as world incomes grew, 
leading to a downward spiral of stagnation for these countries. Here is how 
Myrdal states this position in Underdeveloped Regions:
The main positive effect of international trade on the underdeveloped countries 
was in fact to promote the production of primary products; and such production, 
employing mostly unskilled labor, has come to constitute the bulk of their 
exports. In these lines, however, they often meet inelastic demands in the export 
market, often also a demand trend which is not rising very rapidly, and excessive 
price fluctuations. (Myrdal 1957: 52)
The way out of this trap for Prebisch was industrialization so these countries 
could partake of the benefits of growing demand for manufactures as world 
incomes grew, but the breakthrough into industrialization would in turn need a 
big push with trade protection and planning.
Such, then, was the development terrain and the development discourse as 
Myrdal left the ECE in 1957 and began his decade-long engagement in writing 
Asian Drama. The problems of the free market had been laid bare in the Great 
Depression of the 1930s—high growth rates in the Soviet Union seemed to 
highlight the benefits of central planning; the ‘export pessimism’ of Prebisch and 
8 See Barber (2008: 112).
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others suggested industrialization as the way out; and central planning with the 
state directing investment and trade to orchestrate the big push was the instru-
ment at everybody’s fingertips. There were concerns about the heavy hand of the 
state, expressed by Lewis (1965) and to some extent by Myrdal (1957). But these 
seemed to be secondary to the primary imperative of addressing market failures 
directly and vigorously, when Asian Drama burst upon the scene in 1968.
4.  Asian Drama and After
Gunnar Myrdal’s preface to Asian Drama starts with the words ‘HABENT SUA 
FATA LIBELLI—books have their own destiny . . . ’, and he added, ‘. . . even while 
they are being written and before they are published’.9 In fact the full Latin expres-
sion ‘Pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli’, ‘According to the capabilities of the 
reader, books have their destiny’, may be more appropriate for our purposes since 
Asian Drama has meant many things to many people since it came out more than 
fifty years ago in 1968. Its full title, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of 
Nations, suggested an epoch-making tome, and it hit the development discourse 
like a thunderbolt, but not necessarily to universal acclaim. It was reviewed by 
most of the leading lights of development when it came out, and each saw different 
elements to praise or criticize. After a brief account of the contents of the volume 
this section presents a selection of these reviews to start a discussion of the impact 
of Asian Drama in its time and following on to this day.
Asian Drama is famously long, Myrdal himself saying that ‘The length is 
abominable’.10 It is close to 2,500 pages, spread over three volumes, with seven 
parts, thirty-three chapters and sixteen appendices. Part of the reason for the 
length, Myrdal implies, is because of his . . .
firm conviction that economic problems cannot be studied in isolation but only 
in their demographic, social, and political setting . . . I felt at the outset of the 
study that only by means of a broad institutional approach could I understand 
and explain the economic underdevelopment of the region . . . It is not altogether 
a pretentious metaphor when I describe my endeavor to apply an institutional 
approach in this study as an attempt to analyze the development problems of 
South Asia in the manner that Adam Smith studied England’s development 
problems of two hundred years ago. (Myrdal 1968: ix–x)
And there you have it. The self-stated scope and ambition of the project to match 
Adam Smith brought forth reviews that assessed the outcome with a similar 
standard. But first, briefly, to the contents of the three volumes.
9 Myrdal (1968: vii). 10 Myrdal (1968: x).
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After a long prologue, volume I is in three parts—Introduction, Political 
Problems, and Economic Realities. Part I sets out the broad scope of the study 
and, perhaps expectedly from the author of The Political Element, a statement in 
chapter  2 of ‘the Value Premises Chosen’, whose ‘Modernization Ideals’ have 
already been listed in the previous section. Part II sets the stage at the coming of 
independence, including the partition of India and Pakistan, followed by separate 
chapters on each of India, Pakistan, and a final chapter on Ceylon and Southeast 
Asia. A central theme in these chapters, perhaps the dominant theme, was one 
which Myrdal had presaged in Underdeveloped Regions, the disconnect between 
the ruling elites and the masses:
In contrast to the poverty-stricken masses, the national political leaders were all 
members of the privileged upper class, and their new positions of responsibility 
and power rapidly invested them with still greater privileges . . . Because of the 
narrow social base of the elite and the absence of any pressure from the masses, 
the leaders were under no compulsion to govern vigorously and disinterestedly.
(Myrdal 1968: 273–5)
Following this discussion of politics, part III of volume I is in many ways a con-
ventional laying out of the economic aggregates on demography, national income, 
trade, and inequality. Of particular interest is chapter  13 on foreign trade and 
capital flows, which repeats the analysis and the sentiments of a decade ago from 
Underdeveloped Regions. The existing pattern of trade, with exports of primary 
commodities dominating, is attributed to the colonial legacy of South Asia, and 
this pattern is argued to be inimical to future growth and development:
If development is to occur in the South Asian countries, it will come not as a 
response to foreign demand for the products in which the region has tradition-
ally had a comparative advantage . . . Development must be internally based and 
deliberately prodded and nurtured, since the spontaneous growth-inducing 
stimulus of a relatively free and expanding international trade is no longer 
 present. This is the main thrust of the present chapter. (Myrdal 1968: 583)
This line of argument, very much in keeping with the mainstream of the time, is 
one which stands out as not having stood the test of time in one sense—trade has 
been the engine of growth for South Asia and Asia as a whole in the last three 
decades. However, on a more subtle reading, movement from primary commodities 
to labour-intensive manufacture under initial protection can, in turn, be seen as 
part of the successful development strategy of Asia to break free from traditional 
trade patterns.
Volume II has three parts: A Third World of Planning, Problems of Labour 
Utilization, and Problems of Population Size. The two chapters on population 
in  part VI are perhaps what one might expect from the author of the reports 
on Swedish population policy three decades previously. Similarly, the themes on 
planning had already been well signalled in Myrdal’s earlier work—on the one 
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hand welcoming it as an appropriate response to market failure in developing 
countries, but on the other hand expressing significant concern about state fail-
ure. The last chapter in this section, ‘Corruption—Its Causes and Effects’ broke 
new ground in the development discourse of its time: ‘Although corruption is 
very much an issue in the public debate . . . it is almost taboo as a research topic 
and is rarely mentioned in scholarly discussions of the problems of government 
and planning . . . Embarrassing questions are avoided by ignoring the problems of 
attitudes and institutions . . .’ (Myrdal 1968: 938–9).
Myrdal goes on to discuss Facts, Causes, Consequences and Remedies for 
Corruption. This was indeed a departure from standard development studies of 
the time and can perhaps be argued to have been one with lasting impact and 
whose traces can be found in the debates and discourses of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Part V in volume II also played a role in the discourse of the day by high-
lighting the role of agriculture and agricultural productivity in raising living 
standards, tilting the balance away somewhat from the industrialization emphasis 
to be found in the discourse at that time, as discussed in the previous section.11 
And, although the term ‘informality’ does not appear in the subject index, 
chapter  21, on ‘Unemployment’ and ‘Underemployment’ can lay claim to have 
raised the conceptual and statistical issues we are now familiar with, well before 
the ‘discovery’ of the informal sector by the development discourse in the 1970s.
Volume III, with only a single part, part VII, is devoted to what we would these 
days call ‘human development’. It has five chapters covering different aspects of 
health and education. Myrdal built on ongoing development in the ‘human capital’ 
approach which was becoming dominant at the time, but went further in expected 
directions:
Once economists identified the residual factor in economic growth with investment 
in man . . . this approach derived support from various research undertakings 
that were themselves inspired by it . . . But the model itself is based on a number 
of unwarranted assumptions . . . The model also implies that prevailing attitudes 
and institutions, items in the level of living other than educational facilities, are 
of no consequence to the problem . . . (Myrdal 1968: 1541–6)
How was Asian Drama received when it appeared fifty years ago? His biographer, 
Barber (2008), has compiled an account of the most prominent reviews:
Thomas Balogh . . . was lavish in his praise . . . Kenneth E. Boulding, President of 
the American Economic Association . . . spoke approvingly of the ‘unsparing . . . 
criticism of those Western economists and social scientists who think that 
development is equivalent to technology and who are unable to recognize 
the  obstacles created by ancient tradition, class structures and especially by the 
11 It should be noted, with some surprise perhaps, how little mention is made of Arthur Lewis’s 
surplus labour model of development. Indeed, Lewis is mentioned in this context substantively only 
in appendix 3 and appendix 6, and that, too, only in footnotes.
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existing power structures of society’ . . . Writing in the American Economic 
Review, George Rosen (then with the Asian Development Bank) . . . thought the 
prognosis to be ‘gloomier . . . than justified’. He drew attention to prospects for 
increasing exports and ‘increase in farm output with new technologies, espe-
cially with new varieties of seed . . .’ and noted that ‘some of these technological 
breakthroughs have only begun to have their effects since the book went to press 
in 1966’. (Barber 2008: 140–2)
The praise and criticism also reflected the well-worn debates on market versus 
state, and the position of each reviewer along the spectrum. While Thomas 
Balogh praised Asian Drama, prominent pro-market economist Peter Bauer was 
equally forthright in criticism:
P.T. Bauer of the London School of Economics spoke for the school of economists 
suspicious of government interventions and of non-market solutions to economic 
problems. ‘Even more than other writers on development,’ he wrote, ‘Professor 
Myrdal regards material progress, including apparently the transformation of 
values and conduct, as dependent on state action. The defects of this approach 
are even more pronounced in the underdeveloped world than elsewhere. In 
these countries, far more than in the West, the government is primarily a section 
interest.’ (Barber 2008: 142)
Of course Myrdal himself would have agreed with the last sentence; after all, he 
was the one who had written about ‘the narrow social base of the elite’ and had 
brought the issue of corruption to the fore in his formulation of the ‘soft state’, by 
which he meant ‘an unwillingness among the rulers to impose obligations on the 
governed and corresponding unwillingness on their part to obey rules laid down 
by democratic procedures’ (Myrdal 1968: 277). And yet he recognized the need 
for state interventions given market failures, thereby restating the eternal question 
in political economy, of balance between state and market.12
How was Asian Drama received in India, the dominant focus of the book? In 
an excellent revisit of Asian Drama, Siegel (2017) brings to our attention that 
Gunnar Myrdal joined Alva Myrdal in Delhi in 1957, where she was working with 
UNESCO, and was based in Delhi for four years. Here he ‘quickly emerged as a 
visible and voluble presence throughout the city during the heyday of foreign 
expertise in India’s capital’ (p. 197) and was ‘joined by a rotating cast of junior 
economists and assistants’ (p. 197).13 Siegel’s (2017) review of the reviews of Asian 
Drama in India matches the assessment of Myrdal’s biographer, Barber (2008). 
These were mixed to say the least, with most perhaps being on the negative, or 
at least the questioning, end of the spectrum. For example, Thapar (1968), Gupta 
12 For further discussion of this as the central question in political economy, see Kanbur (2016).
13 An entire separate chapter could and perhaps should be devoted to this group, whose names are 
now recognized as stalwarts of the development discourse of the last half-century, among them Ester 
Boserup, Michael Lipton, and Paul Streeten.
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(1968) and Frank (1970) all wrote highly critical reviews, ranging from observations 
that ‘Asian values’ had not held up Japan’s development, to the fact that Myrdal 
was not aware of the vigorous and sometimes violent struggles the ‘docile’ 
peasantry was fighting against the land-owning class. The doyen of Indian plan-
ning P.C. Mahalanobis wrote a respectful, but in parts also highly critical, review. 
Mahalanobis asked where all the emphasis on politics led to in terms of practical 
policy (Mahalanobis 1969). Thus, perhaps paradoxically, Asian Drama appears to 
have been received much less warmly in India than in the West.
What is interesting is how little there is in Asian Drama on global questions. 
Sure, in part III of volume I, chapter 13, as its title suggests, addresses ‘Foreign 
Trade and Capital Flows’, and makes arguments familiar from Underdeveloped 
Regions and An International Economy. And there are, of course, long forays into 
colonialism and what it wrought. But the inequities of the global system as a 
whole is not treated at length or systematically in Asian Drama, which is more 
focused on within-country issues, and in making the methodological perspective 
of institutionalism a centrepiece. But it was an issue to which Myrdal returned 
with great force and vigour in the rest of his life after Asian Drama. In particular, 
he took up the topic in his Nobel Prize Lecture, ‘The Equality Issue in World 
Development’ (Myrdal 1975), which had a central focus on development assistance. 
In fact, the development assistance issue is an interesting and important lens 
through which to view changes in Myrdal’s thinking, and the evolution of the 
development discourse, before and after Asian Drama.
In his Nobel Lecture, Myrdal began by chiding his former Underdeveloped 
Regions’ self for minimizing the role of aid:
But I must confess that when, twenty years ago in the middle of the Fifties, 
I delivered a series of lectures in Cairo focused on the same topic as my present 
lecture (later published in a volume, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions), and in spite of my already then having attempted to redirect my think-
ing in an institutional direction, I could assert: ‘What is needed is not primarily 
a redistribution of wealth and incomes. Indeed, aid can only be a very small part 
of a rational international equalization program . . . None of the schemes which 
have been propounded for capital aid for development of underdeveloped coun-
tries has ever amounted to taking away more than a tiny fraction of the yearly 
increase of national income per head in the richer countries, which implied that 
no real sacrifice has ever been envisaged . . . A wholesale income equalization by 
redistribution between nations is both impossible and, I am inclined to believe, 
an unimportant objective.’ (Myrdal 1975)
He then went on to say why he thought it had become an important issue:
In recent years there have been sudden, major changes in the world economy. 
They have radically affected the economic situation of all underdeveloped coun-
tries, though in different directions and degrees, and thereby the entire setting of 
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the equality problem I am discussing in this lecture. For by far the larger part 
of the peoples in underdeveloped countries, these changes have been worsening 
their development prospects and in many countries are now threatening the 
survival of large numbers of their poor masses. The type of marginal foreign aid 
we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs.
(Myrdal 1975)
Among these changes were the rapid growth in population, economic stagnation, 
and pressures on natural resources—Myrdal was writing then in the aftermath of 
the OPEC oil prices rises and the global stagflation which followed.
Myrdal became a strong champion of foreign aid in the decade and a half after 
the publication of Asian Drama, influencing Sweden’s own strong stance on 
development assistance. However, in something of a reversal, towards the end of 
his working life he began to have second thoughts, or at least began to sound 
cautionary notes. The reasons relate again to the nature of the state and politics in 
recipient countries. Just as he confessed in the mid-1980s that his views on aid in 
the mid-1950s were wrong, he confessed in the mid-1980s to ‘growing pangs of 
conscience’ (Myrdal 1984) because the aid given was being diverted by the ruling 
elites. He argued for greater control of the flows and their uses by the donors—
conditionality, in other words. One sees again the tensions between market failure, 
which led to an argument for state intervention and development assistance, and 
state failure, which subverted the good intentions of the intervention to  benefit 
powerful interests.
Myrdal was thus not at all beyond questioning his premises, sometimes in 
succession in a long engagement with an issue, and he was known to change his 
mind. However, perhaps the biggest turnaround, or at least the biggest question-
ing of his decade-long project, might have come to him only after his death in 
1987, over three decades ago now, and three decades after he started the Asian 
Drama project. As noted in the previous section, he had already signalled what he 
saw as the dire predicament of the poor countries of the world in Underdeveloped 
Regions, as being ‘in constant danger of not being able to lift themselves out of 
stagnation or even of losing ground so far as average income levels are concerned’ 
(Myrdal  1957: 6), a sensibility and starting point he brought to Asian Drama. 
Much of the thrust of Asian Drama was an attempt to answer why this was the 
case—why these countries, where the bulk of humanity lived, were not able to 
break out of a low income, low growth, trap—and to do so using an institutional-
ist framework which went beyond conventional narrow economic thinking.
But what would now face the Myrdal of Asian Drama is the remarkable growth 
in the very region in which Asian Drama was set. There is no need to detail here 
the historically record-breaking growth performance of China, followed by a slew 
of countries including India, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, and 
even Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Ceylon as it was then). Inequality within these 
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countries has increased along with growth, but income poverty, as conventionally 
measured, has plummeted in Asia as a whole and, given the relatively anaemic 
growth of the rich countries, global inequality, as conventionally measured, has 
also declined.14
This growth performance of Asia was not predicted nor expected in Asian 
Drama. The social structures and constraints so emphasized by Myrdal, partly as 
a rebuke to his own discipline of economics, surely did not undergo a rapid dra-
matic change in the two decades after the publication of Asian Drama and the 
take-off of Asian economic growth. But, quite contrary to the expectations and 
predictions of Myrdal and his contemporaries such as Prebisch, openness and 
trade did explode and Asian countries rode the wave of exporting to the demands 
of rising global incomes to raise their own levels of living. Rising inequality in 
these countries is, and was, a reflection of precisely those structural inequalities 
highlighted by Myrdal in Asian Drama. But one feels that the Asian growth turn-
around and the role of trade in this turnaround would have to be the centrepiece 
of an imagined next magnum opus by Myrdal for our time: Asian Drama in the 
Twenty-First Century.
5.  Conclusion: Asian Drama and the Development  
Discourse in the Twenty-first Century
To conclude with the beginning of Asian Drama, ‘HABENT SUA FATA 
LIBELLI—books have their own destiny . . .’15 How much more so with books 
which are classics, so much so that they are more referred to than read. So far as 
one can tell, Asian Drama has been much cited. At the time of writing this chapter, 
Google Scholar shows 4,876 cites. This includes citations in such well-known 
publications as Krueger (1974), Fukuyama (1992) and Acemoglu et al. (2005: 
385–472). But, as I note in the Introduction, my anecdotal experience is that 
young development economists do not cite Asian Drama very much, and if they 
do, they do so in perfunctory fashion. However, strong traces of Asian Drama, 
and of the Myrdal before and after Asian Drama, are to be found in the twenty-
first-century development discourse. This is because the issues Myrdal raised, 
throughout his life but also in Asian Drama, are fundamental ones, not only for 
development but also for our discipline of economics and for the broader terrain 
of political economy in the twenty-first century. I conclude by highlighting three 
such themes.
14 For Asian growth, poverty, and inequality over this period, see Kanbur and Zhuang (2012).
15 Myrdal (1968: vii).
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The first of these is, of course, the role of values in analysis. Myrdal argued, and 
on this he never wavered after first staking out his claim in the 1930s, that 
economics is by necessity value-laden. He argued that although there had been 
vigorous debate on this in the nineteenth century, the economics of his time had 
tried to present itself as value free, in an attempt to achieve a status comparable to 
that of natural science. But this was manifestly not the case, and could not be the 
case given the nature of the subject. Rather than pretend otherwise, he proposed, 
and carried out his own proposal very thoroughly in Asian Drama, that the values 
should be made explicit. I think this is a major strand of his thinking and we 
would do well to take it to heart.
The second theme that emerges from our study of Asian Drama in the overall 
context of Gunnar Myrdal’s life work is that of the absolute necessity of going 
beyond narrow economic principles to understand society, and even to under-
stand the economy itself. Throughout his work Myrdal maintained a healthy 
respect for the core tenets of economics as a discipline, indeed some of the reviews 
of Asian Drama noted this well.16 But his main thrust is the need to understand 
fully the social, cultural and political context when trying to explain economic 
facts and when developing economic policy prescriptions. This comes through 
most strongly in his discussions of the roles of the ruling elite, and of the 
gap between the formulation and implementation of policy in what he called 
the ‘soft state’.
But ruling elites, corruption and soft states bring to the fore what I consider to 
be the third lasting theme in Asian Drama and in Myrdal’s life work. This is the 
constant struggle to find the balance between state and market. The struggle was 
famously characterized by Edmund Burke as being: ‘What the state ought to take 
upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little 
interference as possible, to individual discretion’ (Burke 1795).
I have argued in Kanbur (2016) that this is, in effect, the eternal question of 
political economy. Keynes (1926) alluded to this in his equally famous critique of 
the laissez-faire doctrine.17 The see-saw between an interventionist stance in the 
face of manifest market failure, and a pull-back upon realization of state failure, 
and where the balance is struck, is seen in Arthur Lewis’s struggles in Ghana.18 It 
is also seen in Gunnar Myrdal’s specific struggles with himself and his cycles of 
thinking on foreign aid, and on the constant back and forth between wanting 
planning as a way out of an underdevelopment trap, and planning itself as a trap 
giving hostages to the elites and to the soft state.
16 As Barber (2008: 141) notes, Rosen’s (1968) critique in the American Economic Review also 
included the interesting observation that ‘in his stress on the need for a more institutional analysis . . . he 
himself uses traditional economic concepts centering about the market and the price system as the 
basis for his own policy suggestions’.
17 For a detailed discussion, see Kanbur (2016). 18 Kanbur (2017).
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The development vista has changed dramatically over the last half-century. But 
the fundamental tensions, including the three themes discussed here, are still 
with us. Myrdal’s struggles with these tensions are his ultimate legacy to the 
development discourse of the twenty-first century.
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Myrdal’s Methodology and 
Approach Revisited
Frances Stewart
‘In fact, most writings, particularly in economics,
remain in large part simply ideological’1
1. Introduction
I read Asian Drama when teaching at the University of Nairobi in 1967–1969, in 
my first encounter with development issues. The book made a huge impression, 
largely because it made sense of my own early reactions. Rereading it some fifty 
years later, I expected to be disappointed; to some extent I am, but in large part I 
am not. On rereading, it became clear that the Myrdalian approach has indeed 
affected the way I have approached most issues over the past fifty years. Much of 
the methodological discussion still seems valid, although no longer so original 
since many have caught up with much of what Myrdal said, and wider reading 
suggests that others had already come to similar conclusions. Many social scien-
tists take much of what he says for granted. Yet mainstream economists ignore 
many of his ideas.
This chapter aims to review the main elements of Myrdal’s methodological 
innovations; to consider how far they were taken up (or independently developed) 
by others and have become accepted over these decades; and to provide an assess-
ment of their validity. Section 2 of the chapter briefly reviews Myrdal’s contri-
butions to methodology. The third section discusses how far his perspectives 
have  been adopted by development analysts, in light of the changes that have 
taken place in the last fifty years. Section 4 briefly reviews findings and considers 
some limitations of his approach, viewed from a twenty-first-century perspective. 
Section 5 concludes.
1 Myrdal (1970: 32).
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2. The Main Elements of Myrdal’s Methodological Approach
The following lists Myrdal’s main methodological preoccupations:
 1. the ‘beam in our eyes’
 2. the political element in analysis
 3. the question of values and the definition of development
 4. the social system and its five major categories
 5. a tentative move towards multidisciplinarity
 6. the inapplicability of Western2 economics.
Myrdal’s approach needs to be viewed as a whole rather than in disparate parts, as 
he reminds us. Yet this makes analysis difficult, so I review his approach bit by bit, 
though some of the elements are virtually inseparable. The first two elements in 
the list above—the beam in our eyes and the political element in analysis—are 
closely interlinked and both relate to distortions and biases that are unavoidably 
involved in social science. Values and the definition of development are also 
clearly linked, as values inform how development—as a normative project—is 
defined; therefore, values and development are discussed together. The issue of 
values also relates to the beam in our eyes, since the ‘beam’ means that each social 
scientist brings their own perceptions and values to their analysis. In contrast to 
this discussion of influences over social scientists’ views, the analysis of the social 
system with its five-factor approach concerns the nature of developing countries 
and their economies as Myrdal sees them. Elaboration of the five factors in fact 
forms the bulk of the analysis in the three volumes of Asian Drama, but is treated 
only briefly here. A need for multidisciplinarity follows from Myrdal’s compre-
hensive analysis of the problems of development.
Section  2.6 of this chapter discusses Myrdal’s major methodological conclu-
sion—that is, the inapplicability of Western economics to the economies of devel-
oping countries. This conclusion emerges from the discussion in sections 2.1–2.5: 
on the one hand, the deformed and opportunistic vision of economists explains 
why Western economists stick to Western economic concepts and theories even 
when analysing the very different situations to be found in underdeveloped coun-
tries; on the other hand, the analysis of values, the definition of development, and 
the nature of developing economies, including the constraints they face, explain 
why Myrdal concluded that Western concepts are inapplicable. All these issues, of 
course, continue to be strongly contested.
2 Myrdal uses ‘West’ and ‘Western’ to refer to non-communist, high-income, industrialized countries. 
Following Myrdal, I use the terms here, but also ‘North’, to refer to the so-called advanced countries, 
and ‘South’ to refer to developing countries.
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2.1 The ‘Beam in our Eyes’
Here Myrdal disputes the idea that the social scientist can be an impartial, objective 
observer seeking the truth, someone whose analysis is independent of their own 
position, history, education, and interests, or, as he puts it, independent of the 
‘personal and social conditioning of our research activity’. ‘The direction of our 
scientific exertions, particularly in economics, is conditioned by the society in 
which we live, and most directly by the political climate’, he argues (Myrdal 1970: 9), 
pointing to the myth of ‘the “scientific” man, . . . conditioned by nothing except his 
desire to discover the true nature of things, [which] is still commonly taken for 
granted’ (Myrdal 1970: 7). Yet, according to Myrdal, ‘[a] “disinterested social sci-
entist” has never existed and never will exist’ (Myrdal 1970: 32).
The reasons Myrdal gave for this conclusion lay primarily in the political inter-
ests and values that economists bring with them and that inform their selection of 
topics, concepts, and assumptions. He suggested that, while economists had 
devoted time to analysing the behaviour of others, ‘[o]nly about the peculiar 
behaviour of our own profession do we choose to remain naïve’ (Myrdal 1970: 6). 
One reason that positioning matters, according to Myrdal, is that economic con-
cepts and theories fuse normative and positive elements, with the normative, in 
particular, reflecting positioning. For Myrdal, this was not a new perspective but 
had clear origins in The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory 
(Myrdal 1965, first published in 1930). But there he suggested that, given aware-
ness of the issue, it might be possible to separate the normative and positive in 
economics. In Asian Drama, in contrast, he suggests that such a separation is not 
possible because the normative and positive are intertwined in the conceptual 
apparatus. The importance of the normative element is brought out in his discussion 
of the political element and of values.
2.2 The Political Element
Myrdal argues that the political motives of the observer are a major influence on 
the normative content. When he was writing Asian Drama, the Cold War was at 
its height, and it was mainly this to which he was referring in claiming that polit-
ical interests were paramount in determining economic analysis. He argued that 
Western economists aimed to advance the interests of the ‘free’ world. As he put 
it: ‘A major source of bias in much economic research on poor countries is thus 
the endeavour to treat their problems from the point of view of the Western polit-
ical and military interest in saving them from Communism’ (Myrdal 1970: 13).
Thirty years after the Cold War ended, it is difficult to remember how deeply it 
affected international relations and related analysis. There was a war of ideas and 
of success in promoting development—to which Myrdal was referring—besides 
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many violent proxy wars. This clear political motivation has lessened since the 
end of the Cold War, although, as argued later, the ideological element has 
remained strong, but has taken a different form in post-Cold War analysis.
2.3 Values and Concepts
‘Valuations enter into the choice of approach, the selection of problems, the defin-
ition of concepts and the gathering of data and are by no means confined to the 
practical or political inferences drawn from theoretical findings [. . .]. In fact, most 
writings, particularly in economics, remain in large part simply ideological’ 
(Myrdal 1970: 32). Concerning the choice of approach one major issue is whether 
the analyst confines their attention to the strictly economic or includes ‘non-
economic’ factors.3 Myrdal’s analysis—to be discussed below—suggests that it is 
essential to look beyond the strictly economic. He argues that Western econo-
mists generally fail to do this, and assume that what can be taken for granted in 
the West applies equally in developing countries. Moreover, economists tend to 
use the concepts they have learned in their own (developed) countries, which, 
for reasons that run through Asian Drama to be discussed below, are frequently 
inappropriate for analysing developing countries. In selecting problems, for example, 
the major preoccupation of Western economists appears to be the generation of 
economic growth and the need to raise the investment ratio to do so, neglecting 
‘non-economic’ factors. Myrdal cited, for example, Nurkse, Rosenstein-Rodan, 
and Hirschman.4 Similarly, data gathering tends to follow Western concepts and 
approaches, not taking into account the differences in context, which require 
 different data as well as concepts.
2.3.1 Choice of Values
In the light of his view that the values of the observer are all-important, Myrdal 
explicitly lays out the values he adopts in Asian Drama.5 As he states, there is a 
‘need to make explicit the value premises applied in a social study, for both logical 
clarity of the conceptual apparatus utilized in the research and the avoidance of 
hidden valuations that lead to biases’ (Myrdal 1970: 49). These values should not 
be selected arbitrarily but should ‘reflect actual valuations held by people who are 
concerned with the problems being studied’ and who are ‘influential in moulding 
public policy’ (Myrdal 1970: 49). In this he omits the views of the majority of the 
3 ‘[T]he distinction between “economic” and “non-economic” [. . .] is a useless and meaningless 
 criterion from a logical point of view and should be substituted by the distinction between “relevant” 
and “non-relevant” factors’(Myrdal 1957: 21–2).
4 Hirschman did in fact include non-economic factors. For example, Hirschman’s work for the 
World Bank and the Colombian government in the 1950s (Alacevich 2009; Adelman 2013).
5 These ideas broadly follow his analysis in An American Dilemma and Values in Social Theory 
(Myrdal et al. 1944; Myrdal 1958).
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population—a point I discuss below. The analysis should be carried out ‘not 
from the viewpoint of [. . .] the foreign observer, but from the viewpoint of those 
valuations that have relevance and significance in the countries’ (Myrdal 1970: 50, 
my emphasis).
He notes some difficulties in ascertaining such values. He then proceeds to 
lay out the values to be adopted in Asian Drama, which are summarized as ‘mod-
ernization ideals’, held mainly by ‘the politically alert, articulate and active part of 
the population’ (Myrdal 1970: 53).
The modernization ideals include rationality (‘Superstitious beliefs and illogical 
reasoning should be abandoned’ (Myrdal  1970: 57)); ‘development’, which he 
defines, somewhat tautologically, as ‘improvement in the host of undesirable con-
ditions in the social system that have perpetuated a state of underdevelopment’ 
(Myrdal 1970: 58); planning; a rise in productivity and levels of living; social 
and economic equalization, ‘to promote equality in status, opportunities, wealth, 
incomes and levels of living [. . .] commonly accepted in public discussion of 
the  goals for planning’(Myrdal  1970: 59); improved institutions and attitudes 
(including thirteen ideals for changed attitudes, which read very much like the 
classic Protestant ideals of behaviour);6 national consolidation and independence; 
and democracy.
2.4 The Social System and its Five Major Categories
While the previous sections concerned Myrdal’s assessment of the way social 
scientists work, this element relates to the process of development, identifying 
the  major causes of ‘underdevelopment’7 in South Asian economies. He points 
to  five  broad categories, together constituting a social system that represents a 
powerful constraint on development:8
 1. output and incomes
 2. conditions of production
 3. levels of living
 4. attitudes towards life and work
 5. institutions.
The five categories interact with each other, and can result in a vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment. For example, conditions of production (primitive technology; 
6 Efficiency, diligence, orderliness, punctuality, honesty, rationality, preparedness for change, 
 alertness to new opportunities, energetic enterprise, integrity and self-reliance, co-operativeness, and 
willingness to take the long view.
7 Myrdal uses ‘underdevelopment’ to refer to the situation of poor countries.
8 He adds a sixth category, ‘policies’; these act on the other five elements, and may enforce or 
 counteract them.
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limited industrialization) lead to low output and incomes and deficient levels of 
living, which in turn limit productivity, as workers have little education and poor 
health and are malnourished; this is compounded by prevalent attitudes (towards 
work, health practices, and so on9) and a variety of institutions which are 
 ill-adapted to development (land tenure systems; the caste system; weak govern-
ment institutions, etc.), all rooted in a highly stratified social system. Viewing 
the  system as an integrated whole means that progress towards development 
is   particularly challenging because operating on just one of the categories will 
be  insufficient, since the system will be held back by limitations in other parts. 
For example, ‘modernization’ requires not only investment in new technologies, 
but also educated and well-nourished workers with ‘modern’ attitudes to work. 
According to Myrdal, advancing on one front only—for example, investment—
will not produce results in the absence of improvements in the other elements, 
including education, health, attitudes, and institutions.
The interconnectedness of the five elements led him to quite pessimistic 
 conclusions about the possibility of accelerating progress. Oddly, here he took the 
opposite view from that in An American Dilemma, which was relatively optimistic 
about progress for the Afro-American population.10 He also identified the mutually 
reinforcing factors holding back the progress of Afro-Americans. But in their 
case he argued that progress on one factor would be likely to stimulate progress 
on others: ‘any change in any one of these factors, independent of the way it 
is brought about, will, by the aggregate weight of the cumulative effects run-
ning back and forth between them all, start the whole system moving in one 
direction or the other as the case may be’ (Myrdal et al. 1944: 1066–7, cited in 
Barber (2008: 73–4)).
There are, perhaps, two reasons why Myrdal was pessimistic about cumulative 
causation in South Asia but optimistic for Afro-Americans in the USA: first, in 
the American case, he believed that the progressive, liberal, and egalitarian values 
of the American people would support progressive change. In South Asia, he 
claimed that the mass of the population did not share the ‘modernization’ values 
of the elite. Second, he suggested that a ‘soft state’ was prevalent in South Asia 
(and, implicitly, not in the USA), which would be unable or unwilling to imple-
ment the institutional reforms needed, including tackling corruption.11
9 ‘[L]ow levels of work discipline, punctuality and orderliness; superstitious beliefs and irrational 
outlook; lack of alertness, adaptability, ambition and general readiness for change and experiment; 
contempt for manual work; submissiveness to authority and exploitation; low aptitude for co-operation; 
low standards of personal hygiene and so on’ (Myrdal 1970: 226).
10 He referred to Afro-Americans as ‘negroes’ but here I use the currently more acceptable term.
11 ‘These countries are all “soft states”, both in that policies decided upon are often not enforced, if 
they are enacted at all, and in that the authorities, even when framing policies, are reluctant to place 
obligations on people’ (Myrdal 1968: 66).
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2.5 A Tentative Approach to Multidisciplinarity
In the light of the multi-factored social system constraining development, Myrdal 
argued for a fundamental change in approach, putting the analysis of institutions, 
interpreted broadly to include norms and values as well as structures, at the centre—
‘our approach is broadly “institutional” ’ (Myrdal 1970: 27). As a consequence of 
this and his multidimensional account of development, ‘in the South Asian coun-
tries the “economic” cannot be understood in isolation from other social factors’ 
(Myrdal  1970: 28). This conclusion led him to appreciate the contribution of 
non-economists. Yet, despite this, he regarded economists as more suited than 
others to the dynamic and political analysis required, and he was tentative in his 
attitude towards non-economists: ‘If we are correct, there is room for more inter-
disciplinary research and we should welcome efforts by sociologists and others to 
improve our system of theories and concepts’ (Myrdal 1970: 29). But he saw prob-
lems in multidisciplinary work: ‘Despite the strivings for “cross-fertilization” and 
interdisciplinary research, the barriers hampering transmission of ideas among 
our disciplines remain considerable’ (Myrdal  1970: 29). Thus Myrdal did not 
abandon the imperialism of economics completely, and his own team working on 
Asian Drama consisted mostly of economists.
2.6 The Inappropriateness of Western Economic Concepts
This is his most fundamental conclusion, which follows from the previous points. 
Indeed, Myrdal states right at the beginning of Asian Drama: ‘That the use of 
Western theories, models and concepts in the study of economic problems in the 
South Asian countries is a cause of bias seriously distorting that study will be the 
main theme of this book’ (Myrdal 1968: 15). The reasons for this view are that 
Western concepts and models reflect the values of Western economists, implicitly 
assuming either that Western attitudes and institutions exist, or that attitudes and 
institutions will adapt automatically. Since Myrdal’s fundamental view of develop-
ment is that attitudes and institutions matter, and that those prevalent in South 
Asia are very different from those in the West and do not adapt automatically, 
he concluded that it is wrong to ignore institutions, and that Western economic 
 concepts that do so are generally inappropriate.12
A prominent example concerned the concepts of unemployment, under-
employment, and disguised employment, which, he argued, assumed a Western 
labour market, in which almost everyone of working age was either formally 
employed or formally unemployed and the cause of unemployment and disguised 
12 These ideas were evident earlier in his 1955 Cairo lectures, reproduced in Myrdal (1957).
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unemployment was demand deficiency (Robinson 1936). Given that people had to 
survive and unemployment insurance was not available in South Asia, relatively 
few people were openly unemployed, and the majority of the workforce was 
working in low-productivity activities. A rise in effective demand would not 
eliminate low-productivity activities because of a deficiency of capital in modern 
high-productivity occupations, nor could a Western-style standard working 
day be assumed, while differences in attitudes had pervasive effects. Hence the 
concepts had to be radically reinterpreted if used in connection with South Asia. 
A second example was the distinction between investment and consumption in 
Western concepts, in particular the classification of expenditure on education, 
health, and daily essentials such as food, as consumption. Myrdal argued that 
resources devoted to health, education, and food raised future incomes and 
should be classified as investment. Arguably, this criticism of the consumption/
investment distinction also applied in the West, especially with respect to education. 
Be that as it may, the use of such clearly inappropriate concepts in developing 
countries arose from the ‘beam in our eyes’, or the effects of positioning, education, 
and culture, as well as the ideological/political element in economics, which led 
Western economists to adopt the concepts.
3. Has Analysis Changed in a Myrdalian Direction?
In many respects, the analysis of development has changed in a Myrdalian direction, 
but mostly not among ‘mainstream’ economists. Here I discuss each of the elements 
reviewed in the previous section.
3.1 Political Motivation and Ideology
Myrdal’s analysis of the Cold War motivation for much development analysis was 
shared by later political scientists, particularly in relation to aid (for example, 
Latham  2011). However, as the Cold War waned, the ideological motivation 
changed from being primarily political to being primarily economic, although 
economic motives had been present in the Cold War period (largely ignored by 
Myrdal), and political elements remain in the post-Cold War era. In relation to 
political motives, for example, during the Cold War, development and foreign aid 
were regarded as crucial for US national security (McNamara 1968), while in the 
twenty-first century they are increasingly viewed as a way of countering extremism 
and migration.13
13 See Curtis (2007). In December 2017, London’s International Development Centre held a debate 
entitled: ‘Can aid help counter violent extremism and terrorism’.
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The development strategy recommended after the Second World War met both 
the political and economic objectives of the West. The strategy of investment 
using Western technologies in import-substituting industrialization while main-
taining a focus on primary production for export supported the economic interests 
of the West, by extending their markets and profitable opportunities for their 
companies, and sustaining supplies of primary products. At the same time, the 
strategy contributed to the Cold War political objective of promoting development. 
The strategy recommended broadly reflected the type of Keynesian economics 
then dominant in the West.
The dramatic turnaround in economics and economic policy in the West in the 
early 1980s, with the revival of monetarist and neoclassical approaches, which 
were then incorporated into Western government policies—notably by Thatcher 
and Reagan—was associated with a similar turnaround in the advice of Western 
economists and the recommendations of the World Bank concerning developing 
country policies. (International Monetary Fund (IMF) advice and conditionality 
had always been monetarist and favoured markets.) This turnaround also served 
the interests of Western economies, particularly Western banks and companies. 
Loans from the international financial institutions (IFIs) financed the repayment 
of some of the debts owed to Western banks, which allowed the banks to survive 
and indeed prosper.14 And, the expansion of private markets in developing 
countries due to trade and capital account liberalization and privatization opened 
up additional space for Western companies in production and sales.
The economic advice given thus broadly reflected the economic interests of 
advanced countries—its ideological nature can be seen not only from this per-
spective but also because the many theoretical and empirical flaws in the system 
advocated were ignored.15 Thus the ideological component of Western economic 
analysis continued, but the underlying motivation tilted towards economic interests 
rather than largely political considerations. This has persisted, despite increasing 
focus on social objectives (i.e., on human development, the MDGs, and then the 
SDGs), as the pro-market approach has continued to form the dominant content 
of policy advice from Western economists. Similarly, the recent switch to micro-
economic randomized experiments, which have come to dominate development 
economics, leaves the nature of the economy, market approaches, and monetar-
ism untouched.
Regarding economic analysis as ideological has, of course, long traditions 
in  critical analysis, including Marxism, in which theorizing is regarded as 
14 We see a similar phenomenon in the case of Greek debt and loans from the EU and IMF in the 
late 2000s and after (Varoufakis 2017).
15 For example, the assumption of perfect information (Greenwald and Stiglitz  1986) and the 
justification for industrial policy and trade interventions (Krugman  1986). Moreover, empirically, 
it  was soon apparent that the policies reduced economic growth and worsened poverty (Cornia 
et al. 1986; Kakwani 1995).
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‘superstructure’ reflecting the underlying interests of capitalists. Myrdal was a 
firmly non-Marxist but heterodox economist and, perhaps as a consequence, saw 
economic analysis not as exclusively reflecting economic interests, but rather as 
the outcome of a range of circumstances, general as well as personal, political as 
well as economic. Other non-Marxist heterodox development economists, such 
as Seers and Hirschman, adopted a similar perspective, agreeing with Myrdal that 
economists’ methods were strongly influenced by their origin, education, and 
ideology (Seers 1962, 1963, 1983; Hirschman 1969).
Postmodern analysis, which developed from the 1960s, had much in common 
with Myrdal’s views, arguing that there is no single ‘objective’ truth and that it is 
necessary to uncover or deconstruct the context and motives underlying any 
analysis, recognizing the critical role of the observer’s positionality (see e.g., 
Freire 1972; Foucault and Rabinow 1984; Derrida 1997). However, going beyond 
Myrdal, postmodern thinkers explicitly recognize the role of power in influencing 
analysis, especially in indigenous postcolonial studies and in feminist literature 
(Freire  1972; Smith  1999). Yet, despite the prevalence of postmodern analysis 
throughout most social sciences, mainstream economics has remained broadly 
untouched: as Myrdal said: ‘Only about the peculiar behaviour of our own profes-
sion do we choose to remain naïve’ (Myrdal 1970: 6).
3.2 The Selection of Values
Given the ideological and value-laden element in economics, Myrdal argued that 
the values assumed in any study should be presented explicitly and should not be 
those of the foreign observer.
The idea that values should be locally determined is now almost universally 
accepted by external development researchers and policy advisors. The IFIs rec-
ognize the need for local ‘ownership’, albeit largely instrumentally, as necessary to 
get policies implemented. Sen’s capability approach regards agency and freedoms 
as essential components of individual flourishing and of desirable development 
and hence the values selected must be those of the population where development 
takes place (Sen 1985).
Yet Myrdal’s belief that only the views of the ‘politically alert, articulate and 
active’ should be considered is not accepted. The presumption is that all those 
affected by policies should be involved—that is, in principle, the mass of the 
population, who are the agents and intended beneficiaries of development. 
Moreover, Myrdal’s method of arriving at his selected values seems quite amateurish 
compared with the extensive consultations that are thought appropriate today. He 
claims that the values he adopts were derived from the national plans and political 
speeches of the politically active, and ‘it turns out that this official creed of the 
South Asian countries is composed mainly of the ideals long cherished in the 
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Western world as the heritage of the Enlightenment’ (Myrdal 1970: 55)—perhaps 
not surprising since many of the political leaders were educated in the West and 
their plans and speeches were often drawn up after consultation with foreign 
experts. This context, and Myrdal’s method of arriving at the selected values, led 
to a set of values very much in line with the values Myrdal himself held, as he 
accepts in the quotation above.
Since he wrote, consultations have become more comprehensive and systematic. 
Yet even these efforts still appear to generate values that largely reflect the 
 perspective of the observer. The IFIs, for example, in drawing up the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), had meetings with groups from many classes, 
regions, and occupations. Yet they ended up with a set of policies that were entirely 
in line with their own (IFI) perspectives (Bretton Woods Project 2001; Booth 2003; 
Stewart and Wang 2006). Similarly, Nussbaum produced a ‘list’ of values and object-
ives which, she argues, emerge from an ‘overlapping consensus’ (Nussbaum 2000). 
Her list, too, appears to reflect those of a progressive, liberal Westerner.
Robert Chambers has been a powerful critic of the casual consultations typical 
of most foreign experts and their failure to consult poor people properly. He 
initiated participatory research involving the poor, and his methodology has been 
widely taken up (Chambers 1997). Chambers guided the World Bank’s Voices of 
the Poor project, which involved extensive efforts to consult the poor on priorities 
and seems to have come much closer to getting at actual values held by local non-
elites than most attempts (Naraya et al. 2000). Although it, too, can be criticized 
for assuming an absence of conflict within the groups consulted about priorities, 
and, once more, as tending to reflect the perspectives of those conducting and 
interpreting the enquiries (Ruggeri Laderchi  2007), the Chambers approach 
comes nearest to the ideal of deriving values from the people themselves. But 
Chambers’ approach is poorly suited to ascertaining local priorities on macroeco-
nomic policy, and never properly used to do so.
In principle, the SDGs were drawn up after extensive worldwide consultations, 
many following the Chambers approach. Yet the outcome of these consultations 
was again totally in line with those of ‘enlightened’ Westerners, and did not 
incorporate the opposing views of some in the South, for example with regard to 
the role of women or child labour. In general, heterogeneity of views makes it easy 
for those orchestrating the consultations to impose their own values. In any case, 
Myrdal would not have wanted to adopt Chambers’ participatory approach, since 
an important component of his modernization values is radical changes in pre-
vailing attitudes. True consultation of the mass of people would thus not have led 
to modernization values, as interpreted by Myrdal, if his assumption about the 
prevalence of ‘non-modern’ attitudes is correct.
In sum, some important subsequent theorizing concurs on the importance of 
ideology in economics; and the view that the values adopted should be local ones 
is also accepted. But Myrdal’s method of identifying local values—both as to 
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whom to consult and how to consult—no longer appear appropriate. Yet, even 
with the apparent intent of full consultation and more sophisticated methods of 
doing so, the perspectives of those orchestrating the consultations (often still the 
foreign observers) remain highly influential, as they retain power in terms of 
framing and interpretation, especially where views conflict. And for much policy 
advice—especially in relation to macro-economic policy—very little genuine 
consultation takes place.
3.3 The Nature of Development
Myrdal recognized that the concept of ‘development’ was difficult to define, or 
‘clearly suffers from indeterminacy’ (Myrdal 1968: 1840). He interpreted develop-
ment as all-encompassing. It involved ‘modernization’; a rise in standards of 
living; social and economic equalization; improved institutions and attitudes; 
national consolidation and independence; and democracy—most elements being 
wanted in themselves and likely to promote other elements. It thus goes well 
beyond the growth-promotion strategy commonly adopted at the time and is in 
the spirit of the widening of development objectives that has occurred since—
from a focus on economic growth to basic needs, human development and cap-
ability expansion, poverty reduction, the MDGs, and the SDGs.16 Myrdal includes 
some elements that have not been incorporated in the human-oriented objectives 
that followed: for example, national consolidation and independence, which formed 
a natural objective in the years immediately following former colonial countries’ 
political independence but has been less emphasized since then although it has 
much in common with the contemporary objective of promoting ‘social cohesion’ 
(de Haan and Webbink 2011; Langer et al.  2017). Institutional improvements 
are currently accepted as critically important, but instrumentally rather than as a 
central, intrinsic objective.
The idea that modernization is the overall normative development project truly 
reflects the ‘beam’ in Myrdal’s eyes. For anthropologists and postmodern analysts 
this represents an unacceptable imposition of values by the foreigner—just what 
Myrdal himself criticized, although most contemporary economists implicitly 
take a ‘modernist’ perspective. A casual look around the world indicates that 
many would reject modernization as an ideal, particularly among religious, envir-
onmental, and ‘indigenist’ groups; but that same casual glance would pick up 
many others who would accept Myrdal’s modernization ideals, with growth and 
Western-type consumerism as their preferred objectives. One thing is sure: in the 
twenty-first century, it is not possible to be so confident about declarations of 
objectives, when talking for others.
16 See Seers (1969), Streeten et al. (1981), UNDP (1990), Sen (1999), Stewart et al. (2018).
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3.4 The Five Elements of the Social System
Myrdal’s five elements were a far cry from the emphasis on physical investment of 
many economists at the time. He regarded levels of living (including health and 
education) as essential inputs into economic progress and not only desirable outcomes. 
Some contemporary economists agreed that these were important inputs into 
growth. For example, both Leibenstein and Nurkse recognized that extreme 
poverty would reduce productivity and could trap countries into a low-level equi-
librium (Nurkse  1953; Leibenstein  1957), while Schultz (1963) pointed to the 
critical importance of investment in education.
Myrdal gave institutions and attitudes paramount importance; indeed an early 
subsection of the book is entitled ‘A plea for an institutional emphasis’ (Myrdal 
1968: 26). The institutions, which he argued inhibited development, included 
land tenure systems, caste, some beliefs (such as the Hindu attitudes to cows), a 
‘soft’ state, and corruption. In his emphasis on institutions, he can be seen as a 
precursor of North, who wrote some twenty years later (North 1986, 1990). Since 
then, most explanations of patterns of development give institutions (encompassing 
attitudes) a central role, a view shared by both neoclassical economists and het-
erodox ones (North 1986; Rutherford 1994), although the neoclassical approach 
involves a narrower definition of institutions than that of Myrdal. Heterodox 
analysis of institutions comes much closer to a Myrdalian approach—for example, 
in Thorp and Paredes’ (2010) investigation of the economic history of Peru, or 
Lall’s (1987) examination of factors affecting technological capabilities, and 
Colclough and Manor’s (1991) discussions of states and markets.
Since the publication of Asian Drama there has been a vast amount of empirical 
work on the determinants and consequences of institutions and attitudes—
much analysis of agriculture in India has focused on land tenure and alternative 
 contractual arrangements (Mazumdar  1975; Bardhan and Rudra  1980), for 
example—and there has been extensive research on the role of caste, ethnicity, 
corruption, ‘governance’, and ‘social capital’, among other institutions (Premdas 
1993; Easterly and Levine  1997; Khan and Jomo  2000; Harriss-White  2003; 
Borooah and Iyer 2005; Bangura 2006; Thorat and Newman 2010; Gören 2014).
Myrdal’s emphasis on the way the nature of the state influences whether devel-
opmental policies are adopted and implemented would now be widely accepted. 
For several decades, the state was regarded by mainstream economists as the prob-
lem rather than the solution to development issues, ‘rational’ analysis suggesting 
that states would inevitably be predatory and their role should be minimized 
(Brennan and Buchanan  1980; Lal  1983); and this remains the view of some 
economists. But the evidence that some states have clearly effectively promoted 
development has led to a return to the Myrdalian issue of how and why some 
states are more developmental than others. Evans’ (1995) insightful analysis of 
states with ‘embedded autonomy’, which he contrasted with predatory states, is a 
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leading example. However, most analyses do not take a binary view of the state 
(‘soft’ or ‘hard’), but see a range of state competencies.
Myrdal’s belief that ‘soft’ states prevailed in South Asia, together with his analysis 
of the interconnected nature of the elements leading to development, led him to 
take a pessimistic view of development prospects in the region. Yet, in the fifty 
years that have elapsed since he wrote, there has been substantial economic and 
social progress in the region (Figures  3.1 and  3.2) despite limited institutional 
change in terms of the nature of the state, corruption, caste, etc. It has turned out 
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Figure 3.1 GDP per capita, 1967–2017 (constant 2010 US$).
















































































Figure 3.2 Infant mortality rate, 1967–2017.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Asian populations appear to be highly adaptable and quick to learn and exploit 
new opportunities; attitudes, if not institutions, have adapted, contrary to Myrdal’s 
expectation. Institutions of various kinds (including deficiencies in state func-
tioning) have shaped and probably slowed progress, but have not prevented it. 
While, clearly, Myrdal was right to suggest that more was needed than physical 
investment alone, progress in education, rising investment, and policy changes 
have led to accelerating growth and modernization, suggesting that prevailing 
attitudes and institutions were not insuperable obstacles.
In this respect, developments followed Hirschman’s observation:
our researchers have uncovered a long list of ‘prerequisites’ for economic devel-
opment, which range all the way from adequate transportation facilities to basic 
psychological attitudes, aptitudes and propensities. But many developing coun-
tries have a disconcerting habit of disregarding the absence of these and to put 
them into place a little late. (Hirschman 1969: 5)
Nonetheless, as the more rapid growth in East Asia suggests,17 progress could 
have been faster had more of the institutional deficiencies been overcome,18 and 
the non-economic constraints may have slowed progress on some goals, includ-
ing advancing equality, eliminating malnutrition and ill-health, and reducing 
insecurities of many kinds.
When Myrdal wrote Asian Drama, his comprehensive approach to the causes 
and constraints on development—embracing education and health, and institutions 
and attitudes—represented an important advance over the way many development 
economists approached development issues. Today, such an approach is broadly 
accepted, even though it is not always apparent in the teaching or practice of 
economists.
3.5 Multi- and Interdisciplinarity
As noted earlier, Myrdal recognized that a much more comprehensive view of the 
determinants of development, with non-economic factors as central components, 
required a broadening of disciplinary approach beyond economics. But he was 
quite tentative about it, and left the lead role to economics. Since then, there 
has been wide acceptance of the desirability of multi- and interdisciplinary 
approaches. Multidisciplinary development journals abound and there are many 
multidisciplinary university departments of Development Studies and inter- as 
17 East Asia had many advantages in ‘initial conditions’ compared with South Asia, including more 
homogeneous populations and higher levels of education.
18 Caste discrimination has seriously impeded efficiency (Thorat and Newman 2010), while the revival 
of cow-worship in India, with new laws to protect cows and vigilante monitoring, is affecting some indus-
tries adversely (‘Modi’s holy cows disrupt Indian industry’, Financial Times, 23 November 2017).
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well as multidisciplinary courses. Competitions for grants for research on issues 
of development in the West frequently require a multidisciplinary approach.
The IFIs, however, were slow to accept the need to broaden the disciplinary 
background of their staff. The World Bank employed its first non-economist 
professional in 1974. The number of non-economists had risen to almost sixty by 
1995, still just a fraction of the economists employed. Michael Cernea, the first 
sociologist at the World Bank, argued that while he was working there, the view 
of sociologists ‘changed from [the Bank] seeing them as the Bank’s own luxury 
species [. . .] to treating them as rather respected and desirable’ (Cernea  1993). 
Yet economists continue to be dominant. In 2010, the Bank’s 150 non-economists 
represented about 3 per cent of its professional staff (Cernea 1995; World Bank 
2004; Mosse 2006).19 In an in-depth study of the role of non-economists at the 
World Bank, Mosse concluded that they are ‘a marginal professional group’ who 
‘make the organization work better without changing what it does’ (Mosse 2006: 1). 
The IMF remains substantially monodisciplinary. It began to employ a few 
non-economists only in 2004, to assist in analysing the social aspects of its 
programmes (Vetterlein  2010). As Vetterlein (n.d.) states: ‘the Fund is very 
homogenous and made up of macroeconomists and financial experts’. Bilateral 
development agencies have a stronger non-economist component, and multidis-
ciplinarity has become a genuine feature of teaching and research in Development 
Studies departments, but rarely in Economics departments. In short, practice 
tends to reflect Myrdal’s somewhat tentative views about the role of non-economists, 
even as the understanding of the constraints and determinants of development 
broaden in a Myrdalian direction.
3.6 The Inapplicability of Western Economic Concepts
This was, perhaps, Myrdal’s most fundamental methodological conclusion. It 
arose because of the importance he gave to non-economic factors—especially 
institutions and attitudes—which, he asserted, were substantially different in 
South Asia from those in the West, while Western economic concepts were 
(implicitly) built on the assumed existence of Western institutions and attitudes.
In two classic papers—which predated Asian Drama—Seers came to very simi-
lar conclusions on most elements of Myrdal’s methodological approach, includ-
ing the inappropriateness of many Western economic concepts, on the basis of 
similar arguments. ‘An economist is by no means immune to chauvinistic or 
ideological influences, and these are strong today’, he stated in ‘Why Visiting 
Economists Fail’ (Seers 1962: 326). He argued that visiting economists typically 
used the models they had been taught, which were suitable for a developed 
19 Assuming professional staff are about half the 10,000 employees.
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country and underestimated qualitative and non-economic factors. Like Myrdal, 
he stated that ‘even apparently technical questions such as choosing variables 
considered significant, deciding what ranges for these variables are plausible, and 
assessing the scope for policy, raise issues which are fundamentally social and 
political’ (Seers 1962: 334).
In ‘The Limitations of the Special Case’ (Seers 1963), Seers expounded the view 
that concepts developed for an advanced economy were likely to be inappropriate 
to less developed countries. He cited earlier analysts who took the same view, 
including John Neville Keynes (father of J.M. Keynes), and quoted Joan Robinson:
English economists, from Ricardo to Keynes, [. . .] have been accustomed to assume 
as a tacitly accepted background the institutions and problems of the England each 
of his own day; when their works are studied in other climes and other periods [. . .] 
a great deal of confusion and argument at cross-purposes arises.
(Robinson 1960: xvii)
According to Seers, ‘[a]nalysis focuses on the wrong factor, and the models do 
not fit at all closely the way in which non-industrial economies operate’ (Seers 
1963: 83). The Indian economist and sociologist Mukerjee made just the same 
point: ‘[T]he postulates of western economics were entirely different from a real-
istic study of the Indian pattern’ (Mukerjee 1955: 9).
Have economists’ analyses of developing countries responded to these criticisms? 
Some have but more have not. With regard to Myrdal’s specific examples, there has 
been a great deal of work on the question of how best to define underemployment 
in a developing country context, and on the need to analyse work in the ‘informal’ 
sector (Turnham 1971; Sen 1975; Stewart 1975; Tokman 1978). Analysis has also 
focused on the non-marketed production of the household, especially the contri-
bution of women (Evans  1991; Mertz et al.  2005), although national accounts 
have not been amended accordingly. Myrdal was undoubtedly right that the simple 
import of Western concepts was inappropriate here. In relation to the investment/
consumption distinction, it is widely accepted that much of what is conventionally 
classified as consumption is in effect investment, raising productivity over time, 
notably by those who point to the contribution of ‘human capital’ to economic 
growth (Dasgupta 1993; Schultz 1993; Psacharopolous 1994). Yet, again, national 
accounts have not been revised to take this into account.
There has been progress regarding these particular concepts and quite a few 
others—for example, by structuralists pointing to the problems for theories of 
inflation raised by structural constraints, as well as the recognition that institu-
tions are an important determinant of development. Nonetheless, macro-eco-
nomic concepts are generally transferred wholesale by mainstream economists, 
without regard for their appropriateness (Stiglitz  2006; Nayyar  2007), as is the 
neoclassical apparatus of market efficiency in resource allocation. The situation in 
both these areas has worsened since Myrdal was writing. On the macro-front, 
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Keynesianism—though strictly not applicable to developing countries with limited 
spare capacity in the formal sector and a high propensity to consume, as pointed 
out by Rao (1952)—has been discredited in the West, along with most state 
intervention in the economy. A strict monetarist approach tends to be adopted 
by the IMF, with a requirement of balanced budgets, often involving cuts in infra-
structure and the social sectors, which can severely constrain growth. Moreover, 
market optimization is assumed, despite its widely acknowledged limitations, 
which are greater in developing countries where there is a lack of complementary 
facilities and highly imperfect knowledge. Import liberalization is advocated, des-
pite the learning and scale economies which incipient industrializers experience 
(Chang 1993). The consequence has been to inhibit industrialization, especially 
in much of Africa.
In general, most heterodox economists would agree with much of what Myrdal 
stated about the need to adapt concepts to context. But orthodox economists 
would not. Indeed, in line with this, the whole idea that development economics 
should be different from economics in general, requiring different concepts and 
models, was explicitly challenged by Robbins as early as 1945 (Robbins 1945), by 
Bauer (Bauer 1957), and later by Lal (1983). As Hirschman noted in 1979, neo-
classicals—on the ascendant in the West—claimed their approach was relevant to 
all types of economy (Hirschman 1979). Implicitly, this view is widely accepted. 
In practice, most economists working on developing economies continue to 
adopt the economic concepts and theories accepted in mainstream Economics 
departments in Western universities.
4. The Relevance and Irrelevance of Myrdal Today
In this section, I discuss three issues: first, areas where Myrdal has influenced the 
profession, or where it has moved in his direction; second, areas where Myrdal 
was correct, in my opinion, but his views have rarely been incorporated into 
analysis, even by heterodox economists; and third, areas where I would depart 
from Myrdal’s methodological analysis, or where developments over the past 
half-century require new approaches.
4.1 The Acceptance of Myrdal’s Ideas
Acceptance is mainly among heterodox economists, but on some issues extends 
to more orthodox ones:
 • Development is recognized as a normative project, and there is now 
 considerable debate about the normative content, although few would 
accept Myrdal’s modernization ideals. Rather, there has been movement 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/07/19, SPi
70 Asian Transformations
towards human-centred and plural objectives, with particular attention to 
(multidimensional) poverty and the reduction of inequality.
 • There is general acceptance of the idea that local people should choose their 
own priorities, but there remain problems about who and how to consult, 
and how to deal with diverse views, among other issues.
 • There is recognition that the determinants of the state of (under)develop-
ment are holistic, involving many ‘non-economic’ factors; most of Myrdal’s 
elements would be agreed on, including the investment aspects of education, 
health and nutrition, and the critical role of institutions, as well as circular 
causation among elements.
 • There is agreement, especially among heterodox economists, that context 
matters, and considerable efforts are made to identify contextual factors 
through empirical work. But others take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.
4.2 The Ideas That Have Not Been Taken Up
Preeminent here is ‘the beam in our eyes’. With the major exception of Seers,20 
development economists, whether heterodox or orthodox, rarely analyse or declare 
how their own positioning, their home society, education, and so on is likely to 
have affected their analysis. Rather, most economists believe (or at least write as if) 
there is ‘truth’ out there, unrelated to their own positioning. Values are typically 
implicit, not laid down explicitly. On Western concepts, new concepts have 
emerged in development analysis that are more appropriate to local conditions—
such as the informal sector and governance—but mostly this has occurred without 
discarding the old concepts.
4.3 Moving On . . .
Several important critiques of Myrdal have emerged from the discussion, pointing 
to the need to move on. First, despite espousing the need for multidisciplinarity, 
Myrdal retained a belief in the primacy of economists and suggested only a minor 
role for other social scientists. Second, while advocating the incorporation of 
local values, Myrdal deferred to the values of elites, and explicitly rejected those 
of the masses, even though he firmly favoured democratic institutions. Moreover, 
while he emphasized the importance of deriving local values (albeit from the 
elite), in practice the values he put forward were basically those of a progressive 
Scandinavian (i.e., his own). Third, despite rejecting Western economic concepts 
as inappropriate, in practice, Asian Drama gives little recognition to the contribution 
of local thinkers. These are all areas where analysis and practice has moved on. 
20 In his preface, Seers (1983), for example, gives a potted biography of his life.
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Beyond these areas, two other issues relevant to contemporary analysis go beyond 
Myrdal’s approach: first, the inappropriateness of many economics concepts to 
developed as well as developing countries; and second, the increasing convergence 
between North and South in their economies and the social and economic prob-
lems they face. This section briefly discusses these issues.
4.3.1 The Recognition and Practice of Multidisciplinarity
In many cases both recognition and practice go well beyond Myrdal’s somewhat 
tentative bow towards multidisciplinarity. Political scientists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, and (increasingly) ‘hard’ scientists contribute to the analysis of 
development issues, while many individual scholars themselves adopt a multidis-
ciplinary perspective, even if the economist remains ‘king’, especially in the arena 
of macro-policies and the work of the IFIs.
4.3.2 The Identification of Local Values
As noted, this has become a much more systematic and sophisticated exercise, no 
longer confined to capturing the views of the elite, but with attempts to involve 
the whole population. Yet deficiencies in the identification of local values remain, 
especially with respect to macroeconomics. In interpreting local values, there is a 
clear tendency to neglect views that are inconsistent with those prevalent in the 
West, as indicated by the SDGs, which essentially reflect progressive liberal val-
ues—for example, any local questioning of democracy or opposition to gender or 
other types of equality is ignored. More fundamentally, the difficulty (in part, 
impossibility) of incorporating the views and interests of future generations raises 
questions about whether local contemporary values should be supreme.21
4.3.3 Recognition of the Contribution of Local Social Scientists
A major defect of Asian Drama is the very limited attention paid to South Asian 
economists, let alone other social scientists. In fact, Indian economists in the 
1930s and before had analysed many of the issues that Myrdal discusses, and had 
come to similar conclusions. Rao, for example, recognized the holistic nature of 
development constraints, the need to analyse non-economic factors, and the 
inappropriateness of some Western economic concepts.
Krishnamurty (2017) describes important contributions made by Indian 
economists in the first half of the twentieth century, as shown in the following 
quotations from his analysis:
 • Radhakamal Mukerjee’s (1934) ‘highly original paper on the “Broken Balance 
of Population, Land and Water”, dealing with the ecological problems of the 
21 See Stewart (2018) for some suggestions about how the interests of future generations might be 
included in current deliberations.
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Gangetic valley [. . .] long before environment economics became part of 
professional and popular discourse’ (Krishnamurty 2017).22
 • Gyanchand’s 1935 paper ‘The Essentials of Economic Planning for India’ 
‘questioned the then current euphoria over economic planning’ and the 
possibility of achieving redistribution with growth in a colonial setting. 
‘This paper was a precursor to the debates after independence on [. . .] 
whether growth by itself would lead to better redistribution.’
 • ‘[P]erhaps the most original paper published in the IJE in 1938 . . . was 
V.K.R.V. Rao’s paper “The Problem of Unemployment in India” ’ in which he 
adapted Robinson’s concept of disguised unemployment to conditions in 
India, arguing that ‘there are on the land a number of people who do not 
really contribute to the production of agricultural output and that if they 
give up agriculture output would be much the same. They are the disguised 
unemployed of India’ (Rao 1938: 631).
Other significant Indian contributions included that of B.R. Ambedkar on indus-
trialization as the solution to surplus labour and the Indian agrarian problem, 
published in 1918, and those of A.K.  Dasgupta, including a Lewis-type model, 
developed earlier in lectures and published in 1954 (Krishnamurty 2008). None 
of these papers appears in the index of Asian Drama. There are many references 
to Indian economists, but almost entirely to empirical studies, ignoring their 
methodological contributions.
4.3.4 The Inappropriateness of ‘Western’ Economic  
Concepts to the West Itself
In Asian Drama, Myrdal rarely challenges the appropriateness of the economic 
concepts for the West itself, but argues that the concepts become inappropriate 
when applied to South Asia (although earlier he had questioned the relevance of 
static equilibrium in analysing Western economies). This may be due to the dom-
inance of Keynesianism when he was writing Asian Drama, since Keynesianism 
did appear to be relevant to the analysis of Western economies, in contrast to the 
static equilibrium analysis that preceded it (Myrdal 1958).
The inappropriateness of many economic concepts and theories to Western 
economies has become particularly evident in the post-Keynesian era. For example, 
Solow’s neoclassical growth model ‘explains’ only a small portion of Western 
 economic growth because it is unrealistic about the nature of technical change, 
learning economies, and returns to scale (Solow 1956; Balogh and Streeten 1963; 
Scott  1989). Similarly, neoclassical theories of trade have serious deficiencies, 
22 In other work, Mukerjee (1926, 1934, 1939, 1940) emphasizes the need for multidisciplinary 
work, and the role of institutions in the economy. And already in 1917, he had lectured on the ‘incom-
mensurability of the western economic models with the Indian reality’ (Thakur 2012: 95).
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again largely owing to a failure to incorporate learning and scale economies 
(Helpman and Krugman  1986; Krugman  1986). Equally, the view that free 
markets would lead to Pareto optimal equilibria is based on incorrect assump-
tions about technology and information, whatever the economy (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz 1986). In addition, the view that the distributional consequences of mar-
kets could be corrected by governments ignores universal political constraints. 
Moreover, the need to broaden objectives beyond growth maximization applies as 
much in the North as in the South. The need to do so becomes overwhelming once 
environmental considerations are taken into account. In short, objectives, con-
cepts, models, and policies need to be substantially amended in the North as well 
as the South, a perspective which I am sure Myrdal would accept, were he around.
4.3.5 A Convergence
Over the last fifty years, there has been considerable convergence between the 
economies of the North and South, especially among the ‘emerging’ economies of 
the South. Many developing economies have grown much faster than developed 
economies, resulting in a substantial catch-up with the high-income countries 
and a rising share of the South in the global economy. The structure of many 
economies has been transformed, moving from heavy reliance on primary pro-
duction to an increasing share of industry and modern services, becoming much 
more like that of the high-income economies (Nayyar  2014). Investments and 
technologies flow from the South to the North as well as from North to South; 
problems of debt and adjustment are universal; countries everywhere face 
employment problems and Northern economies, too, have substantial informal 
sectors; issues of poverty and social protection are universal, as are inequalities 
and discrimination; governance is a shared problem; political economy is univer-
sally relevant, and so on. In every case, context matters. Economic concepts are 
often inappropriate to a particular context, but this is the case for the North as 
well as the South. Institutions and attitudes matter everywhere.
Concepts need to be reformulated to fit the context. Some issues and concepts 
may be applicable in the North and not the South, and conversely. Some may be 
applicable universally. And some may be inapplicable everywhere. It is no longer 
correct to differentiate sharply between North and South, as Myrdal did. Rather, 
we need to revise economic concepts in the light of the best parts of his approach 
in both North and South.
5. Conclusion
The methodological contributions in Asian Drama are of fundamental importance, 
pushing the economic analysis of development in a holistic and multidisciplinary 
direction; recognizing how values and politics permeate analysis as well as policy, 
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and how the position of the observer affects the analysis. These ideas all  challenged 
the unthinking transfer of advanced country economic concepts and theories to 
the analysis of underdevelopment. Myrdal’s methodological approach was not 
entirely original. Others, including Seers, Hirschman, and Rao, had made similar 
points. Yet put together in Asian Drama (and earlier works), they made a major 
contribution to a radical rethinking of development analysis.
Paradoxically, Myrdal’s conclusion from this vision was of deep pessimism 
about the possibilities of development which subsequent events have shown to be 
wrong, certainly in the Asian case. Yet the central points he made—on values, on 
the importance of institutions, on the non-economic determinants of development, 
and on the need for multidisciplinarity—reflected much of the reality of the situ-
ation on the ground, not only in Asia but also beyond, as I found in exploring 
development issues in the late 1960s in Kenya. His main points remain valid, not 
only for the South but also for the North. Although some of his ideas seem com-
monplace now, since they have been widely incorporated into critical analysis, it 
continues to be important to turn to them, as many economists remain trapped 
in conventional perspectives.
The world has moved on since Asian Drama in one particularly vital respect. 
Myrdal was writing before environmental considerations became dominant. 
These require a radically new look at values, objectives, concepts, and theories, 
which need to be incorporated into any analysis of the development drama today 
(Gough 2017; Raworth 2017). While this will necessitate substantial revisions of 
the positive analysis in Asian Drama, the work’s open and critical methodological 
approach is well suited to providing guidance for the changes needed.
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Asia and the World Economy  
in Historical Perspective
Ronald Findlay
‘History, then, is not taken to be predetermined, but within the power of 
man to shape. And the drama thus conceived is not necessarily tragedy.’1
Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama
1. Introduction
The Asian world in Myrdal’s study essentially begins in the aftermath of the Second 
World War with the British withdrawal from their empire in Asia and Indian 
independence. These ‘initial conditions’ are taken as given without enquiry as to 
how they came to be what they were. This chapter can be considered as providing 
the missing historical background to Asian Drama, with the advantage of fifty 
years of hindsight. For convenience Asia will be divided into four regions: South 
Asia (what is now India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka); East Asia (China, 
Korea, and Japan); Southeast Asia (the members of ASEAN from Myanmar to the 
Philippines) and Central Asia (the area east of China, west of Russia and Iran and 
north of India and Pakistan).
The rest of this chapter is divided into six more sections. Section 2 provides 
the geographic, demographic, cultural, and political background to Asia over 
the period from 1000 to 1500. Section 3 describes the patterns of trade between the 
Asian nations and their overseas and overland contacts with the Middle East 
and Europe over the same period. Section 4 covers the European intrusion into 
Asia by the Portuguese Estado da India and the Dutch, English, and French East 
India Companies from 1500 to 1650, and the impact of the ‘discovery’ of the New 
World on Asian trade flows and economic systems. Section 5 analyses the pressure 
exerted on the land-based Asian powers by the sea power of the European intruders 
from 1650 to 1860. Section 6 surveys the imposition of European imperialism 
on the Asian nations and their resistance to it, resulting in the achievement of 
political and economic independence by 1968, the year in which Asian Drama was 
1 Myrdal (1968: vol. I, p. 35).
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published. The final section 7 discusses the differences between the evolutionary 
paths of European and Asian societies and considers whether the twenty-first will 
indeed be the ‘Asian Century’.
2. Malthus, Muslims, and Mongols, 1000–1500
According to McEvedy and Jones (1978) the population of the world in 1000 was 
270 million and of Asia 185 million, with the Indian subcontinent accounting for 
almost 80 million and China ‘proper’ for 60 million, substantially higher propor-
tions of both Asia and the world even than they are today. The explanation for the 
continued dominance of the two Asian giants is, of course, the fertility of the 
great river valleys of the Ganges and the Indus in India and the Yellow and Yangzi 
Rivers in China. The underlying economic basis is still best provided by the clas-
sical Malthus-Ricardo model, in which long-run equilibrium per capita incomes 
are determined at the levels which balance the endogenous fertility and mortality 
rates, while total populations and GDPs are determined by the extent of the land 
areas and levels of technology in each case.2 Already accumulated over millennia 
by 1000, India and China enjoyed not only the advantages of geography but of 
culture and institutions as well, enabling them to have the two largest and most 
productive economies in the world at that time.
The sedentary populations of both these civilizations bordered on the steppes 
of Central Asia. Both were thus natural targets for the predatory inroads of the 
pastoral nomads, with their mastery of the horse and the bow. The Turko-Afghan 
warlord Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (r.998–1030) conducted no less than seventeen 
deep plundering raids into Northern and Western India, sacking cities and 
temples and collecting vast amounts of treasure that he took back to his capital 
in Afghanistan.3 What John F. Richards (1974) calls the ‘Islamic Frontier’ had 
been extending westwards into India since the eighth century when an Arab army 
crossed the Makran desert and invaded Western India before running out of 
momentum. It was the conversion to Islam of the Turkish and Afghan warrior 
tribes that provided the sustained basis for the thrust of that frontier deep into the 
subcontinent. The systematic conquest and occupation of large parts of India by 
Muslim rulers, who established a sequence of dynasties collectively known as the 
Delhi Sultanate that ruled northern and central India from the early thirteenth to 
the end of the fourteenth century, began in the last quarter of the twelfth century. 
The Sultanate’s rule at its maximum extent ran from Sind and Gujerat in the west 
to Bengal in the east and deep into the Deccan plateau and parts of the Malabar 
and Coromandel coasts in the south.
2 See Findlay and Lundahl (2017: chapter 5) for technical details and applications to historical epi-
sodes such as the Black Death.
3 See Thapar (1990: chapter 10).
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The Muslim conquests obviously led to the establishment of a new Muslim 
military and administrative ruling class. By and large the military leaders were 
Turks and Afghans while the civil administrators tended to be Persian-speaking 
Tajiks. Both were supported by the rights to rents and taxes on land in return for 
service held under the familiar Islamic iqta system. Despite receiving their incomes 
from the rural areas, the Muslim ruling class as well as the ulema or clergy had a 
distinct preference for living in cities, leading some historians to speak of a virtual 
‘urban revolution’ as a result of the Muslim conquest. The Hindu caste system had 
kept most skilled and unskilled workers outside city walls to preserve the ritual 
purity of the Brahmins within. With this obstacle removed the urban population 
swelled with a significant boost to economic activity (Habib 1974: 59–80). Many 
notable technological advances were introduced, such as the production and 
use of paper, acquired by the Arabs from the Chinese in the eighth century and 
diffused throughout the Islamic world from Samarkand. Also very important was 
the introduction of the ‘Persian wheel’ for lifting water in place of the primitive 
‘bucket and chain’ system which no doubt was a great advantage for irrigation and 
agriculture. The spinning wheel and carding devices for the cotton textile industry 
were also major innovations introduced from the Islamic world into India (Digby 
and Habib 1982).
It would be quite wrong, however, to think of Hindu India as being merely the 
passive recipient of military, economic, and cultural influences from its Muslim 
rulers. As we know, the famous ‘Arabic numerals’ and the crucial concept of zero 
were actually Indian and had already been transmitted to the Islamic world by the 
eighth century. While urban life, as we have noted, was strongly influenced by the 
new ruling class, the countryside where the vast majority of the population lived 
remained familiarly Hindu, with the caste system still enduring with some adap-
tations, and even continuing to influence many of those who converted to Islam.
The Muslim population that came in with the invading armies was a miniscule 
proportion of that of India as a whole. Service in the conquest states was an 
attractive prospect for the many warriors, clerics, scribes, poets, artists, and 
scholars from the Middle East and Central Asia, but this immigration still made 
little difference in the aggregate. There were no forcible conversions and little 
incentive to do so on a voluntary basis. According to Richards (1974: 104) the 
Muslim population was estimated at a mere 3–4 million out of a total of 170 
million in 1400.
What emerged from the long encounter was in many respects not just a Muslim 
political superstructure dominating a largely Hindu economic base but a 
distinctive Indo-Muslim civilization, as can readily be seen in the architectural 
styles, construction, and workmanship of the many mosques, minarets, palaces, 
tombs, and fortresses built by the new rulers. Like the British after them, the 
Muslim conquerors had to rely on the natives to staff their armies and 
administration, and not always in completely ‘subaltern’ positions. They also had 
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to rely extensively on the supply of credit from Hindu merchants and brokers, 
organized collectively into powerful guilds with far-reaching contacts within 
India and abroad. The ‘Hindustani’ lingua franca that emerged in northern India 
led to the parallel development of Hindi and Urdu as vernacular languages, while 
Sanskrit and Persian were the languages of religion and statecraft. India thus proved 
much more resistant to complete cultural ‘Islamicization’ than the other ancient 
civilization of Iran, for example Stein (1998: chapter 3).
During the time that northern India was enduring the depredations of Mahmud 
of Ghazni, the southern end of the peninsula was blossoming under the rule of 
the Chola Dynasty. They administered a contiguous, well-organized empire that 
comprised both the eastern Coromandel and western Malabar coasts but much 
of the uplands between them. Particularly notable was their command of strong 
naval forces that enabled them to conquer the Maldive Islands and much of Ceylon 
as well as to launch successful raiding expeditions into Southeast Asia. This naval 
power was deployed to support the wide-ranging commercial activities of Tamil 
merchant guilds that operated not only all over Southeast Asia but also as far as 
China. When the Sumatran kingdom of Srivijaya attempted to divert the lucrative 
trade from China to the Middle East to its own advantage, the Cholas sent an 
expedition in 1025 that forced the local ruler to restore the trading rights of the 
Tamil merchants. The Cholas ruled until the early fourteenth century, after which 
power in the south passed to the rising militarized state of Vijayanagar (Thapar 
1990: chapters 9 and 14).
While India, as we have seen, had one previously nomadic predatory state 
on its northern border in the eleventh century, China had two, that of the Khitan 
Liao Kingdom in the north-east, and that of the Tangut Xi Xia Kingdom in the 
northwest. The ethnic Chinese Song Dynasty came to power in 960, succeeding 
the Tang Dynasty after the interregnum known as the ‘Five Dynasties’ period from 
907 to 960, with its capital at Kaifeng. From the beginning it had to confront the 
problem of how best to deal with its powerful northern neighbours. The option it 
chose was what Dieter Kuhn (2009: 28) has called ‘peaceful coexistence’. In effect 
it ‘bought’ peace by sending 300,000 bolts of silk and 200,000 ounces of silver 
annually to the Liao and 150,000 bolts of silk, 70,000 ounces of silver and 10,000 
catties of tea annually to the Xi Xia. With peace thus secured, however humiliatingly, 
China could proceed with what has rightly been called the ‘Song Economic 
Miracle’ with agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce all flourishing as never 
before under a civil administration of scholar-officials chosen on merit by a 
rigorous examination system based on the Confucian classics Shiba (1970).
While millet and wheat were the main crops in the north, rice was the 
mainstay in the Yangzi valley and the south. Production got a huge boost from 
the introduction of ‘early-ripening rice’ from Champa, which led to double and 
sometimes even triple cropping. This stimulated the growth of the population 
from 60 million in 1000 to 115 million in 1200. By comparison, the population on 
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the Indian subcontinent rose only from 80 million to 86 million over the same 
two centuries. The population of Kaifeng in 1078 was about 750,000, making it 
probably the largest city in the world. Iron production at this time was of the 
order of 150,000 tonnes annually, a level not reached in all of Europe until after 
1700 (Hartwell 1966).
The ‘peaceful coexistence’ that the Song had enjoyed on their north-eastern 
border came to an end in 1127 when the Khitan state was overthrown by another 
tribe of warrior nomads, the Jurchen. Not content with simply enjoying the Song 
tribute the Jurchen invaded North China and drove the Song out of their capital 
Kaifeng, forcing them to take refuge south of the Yangzi. There they established 
the Southern Song Dynasty, with its capital at Hangzhou, which soon became 
even more prosperous than it had been while based in the north. The cultivation 
of tea and the production of ‘true’ porcelain were two of the main activities 
and commerce with Southeast Asia and beyond flourished. The population of 
Hangzhou was estimated at a staggering 1.5 million and the urban population 
ratio of the Southern Song was 12 per cent, not exceeded in Europe until 1800, 
according to Richard von Glahn (2016: 251).
The Southern Song and the Jurchen in the north both fell prey to the rising 
superpower of the Mongol Empire of Chinggis Khan (r.1206–1227) and his 
successors. His grandson Khubilai Khan (r.1260–1294) proclaimed himself the 
first emperor of the Yuan Dynasty in 1271, ruling over a reunified China after the 
final defeat of the Southern Song in 1279. The regime that he established was 
on the whole a remarkably enlightened one. The Mongols were clearly the ruling 
elite but the Chinese people were not subjected to oppression. The Confucian 
scholar-officials continued to be employed but did not enjoy a monopoly of the 
higher posts, sharing them with talented individuals from all over the empire and 
beyond. Agriculture, industry, and commerce were all encouraged and extensive 
public works undertaken. The famous postal service with riders covering up to 
250 miles a day connected all points of the empire. Paper currency was issued, at 
first excessively but later with more restraint. Foreign trade was actively promoted, 
both overseas and overland. The borders of China were extended permanently to 
include the provinces of Yunnan in the southwest and Gansu in the northwest. 
Inevitably, however, the familiar ‘dynastic cycle’ of Chinese history took its course. 
Subsequent rulers had short and troubled reigns, the administration became 
increasingly corrupt, the hydraulic infrastructure was neglected, leading to 
disastrous floods and outbreaks of plague that caused severe disruption. Native 
Chinese dissent multiplied and erupted into fierce rebellion. In 1368, the leader of 
the rebellion finally drove out the Mongols, proclaiming himself the first emperor 
of the new Ming Dynasty (Rossabi 1988, 2014).
Korea and Japan had developed autonomously but were recipients of strong 
cultural influences from China, particularly during the Tang Dynasty. Japan was, 
in principle, a unified state under an emperor of supposedly divine descent but 
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real power was in the hands of regional feudal lords. One of these lords, Minamoto 
Yoritomo (1147–1199) acquired the title of Shogun (‘generalissimo’) and established 
what was known as the Kamakura Shogunate which effectively ruled the country 
from 1192 to 1333. It was this regime that organized the successful defence 
against Mongol invasions in 1274 and 1281. The stress caused by these invasions 
and their aftermath led eventually to the fall of the Kamakura and its replacement 
by the Ashikaga Shogunate (1338–1573), also known as the Muromachi Bakufu 
(‘government’) from the location of its headquarters near Kyoto (Hall  1970: 
chapter 7).
Chinese civilization in the form of Confucianism and Buddhism, as well as the 
writing system, was diffused to the Korean peninsula where three kingdoms 
arose: first Koguryo in the north, followed by Paekche in the southwest and Silla in 
the southeast by the fourth century. All three kingdoms contended for power in 
the peninsula while also engaging in conflict and co-operation with China, with 
unification finally being achieved in 1392 by a new state Koryo, renamed Choson 
by the first ruler of the Yi Dynasty which lasted until 1910 (Lee 1984).
Despite millennia of strong influences from India and China, the mainland 
states and island polities of Southeast Asia have their own distinct ethnic, linguistic, 
and cultural identities. Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar and Thailand now 
exist nowhere else in Asia other than Sri Lanka, and the Islam of Indonesia and 
Malaysia has a distinctively different social character from that of the Middle East 
or South Asia. Overland migration routes from China into the great river valleys 
of the mainland are relatively easy to traverse and there has been traffic on the sea 
lanes linking the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian 
Gulf since time immemorial, with Srivijaya in Sumatra and Melaka on the Malay 
Peninsula as major entrepots. Strong centralized kingdoms on the mainland and 
the interior of Java like Pagan, Ayuthia, Angkor, Annam, Champa, and Majapahit 
interacted closely with their coastal regions and with China and India in trade, 
warfare, and cultural exchange during this period from 1000 to 1500 (D.G.E. Hall 
1968: part 1).
3. Silk Roads and Sea Lanes: International Trade, 1000–1500
In the Chinese view of the world order China was the ‘central kingdom’ from 
which the emperor ruled ‘all under heaven’. All foreign states were thus regarded 
as vassals and foreign trade was viewed as the payment of ‘tribute’ to which the 
‘Son of Heaven’ graciously responded with gifts of equal or greater value. Relations 
with Korea and Japan, in particular, were regulated in this way.4 Korean exports 
4 See Fairbank (1968).
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were ginseng, furs, and other natural products while Japan mainly provided raw 
silk. Paper was imported from China but Japan eventually learned paper-making 
from the Koreans, attaining quality levels that surpassed that of the Chinese. The 
Japanese ability to reverse engineer imported products and to improve upon and 
eventually to export them, so familiar in the twentieth century, was thus evident 
even from these very early days. Another important example from this early 
period is the manufacture of the famous samurai sword blades that were in great 
demand all over East and Southeast Asia. Tens of thousands of these swords were 
exported annually to Japan, in addition to raw materials like sulfur and copper 
and other manufactured goods such as paper, screens, and decorative folding 
fans.5 The Chinese imports most in demand were silk fabrics and books—not only 
the Chinese classics but also technical works on science and technology. Huge 
amounts of Chinese copper coins balanced the trade and were increasingly used 
as a medium of exchange in Japan, an interesting early example of ‘dollarization’ 
arising out of spontaneous market forces, even within the archaic framework of 
the tribute system (Yamamura and Kamiki 1983).
According to von Verschuer (2006: 19), one-third of all the Chinese books 
in  existence at that time were available in Japan as early as 831, showing how 
successfully Japan was absorbing Chinese culture. China’s trade with Korea 
obviously had lower transport costs and was larger than with Japan. The city of 
Sakai, near Osaka, became the main centre for trade with Korea and Southeast 
Asia, particularly Siam. One interesting export item was printed volumes of the 
Buddhist canon, indicating that Korea was a pioneer in printing even before China 
and centuries before Gutenberg (von Verschuer (2006: chapter 4–5).
Chinese international trade was particularly active during the period of the 
Southern Song (1127–1279). With the overland routes to the west cut off, they 
were obliged to rely on overseas trade, which they did with a vengeance. ‘The 
ocean in Sung times was the front door of China and it was open to all who were 
interested in commercial relations with China’ (Ma 1971: 30). While Canton was 
the only official port for foreign trade under the Tang, there were nine such port 
cities under the Song, each under an Office of Maritime Trade. Canton was dis-
placed by Quanzhou in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan as the leading port city. 
In 1225, the Superintendent of Foreign Trade in this city, Chau Ju-kua, published 
a remarkable work on the ‘Records of Foreign Nations’ in which he lists all the 
nations trading with Quanzhou and the hundreds of commodities they exported 
and imported, extending from Southeast Asia to India, East Africa and the Middle 
East, all the way to the Mediterranean (Wheatley 1959; Hirth and Rockhill 1964).
The trade across the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea used to be carried 
in Arab and Persian vessels but under the Song the large, highly seaworthy 
5 See von Verschuer (2006: chapters 4–5) and Kang (2010: chapter 6).
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Chinese junks replaced them. With the Middle East enjoying the ‘Golden Age of 
Islam’, South India growing vigorously on both the Coromandel and Malabar 
Coasts under the Chola Dynasty, and strong kingdoms emerging in Southeast 
Asia, the arc of trade extending from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf 
and the Red Sea saw unprecedented prosperity. Silk and porcelain from China, 
black pepper from the Malabar Coast, cinnamon, nutmeg and cloves from the 
East Indies, cotton textiles from Bengal and Gujerat, pearls from Ceylon, ivory 
from East Africa, and the proverbial frankincense and myrrh from Arabia were 
the main but far from the only goods that entered this commerce. Just to remind 
us that all commerce is not necessarily peaceful, Simon Digby (1982: 147) notes 
the continuing significance of the trade in war-animals, cavalry horses from Iran 
and Arabia and fighting elephants from the jungles of Ceylon and Southeast Asia.
The prospects for overland trade to the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, in contrast to 
the Southern Song, were virtually unlimited. The Mongol Empire as a whole con-
trolled not only all of China under the Yuan but also the ancestral Mongol lands 
of Central Asia under the Chagatai Khanate, Iran under the Islamicized Mongol 
regime known as the II-Khanate, and most of Russia which owed allegiance to the 
Golden Horde under the so-called ‘Mongol Yoke’. This led to the establishment of 
what came to be known as the Pax Mongolica across the entire extent of Central 
Asia. The fabled Silk Roads, which had reached their heyday from the seventh to 
the tenth centuries under the Tang, now enjoyed a great revival under the protec-
tion and support of the Great Khans.
It was not only goods that were conveyed in both directions along the Silk 
Roads and associated sea lanes but, even more importantly, ideas and technical 
knowledge, as stressed in the seminal work of Joseph Needham (1954). Crucial 
inventions such as gunpowder, printing, the compass and other navigation aids 
such as the sternpost rudder and lateen sails, all moved from east to west during 
this period, stimulating their adoption and improvement in Europe during the 
Renaissance. Religious ideas propagated by monks and missionaries were written 
down and influenced scripts adopted by previously unlettered peoples such as the 
Uighurs and the Mongols (Liu 1988; Millward 2013). Unfortunately, the plague 
germ that brought the Black Death to Europe and the Middle East in the 1340s 
also travelled along the Silk Road, wiping out over a third of the population initially 
but with the associated rise in per capita incomes and wages leading to growth of 
population and GDP that went well beyond the initial levels in the long run 
(Findlay and Lundahl 2017: chapters 5, 7).
At the western end the main beneficiaries from the Pax Mongolica were the 
Byzantine Empire, the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria, and the rising Italian 
city-states of Venice and Genoa, with their trading stations on the shores of the 
Black Sea. The fact that all of these states were themselves connected to Europe all 
the way west to England, Flanders, and France enabled Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) 
to speak of a ‘thirteenth-century world system’ from 1250 to 1350, preceding the 
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fully global one established by the European ‘voyages of discovery’ at the end of 
the fifteenth century. The Venetian Marco Polo (1254–1324) and the Moroccan 
Ibn Battuta (1304–1377) were both able to travel from one end of this world to the 
other and back, one largely by land and the other mainly by sea, without the 
slightest danger, to bring to the rapt attention of the readers of the accounts of their 
travels, then and since, the myriad wonders they had witnessed along the way.
After the fall of the Yuan, the first five emperors of the new Ming Dynasty, 
from 1368 to 1435, maintained a vigorous expansionist policy on both the north-
ern and southern land frontiers and in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
switching to a more defensive posture after that date. The celebrated seven voy-
ages from 1405 to 1433 in the Indian Ocean led by the Muslim admiral Zheng He 
(1371–1433) reflect both the great ambition of the expansionary phase and its 
abrupt and permanent conclusion.6 The great armadas of Zheng He displayed the 
Ming imperial banners to all the mainland and island states of Southeast Asia, 
Bengal and both coasts of the Indian peninsula, Ceylon, the Horn of Africa, the 
Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. After his death and that of the fifth emperor in 
1435, the expeditions were discontinued and the resources diverted to frontier 
defence against a possible return of the Mongols.
A good measure of the rise and fall of Ming China’s influence on Southeast 
Asia is provided by Anthony Reid (1993: table 1) which shows forty-two tribute 
missions from Java, thirty-seven from the two Malay states of Melaka and Pasai, 
thirty-three from Champa and thirty-one from Siam, a total of 143 in all over the 
period 1400 to 1439 of the Zheng He voyages, compared to a total of seventy-
three or barely half from these states over the next seventy years from 1440 to 
1510. The command of the ‘southern ocean’ was thus ceded to a small nation 
on the western edge of Europe that dispatched a flotilla of caravels around Cape 
Horn, landing at Calicut in 1498 and initiating a new era in Asian and world 
history, the ‘Vasco da Gama Epoch’ (Panikkar 1969).
4. The European Intrusion and the Creation  
of Global Trade, 1500–1650
Lord Acton gave the Portuguese the accolade of being ‘the first Europeans to 
understand that the ocean is not a limit, but the universal waterway that unites 
mankind’ (Acton 1961: 61). In less than two decades after da Gama’s historic voy-
age they captured Goa, Hormuz, and Melaka but failed to take Aden, the entrance 
to the Red Sea. They thus failed to cut off completely the supply of Eastern spices 
to Venice through Alexandria, which was the main motivation of their enterprise. 
6 See Dreyer (2007) for a detailed account.
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Melaka, captured in 1511, commanding the Straits of Malacca, was a fabulously 
rich port-city-state ruled by a family of Malay sultans since about 1400. It was 
visited by about a hundred ships a year from the Middle East, both coasts of India, 
the Bay of Bengal, the Indonesian islands and China, according to the Portuguese 
traveller Tome Pires. These ships brought an enormous variety of goods: cotton 
textiles from India, rice from Burma and Siam, Chinese silk, and Indonesian 
spices that went both east and west. It was Pires who made the famous observation 
that ‘the lord of Melaka has his hand on the throat of Venice’, failing to note that 
Venice could indeed be choked but not strangled if Aden was not also secured 
(Reid 1993: vol. II).
The Portuguese king Dom Manuel I (r.1495–1521) declared himself ‘Lord of 
the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India’ 
and as such claimed the right to control entry and exit into all ports in the Arabian 
Sea and the Indian Ocean, in other words issuing a ‘license to plunder’ by 
charging ‘protection money’ from all merchant vessels of any nationality plying 
these shores (Newitt 1980: 19). The Estado da India, as the Portuguese enterprise 
came to be called, expanded rapidly, settling and fortifying Colombo in 1518, 
Macao in 1557 and finally Nagasaki in 1571 (Subrahmanyam 1993).
While the Portuguese entered the Pacific from the west, the Spanish crossed it 
from the east, colonizing the Philippines in the 1540s with Manila as the capital. 
The arrival there of a galleon from Acapulco, laden with silver from Potosi in 
Bolivia, returning with an even more precious cargo of Chinese silk, marked the 
global circuit of trade for the first time in history. The flood of New World silver, 
brought across the Pacific by the Spaniards and across the Atlantic, Mediterranean, 
and Indian Ocean by the Portuguese and later the Dutch and the English, trans-
formed the monetary and general economic history of Asia. Silver was basically 
the only commodity that European traders could offer in exchange for Chinese 
silk and porcelain, Indonesian cloves and nutmeg, Malabar pepper and the cotton 
textiles of Bengal and Gujerat, to export back to the markets of Europe, Africa, 
and the New World. While the silver ‘windfall’ accrued initially to the Habsburg 
rulers of Spain and Austria, it increasingly ended up in the hands of the newly 
established Dutch and English East India Companies that used it for the purchase 
of the Eastern commodities that they shipped around the world (Findlay and 
O’Rourke 2007: 212–26).
The period 1500 to 1650 saw a remarkable expansion of the Ming economy, to 
a considerable extent in response to currents unleashed by the Iberian voyages 
at the turn of the fifteenth century. Particularly important were the food and 
other crops from the New World that found their way into China such as maize, 
sweet potatoes, and peanuts. These were all grown as second or even third 
crops, boosting rural per capita incomes and stimulating population growth. The 
population rose from 110 million in 1500 to 160 million in 1600, before falling to 
140 million as a consequence of the disturbances associated with the dynastic 
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transition from the Ming to a new Manchu Qing Dynasty in 1644. The influx 
of  silver from the New World and new mines discovered in Japan provided 
the  monetization necessary to lubricate the expansion. Silk and porcelain were 
exported all over the world and several technical innovations made in transport, 
manufacturing, and agriculture (Bray 2000; von Glahn 2016: 296–312).
The fall of the Ming was due not to any erosion of the economic base but to 
problems with the political and administrative superstructure. Corruption and 
factional disputes within the bureaucracy caused public dissatisfaction, leading 
to internal disorders and rebellion. This gave an opportunity to the Manchus, a 
Sinicized nomadic tribe related to the Jurchen, to intervene and oust the Ming, 
establishing a new Qing Dynasty in 1644 that lasted until 1911 (Rowe  2009: 
chapter 1).
In Japan, the Ashikaga shoguns based in the capital Kyoto were gradually 
losing power to a new class of locally based feudal lords, known as the daimyo, in 
the east and the north. Warfare between contending clans and factions, making 
extensive use of firearms that had been introduced by the Portuguese, became 
ever more intense leading to the outbreak of a prolonged period of instability 
known as the Sengoku Jidai or ‘Warring States Period’. Order was finally restored 
only after the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, when Tokugawa Ieyasu defeated a 
coalition of opposing feudal lords and established the Tokugawa Shogunate that 
lasted until 1868. To consolidate power the Tokugawa imposed a rigorous policy 
of sakoku or ‘seclusion’, cutting Japan off from all contact with foreigners, includ-
ing Christian missionaries, except for official relations with China and a small 
Dutch trading post in Nagasaki (Hall 1970: chapters 9–10).
India after the fall of the Delhi Sultanate was ruled by a succession of weak 
regimes until the founding of the Mughal Empire in 1526 by Babur (1483–1530), 
a Timurid prince from Central Asia. The empire was consolidated and extended 
over the whole of northern India by his grandson, the great Emperor Akbar 
(r.1556–1605). The Mughals, like the Ottomans and Safavids, were what Hodgson 
(1974) called a ‘gunpowder empire’, one that relied on heavy siege artillery to 
batter down all opposition into submission. While Akbar began his rule with a 
succession of hard-fought victories over Hindu Rajput and rival Muslim rulers, 
his charismatic personality, moral character, and far-sighted vision made the 
Mughals into what could be called a truly Indian, as opposed to an Indo-Muslim, 
dynasty (Mukhia 2004).
The population of Mughal India is put at around 115 million in 1600, out of 
150 million for the sub-continent as a whole (Streusand 2011: 272), rising to 200 
million in 1800. For China, the figures are also 150 million in 1600 but rising 
to 320 million in 1800. We can thus infer from the Malthus-Ricardo model that 
technical progress and capital accumulation was much greater in China than 
in India. The introduction of New World plants, for example seems to have been 
much less extensive than in China. There is no reason to doubt, however, the 
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contention by Richards (1993: 204) that ‘the secular trend for Mughal India was 
that of economic growth and vitality’. Population growth was slow but steady, 
indicating no severe squeeze on peasant incomes. The surplus extracted must 
have been enormous to create such surviving monuments as Fatehpur Sikri, the 
Taj Mahal, and the great fortresses. The emperor’s personal income alone is 
estimated at one million silver rupees per month, compared to a monthly wage 
for unskilled workers at 1.5 rupees per month (Moosvi 1987: 284). Cotton cloth, 
in a very wide range of qualities and styles in the form of calicos, chintzes, taffeta, 
and the superfine muslins, continued to be the mainstay of manufacturing and 
international trade, in which the Dutch and English East India Companies 
were coming to play an increasing role, but without displacing the very active 
participation of Hindu and Muslim merchants. Indian cotton textiles, together 
with Chinese silks and porcelain were the main manufactured exports of the 
world until the rise of Lancashire cotton textiles during the Industrial Revolution 
(Chaudhuri 1982; Roy 2012: chapter 4).
India’s main import was silver, in massive amounts largely to be coined into the 
silver rupees issued since the time of Akbar at never less than 96 per cent purity. 
The imports averaged about 100 tonnes annually from about 1590 to 1645, mostly 
from the Ottoman and Safavid territories and Europe. The silver influx, as in 
China, did not cause inflation of the price level since it facilitated internal trade and 
exchange, boosting productivity and output. The two great ‘sinks’ for the surge of 
world silver flows from 1500 to 1650 were Ming China and Mughal India, the 
giant planets of the Asian galaxy, drawing the world’s silver into their orbits by the 
sheer force of gravitational attraction (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007: 212–26).
5.  Land Power versus Sea Power, 1650–1860
In 1650, as we have seen in the previous section, Mughal India, Qing China, and 
Tokugawa Japan were all strong, centralized states in full control of their borders. 
By 1860, however, the European merchant companies previously confined to the 
coastal peripheries had succeeded in destabilizing both of the great Asian empires 
and seriously threatening their sovereignty, while an American commodore was 
forcing the Tokugawa to breach their seclusion policy and open Japan to free 
trade. How did all this come about?
The reign of the Emperor Aurangzeb (r.1658–1707), the last of the great 
Mughal rulers, was most notable for its rejection of Akbar’s efforts to rule as an 
Indian rather than a strictly Muslim monarch. He adopted a narrow and dogmatic 
Sunni Sharia version of Islam and introduced a number of discriminatory 
measures against his Hindu and Sikh subjects, including the destruction of some 
temples and shrines. Not surprisingly this led to strong resistance, not only from 
the previously loyal Rajputs but also particularly from the fierce Maratha warriors 
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of the western Deccan under their great leader Shivaji Bhonsle. After his death in 
1707, he was succeeded by a number of mediocre rulers and the empire went into 
a pronounced decline (Streusand 2011).
Meanwhile, the English East India Company was steadily extending the range 
and profitability of its operations, acquiring the well-located trading stations 
of Surat (1607) and Bombay (1661) on the west coast, and Madras (1640) and 
Calcutta (1690) on the east. Surat was displaced over time by the other three, 
which became the bases for regional Company ‘presidencies’. All three were not 
only trading stations but fortified city-states,7 with their own armies of native 
troops led by European officers, as with the French centre at Pondicherry and the 
Dutch at Pulicat. With their thriving foreign trade and other commercial oppor-
tunities these places attracted many local merchants and others with various skills 
to offer. With a sort of ‘extraterritoriality’ in place, they had independent legal 
systems that many locals must have found more conducive than what the Mughals 
and other Indian rulers had to offer, on which see (Roy 2012: chapter 4).
From a military standpoint the Company forces of small but well-trained 
detachments of Indian soldiers with European officers were able to prevail over 
the much larger but less disciplined armies of the Indian rulers whenever clashes 
occurred. Thus, the sea power that secured the Europeans in their coastal stations 
was supplemented by increasingly formidable power on land. This was convin-
cingly demonstrated by the victory of Company forces under Robert Clive at the 
battle of Plassey in 1757, when it defeated the Nawab of Bengal, and over an even 
larger Mughal army at the Battle of Buxar in 1764. The prize for these victories 
was the award to the Company by the Mughal Empire of the diwani, the rights to 
collect the entire revenue of Bihar, Orissa, and the enormously wealthy province 
of Bengal, rightly called the ‘British Bridgehead’ to the ultimate conquest of all of 
India by P.J.  Marshall (1987). Subsequent decades saw the consolidation of the 
Company’s hold on India with wars against the Marathas, Sikhs, Afghans, and the 
Gurkhas of Nepal. The shock of the outbreak of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 and its 
violent suppression finally led to the Crown taking over the administration of 
India from the Company (Stein 1998: chapters 5–6).
The Manchu Qing Dynasty, which replaced the Ming in 1644, was remarkable 
in many ways. A branch of the Jurchen tribes of Manchuria, they were not pastoral 
nomads from the steppes, though their military striking power was also based on 
mounted archers. They were organized into a very effective military force by two 
great leaders, Nurhaci (1559–1626) and his son Hong Taiji (1592–1643), divided 
into what were called the ‘Eight Banners’, each Banner constituting not just an 
army unit but the entire households of all the troops within it. The ethnic 
composition of each Banner was not fixed, consisting not only of Jurchens but 
7 See Richards (1993: 240).
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also allied Central Asians and ethnic Chinese that had been absorbed into the 
Manchu orbit (Crossley 1997). Hong Taiji subdued Korea in 1638 but died in 1643, 
with his infant son becoming the first Qing Emperor Shunzhi (r.1644–1661).
The most urgent problem for the new regime was suppressing multiple rebel-
lions by Ming loyalists. The most important of these was that of the Zheng family, 
which had been involved in coastal trade and piracy, sometimes in association 
with, and at others in opposition to, Japanese, Portuguese, Dutch, and other 
foreign interests. The half-Japanese Zheng Chenggong (1623–1662), known in 
the west as Coxinga, built up a formidable naval force and mercantile empire, 
establishing his base in Taiwan after driving out the Dutch, from where the 
Zhengs conducted lucrative trade with Japan and Southeast Asia, while harassing 
the Manchu regime until it captured the island in 1683.8
The next three Qing emperors Kangxi (r.1662–1722), Yongzheng (r.1723–1735) 
and Qianlong (r.1736–1795) saw the dynasty reach its zenith during their long 
and illustrious reigns, with its territorial extent unmatched in Chinese history. 
They added not only Xinjiang and Tibet but also Manchuria, Inner and Outer 
Mongolia, and areas of Eastern Turkestan as well. Their forces marched west, 
armed with cannon and muskets, destroying the threat of the Mongol steppe 
nomads to China and sedentary civilizations forever. While Qing China was 
driving through Central Asia from the east, Russia under the Romanovs was 
already moving vigorously in the opposite direction but further north in Siberia, 
reaching the Pacific at Okhotsk in the 1640s. The interests of the two empires 
collided in the fertile valley of the Amur River but were peacefully resolved by the 
treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiatkha (1727), leading to considerable trade of 
Russian furs for Chinese tea and silk (Perdue 2005).
The Manchus accepted Chinese culture and institutions almost entirely, relying 
on the scholar-gentry officials to administer the country and maintaining the civil 
service examination system. They also, however, undertook shrewd measure to 
ensure that their elite position in the society was not threatened. They did this by 
establishing a sort of parallel administration, pairing Manchu and ethnic Chinese 
officials at each level below the top, which was solely occupied by Manchus. The 
Manchu language and script was also used to maintain all confidential records 
to preserve security. Internally the country continued to thrive economically in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but by the turn of the nineteenth 
signs of stagnation and decline were becoming evident, as noted by the British 
ambassador Lord Macartney who observed that Qing China resembled ‘an old, 
crazy man-of-war’ that would soon be ‘dashed to pieces on the shore’ (Spence 
1990: 123; Rowe 2009: ch. 2).
8 See Clements (2005).
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From about 1800 onwards the Qing regime came under increasing pressure 
from both internal dissension and external threats. The spread of opium addiction 
due to the sale of the drug by the East India Company led to a crackdown by 
Qing officials, in response to which the British launched what came to be known 
as the First Opium War of 1839–1842, with a small naval force of steam-powered 
gunboats sailing up the Yangzi, easily defeating the Manchu resistance. The 
resulting ‘unequal’ Treaty of Nanjing (1842) saw the ceding of Hong Kong and the 
opening of five ports, including Shanghai, to free trade. A further dispute led to 
the Second Opium War of 1856–1860 with the Treaty of Tianjin (1860) opening 
the Yangzi River to international commerce and adding more ports open to free 
trade. The crisis created by the Opium Wars was compounded by the outbreak of 
the devastatingly lethal Taiping Rebellion, in which an estimated 60 million 
 people lost their lives between 1850 and 1864 (Rowe 2009: chapter 7; Rossabi 2014: 
chapter 9).
Despite the severe political setbacks at the hands of the British and other 
European interests, the economies of both India and China performed quite well 
over the 1650 to 1860 period. The population of the Indian subcontinent rose 
from 145 million in 1650 to 225 million in 1850, while that of China more than 
trebled from 130 million to 420 million over the same period. While this surge in 
population undoubtedly contributed to the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion, it 
must have been improved economic circumstances that led to the massive rise in 
the first place. The cultivated area doubled and yields per acre rose as a result of 
both the continued spread of the New World crops and the boom in tea that was a 
major driving force of the Qing economy in these decades. Most of the tea was 
exported from Canton, the sole port officially open to foreign trade before the 
‘unequal’ treaties, and was also the entrance for imports. Naquin and Rawski (1987: 
table 2) construct an index of the volume of trade passing through Canton that rises 
from the base of 100 in 1719 to 1338 in 1833, levelling off thereafter up to the 1850s.
The East India Company was the main actor in shaping both intra-Asian trade 
and the trade of Asia with Europe and the rest of the world. Chaudhuri (1978) 
calculates that the compound rate of growth of the Company’s exports and 
imports between Asia and England of goods and treasure was 2.2 per cent per 
annum from when it was founded in 1600 to 1760, a faster rate than that of either 
population or aggregate output in Asia and Europe between those dates. Initially 
the Company had to export considerable amounts of treasure, mostly silver, to 
pay for the purchase of Indian cotton textiles and other goods to be sold in 
exchange for the spices it acquired in the East Indies for resale in Europe. The 
proportion of treasure to total exports fell from above 75 per cent for most of the 
period from 1600 to 1760 to only 30 per cent at the end, reflecting the crucial 
significance of the acquisition of Bengal. The Company sold Indian raw cotton to 
China for the manufacture of cheap cotton cloth sold in its home market as well 
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as for export but its exports to China came increasingly to rely on opium, rising 
from about 2,000 chests a year in the 1790s to 24,000 annually by the 1830s, with 
which it purchased tea to export to Europe and the rest of the world (Roy 2012: 
chapter 5). As Tan Chung (1974: 431) wryly observed about the Britain–China–
India trade triangle, it worked out as ‘Indian opium for the Chinese, Chinese tea 
for the Britons and the British Raj for the Indians’.
The period 1600 to 1867 that Japan spent under the Tokugawa Shogunate has 
been widely misunderstood as one of total seclusion from the rest of the world. 
While most contact with Europeans was cut off, relations with China through 
Nagasaki, and with Korea through the island of Tsushima and with Southeast Asia 
through the Ryukyu Islands continued uninterrupted. The tiny Dutch trading 
post at Deshima was a very narrow ‘window to the West’ but one through which 
Japan achieved much greater knowledge of modern science and technology than 
India or China despite those countries not having anything resembling the sakoku 
policy.9 In the light of all this it can be argued that the ‘seclusion’ of Japan under 
the Tokugawa, giving Japan a century and a half of peace and prosperity, made 
her better able, not less, to deal with the forced intrusion of the West, when it 
finally came in the form of Commodore Perry’s ‘black ships’, than the rest of Asia.
6.  Imperialism to Independence, 1860–1968
This period begins with Europe at the pinnacle of its global dominance. The 
Industrial Revolution had spread from Britain to the rest of Western Europe, pro-
viding it not only with strong industrial economies but the military power associ-
ated with it. India had fallen almost completely under British rule and Qing 
China was reeling from the shocks of the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion 
and in no position to resist further European intrusions. Southeast Asia had been 
opened to European trade and influence for centuries but its traditional kingdoms 
had started to lose their territorial sovereignty, to Britain in Burma and Malaya, 
France in Indo-China and to the Netherlands in Indonesia. The opening of the 
Suez Canal and the substitution of steam for sail saw a drastic reduction in 
transport costs and the era of the ‘Great Specialization’ from 1870 to 1914, with 
Europe providing the manufactured exports and India, China, and Southeast 
Asia the primary products rice, tea, and industrial raw materials such as rubber, 
tin, and jute.
Colombo, Calcutta, Rangoon, Saigon, Singapore, and Batavia emerged as the 
strategic centres of this new pattern of colonial development in Southeast Asia 
while Hong Kong and Shanghai played the same role on the coast of China. 
9 See Keene (1969).
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Chinese settlers from the southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong moved 
in large numbers into Southeast Asia, expanding the vibrant ‘Overseas Chinese’ 
communities in the Dutch East Indies and Malaya, while Indian workers, mer-
chants and moneylenders went to Burma and Malaya. No less than 2.5 million 
Chinese went to the Dutch East Indies between 1880 and 1922, while 263,000 
went to Malaya, bringing the Chinese population residing there to 2.8 million and 
433,000 respectively, while the Indian population in Burma in 1930 was 1.3 million 
and in Malaya 628,000 (Lewis 1978: 185). Capital, and the top layers of the colonial 
administration, was generally provided by the metropolitan centres in each case. 
The result was what Furnivall (1948) called the ‘plural economy’.
The one Asian country that was not under some sort of colonial or semi-
colonial status was of course Japan. The Tokugawa Shogunate, discredited by its 
humiliations at the hands of Commodore Perry was swept away by the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 that launched the country on its then unprecedented course 
of rapid modernization.10 The transformation is very evident in terms of foreign 
trade, brilliantly analysed by Lockwood (1968: chapter 6) on ‘Trade as a Highway 
of Learning’. Japan’s exports grew at 7.4 per cent per annum between 1883 and 
1913, more than twice as fast as world trade, which grew at 3.4 per cent, with 
China and India at 3.35 and 3.05 respectively (Lewis 1978: 169). The changing 
structure of the exports was even more impressive, with the share of manufactures 
rising from below 60 per cent at the beginning and over 90 per cent at the end 
(Macpherson 1987: table 3). From 1913 to 1938 Japan’s GDP growth rate was 
3.9 per cent per annum, compared to 0.7 per cent for Great Britain, 1.1 per cent for 
the USA and 1.85 for Germany (Nakamura 1997: table 3.2).
It was this very rapid industrialization that enabled Japan to pursue an 
expansionist foreign policy, defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–
1895 and annexing Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910. What brought her the 
most prestige of all, however, was her defeat of Tsarist Russia and the sinking of 
the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. 
While all other Asian nations in one way or another were victims of imperialism, 
Japan was able not only to avoid that fate but to actively join the imperialist club 
herself and victimize China and Korea (see Beasley 1987). Further gains at the 
expense of China were obtained when the German-held ‘concessions’ in China 
were given to Japan as reward for her belated entry into the First World War on 
the Allied side. Finally, it was the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 
followed by the brutal invasion of China in 1937 that led to the outbreak of the 
Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (Hall 1970: chapters 16–18; Beasley 
1987: chapters 12–16).
10 See Hall (1970: chapters 12–15).
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Qing China attempted to recover from the disasters of the Opium Wars and 
the Taiping Rebellion with some belated reforms, such as the so-called ‘self-
strengthening’ movement to build up her defence capabilities, but after the defeat 
in the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 the position of the 
regime became increasingly untenable, the six-year-old last emperor abdicated 
and the Republic of China declared in 1912. The first general election was won by 
the Kuomintang Nationalist Party led by Sun Yatsen but he was soon ousted by a 
military ‘strong man’ and the country dominated by a succession of regional war-
lords. The Nationalists under Chiang Kaishek and the newly formed Communist 
Party under Mao Zedong vied for power until they were forced into collaboration 
by the Japanese invasion of 1937 (Rowe  2009: chapters 8–10); Rossabi (2014: 
chapters 10–11).
Economic growth in both India and China was dismally poor, both in this 
period and over the very long run. According to Heston (2005: 379) per capita 
income growth in India during 1860 to 1920 was under 0.5 per cent per annum and 
zero from 1920 to 1947. The performance of China was even worse. According to 
Maddison (2007) real per capita income was constant at US$600 between 1300 
and 1820, and then fell to US$538 in 1952. In other words, both India and China 
remained caught in the Malthus–Ricardo ‘trap’ for the entire millennium (Elvin 
1973). Real per capita income in China, in terms of 1990 US dollars, fell by more 
than half from over US$1200 in 1090 under the Northern Song, to under US$600 
in 1850, and could not have risen much, if at all, for the rest of the millennium 
(von Glahn 2016: table 9.4).
It is therefore not surprising that the challenge of economic development 
confronting the Asian economies, and especially in India and China, should have 
appeared so daunting to Gunnar Myrdal in Asian Drama. With per capita 
incomes so low, how could a sufficiently high savings rate be attained for GDP to 
keep pace with population growth, let alone exceed it? How could sufficient 
‘surplus’ resources be squeezed from a desperately poor rural sector to build up 
infrastructure and manufacturing in the urban areas?
The Southeast Asian export economies all grew fairly rapidly until the onset of 
the Great Depression, which generally had a devastating effect on all of them 
when the world prices of rice, rubber, coffee, sugar, and other primary products 
all collapsed from 50 to 80 per cent, causing great distress to peasant cultivators, 
smallholders, and agricultural labourers (Elson 1992: 182–7). In Burma this led 
to the alienation of lands used as collateral for loans taken from the Chettiar 
moneylenders, leading to riots against urban Indian communities and the Saya 
San peasant rebellion. The 1930s consequently saw the upsurge of nationalism 
and demands for independence all over Southeast Asia. Thailand was also hit 
hard but its political independence enabled it to take more active measures to 
protect the rural sector than the mostly laissez-faire policies of the colonial 
regimes (Boomgard and Brown 2000).
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The outbreak of the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific region saw Japan in 
full control of all the colonial parts of Southeast Asia from 1942 until her surren-
der to the Allied Forces in 1945. By a strange irony it was the Asian country that 
had turned imperialist itself that ‘liberated’ the other Asian countries from their 
colonial oppressors. After their humiliating defeats at the hands of the Japanese 
there was no way that colonial rule could successfully be restored, despite the 
futile efforts of the French in Vietnam. The British withdrawal from the Indian 
subcontinent was tragically accompanied by the calamity of the partition between 
India and Pakistan. The Southeast Asian former colonies saw hostilities between 
domestic factions divided along ideological and ethnic lines enduring in Burma 
to the present day. The fall of Japan brought independence to the Korean people 
for the first time since 1910 but saw them bitterly divided at the 38th Parallel into 
a North supported by the USSR and a South by the USA. In China, 1945 saw the 
end of hostilities with Japan but also the end of the anti-Japanese alliance between 
the Nationalists and Communists, with the former having to withdraw to Taiwan, 
leaving Mao Zedong and the Communists in charge of the mainland by 1949. The 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 ended only in 1953 after the entry of China 
(Spector 2008).
Reshaped by the ‘MacArthur Shogunate’, Japan launched a sustained drive for 
development and technological change, powered by manufactured exports of 
electronics and automobiles. The Japanese model was followed with dazzling 
success by the ‘gang of four’ of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Vogel 
1991). Meanwhile China under Mao Zedong was undergoing the pangs of the 
Cultural Revolution until the situation was transformed by the pragmatic reforms 
of Deng Xiaoping.
Since then India, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia have all enjoyed sustained 
and even rapid economic growth, with China and India making vast strides in the 
eradication of poverty and going a long way to restore their ancient role of being 
the world’s leading manufactured exporters. In terms of the epigraph to this 
chapter, the Asian ‘drama thus conceived’ has seen many tragic episodes but on 
the whole, as viewed in 2018, it certainly has been far from being a tragedy since 
‘history then is not taken to be predetermined but within the power of man to 
shape’ as the pages of this chapter amply demonstrate.
7. Will this be the Asian Century?
In 1968 the answer to whether the twenty-first would be the ‘Asian Century’ 
almost certainly would have been clearly negative. When Myrdal said that the 
drama need not be ‘necessarily tragedy’ he was still clearly worried that it was a 
very real possibility. Today most people would consider the answer to be obviously 
‘yes’. At this point it would be useful to look back from our millennial perspective 
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into the old question of the differences between Asia and Europe that occupied 
the greatest minds of Europe from Herodotus and Aristotle to Hegel, Marx, and 
Weber. Marx envisaged Europe as evolving from primitive communal life through 
the successive ‘modes of production’ of slavery, feudalism and  capitalism. He 
specifically excluded Asia from this process, with the important exception of Japan 
that he unhesitatingly described as ‘feudal’ (see Marx 1967: vol. I, 718), an opinion 
confirmed by the complementary authority of Marc Bloch (1961: vol. II, 382) and 
J.W. Hall (1968: chapter 2).
India and China he designated as instances of an ‘Asiatic Mode of Production’, 
characterized by the total dominance of the ruler over the entire society due to 
the indispensable provision by the state of large-scale irrigation works. Society 
itself was merely a collection of self-sufficient villages paying tribute to the ruler, 
with a few cities serving as administrative centres or ‘princely camps’ rather than 
independently generating economic activity like the towns of medieval Europe. 
Here is a complete ‘absence of private property in land’ and hence no landed 
aristocracy or self-governing cities and thus no possibility of genuine feudalism. 
History is merely a succession of different empires changing as a result of internal 
decay or foreign conquest without any structural evolution. It is apparent, even 
from the very brief outline presented here, that this is a caricature of Asian history, 
and its applicability to Asia, or anywhere else for that matter, has been roundly 
rejected by Marxists and non-Marxists alike, but this brings up the question, 
plaintively asked by Byres (1985: 13): ‘If not feudalism, or the Asiatic Mode, then 
what?’. Before attempting to provide an answer it will be useful to note that Max 
Weber also made an unsuccessful attempt to differentiate Europe and Asia on 
the basis that ‘instrumental rationality’ was present only in the former, while its 
absence in the latter made it impossible for the transformation of economy and 
society to be achieved autonomously.11
A very effective answer to the question posed by Byres, provided by John Haldon 
(1993), and a number of other Marxist writers, is the concept of a ‘Tributary 
Mode of Production’ that applies to the Indian and Chinese cases considered here, 
as well as to the contemporaneous Ottoman, Safavid, and Muscovite empires. The 
‘ideal type’ of this construct is one in which the land is cultivated by peasants, 
who may be serfs as in the Russian case, but also free to move, as in the Indian and 
Chinese cases, but who are obliged to pay taxes assessed on the lands they cultivate, 
collected by local officials designated for that purpose, and then transmitted to a 
regional headquarters or the capital itself after deducting costs of collection and 
their own compensation. It is out of this ‘surplus’ that the ruler has to maintain 
himself, his court, army, and civil administration. While the bulk of the population 
will be rural, there will be towns where the officials assigned to the area would live 
together with merchants, artisans, and other providers of urban services. There 
11 See Nayyar (2016: 36–8).
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will be markets not only for goods and services but for labour, land, and capital as 
well, with whatever degree of regulation the ruler deems appropriate. Trade and 
contact with foreigners would also exist to whatever extent the regime is prepared 
to permit.
The key tension in the tributary mode is the distribution of the tribute itself, 
the revenue collected from the peasant producers, between the local elites of 
landowners and officials on the one hand and the centre on the other. In the early 
stages of the familiar dynastic cycle, the founder comes to power with a victorious 
army with all the glory of a conquering hero, local authorities fear his power and 
transmit as much revenue to the centre as is expected of them. In the later stages 
the central authority starts to weaken, a smaller fraction of the revenue is trans-
ferred, weakening the centre still further until it is overthrown by an external 
invader or internal rebellions that lead to provinces or regions breaking away and 
forming independent states until a new unifier arises and starts the cycle all over 
again. The reader will clearly recognize this pattern repeating itself in the Indian 
and Chinese cases considered here.
As we have seen, there is no reason why societies operating under this mode of 
production cannot have thriving and prosperous economies. The frontiers of the 
empire could also be extended beyond existing borders through both conquest 
and settlement. The Song clearly had a higher level of development than any 
contemporary state in feudal Europe and the Mughal Empire at its height was 
wealthier than any individual state in Europe of its time, though perhaps not of 
the composite Habsburg Empire with its vast possessions in the New World. All 
of this raises the questions of why did not capitalism, or more specifically the 
‘Industrial Revolution’, emerge endogenously in either Mughal India or China 
under the Song or any later dynasty, and why was there a ‘Great Divergence’ 
(Pomeranz 2000) between the living standards of Europe and Asia at least by the 
nineteenth century, if not even earlier.
The answer seems to be that despite the level of prosperity in the aggregate, the 
tributary states remained parasitic on their rural peasant sectors, precluding any 
agricultural revolution prior to, or accompanying, an industrial revolution as 
occurred in Britain. The urban sectors remained self-contained, catering to their 
elite clientele without any reciprocal interactions with the rural sector beyond 
the exploitative extraction of land revenue. Irfan Habib (1995: 231) puts this 
succinctly: ‘it must be considered whether the entire commercial system of the 
Mughal Indian economy was not largely parasitical, depending upon a system of 
direct agricultural exploitation by a small ruling class’. He goes on to say that 
 capital had tied its fortunes to the Mughal ruling class and failed to develop an 
independent existence. On China, another distinguished historian Ray Huang 
(1990: 94) says ‘Given the constitutional differences between the Qing Empire 
and its contemporary nation states in Western Europe, it would have been 
impossible for the Chinese to follow the path of the latter’.
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Joseph Needham (1969, 1981) posed the puzzle of why China failed to follow 
up on her brilliant early start in science and technology, falling behind the West 
by the seventeenth century when the Scientific Revolution occurred, failing to 
endogenously generate an Industrial Revolution. Lin (1995) provides an interest-
ing answer to this ‘Needham Puzzle’ in terms of the fact that the best intellectual 
talent in China was channelled into passing the civil service examinations based 
on mastery of the Chinese classics rather than acquiring the mathematical and 
scientific knowledge necessary for science-based innovation such as occurred in 
Britain and Europe. The inventors of the steam engine, Thomas Newcomen and 
James Watt, were not highly trained scientists themselves but they benefitted greatly 
from contact with Fellows of the Royal Society with whom they were familiar.12 
The civil service examination itself, however, has to be seen as an integral part of a 
deeply conservative Confucian ‘tributary’ society, which could not have been 
easily replaced or even supplemented by an alternative ‘ladder of success’.
We thus see that there was no pathway from the tributary mode to capitalism in 
either of our two Asian cases, just as there was none with the Ottomans, Safavids, 
and Romanovs. It was only ‘feudal’ Japan that was able to make the transition 
to capitalist modernity before the end of the nineteenth century. The Meiji 
Restoration accomplished this in the amazingly short period of a single generation. 
Successful merchants in China bought land and prepared their sons for the civil 
service examinations so that they could move into the sole prestigious class, that 
of the scholar-gentry. In Japan, the corresponding chonin mercantile group was 
excluded from entering the ruling samurai class and so developed their own 
independent bourgeois culture in the stimulating environment of the great cities 
of Tokyo and Osaka, while also building up the great commercial empires of 
the Matsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, ready to take full advantage of the vastly 
greater opportunities that opened up after 1868 (Hall 1970: 226–32).
The two outstanding cases of rapidly catching up to the British lead in the 
Industrial Revolution were Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan. In both cases, 
Britain suffered from what Veblen (1966) called the ‘penalty of taking the lead’ 
with the follower countries able to take advantage of the mistakes of the pioneer 
to quicken the pace of catching up. In the ‘Opportunity of Japan’, Veblen said ‘It is 
this unique combination of feudal fealty and chivalric honor with the material 
efficiency given by the modern technology that the strength of the Japanese 
nation lies’ (Veblen 1998: 251). The same idea was also advanced by Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962) as the ‘advantages of backwardness’ and applied by his 
student Henry Rosovsky (1966) to Japan. Gerschenkron noted that as the locus 
of capitalism and industrialization moved eastward, from Britain to France, 
Germany and Russia, the state played an increasingly active role in forcing the 
12 See Allen (2017).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
102 Asian Transformations
pace of the catching-up process. The case of Japan, with the Meiji state acting as a 
very aggressive ‘venture capitalist’, and also of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, only 
confirms this insight. It is now up to the rest of Asia to catch up with, and perhaps 
even overtake and surpass, the West.
References
Abu-Lughod, J.L. (1989). Before European Hegemony. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Acton, Lord (1961). Lectures on Modern History. New York: Meridian Press.
Allen, R.C. (2017). The Industrial Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beasley, W.G. (1987). Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bloch, M. (1961). Feudal Society, Volumes I, II. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press.
Boomgard, P., and I.  Brown (2000). Weathering the Storm. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies.
Bray, F. (2000). Technology and Society in Ming China, 1368–1644. Washington, DC: 
American Historical Association.
Byres, T.J. (1985). ‘Modes of Production and Pre-Colonial Non-European Societies’. 
In T.J. Byres and H. Mukhia (eds) Feudalism and Non-European Societies. London: 
Frank Cass.
Chaudhuri, K.N. (1978). The Trading World of Asia and the English East India 
Company 1660–1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chaudhuri, K.N. (1982). ‘European Trade with India’. In T. Raychaudhuri and I. Habib 
(eds) Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Clements, J. (2005). Coxinga and the Fall of the Ming Dynasty. Stroud: Sutton 
Publishing.
Crossley, K. (1997). The Manchus. Oxford: Blackwell.
Digby, S. (1982). ‘The Maritime Trade of India’. In T. Raychaudhuri and I. Habib (eds) 
Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume I, c.1200–1750. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Digby, S., and I. Habib (1982). ‘Northern India under the Sultanate’. In T. Raychaudhuri 
and I.  Habib (eds) Cambridge Economic History of India, Volume I, c.1200–1750. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dreyer, E.L. (2007). Zheng He. New York: Pearson Longman.
Elson, R.L. (1992). ‘International Commerce, the State and Society’. In N. Tarling (ed.) 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume III. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Ron Findlay 103
Elvin, M. (1973). The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.
Fairbank, J.K. (ed.) (1968). The Chinese World Order. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Findlay, R., and M.  Lundahl (2017). The Economics of the Frontier. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Findlay, R., and K.H. O’Rourke (2007). Power and Plenty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Furnivall, J.S. (1948). Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Habib, I. (1995). ‘Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal 
India’. In I. Habib (ed.) Essays in Indian History. New Delhi: Tulika.
Habib, M. (1974). ‘The Urban Revolution in Northern India’. In Politics and Society 
During the Early Medieval Period: Collected Works of Professor Muhammed Habib, 
Volume I (pp. 59–80). New Delhi: Tulika.
Haldon, J. (1993). The State and the Tributary Mode of Production. London: Verso.
Hall, D.G.E. (1968). A History of Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan.
Hall, J.W. (1968). ‘Feudalism’. In  J.W.  Hall and M.B.  Jansen (eds) Studies in the 
Institutional History of Early Modern Japan. Princeton, NJ: University Press.
Hall, J.W. (1970). Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times. New York: Dell.
Hartwell, R. (1966). ‘Markets, Technology and the Structure of Enterprise in the 
Development of the Eleventh-century Chinese Iron and Steel Industry’, Journal of 
Economic History, 26: 29–58.
Heston, A. (2005). ‘National Income’. In D. Kumar (ed.) Cambridge Economic History 
of India, Volume III, c.1757–2003. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hirth, F., and W.W. Rockhill (1964). Chau-Ju Kua. Taipei: Literature House.
Hodgson, M.S. (1974). ‘The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times’. In The Venture 
of Islam, Volume III. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Huang, R. (1990). China: A Macro History. New York: Sharpe.
Kang, D.C. (2010). East Asia Before the West. New York: Columbia University Press.
Keene, D. (1969). The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720–1830. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Kuhn, D. (2009). The Age of Confucian Rule. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Lee, K.B. (1984). A New History of Korea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, W.A. (1978). Growth and Fluctuations, 1870–1913. London: George Allen & 
Unwin.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
104 Asian Transformations
Lin, J.Y. (1995). ‘The Needham Puzzle’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
43(2): 269–91.
Liu, X. (1988). Ancient India and Ancient China. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Lockwood, W.W. (1968). The Economic Development of Japan. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Ma, L.J.C. (1971). Commercial Development and Urban Change in Sung China, 
960–1279. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Macpherson, W.J. (1987). The Economic Development of Japan, 1868–1941. London: 
Macmillan.
Maddison, A. (2007). Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 960–2030 AD. 
Paris: OECD.
Marshall, P.J. (1987). ‘Bengal’. In New Cambridge History of India, Volume II. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marx, K. (1967). Capital, Volume I. New York: International Publishers.
McEvedy, C., and R. Jones (1978). Atlas of World Population History. London: Penguin 
Books.
Millward, J.A. (2013). The Silk Road. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moosvi, S. (1987). The Economy of the Mughal Empire, c.1595. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.
Mukhia, H. (2004). The Mughals of India. Oxford: Blackwell.
Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Volumes I, II, 
and III. New York: Pantheon Press.
Nakamura, K. (1997). ‘Depression, Recovery and War, 1920–45’. In K.  Yamamura 
(ed.) The Economic Emergence of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Naquin, S., and E.S. Rawski (1987). Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Nayyar, D. (2016). Catch Up. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Needham, J. (1954). Science and Civilization in China, Volume I. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Needham, J. (1969). The Grand Titration. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Needham, J. (1981). Science in Traditional China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Newitt, M. (1980). ‘Plunder and the Rewards of Office in the Portuguese Empire’. In 
M.  Duffy (ed.) The Military Revolution and the State 1500–1800. Exeter: Exeter 
University Publications.
Panikkar, K.M. (1969). Asia and Western Dominance. London: Collier Books.
Perdue, P. (2005). China Marches West. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pomeranz, K. (2000). The Great Divergence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Ron Findlay 105
Reid, A. (1993). Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Volume II, 
Expansion and Crisis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Richards, J.F. (1974). ‘The Islamic Frontier in the East’, South Asia, 4(1): 91–109.
Richards, J.F. (1993). The Mughal Empire, New Cambridge History of India, Volume I. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosovsky, H. (1966). ‘Japan’s Transition to Modern Economic Growth, 1868–1885’. In 
H. Rosovsky (ed.) Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor of Alexander 
Gerschenkron. New York: Wiley.
Rossabi, M. (1988). Khubilai Khan. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press.
Rossabi, M. (2014). A History of China. Oxford: Blackwell.
Rowe, W.T. (2009). China’s Last Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roy, T. (2012). India in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shiba, Y. (1970). Commerce and Society in Sung China. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan.
Spector, R.H. (2008). In the Ruins of Empire. New York: Random House.
Spence, J.D. (1990). The Search for Modern China. New York: Norton.
Stein, B. (1998). A History of India. Oxford: Blackwell.
Streusand, D. (2011). Islamic Gunpowder Empires. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Subrahmanyam, S. (1993). The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500–1700. New York: 
Longman.
Tan, C. (1974). ‘The Britain-India-China Trade Triangle (1771–1840)’, Indian Economic 
and Social History Review, 11: 411–31.
Thapar, R. (1990). A History of India, Volume I. London: Penguin Books.
Veblen, T. (1966). Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press.
Veblen, T. (1998). ‘The Opportunity of Japan’. In Essays in our Changing Order. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Vogel, E.F. (1991). The Four Little Dragons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
von Glahn, R. (2016). The Economic History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
von Verschuer, C. (2006). Across the Perilous Sea. Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, 
Cornell University.
Wheatley, P. (1959). ‘Geographical Notes on Some Commodities Involved in Sung 
Maritime Trade’, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 32: 
1–140.
Yamamura, K., and T. Kamiki (1983). ‘Silver Mines and Sung Coins’. In J.F. Richards 
(ed.) Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Modern Worlds. Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi




OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
5
The State and Development
Peter Evans and Patrick Heller
1.  Introduction
The ‘developmental state’ has been Asia’s iconic contribution to global theories 
and empirics of the state over the course of the last half-century, providing both a 
framework for the comparative examination of Asian states and a global paradigm 
for how states can play a positive role in social and economic development. Late 
twentieth-century Asian cases challenged the mid-twentieth-century theoretical 
paradigm of the Anglo-Saxon ‘minimalist’ or ‘night-watchman’ state. The theories 
of the developmental state that emerged from the analysis of Asia, particularly 
Northeast Asia, provoked a sea change in global perspectives on the role of the 
state in development.
We begin our analysis with a review of classic perspectives on the late twentieth-
century developmental state in Northeast Asia, followed by a discussion of the 
evolution of these states to become ‘21st century developmental states’, facilitating 
the delivery of capability-enhancing collective goods. We then complement this 
literature by bringing in the case of China, the most important Asian case. The 
case of China is not only the single most important case for any analysis of the 
role of the state in the twenty-first century, but also requires new reflections on 
the political institutions that connect state and society.
Using this East Asian analysis as a foundation, we expand our comparative 
scope. First, we look briefly at the range of sub-regional outcomes in a selected set 
of Southeast Asian states: Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 
Comparative analysis of Southeast Asia both reinforces the lessons of East and 
Northeast Asia and makes it clear that Asian states can fail as well as succeed, 
with colonial histories and national socio-political dynamics undercutting the 
possibility of states being able to contribute to either development or democracy.
From there we turn to the perplexing case of India, which has enjoyed admirable 
formal institutions in terms of both a robust bureaucratic structure and systems 
of political representation that have been successful in uniting a highly pluralistic 
society, but suffers from both a highly uneven ability to translate local deliberation 
and mobilization into effective political representation and a disappointing 
performance at delivering increased well-being in comparison to both China and 
Northeast Asian. India’s inability to build synergistic relations between the central 
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state and local institutions, with results that some have characterized as a ‘flailing 
state’ (Pritchett 2009: 4) is particularly striking. Focusing on differences among 
different scales of governance forces us to argue that Myrdal’s original diagnosis 
of the ‘soft state’ needs refinement and rethinking.
Recent political shifts have further complicated analysis of the Indian state. 
Alliances with global capital have transformed what was once comfortable alli-
ance of a dirigiste Nehruvian state and protected local capital. The dominance of 
social democratic ideology has been replaced by a combination of neo-liberal 
economic ideology and Hindu nationalism. When these shifts are added to the 
mix, India’s position as the most analytically challenging of the Asian states is 
reinforced.
To the extent to which it has been instantiated, the developmental state has 
been effective in Asia, both in its classic form as a strategy of industrial transform-
ation and in its broader form as a strategy for supporting capability expansion. 
The Northeast Asian developmental state has enjoyed success in promoting 
societal well-being for over three decades. Yet, despite its apparent efficacy, the 
political robustness of the developmental state in the coming decades of the 
twenty-first century cannot be taken for granted.
Will the Asian state continue to be used as a paradigm for general theories 
of the state as it has been in recent decades? Or, will Asia become yet another 
instance of the decline of state institutions that has plagued other regions? 
Based on our analysis, there is unlikely to be a single answer to this question. 
Amalgamating Northeast Asia, China, the various states of Southeast Asia, and 
India into a single paradigm did not make sense in the twentieth century. It would 
be even more clearly a mistake in the twenty-first. The future of the Asian state 
will involve multiple, often contrasting, trajectories in the twenty-first century, 
just as it has in the fifty years since Asian Drama. The exciting transformations in 
the role of the state that were emerging in Northeast Asia at the time Myrdal was 
writing went largely unrecognized in the literature until decades later. We can 
only hope that contemporary analysis of the Asian state will prove less out of step 
with empirical realities than they were prior to Myrdal’s work.
2. The Northeast Asian Developmental State: 
Origins and Transformation
Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) analysis of Japanese development in the 1970s created 
the foundations for the model of the developmental state. But it was the small 
East Asian ‘tigers’—Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—that became the archetypal 
instantiations of the model (e.g., Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). The East Asian tigers 
managed to change their position in the world economic hierarchy, moving from 
‘underdeveloped’ to ‘developed’ in the course of two generations. This kind of shift 
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is unprecedented among twentieth-century developing countries and exceptional 
even in the broader historical context that includes the historical experience of 
Europe and the Americas.
To focus on the East Asian developmental states is to focus on the importance 
of the capacity of public bureaucracies. Nearly everyone agrees that when East 
Asian public bureaucracies are compared with those of developing countries in 
other developing countries, they more closely approximate the ideal typical 
Weberian bureaucracy. Meritocratic recruitment to public service and public 
service careers offering long-term rewards commensurate with comparable 
private sector jobs were institutional cornerstones of the East Asian economic 
miracle. Capable, internally coherent, state bureaucracies were crucial to providing 
predictability—both the foundational ‘rule of law’ sort and the more quotidian 
administrative and policy sort.
The next challenge was connecting the state to key actors in society. At the 
broadest level, East Asian governments managed to generate a sense of commit-
ment to a collective project of national development. Despite political divisions 
and governmental missteps, this sense of a national project gained surprisingly 
widespread credence and constituted one of the most important ‘collective goods’ 
provided by the state. The essential complement to this broad ideological connec-
tion was a dense set of concrete interpersonal ties that enabled specific agencies 
and enterprises to construct joint projects at the sectoral level. The ‘embeddedness’ 
created by these dense ties is as central to the twentieth-century developmental 
state as bureaucratic capacity.
Embeddedness was never a tension-free symbiosis. Based on the prior per-
formance of local business, state officials assumed that the private sector’s ‘natural’ 
strategy was ‘rent-seeking’, a quest for officially sanctioned niches that would allow 
local firms to buy cheap and sell dear without having to brave entry into newer, 
more risky sectors. Therefore, the developmental state had to avoid being politically 
captured by its partners in order to keep private elites oriented toward national 
projects of accumulation rather than their own consumption. Maintaining dense 
ties to entrepreneurial elites, while avoiding capture and being able to discipline 
these elites, is a defining feature of East Asian development states, distinguishing 
them from less successful states in Asia and Africa (see Kohli 2004).
East Asian states’ crucial ability to maintain autonomy from local industrial 
elites was not simply the fruit of bureaucratic competency and coherence. 
The  revolutionary violence and chaotic geopolitics of mid-twentieth-century 
Northeast Asia had the developmentally propitious consequence of wiping out 
landed elites as politically effective class actors in national politics in East Asia 
after the Second World War. Local industrial elites were weak, both economically 
and politically, and transnational capital largely absent from domestic processes 
of accumulation. Consequently, it was possible to construct a form of embedded-
ness that facilitated national projects of transformation.
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While the twentieth-century developmental states worked to avoid becoming 
instruments of furthering the particularistic interests of private elites, they did 
not devote the same effort to counterbalancing elite ties with connections to other 
social groups. On the contrary, civil society as a whole was excluded from the 
process of ‘state–society synergy’. While private industrial elites were seen as key 
collaborators, other social groups were seen as peripheral if not threatening to 
this exclusive state–society partnership.
The basic vision of the twentieth-century developmental state remains com-
pelling. A coherent, capable state apparatus is paired with dense ties to private 
entrepreneurial elites to produce forward-looking investments that enhance 
productivity, grow incomes, and lead to increased well-being. This narrative is 
certainly consistent with the ‘institutional turn’ in development theory, which 
emphasizes that functioning markets require a complex of underlying institu-
tional arrangements in which the state is likely to be central (see Rodrik 2000; 
Evans 2004).
At the same time, the rise of the developmental state in Northeast Asia must be 
set in its historical and geopolitical context. Korea and Taiwan were miserably 
poor in the aftermath of colonial domination, the Second World War, and the 
Korean War and appeared to be institutionally bereft as well. But, they had less 
obvious key advantages that eventually proved telling. First, Northeast Asia had a 
thousand-year history of meritocratic state institutions to build on. Second, 
national projects of development were essential to the political survival of these 
regimes. Geopolitical uncertainties combined with tiny and unpromising markets 
meant that global capital found the small, poor countries of Northeast Asia less 
attractive than larger markets with apparently lower levels of political risk. 
Consequently, the success of local projects was more dependent on local capital-
ists, and on their collaboration with the state. Thus, the construction of the 
Northeast Asian developmental state made sense as the most plausible path to 
regime survival given where Northeast Asia was situated in the mid-twentieth-
century global political economy.
The state capacities exhibited in Korea and Taiwan’s successful industrial 
transformations have been well specified. The coherence and quality of the 
bureaucratic apparatus, combined with the ability to create dense ties to indus-
trial elites, made it possible for political elites to construct a transformative 
economic response to their geopolitical vulnerabilities. The power and clarity 
of  the story of the twentieth-century developmental state as an instrument of 
industrial transformation did, however, have an analytical downside. It created a 
temptation to overstate the degree to which the Northeast Asian developmental 
states were institutionally fixed. This, in turn, led to neglect of the transformations 
that were turning these states into twenty-first-century developmental states with 
a Senian (1999) agenda of ‘capability expansion’ (Evans  2010,  2014a,  2014b; 
Evans and Heller 2015).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Peter Evans and Patrick Heller 113
By the late 1980s, it was already clear that these developmental states were 
pursuing an evolving set of political, economic, and social goals on their way to 
becoming twenty-first-century developmental states. The contribution of capabil-
ity expansion to the economic success of the East Asian tigers, even in their 
twentieth-century incarnations, had always been a key feature, always acknow-
ledged, but still not given the centrality it deserved. These states were pioneers in 
capability expansion, renowned for their levels of investment in human capital. 
They began their periods of accelerated economic growth with education levels 
that made them outliers for countries at their income levels, and they continued 
to invest in the expansion of education throughout the period of their rapid 
expansion.
If we refocus on these states in the last thirty years, the centrality of capability 
expansion to their development strategies becomes even more obvious. Over the 
course of the last thirty years, Korea and Taiwan stand out both for their ability to 
preserve low levels of inequality and for their continued improvements in terms 
of the basic indicators of capability expansion, education, and health (Siddiqi and 
Hertzman 2001). As both Korea and Taiwan moved towards democratization in 
the 1980s, they began a notable expansion of social protection.1 The last quarter-
century has been a period of socio-political transformation in Northeast Asia that 
looks, more than anything else, like an effort to construct a twenty-first-century 
East Asian version of post-Second World War Golden Age European social 
democracy.
The transformation of Northeast Asian states forced rethinking the meaning 
of the developmental state (Williams  2014), but the emergence of China as a 
developmental success story was an equally important stimulus for forcing new 
theoretical reflections. Adding discussion of China to debates on the origins, 
structure, and consequences of the developmental state makes these debates more 
intellectually challenging and productive and results in a more nuanced version 
of the embedded autonomy framework.
3. China: A Theoretical Challenge to the  
Analysis of the Asian State
Chalmers Johnson, writing at the beginning of the 1980s, cannot be blamed for 
leaving China out of his analysis. China was not then a star at industrial transform-
ation. Yet, as the literature on the developmental state burgeoned in the 1990s, 
China’s success at industrialization was clearly extraordinary. Why was China 
still left out? Probably because the developmental state was implicitly the 
1 See Wong (2004), Peng and Wong (2008), Dostal (2010), McGuire (2010), and Lee (2016).
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‘developmental capitalist state’ and China was still seen as a socialist political 
economy, despite the growing importance of markets and private investment in 
its development. Nonetheless, leaving China out of the 1990s’ developmental state 
debate was a mistake. Once China is brought into the discussion, its case helps us 
move towards a more sophisticated understanding of the concept of the develop-
mental state.
Analysis of the long historical process of building the foundations of a coher-
ent and cohesive state apparatus in China would have enriched the 1990s debate 
on the origins of state capacity. As Zhao’s (2015) careful synthesis of the early 
formation of the organizational and ideological sinews of the Chinese state from 
the time of the Western Zhou Dynasty (1045 bce) to the apogee of the Western 
Han dynasty (50 bce) shows, Chinese rulers were devising ways to ensure the 
corporate coherence of the state apparatus long before serious efforts to create 
state apparatuses in Europe had begun. The most interesting facet of this process 
of building state capacity was its cultural/ideological dimension. China was too 
large and variegated for bureaucratic structures in themselves to achieve the 
scope and penetration necessary to control military and economic elites. The 
formulation and widespread diffusion of the Confucian–Legalist belief system 
provided the essential cultural complements. Requiring officials to assimilate 
and understand the Confucian–Legalist belief system constituted a particular 
kind of ‘meritocratic recruitment’. Shared ideological fundamentals enabled a 
relatively small, thinly dispersed set of bureaucrats to formulate consistent policy 
and implement procedures across a domain that would have been otherwise 
uncontrollable.
The Chinese state has, of course, been implicated in development disasters, but 
it has also presided over remarkable, indeed globally unprecedented, develop-
mental success. Its surprising degree of coherence in the contemporary period 
remains one of the prime conundrums to be solved by theorists of the state. The 
legacies of early cultural and organizational constructions are only part of the 
story. They must be reinforced by practices that build the contemporary infra-
structural power of the state. Nonetheless, their foundational role needs to be 
acknowledged. There is no comparably compelling Chinese historical narrative 
regarding embeddedness. From the times of the emperors through most of the 
communist period, the historical absence of a national capitalist class with an 
industrial vocation was as much a signal feature of the Chinese political economy as 
its ‘high stateness’.2 It was only under Deng Xiaoping, that the post-Mao state began 
building a dense network of ties joining a private entrepreneurial elite together with 
state officials. The rise of private industrial capital in twenty-first-century China 
2 See Nettl’s (1968) classic analysis of the concept of ‘stateness’ and its variations in the North 
Atlantic. It is interesting to note that Nettl focused on Anglo-Saxon ‘low stateness’ rather than ‘soft’ 
states as the problematic configuration.
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could be seen as creating the basis for building the missing embeddedness 
dimension or as eroding the state’s autonomy.
Visions of rising private power overwhelming the control of the state are 
probably exaggerated. The state’s sway appears to remain strong. Zhu (2015: 15) 
concludes, after an extensive review of the literature, that ‘business as a whole has 
not yet come anywhere close to successfully challenging state power, and govern-
ment–business relations are still very much dominated by the former’. Yu (2014: 
165) puts it even more bluntly, saying: ‘The state sector remains the driving force 
behind economic development in China’.
The analysis of the relation between public and private power in China is further 
complicated by the fact that in China, unlike the small, compact Northeast Asian 
countries, public power is constructed around a complex multilevel combination 
of a national state apparatus interacting with regional, prefect, and county 
apparatuses (see Chen  2017). According to Zhu (2015: 1), ‘Local governments 
take care of day-to-day business of China’s development’. Focusing on any single 
level is likely to miss the full impact of embedded autonomy in China.
Current strategies in support of a shared project of industrial transformation 
appear to be articulated via multilevel embeddedness. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the state at various levels is involved in orchestrating a programme of indus-
trial development following the classic developmental state path of encouraging 
investment in higher-value-added sectors that might otherwise be considered too 
risky by private investors. For example, Jonas Nahm’s (2017a, 2017b) analysis of 
the role of the state in promoting the solar power industry suggests that a division 
of labour between national state policies and local implementation has been quite 
effective. In short, looking at China suggests that a multilevel analysis of embed-
ded autonomy may produce a more sophisticated version of the embedded 
autonomy framework, one more suited, not just to China, but to larger countries 
more generally.
Even if China’s strategy of industrial transformation continues to be successful, 
it may not be sufficient to deliver development defined as capability expansion in 
a twenty-first-century economy where industry is no longer the cornerstone of 
overall improvements in well-being (Hung 2016). As Drèze and Sen (2002) and 
Bardhan (2010) among many others have pointed out, the Chinese state was very 
effective at delivering capability-expanding collective goods as well as structural 
reforms such as land redistribution in the 1960 to 1980 period, prior to the rise of 
the market. The question is whether the new ‘market-friendly’ China will succeed 
in constructing a robust twenty-first-century version of the developmental state.
Comparison between China and Korea problematizes China’s success in 
becoming a fully-fledged twenty-first-century developmental state (see Drèze and 
Sen  2002). Starting in the 1980s with levels of life expectancy comparable to 
China’s, Korea ends up at the end of the first decade of the new millennium with 
levels comparable to the EU and higher than the US. Infant mortality trends 
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provide another window on divergent ability to deliver capability expansion. In 
the period from 1960 to 1981, China’s performance in terms of income growth 
was significantly inferior to Korea’s, yet China outperformed Korea in terms of 
reductions in infant mortality. In contrast, in the period from 1990 to 1999 
improvements in infant mortality collapsed in China, despite spectacular rates of 
income growth, while Korea’s performance in terms of infant mortality acceler-
ated, despite lower rates of economic growth.
In the final decades of the twentieth century, China looked like an example 
of the negative phase of Polanyi’s double movement, the phase in which market 
forces overpower social protection.3 Drèze and Sen (2013: 15) argue that the 
‘huge retreat from the principle of universal health care coverage’ that 
 accompanied the ‘market reforms’ of the 1980s and 1990s ‘sharply reduced the 
progress of longevity in China’. In the early decades of the twenty-first century, 
however, they underscore the post-millennium return of ‘capability-expanding 
investments’ in the Chinese health care system. This early twenty-first-century 
upsurge may still be followed by another downturn, but regardless of what hap-
pens in the future, shifting trends over the course of the last thirty-five years in 
China do not mirror the clear connections between the evolution of political 
institutions and shifts in state strategy that characterize the Northeast Asian cases.
Unfortunately, we lack convincing, parsimonious models of China’s distinctive 
forms of embeddedness. Obviously, the superimposition of administrative and 
party organization is key to structuring state–society relations, but acknowledg-
ing this is not the same as understanding the political dynamics at work.4 Studies 
at the local level5 reveal a complex set of dynamics that cannot be reduced to 
simple imposition by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, but still reveal only 
minimal opportunities for bottom-up policy initiatives. In contrast, the politics of 
increased state involvement in capability expansion in Taiwan and Korea suggest 
a close connection between the rise of civil society organizations, the emergence 
of electoral competition, and increasing state receptiveness to a twenty-first-century 
developmental state agenda (see Peng and Wong  2008; McGuire  2010). Dostal 
(2010: 165), for example, pinpoints ‘democratization and political mobilization’ as 
the most significant factors in expanding social provision in both Korea and 
Taiwan (see also Wong 2004).
The Northeast Asian cases offer a clear argument that the ability to move to the 
twenty-first-century developmental state depends on the emergence of a more 
‘encompassing’ form of embeddedness that includes democratization and political 
mobilization. China suggests that other kinds of political and organizational 
3 Wang (2004) exemplifies this position.
4 One creative, if not fully convincing, effort to understand how party organization might comple-
ment administrative hierarchies is Rothstein’s (2015) invocation of the model of ‘cadre organization’.
5 For example, Tsai (2007), Birney (2014), Friedman (2014), and Mattingly (2016).
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mechanisms may be partial substitutes, even if they are not as efficacious. But, 
China does not refute the basic proposition that the developmental state as 
epitomized by Northeast Asian cases offers a credible route, not just to conventional 
growth but to capability expansion as well.
4.  Southeast Asian Counterpoints
If Northeast Asia provided the raw material for what was to become a global 
template and China complicates the logic of the developmental state, Southeast 
Asia is the epitome of variation, demonstrating the range of variability that is 
possible within a single sub-region. We make no claim to be able to fully explore 
or even catalogue the variegation that might be considered under the rubric of 
‘Southeast Asia’. We will not venture into the dozen ‘Pacific Island Countries’. 
Among the other eight Southeast Asian countries, we will focus only on a subset 
of four, hoping to use them to illustrate the range of variation among state struc-
ture and, more importantly, offer some clues as to the historical origins and socio-
political consequences of that variation. To this end, Singapore, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia provide a challenging and provocative subset.
As a way of setting the stage for an examination of the range of variation among 
Southeast Asian states, it is worth noting the positioning of a slightly different 
set of four Southeast Asian states—Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines—which were the subject of a quantitative analysis of differences in 
the quality of state bureaucracies done twenty years ago. These states, among 
thirty developing countries, were assessed on the dimension of ‘Weberianness’, 
which meant primarily assessing the degree to which their bureaucracies were 
characterized by meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders (see 
Evans and Rauch  1999: figure 1). The degree of ‘Weberianess’ is a significant 
feature of states, strongly associated with higher levels of economic growth. The 
four Southeast Asian states included covered the gamut of results. On one end 
was Singapore, which was the most Weberian of all the states considered, scoring 
slightly higher than the Northeast Asian cases (Korea and Taiwan). The 
Philippines was in the bottom half of the distribution. Malaysia and Thailand sat 
in between, with Malaysia closer to Singapore and Thailand closer to the 
Philippines. These results mirror and reinforce the assessments arrived at in 
qualitative comparative case studies and make the task of exploring the origins 
and correlates of differences in state structure all the more important.
Singapore is especially interesting in relation to the Northeast Asian develop-
mental states. Two aspects of the comparison are notable. First, Singapore 
demonstrates that the possibility of the emergence of developmental states is not 
restricted to the very special geopolitical context of Northeast Asia. Singapore’s 
colonial history bore little resemblance to that of Northeast Asia. Nor was the 
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threat of being overrun militarily an overwhelming variable in the Singaporean 
regime’s quest for survival. In addition, unlike the Northeast Asian cases, but like 
other cases in South and Southeast Asia, ethnic diversity is a key element in shaping 
politics. Singapore is therefore a useful case for thinking about the elements that 
create the conditions for the emergence of developmental states.
The second element that distinguishes Singapore from the Northeast Asian 
developmental states is that it continues to resist pressures for democratization. 
Elections are held but the opposition is never allowed to win. While both Korea 
and Taiwan have succeeded in creating political competition that involves the 
succession of different parties in power, Singapore has maintained a closely held 
single party dominance. This contrast makes it clear that the emergence of 
democratization in Korea and Taiwan cannot be attributed simply to the effects 
of  achieving sufficiently high levels of material prosperity. At the same time, 
Singapore should serve as a brake on any optimistic readings of the effect of 
higher income levels on the prospects for democracy in China.6
What is perhaps most interesting about the comparison between Singapore 
(and Malaysia) on the one hand and Taiwan and Korea on the other is the puzzle 
that it creates for Dan Slater’s paradigm of ‘strong state democratization’ 
(Slater 2012; Slater and Wong 2013). Slater’s formulation is refreshing because it 
reverses the conventional causal arrow: strong states lead to democratization 
rather than democratization leading to weak states. Slater argues that Taiwan and 
Korea were able to allow real competition among political parties in part because 
of the strength of their state apparatuses. Since ‘Korea and Taiwan possess a 
deeper source for enduring political stability—an inherited strong state’ 
(Slater 2012: 26), political elites were able to make concessions to pressures from 
below, confident that political change would not derail their developmental success. 
‘Strong state democratization’ is a plausible frame, but it immediately raises the 
question of why Singapore’s elite have been unwilling to accept the same risk.
Vietnam offers a different kind of opportunity for continuing the dialogue with 
East and Northeast Asian cases, and is particularly interesting in relation to 
China. While Vietnam fiercely values its autonomy in relation to China, the 
structure of the Vietnamese state and state–society relations in Vietnam resemble 
Chinese patterns more than do those of any other Asian case. These similarities 
are obviously rooted in part in overlapping historical traditions.7
Dell et al. (2017) argue that Vietnam offers a fascinating bridge between 
Northeast Asian models of the state and Southeast Asian patterns of governance. 
In their view: ‘Northern Vietnam (Dai Viet) was ruled by a strong, centralized 
6 Much of this analysis could also be applied to Malaysia. See Doner et al. (2005), Slater (2012), and 
Slater and Wong (2013). We have foregone introducing the Malaysia–Singapore comparison here in 
the interests of maintaining minimal levels of parsimony in the overall discussion.
7 See Montes’ (Chapter 20, this volume) reference to Myrdal’s (p. 409) invocation of the relevance 
of East Asian state traditions to the case of Vietnam.
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state in which the village was the fundamental administrative unit. Southern 
Vietnam was a peripheral tributary of the Khmer (Cambodian) Empire, which 
followed a patron–client model with more informal, personalized power relations 
and no village intermediation.’ They then go on to argue that ‘. . . areas exposed 
to  Dai Viet administrative institutions for a longer period prior to French 
coloniz ation have experienced better economic outcomes over the past 150 years’ 
(Dell et al. 2017).
As in the case of China, Vietnam presents an ambiguous picture of state–
society relations. The bureaucratically organized and often repressive party-state 
dominates civil society. Yet, over decades of resistance to the French and their 
American successors, the party-state also depended on being able to elicit 
 support from civil society, which suggests again a poorly understood kind of 
embeddedness. Studies of interactions between party and civil society at the local 
level find intriguing echoes of this legacy (see O’Rourke 2004). In recent decades, 
Vietnam has experienced developmental success reminiscent of China’s. Having 
pulled itself out of a tragic history of colonialism and murderous US aggression, it 
turned its ‘Dai Viet’ legacies to the task of development with remarkable success. 
As Stallings and Kim (2017: 172) point out, having emerged from centuries of 
colonialism and decades of war imposed by Western imperialism, Vietnam 
enjoyed one of the highest growth rates in the world in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Stallings and Kim (2017: 174) also point out that Vietnam has had substantial 
success in the social area. Vietnam’s Gini was essentially flat at a low level of 
0.36 throughout the period with some small variation, and Vietnam has been 
extremely successful in lowering poverty, both rural and urban. In rural areas, 
poverty defined as the share of the population below the national poverty line, fell 
from 66 per cent in 1993 to 19 per cent in 2008. In urban areas, the figures were 
25 and 3 per cent, respectively. Given the economic and political centrality of the 
state in Vietnam, these results must be attributed in part to the structure and 
relative efficacy of the state.
Vietnam reinforces yet again the value of strong state institutions for develop-
mental success, including the sort of capability-enhancing success that is central 
to the twenty-first-century developmental state model. It also reinforces the 
ambiguous but potentially significant element of an embeddedness with civil 
society. Nonetheless, Vietnam remains another counter-example to the ‘strong 
state democratization’ thesis. China’s trajectory is a likely predicator for Vietnam’s 
future political economy with respect to embeddedness and democratic respon-
siveness. Like the leadership of the Chinese party-state, Vietnam’s political leader-
ship has shown little interest in allowing the growth of civil society organizations 
that might be the basis for democratic politics of the kind that have emerged in 
Northeast Asia.
Given the similarities in state strength and effectiveness that extend from 
Korea to Singapore, shifting focus to the Philippines is a startling contrast. 
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Centuries of Spanish and then American colonial rule appear to have entrenched 
a powerful, rent-seeking, clientelistic elite whose undermining grip on the state is 
almost impossible to shake, stifling the possibility of creating a developmentally 
effective state. The massive land reforms that reshaped the political foundations 
of the state in Korea and Taiwan were lacking. The Philippines’ colonial legacies 
left it as a case in point for the negative effects of ‘non-developmental’ political 
monopoly. Despite powerful and repeated efforts to transform formally demo-
cratic institutions into substantive instruments of popular aspirations, elites 
remain entrenched and development flounders (see Törnquist  2002; Cruz 
et al. 2017). The overall outcome is a different world from the one that the devel-
opmental states, in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, have been able to deliver. 
Incomes are somewhat higher in the Philippines than in Vietnam, but life expect-
ancy is substantially lower and poverty rates are higher.8
Indonesia has performed better than the Philippines (see Timmer  2004 and 
Chapter 17, this volume) but, like the Philippines, it has never had the benefit of 
the kind of fundamental agrarian reform that was so central to creating the foun-
dations for the Northeast Asian developmental states. Despite massive revenues 
from natural resource exports, Indonesia has not managed to replicate the dyna-
mism of the developmental state cases. Income levels are still higher than those in 
Vietnam but life expectancies are lower. The hopes of global technocrats that sup-
porting authoritarian regimes would produce capitalist development, which 
would in turn lead to democratization, have been only partially realized. At the 
same time, the powerful 1998 thrust in the direction of more democratic control 
over the state has also had frustrating results. As in the Philippines, vibrant local 
efforts aimed at building a more responsive state apparatus have gained only 
limited traction in relation to the national state apparatus (see Törnquist 2002), 
though the current regime appears to be making a genuine effort at capability-
expanding investments. It is hard to draw cogent analytical lessons from 
Indonesia’s contradictory political economy, but the Indonesian case does serve 
as good preparation for the even more complex and contradictory case of India.
5.  The Contradictory Configuration of the Indian State
The Indian state has been variously described as predatory (Bardhan  1983), 
 semi-developmental (Evans 1995), soft (Myrdal 1968) and exclusionary (Heller 
and Mukhopadhyay  2015). No state in the global south has so defied clear 
 categorization and prompted so much debate. The best possible generalization is 
8 The Philippines’ developmental trajectory in the late twentieth century occupied what might be 
called a ‘sour spot’ with regard to growth and inequality—that is, high inequality combined with low 
growth. See Timmer (2004: table 1).
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undoubtedly Kohli’s: ‘India is a well-functioning democracy that delivers a poor 
quality of government’ (Kohli 2012: 225). Kohli’s quip immediately draws atten-
tion to the central problematic of the Indian state. Unlike its East Asian counter-
part, the Indian state in the post-independence period has been democratic, 
answerable, however imperfectly, to periodic electoral verdicts and to surpris-
ingly robust constitutional powers. The Indian state has always, then, been 
accountable, if not responsive.
Framed in the developmental state literature, the Indian state appears as a 
paradox. In formal Weberian terms, it has a robust state machinery dominated by 
a high-status cadre of high-performing officials (the Indian Administrative 
Service) and a robust rational–legal governing framework. But in contrast to for-
mal descriptions of the state’s properties, most academic accounts of the Indian 
state paint a picture of a state that has been fully penetrated by particularistic 
interests and a democratic polity that has served elites more effectively than the 
people. These accounts of the captured state, more predatory than developmental, 
take two general forms: Marxist accounts that point to state capture by dominant 
proprietary groups (Bardhan 1983) or modernization accounts along the lines of 
Myrdal’s ‘soft state’, a state that fails to impose its institutional rationality over 
traditional social or individual loyalties.9
Even though the Indian state has fallen far short of its East Asian counterpart 
by any metric, the mid-twentieth-century Nehruvian state saw itself as a develop-
mental state, heavily influenced by the institutionalist perspective (Myrdal) that 
rejected laissez-faire doctrine in favour of state intervention and planning. The 
Indian case was, moreover, heavily inflected with a high-modernist vision that 
vested enormous faith in the central state, technical expertise, and the ‘steel frame’ 
of the Indian bureaucracy. This faith was so pronounced that Nehru could confi-
dently emphasize state-led growth over equity-promotion. Investments were 
accordingly focused on building core industries through state-owned enterprises, 
infrastructural projects geared to accumulation, and an emphasis on higher edu-
cation. These investments, and especially the focus on higher education, in part 
set the stage for the post-1991 take-off, but initially produced low levels of growth 
(the infamous ‘Hindu rate of growth’) and very little export dynamism.
The Nehruvian developmental state was much more dirigiste than the East 
Asian developmental state. The licence-quota-raj, as it became derisively known, 
micro-managed the economy through both indicative planning and tight regula-
tion of product markets. There was little, if any of the dynamic partnerships with 
the private sector that characterized the East Asian developmental state. 
9 Not coincidentally, the solution invariably takes the form of pleas for ‘good governance’, pre-
cisely what the multilaterals and their armies of consultants (academic and beltway) have to offer. But 
‘institutional monocropping’ (Evans 2004) has never worked and never will because it abstracts from 
the specific political and institutional conditions under which governance, which is after all a relation 
of power, takes shape.
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State-dominated sectors and the state-protected private monopolies suffered 
from low levels of productivity and little if any product innovation. Consequently, 
India missed out on the phase of low-value-added export industrialization that 
propelled the East Asian states into global markets. Its current growth trajectory 
began in the 1980s and has been maintained at an impressive rate over the past 
quarter-century. But the take-off of the much-celebrated Indian tiger has not been 
as deep, as dynamic, or as inclusive as in East Asia, and much of this can be attrib-
uted to failures of the state.
Any positive assessments of the Indian state’s performance based on recent 
high aggregate growth rates must be qualified in at least three respects. First, 
overall growth rates obscure the regional concentration of growth and the fact 
that growth has been concentrated in mega-cities. There have been few of the 
deep backward linkages to rural areas that characterized China’s take-off. 
Agriculture, which still provides the majority of Indians with their livelihoods, 
has more or less stagnated. Manufacturing growth has been concentrated in a few 
sectors with little of the widespread diversification and deepening of export sec-
tors witnessed in East Asia. Second, much of the growth has been in rent-thick 
sectors including land and resource extraction (Heller et al. 2019) rather than in 
sectors where growth is driven by rising productivity. Third, India’s economic 
growth has been relatively jobless growth, with most of the dynamic sectors con-
centrated in either capital-intensive manufacturing or high-end IT and business 
services that only employ highly educated labour. If anything, the divide between 
the labour-squeezing informal sector and the high-wage, high-productivity for-
mal sector has grown since liberalization, contributing dramatically to India’s 
increasing income inequality. Historically, the Gini coefficient for India has been 
comparatively low, but it has now reached historically high levels. Using new data 
sources pioneered by Piketty and Saez, the World Bank reports that in 2016 the 
share of national income accruing to India’s top 1 per cent of earners was 22 per 
cent, while the share of the top 10 per cent was around 56 per cent, well above 
China’s 41 per cent (World Bank 2018a: 5). The failure to steer the economy into a 
more dynamic and deeper pattern of economic transformation is also reflected in 
the social development sector. If the Indian state’s performance as a developmen-
tal state fails to match Northeast Asian parameters for the classic developmental 
state, it is equally lacking with respect to the parameters of the twenty-first-cen-
tury capability-enhancing developmental state.
The Nehruvian state’s comparative neglect of social development was well 
documented. Other than a half-hearted attempt at rural reform through the 
community development programme, there were few concerted efforts—as 
Myrdal noted in Asian Drama—to invest in social development and rural infra-
structure and to implement basic institutional reforms. By the 1980s, India had 
fallen well behind East Asia in terms of all basic human development 
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indicators. But even more alarming is how little of the growth dividend of the 
past quarter-century has failed to translate into social development. Indeed, 
Drèze and Sen (2013) have documented how India has fallen behind both 
Pakistan and Bangladesh in the past decade, despite having a much more 
impressive level of growth.
Shortfalls in public investment continue to be a drag on the Indian economy, 
especially in terms of human capital formation. A range of indicators leave little 
doubt as to the disconnect between current output growth and capability expan-
sion. For example, despite very significant increases in educational spending and 
a now near-universal rate of primary school enrolment, teacher absenteeism 
remains chronic, caste discrimination rampant, and school failure endemic 
(Ramachandran 2009). The most recent comprehensive national evaluation con-
cluded that by the end of the fifth year of education, more than half of school 
children have yet to acquire a second-year level of reading (Assessment Survey 
Evaluation Research Centre  2018). Even as the upper caste/classes of India 
reap the rewards of the global knowledge economy, World Bank data (World 
Bank 2018b: 5) show that India continues to be beset by levels of inequality of 
educational opportunity that surpass almost all Latin American countries and 
even some African countries. Even more striking is the complete failure to deliver 
the most basic of capabilities—food and health. A recent assessment found that 
in 2006, 48 per cent of children under the age of five suffered from stunting 
(the highest level of malnutrition in the world), a condition that has severe long-
term health consequences (Government of India 2009). Annual reports from the 
National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau actually show a decline in the consumption 
of calories over the past two decades.
How does one explain the comparative failures of the Indian state? In keeping 
with the development state literature, we point to the twin analytical variables of 
autonomy and embeddedness, but with a twist. Autonomy and embeddedness are 
dynamic only when they are balanced in what is a very delicate equilibrium: 
co-production (embeddedness) between state and social actors has to be secured 
without compromising the autonomy of the state to shield itself from particular-
istic demands and deliver public or social goods. In contrast to the modal East 
Asian pattern, state formation in India has been less continuous, passing through 
multiple institutional and territorial configurations. Independent India inherited 
a mosaic of sovereignties (the 565 princely states) and a myriad of regimes of 
indirect government bequeathed by layers of Hindu and Moghul empires and 
multiple British regimes of colonialism.
Continuous stateness provides clear advantages (as per the East Asia argument 
made above), but lack of historical continuity is not necessarily disqualifying 
for constructing effective developmental states. Germany and Italy were relative 
latecomers to European nation building but grew rapidly, and Costa Rica and 
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Mauritius, the high performers in their respective continents, are both relatively 
new states (see Sandbrook et al. 2007). But most importantly, within India, as the 
discussion to follow will indicate, there are sharp differences between states, 
suggesting that a strict path-dependent view of state formation is not warranted.
Since India is the only continuous post-Second World War democracy in Asia 
there is a temptation to attribute the problems of the Indian state to its ‘prema-
turely’ democratic political foundations. But the premature democratization thesis—
which has quite a bit of currency in India—suffers from two glaring flaws. First, 
recent work on development has reversed the growth–redistribution sequence by 
making the case that it is investment in social development that drives economic 
growth and not vice versa (Evans et al.  2017).10 The capabilities-enhancement 
path to development popularized by Sen brings us back full circle to Myrdal who 
dedicated an entire volume of Asian Drama to human capital.
Second, the assumption that democracy itself unleashes redistributive demands 
that undermine growth is clearly false, at least in the Indian case. Six decades of 
democracy have not produced a welfare state, effective labour market regulation, 
land reform, or progressive taxation. Indeed, fully 91 per cent of the labour force 
is mired in the informal sector, wholly lacking in any of the most basic legal 
and social protections. This is precisely one of the most important institutional 
hindrances to development that Myrdal identified. The problem, then, is not that 
there has been too much democracy but that there has not been enough. The 
problem of democratic deepening is, in turn, inextricably tied to the problem of 
both the autonomy and embeddedness of the state. Democracy matters for gov-
erning large complex societies such as India for two reasons. First, democracy by 
definition protects and manages pluralism, creating the political underpinnings 
of recognition in heterogeneous and diverse societies. Second, democracy can, 
though it does not always, favour encompassing demand making. These two 
dynamics—recognition and redistribution—are often in tension, and this is 
where Indian democracy has both succeeded and fallen short.
In the immediate post-independence period, India’s first priority was nation 
building. Having inherited the most diverse and pluralistic society in the world, 
one that was fragmented into a multiplicity of governance regimes and marked by 
centrifugal regional forces, and having just lived through a tragic and traumatic 
partition, India’s post-independence leaders were by necessity squarely focused 
on nation building. In this respect Indian democracy has been a spectacular 
success, at least until recently. Religious, caste, linguistic, and regional minorities 
have all developed a stake in the polity precisely because it was democratic. 
All  groups have achieved a modicum of recognition and dignity, even if in 
some  states the process has taken longer than in others. For better or worse, 
10 See also Ranis and Stewart (2006) and Ranis et al. (2000).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Peter Evans and Patrick Heller 125
India remains the only major nation in Asia, other than Thailand, not to have 
undergone a violent transition (revolution or war). What had been in fact a 
 multiplicity of nations at the time of Independence has been integrated into a 
single polity and economy, quite possibly the greatest nation-building effort in 
human history.
The downside here is that the accommodation of this multiplicity of interests 
and identities has come, with notable subnational exceptions—at the expense of 
forging more encompassing interests and interventions. Thus, rather than pursu-
ing broad-based policies and reforms that could secure social and public goods 
and generally enhance capabilities, the electoral logic of first-past-the-post has 
prioritized symbolic politics and group patronage. The need to build majoritarian 
coalitions based on highly complex and localized aggregations of caste and com-
munity has resulted in the complete instrumentalization of policies. As Chandra 
(2007) has wryly noted, Indian elections amount to ‘an auction of public assets 
to the highest bidder’. The autonomy of the state has, in other words, been thor-
oughly compromised by the political logic of short-term electoral gains in a 
highly divided and fragmented polity. The institutional boundaries that are meant 
to separate the roles of representation and bureaucratic implementation, that is, 
of politics and the state, have been completely blurred. In the absence of auton-
omy, some commentators have described the Indian state as a form of ‘embedded 
particularism’ (Herring 1999).
Attributing the limits of the Indian developmental state to patronage democ-
racy, however, has to be carefully qualified, historicized, and contextualized. First, 
this is not a story of institutional collapse as in the case of patrimonial or failed 
states. There are many elements of the Indian state that remain institutionally 
robust, not least of which are its military and various islands of bureaucratic 
efficiency (the higher levels of the judiciary, the electoral commission, the Reserve 
Bank of India, and the armed services). The limits of state autonomy are first and 
foremost political and emerge from specific state–society relations. Kohli (2004), for 
example, has carefully documented the historical process of de-institutionalization 
of Indian politics. Because the Congress Party never developed a mass base it 
was highly dependent on state-level intermediaries and opportunistic electoral 
coalitions. This ultimately compromised its capacity to push through the hard 
reforms—most notably land reform—that development required and made the 
party increasingly dependent on a heterogeneous coalition of various elite groups 
competing for scarce state resources.
Second, the problem of stateness in India looks very different depending on 
what level of the state is under scrutiny. The commanding heights of the Indian 
state enjoy significant capacity and some autonomy from particularistic interests, 
particularly in the realm of macro-economic policy. Yet, as one moves downward 
from the centre through the subnational state and into local government, state 
capacity deteriorates the more the state directly engages with society. The 
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deterioration is so pronounced that the local state (the municipality and the village 
panchayat)—with notable exceptions—has almost no developmental capacity.11
The ineffectiveness of the Indian state at the local level has earned the Indian 
state the evocative label of a ‘flailing’ state, that is one in which the head (national 
and some state institutions) is highly competent and knows what it is doing, but 
‘that this head is no longer reliably connected via nerves and sinews to its own 
limbs’ (Pritchett  2009: 4). Indian democracy in other words remains a highly 
centralized one, and this itself is a specific artefact of the nation-building project. 
In order to hold the nation together, Nehru devolved significant power to states, 
which, in turn, developed their own political interests and hoarded power at the 
state level. Municipalities and village governments (panchayats) have never really 
developed as a third tier of government. The most important developmental 
functions at the local level—including land management, planning, housing, 
basic services, education, health, and policing—are controlled by state-level line 
departments.
It is tempting, as Myrdal did, to simply argue that the Indian state is ‘soft’. 
Compared to the Chinese state, the Indian state has not penetrated as deeply into 
society and does not exert as much control over local social forces. But this chain 
of command problem is less an organizational problem than a political problem. 
The problem lies more in the chain of sovereignty than in the chain of command 
and specifically the limited capacity of democratic citizens to exert binding con-
trol over the state. The comparatively top-down and politically instrumentalized 
manner in which state authority has been constructed has favoured transactional 
logics of authority over more normatively grounded forms of state legitimacy. In 
sharp contrast with Tsai’s (2007) influential argument that the local rural Chinese 
state actually enjoys a high degree of embedded legitimacy, the literature on the 
local state in India paints a relatively unambiguous picture of elite capture.
Given how poorly and selectively the Indian state is actually embedded in society, 
its developmental limits then become clear. The Indian state is indeed a flailing 
state: it has few sensors, no effective feedback mechanisms, and no co-producers. 
It can deliver on macro-economic policy and some mega projects, but it cannot 
get teachers to teach, nurses to show up, municipalities to make their budgets 
transparent, or create the kind of stable local institutional environment in which 
private actors can thrive.
The credibility of this argument is strongly reinforced by the existence of 
subnational states that have demonstrated a marked capacity for enhancing 
capabilities, most notably Kerala (Heller 2000) and to a lesser extent Tamil Nadu 
11 By 2012, only 19.6 per cent of households in rural India had full basic services (in-house water, 
toilet, electricity) (Mishra and Shukla 2015: 10). But the variance is enormous across states, from 
69.5 per cent in Kerala to 30.7 per cent in Gujarat and 20.4 per cent in Maharashtra, India’s most 
industrialized states.
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and Himachel Pradesh. Though all three states share roughly the same resources, 
institutional forms, and bureaucratic structures of other states, on a wide number 
of indicators all three are much better governed than other states. Successes at the 
state and local level are tied, in turn, to patterns of social mobilization. The dra-
matic progress in social development in the southern states of Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu can be tied directly to their historical patterns of social mobilization. 
Broad-based anti-caste movements produced enduring encompassing political 
formations that not only strengthened the demand-side dynamic of civil society, 
but also created more competitive, redistributive party politics (Heller  2000; 
Harriss 2003). This not only secured a greater degree of autonomy for the bureau-
cracy, but also created far more continuous and effective forms of accountability.
Just as variations across state jurisdictions qualify judgements of the incapacity 
of Indian state institutions in important ways, developments at the national level 
in the waning years of the Congress Party domination suggest that significant 
exceptions to the state’s inability to foster transformation are possible. During the 
two Congress Party-led governments that preceded the current BJP (Bharatiya 
Janata Party) government, the state adopted more ambitious pro-social develop-
ment legislation and reforms than in the entire post-independence period. These 
included legislative projects to universalize education, provide food security, sub-
ject the government to greater accountability (the Right to Information), and 
maybe most significantly guarantee a minimum level of employment to the rural 
poor (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act—NREGA). It is important to 
note that these reforms were, in large part, driven by civil society actors. Indeed, it 
was an alliance between the president of the Congress Party and influential civil 
society actors that produced the legislation and got it through parliament. This 
suggests that even when patronage democracy remains well entrenched, other 
forms of embeddedness can strengthen the state’s developmental capacity.
Sadly, the recent re-alignment of Indian political institutions threatens to 
undercut the momentum of India’s exciting experiments in capability expansion. 
The atrophy of the political foundations of the Nehruvian state, combined with 
disillusionment created by jobless growth and ineffectual delivery of basic collective 
goods, lent charisma to a regime that combined the putative economic returns of 
the ‘modern’ mystique of neo-liberal capitalism with the traditional identity 
rewards of Hindu nationalism. The new majoritarianism of upper caste Hindus 
reinforces traditional exclusions of caste and community and the Modi regime has 
shown itself to be openly hostile to civil society. The apparent political success of 
this regime raises the ominous possibility that just as Northeast Asian provided a 
model of economic efficacy in the decades following Asian Drama, South Asia 
may be offering a new template for the state, combining capture by private capital 
with political legitimacy based on recognition politics aimed at the majority. If this 
‘pro-capital populism’ proves to be a politically robust model, it will constitute a 
threatening alternative to the twenty-first-century developmental state.
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6. What Lessons from the Transformations  
of the Asian State?
Over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century, Asia has emerged as the 
region of the globe that constitutes the most important laboratory for under-
standing the roots of state effectiveness and the consequences of different modes 
of state action for delivering enhanced well-being and effective representation of 
shared societal goals. This role was not anticipated by the main currents of mid-
twentieth-century social science research. Mid-twentieth-century social science 
was still focused on debates between planning and markets. Neo-liberal market 
worship dominated debate in the later part of the century. Both missed the fact 
that a new paradigm for state effectiveness—the developmental state—was being 
incubated in Northeast Asia. By the early twenty-first century times had changed. 
The centrality of Asian cases to any general theoretical analysis of the state was 
recognized. Even then continued fascination with the increased output of tangible 
goods distracted attention from the accomplishments of twenty-first-century 
developmental states in facilitating the provision of capability-expanding services 
that enhanced well-being and human flourishing. Can we do better as we look to 
the future?
Recognition of centrality of the Asian experience does not make it easier to 
derive clear lessons from the variegated transformations of the Asian state over 
the period since Myrdal’s classic analysis. The lessons of the Asian state are a 
complex composite created by a mélange of individual national trajectories. We 
would, nonetheless, like to propose some potential ‘lessons’. These are not proven 
propositions. Some have more evidence behind them than others. But, as the 
fruits of synoptic reflections on past trajectories, they are hopefully useful starting 
points for thinking about future transformations.
The most fundamental point to be made is that Asia in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries has validated the idea that capable, coherent state bur-
eaucracies are a valuable social asset worth protecting and nurturing. Despite 
being partially undermined by the encroachments of global capital in Northeast 
Asia, the original developmental states have continued to perform well. They have 
managed to incorporate the capability-expanding developmental agenda of the 
twenty-first-century developmental state into their societal agendas. In addition, 
they have managed to move from authoritarian politics to competitive demo-
cratic politics.
China, Vietnam, and Singapore extend the vindication of the value of state 
capacity and coherence to East and Southeast Asia, including the idea that such 
states have been foundational to development in the broader sense of well-being 
and human flourishing, as well as facilitating industrial growth and rising 
incomes. At the same time, the range of political configurations that connect 
these states and their societies cannot be simply summarized. ‘Strong state 
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democratization’ may be a plausible description for the original Northeast Asia 
developmental states, but China, Vietnam, and Singapore show that there is no 
inexorable connection between state capacity and transitions to democratic 
politics. They leave us with a conundrum: what are the institutional mechanisms 
that enable these states to remain responsive to social demands in the absence of 
conventional electoral mechanisms of democratic accountability?
We have suggested that the earlier consolidation of stateness and periods of 
mass mobilization can, at least in the cases of Vietnam and China, account for 
a certain degree of general embeddedness of the state in society (if not an inde-
pendent civil society). This has made these states responsive, if not accountable. 
We certainly need much more research to identify the specific mechanisms that 
enable bureaucratically competent states to maintain awareness of demands from 
below and respond to them, but there is little support for the idea that less 
powerful state apparatuses facilitate the successful implementation of democratic 
agendas that reflect popular agendas and aspirations. For example, the clientelis-
tic morass of the Philippine state may have allowed admirable mobilizational 
upsurges, but none have been able to turn the state into an instrument of their 
aspirations.
Asian states also contradict another piece of conventional wisdom: the idea 
that authoritarian state structures produce ‘modernizing’ economic results which 
then translate into robust democratic accountability. Reading Myrdal, one might 
be tempted to conclude that ‘soft states’ are insufficiently authoritative, prone to 
an undisciplined sort of democracy. Looking at the Philippines and Indonesia, it 
is clear that these states are not ‘soft’ in being excessively responsive to pressures 
from below; they are ‘soft’ in relation to privilege from above, unable to resist 
serving the interests of long-entrenched elites.
Finally, of course, there is India, which is in some ways the richest and most 
provocative of the Asian cases. The Indian case underscores two central claims of 
the developmental state literature while raising an additional set of challenges 
to explaining developmental outcomes. On the one hand, India reinforces the 
importance of nurturing a coherent Weberian bureaucracy. The rule of law and 
bureaucratic organization of state authority have secured stability, protected 
pluralism, and, in the post-liberalization period, have helped create the conditions 
for sustained growth. At the same time, India is another illustration of the con-
founding complexities of embeddedness (Veeraraghavan 2017).
The Indian state’s embeddedness in society has been doubly compromised. 
First, in the absence of more genuine decentralization, the efficacy of the state 
remains highly constrained at the local level. Second, the fragmented nature of 
representation in the Indian polity has favoured particularistic over more encom-
passing interests, weakening the bureaucratic autonomy of the state. More than 
anything else, the limits of embeddedness explain India’s dismal performance in 
social development and its current trajectory of growth without inclusion.
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But India also forces introspection. Development academics, multilaterals, and 
state elites have long harboured explicitly or implicitly the high-modernist fantasy 
that they have the right tools and policies to get the job done as long as popular 
demands and pressures can be postponed or kept at bay. It is telling that the cur-
rent enthusiasm for the elixir of ‘good governance’ is sanitized of any attention to 
politics and so allergic to populism.12
The first generation of East Asian developmental states and more recently 
China provide superficial support for this position, until one takes into account 
the unique histories of these countries, including long histories of state formation 
and the inevitably violent ruptures (war, revolution, mass famines) that set the 
stage for the developmental state. This is not a path that India can follow. India 
demonstrates that ‘premature’ democracy was not an impediment to develop-
ment, but was in fact essential to the project of nation building. Variation across 
Indian states, moreover, shows that where democratic institutions and practices 
have sunk deeper roots, largely as a result of social mobilization, development has 
been far more inclusive. India’s internal variations show that democratic politics 
can effectively ‘embed the state’ and counter its ‘flailing’ character. This said, the 
Indian case overall is a sobering reminder that, even fifty years after Asian Drama, 
we have only a limited understanding of how to build and use state apparatuses.
If complex variation defeats efforts at succinct synopsis of the political econ-
omy of the Asian state, predicting the trajectories of Asian states over the course 
of the next twenty-five years would be an even more precarious venture. The 
analysis of national dynamics, which we have focused on here, is challenging 
enough, but projecting the future transformations of Asian states requires mesh-
ing national dynamics with the evolution of the global political economy, a task 
that we have prudently avoided. The rise of the Northeast Asian developmental 
state depended on its ability to engage with global markets without being overrun 
by the corrosive effects of global neo-liberal capitalism. There is no guarantee that 
this same ability can be preserved in the coming decades, in Northeast Asia or 
elsewhere in Asia. At the same time, the global rise of reactionary nationalist 
populism has already had effects in Asia (for example, in India and the 
Philippines). This ideological wave could easily undermine the possibility of shifts 
in the direction of the twenty-first-century developmental state, turning political 
energies instead towards the exclusion and demonization of the minority ‘other’. 
In short, Asian states must not only deal with internal obstacles and challenges 
over the course of the next twenty-five years, they must also confront the Scylla 
and Charybdis of the twenty-first-century global political economy.
The developmental value of competent, coherent state apparatuses remains 
undeniable. The ability to preserve such states, and create them where they do not 
12 Rodrik’s (2016) recent work being a notable exception.
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yet exist, will be a prime determinant of Asia’s future path. At the same time, the 
quest continues to find ways of replacing control by elites whose narrow short-
term interests drown society’s developmental agendas, and building institutions 
that will secure effective delivery of collective goods and enable societies to estab-
lish priorities through democratic deliberation. The institutions of democratic 
accountability remain precarious where they exist and elusive where they have 
not yet been established. Any teleological vision of the future transformation of 
the Asian state process must be abandoned in favour of a clear-eyed investigation 
of political possibilities constrained by historically entrenched circumstances.
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Economic Openness and Development
Richard Kozul-Wright and Daniel Poon
1. Introduction: Economic Openness and Asian Divergence
The Asian Drama is something of a misnomer; as Gunnar Myrdal himself 
acknowledged, it was a South Asian drama based, in particular, around the devel-
opment experiences of India and Pakistan. Myrdal was not optimistic about the 
region’s prospects, in large part because the institutional prerequisites for devel-
opment were missing and he saw few signs of a break in the class relations that 
underpinned their soft states, perpetuating a ‘fateful development’ (Myrdal 1970a: 
380) of high, and possibly rising, inequality that would hold back structural trans-
formation and sustained growth.
Myrdal had less to say about Southeast Asia, although Indonesia, Thailand, 
and others from the region do appear episodically throughout the study (see 
Myrdal  1968), and there is almost nothing about East Asia. These gaps in the 
analysis could be overlooked to the extent that these other regions were still largely 
agricultural with weak industrial sectors, faced much the same external constraints 
as South Asian economies, and shared similar institutional weaknesses. Moreover, 
differences in income levels across the region were confined to a relatively narrow 
band at the time Myrdal was researching his book, annual growth rates were 
similar in the sub-regions (and too slow to close the income gap with the advanced 
economies), and manufacturing performance (whether measured in terms of 
output, jobs, or exports) was weak (UNCTAD 2016a: chapter 3).
In fact, with hindsight, Myrdal was writing on the cusp of a great divergence 
across the Asia sub-regions: growth accelerated in the East Asian newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) as they embarked on catching up with advanced 
economies; South Asia would continue to stagnate for most of the remainder of the 
century; and Southeast Asia exhibited a more erratic development path with growth 
spurts and subsequent setbacks. As an even later latecomer, China’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita level lagged behind through the 1970s, but had surpassed 
Southeast Asia by the mid-2000s and reached a level of one-quarter the GDP per 
capita of the United States by 2017 (see Kozul-Wright and Poon 2018: figure 1).
While other contributions in this volume delve into the fine-grained detail and 
diversity of development processes in Asian countries and sub-regions, this chapter 
looks in broader terms at approaches to opening up to the global economy, 
confining the discussion to the experiences of one country per sub-region: China, 
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India, and Malaysia. These stylized accounts cover the range of approaches to 
openness, which are often classified as ‘high’ (Malaysia), ‘medium’ (China), and 
‘low’ (India). Such a classification by degrees of openness offers a loosely descriptive 
framework for locating the integration efforts of Asian countries into the global 
economy, but says little about the mix of different policies used to manage 
integration and, in particular, the strategic approach to integration adopted by the 
East Asian NIEs during their formative stages of catch-up development.1
Central to our analysis of the direction and impact of the opening-up process 
in shaping the Asian divergence is whether, and how effectively, state institutions 
used and co-ordinated ‘operational controls’ (or policy levers) over the domestic 
economy, which includes the nature and scope of interactions with foreign 
economic entities and flows (Myrdal, 1968: 902).
This chapter contends that the Asian divergence can be interpreted in large 
part by the variations in the institutional capabilities and operational controls to 
address market (and government) failures encountered in the process of late-
comer economic opening, and the pragmatic experimentation of policymakers in 
search of more effective institutional mechanisms—carrots, sticks, and competi-
tive pressures—in pursuit of desired development outcomes. To set the broad 
analytical framework used in the remainder of the chapter, section 2 outlines four 
key concepts closely associated with Myrdal’s contributions to the development 
canon. In section 3, Myrdal’s concepts are set in the context of the experience of 
East Asian NIEs and subsequently contrasted with the three selected Asian 
countries in relation to policy instruments linked to trade, technology, and global 
value chains (GVCs) (section 3.1); and foreign and domestic resource mobilization, 
and development finance (section 3.2). Section 4 summarizes the chapter’s policy 
lessons—particularly the notion of soft states and the rational co-ordination of 
operational controls—to inform the ongoing and unfinished drama of economic 
development in Asia.
2. The Abiding Legacy of Myrdal’s Asian Drama
Myrdal’s Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations was an ambitious 
project, involving over a decade of research and ranging over three lengthy 
1 Despite the repeated assertion by conventional economists and the vast econometric literature 
testing the links between openness and economic growth, there are plenty of familiar methodological 
pitfalls in trying to capture a process as complex as economic integration in a linear statistical classifi-
cation: (i) the often vague definition of openness and the failure to separate episodes of export promo-
tion from those of import liberalization can easily lead to the misrepresentation of trade regimes, 
making it difficult to draw cross-country comparisons and interpret the findings; (ii) cross-sectional 
averages hide country-specific differences and breaks in the series; (iii) the failure to present an 
explicit counterfactual, together with biases in country selection, raises further doubts about the 
robustness of results; and (iv) the inability of such exercises to analyse non-linear historical processes 
greatly diminishes their value for guiding policy.
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volumes. It not only aimed to discover the constraints on economic and social 
progress in one of the most populous regions of the world but, as its subtitle 
suggested, to uncover more broadly the causes of (and remedies for) global 
poverty. The Asian Drama also provided Myrdal with an opportunity to survey 
the methodological and analytical debates that had accompanied the rise of 
development economics over the previous two decades, to which he had been 
a  prominent contributor. Four concepts, all closely associated with Myrdal’s 
contribution to the development canon, are key to his analysis of both the regional 
and global challenges: (i) interdependent development; (ii) circular causation and 
cumulative change; (iii) spread (and backwash) effects; and (iv) soft states.
For the post-war generation of economists that shaped the classical development 
canon, and its accompanying policy advice, the interrelationships between economic 
growth, structural transformation, and institutional conditions took centre stage. 
Myrdal was no exception, defining development as ‘a movement upward of a whole 
system of interdependent conditions, of which economic growth, assuming that 
it  could be properly defined and measured, is only one of several categories of 
causally interrelated conditions’ (1970a: 391).
The challenge of ‘interdependent development’ focused on predominantly 
agrarian economies most of which had recently gained political independence 
after decades (or longer) of colonial (mis)rule. While there were differences among 
development scholars and practitioners about where best to begin meeting the 
challenge and how best to manage it, there was general agreement that shifting 
resources towards the industrial sector was key to eliminating poverty and 
catching up with countries higher up the development ladder. Myrdal was in no 
doubt that ‘no substantial development in South Asia is possible over the long run 
unless the countries can employ a much larger part of their labour force in modern 
industry or other productive non-agricultural occupations’ (1970b: 1185).
The case for industrial development in South Asia—and the South more 
generally—rested on its capacity to generate and combine a series of linkages 
and complementarities that together could sustain a virtuous circle of resource 
mobilization, rising productivity, increasing incomes, and expanding market 
demand, both at home and abroad (Toner 2000). Moreover, industrialization was 
closely tied to social and demographic transitions involving a younger, more 
urban, more educated, and more productive workforce, which would reinforce 
this virtuous circle. Myrdal associated the spread effects of industrialization with 
aggregate shifts on both the demand side, operating through higher incomes and 
investment levels, as well as the supply (or cost) side, operating through scale 
economies, new skills, and higher productivity. But he also acknowledged the 
role of Hirschman-type backward and forward linkages within and across sectors 
of the economy and with external economies in a wider sense associated with 
changes in the organization of work and attitudes towards it. At the same time, 
Myrdal recognized that industrialization carried destructive impulses through 
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‘backwash’ effects, such as the elimination of labour-intensive jobs in traditional 
small-scale enterprises unable to compete with larger and more capital-intensive 
modern firms.
The central role for industry in triggering a circular and cumulative process of 
self-sustaining development helped frame a policy of planning for development 
through a series of interrelated investments in infrastructure, skills, and new 
industries, as well as institutional reforms to help strengthen spread effects. For 
Myrdal, it also implied a methodological break with the ‘biased theoretical 
approach’ of conventional growth models that were guilty not only of abstracting 
from attitudes and institutions but also of employing unrealistic assumptions that 
reduced the development process to a series of incremental supply-side adjust-
ments that, guided by price signals, would automatically push a developing econ-
omy towards its optimal equilibrium state.
The nature and impact of spread and backwash effects, and the ability of pol-
icymakers to manage these in support of a sustained virtuous development circle, 
were not confined to domestic circumstances and conditions but included the 
international context. Myrdal believed that while international trade and capital 
flows had earlier allowed a small group of countries in Western Europe (particu-
larly Sweden) to raise their standard of living at a historically unprecedented rate, 
episodes of export growth in Asia, linked to commodity production, had failed to 
produce a cumulative process of development. Rather, these had created (often 
highly profitable) enclaves with strong links to the developed country from which 
capital and management had originated, and to where the commodity was often 
exported, but isolated from the local economy.
As a result, Asian economies found themselves part of an international 
division of labour dominated by a high-income and technologically sophisticated 
‘core’ that exported mainly manufactured goods, and a low-income and a 
technologically weak ‘periphery’ that was largely dependent on primary exports. 
Under these conditions, the backwash from trade and capital flows would more 
than likely reinforce a distorted process of development, and which, according to 
Myrdal, had precluded South Asia from replicating the development path found 
in Western Europe. Moreover, with their large first-mover advantages, manufac-
turing firms from advanced countries had established a strong grip on global 
markets compounding the entry difficulty of potential newcomers into manufac-
turing sectors.
From this perspective, industrialization would need to be a much more 
planned process than it had been in the past. By this Myrdal did not have in mind 
the Soviet model of central planning but, rather, a series of co-ordinated policy 
initiatives across a broad range of economic and social activities, including 
concerted measures to raise labour utilization and to improve productivity in all 
sectors. In particular, following a path well trodden by almost all developed 
economies, domestic industries needed to be supported and protected in their 
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early stages, until they developed their own capacities to compete. In addition, 
and more so than for earlier generations of industrial catch-up economies, add-
itional targeted support would be needed to promote manufactured exports from 
the South, given the first-mover advantages of firms in the leading industrial 
economies, the productivity and technological gaps this generated, and the size of 
the domestic market in most developing countries.
In all these respects, Myrdal’s approach was in line with conventional develop-
ment wisdom in the 1950s and 1960s. However, Myrdal insisted that there was no 
automatic guarantee that state structures would be in place to ensure that virtu-
ous circles would be established. Indeed, central to his Asian Drama was a long-
standing weakness of South Asian states to manage the policy initiatives he had in 
mind. In particular, he highlighted a lack of discipline in public institutions (and 
their officials), which created a ‘soft state’, too easily captured by special interests 
and, in turn, promoting a more widespread resistance to public policies and regu-
lations (see Myrdal 1970a: chapter 7).
Myrdal recognized that a harder state would be needed to steer Asian develop-
ment. Key to moving in this direction would be the application of operational 
controls over the private sector aimed at influencing its behaviour, both positively 
and negatively. These could be used in a discretionary or non-discretionary 
manner by policymakers seeking to align business decisions with wider 
development goals and targets.2 But in the absence of an environment that would 
lend itself to the use of non-discretionary positive control measures (typical of 
the successful late industrializing states of Northern Europe) and an inability to 
design effective discretionary negative controls, Myrdal argued that soft states in 
South Asia had a tendency to resort to overly generous discretionary positive 
controls to achieve the desired response from business, oftentimes accompanied 
by an excessive use of broader negative controls that curtailed business 
development more generally. Myrdal likened this to ‘driving a car with the 
accelerator pushed to the floor but the brakes on’ (1968: 925), a combination that 
favoured incumbent firms and perpetuated vested interests and was more likely 
to give rise to swerving and skidding in the economy than to producing a 
sustainable process of catching up.3
2 For Myrdal, positive controls are used to stimulate, encourage, facilitate, and induce production 
or consumption, generally or in a specific sector, and include information support services, technical 
assistance, fiscal measures, cheap credit, tariff protection, access to foreign exchange, etc.; negative 
controls are meant to limit production or consumption by means of bullying, administrative restrictions, 
denial of foreign exchange, and in general raising production and transaction costs. Discretionary use 
involves a targeted decision by an administrative authority with power to act at its own discretion; 
non-discretionary use follows a definite rule or induced price change that is not specific to any 
particular firm.
3 While Myrdal insisted on the central importance of domestic reforms, he also drew attention to 
weaknesses in the governance of the international economy that could hinder efforts at catching up. 
This referred not only to the backwash effects linked to trade and capital flows noted earlier but also to 
vulnerabilities linked to changes in market conditions and policies in developed countries. Reform of 
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3. Trade and Investment Patterns in the Asian Divergence
A vast body of literature has described the performance of the East Asian tiger 
economies, and, in particular, their emergence, as strong manufacturing exporters. 
However, there is still not agreement about how they did it. A conventional 
narrative has long argued that rapid opening up to international trade and to 
foreign firms allowed these countries to fully exploit their comparative advantages 
with attendant growth impulses (Lal 1985; World Bank 1993). This is, at best, 
a  partial account, recognizing that any poor and predominantly rural country 
integrating into the global economy can only begin to do so by better mobilizing 
its existing resources on the basis of inherited institutional conditions. But what 
distinguished these economies from most other developing countries (including 
elsewhere in Asia) was not only the pace at which the export of labour-intensive 
manufactures grew, especially in textiles and clothing, but also their early diversi-
fication into other light industry sectors, followed in quick succession by an even 
more spectacular shift into both capital-intensive and technologically intensive 
products such as transportation, chemicals, and electronics.
There is no doubt that this success with manufacturing exports demonstrates 
the potential of outward-oriented catch-up strategies built on the expansion of 
manufacturing capacity. Given their small domestic markets and the unavoidably 
heavy demand for imports of intermediate and capital goods, exports were crucial 
in establishing a virtuous interdependence between structural change, investment, 
and market expansion. Particularly in the early stages of industrialization, a ‘vent 
for surplus’4 allowed these countries to meet growing import demand without 
threatening domestic output growth and, subsequently, to achieve scale economies 
as they sought to compete internationally, less on the basis of low wages and more 
through product diversification and rising productivity. In all cases, a very rapid 
rate of capital formation helped to raise and sustain the rate of economic growth, 
beginning in the earliest stages of their development, and underpinned by high 
rates of reinvested profits (UNCTAD 1994, 1996).
In doing so, none of these economies, including the city states of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, relied only on market forces or on foreign capital, to finance a 
faster pace of capital accumulation and channel resources into the export 
global governance and related efforts to strengthen development co-operation, to ease the balance of 
payments constraint on faster growth, and to mobilize more (and more predictable) international 
resources to boost investment, would thus be central to industrialization efforts in developing 
countries.
4 ‘Vent for surplus’ differs from conventional trade theory, which assumes full employment of 
resources, by emphasizing the role of international trade in providing an outlet for domestic productive 
capacities that would otherwise remain underutilized. This was one of the elements in Adam Smith’s 
attempt to explore the relationship between trade and development (see Myint 1977).
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sector.5 It was the establishment of a nexus between profits, investment and 
exports, not the simple logic of comparative advantage, which underpinned 
East Asian success.
Foreign direct investment, which is a hybrid capital flow involving more than 
new capital in plant and equipment, is only one element of such a nexus,6 and 
East Asian economies, contrary to popular perception, exhibit a diversity of 
experiences with its role in the growth process (see Kozul-Wright and Poon 2018: 
table 1). FDI did not, in the aggregate, play a prominent role in the industrializa-
tion of the two larger economies in the first-tier NIEs, partly because they were 
very selective in the foreign firms they attracted, and partly because Japan, the 
obvious source country, had not yet become a major overseas investor.7 Aggregate 
figures, such as the share of foreign affiliates in manufacturing sales or the share 
of FDI in domestic capital formation, do not, however, measure the full importance 
of international firms in the industrialization process. In the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), for example, foreign affiliates accounted for a quarter of all manufactured 
exports, which is many times greater than their small shares of GDP or gross 
capital formation. In the key electrical and electronics sector, the share of foreign 
affiliates was between 65 and 73 per cent.8
Thus, although development in ROK and Taiwan (Province of China) relied 
mainly on domestic firms, an important role was, and still is, played by FDI in 
certain sectors of the economy. However, in all cases, policymakers have used 
an array of instruments to ensure that FDI complemented wider developmental 
objectives. The larger economies of the first tier—following the earlier lead of 
Japan—adopted a more distant and dirigiste approach to FDI with the aim of 
building domestic technological capabilities. Policymakers in both ROK and 
Taiwan (Province of China) consciously chose to tap foreign capital in ways other 
than FDI, while drawing on various other forms of technology transfer to fill gaps 
in their productive structure. Managerial and technical assistance from Japanese 
companies played an important role. Thus, with help from companies such as 
Kawasaki Shipbuilding and Nippon Steel from Japan, world-class industries were 
created within the space of a decade in ROK. Singapore, which had a much more 
open policy, also used a variety of measures to direct FDI into strategic sectors.
A defining feature of the successful East Asian development strategies was how 
business and development interests were ‘forcibly aligned’ (Studwell  2013: 61) 
5 On Singapore’s developmental pragmatism, see Low (2001).
6 This confusion has become commonplace in development policy discussions; for further discus-
sions, see Blanchard and Acalin (2016) and Akyuz (2017).
7 In this respect, the ‘flying geese model of development’, which is often used to describe 
the  importance of regional interactions in the East Asian catch-up story, can be misleading (see 
UNCTAD 1996).
8 However, these statistics should be treated with caution since many affiliates are part of joint ven-
tures and may include a large domestic contribution. For example, according to some estimates, in 
1986 foreign affiliates employed 11.4 per cent of all manufacturing workers in Taiwan, but when the 
numbers are weighted by equity holdings the foreign share falls to 6.5 per cent (see Tu and 
Schive 1995).
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through the use of effective control mechanisms to both encourage and discipline 
profits, particularly in an expanding manufacturing sector, as the animus linking 
a virtuous circle of rising productivity, growing incomes, expanding markets 
(at home and abroad), and higher investment, feeding back to rising productivity 
(UNCTAD  1994,  1996,  2003). Just as importantly, those control mechanisms 
extended to managing their integration into the global economy. From this 
perspective, integration, through both trade and FDI, was approached from a 
strategic perspective: in terms of goals to realize scale economies, job creation, 
technology transfer, and generate foreign exchange, while promoting local linkages 
and productive capacities, including in favoured sectors, and reducing vulnerability 
to external shocks. This involved all the East Asian economies adopting a smart 
and selective combination of policy measures that included trade opening, export 
promotion, selective attraction of foreign firms, and support for, along with 
surveillance of, infant industries and domestic content, as part of a broad set of 
policies to stimulate structural transformation (Thurborn and Weiss 2006).
East Asia’s use of special economic zones (SEZs), or export processing zones 
(EPZs), provides a fitting illustration of the strategic approach to global economic 
integration. Despite often heralded as having the most successful EPZ cases, the 
role of EPZs in ROK and Taiwan never gained great significance in terms of 
respective shares of total exports or employment. Both countries were nonetheless 
able to deepen their industrial base in diversifying away from low value-added 
labour-intensive industries, while also building strong input–output linkages 
between firms located inside the zones and domestic industries located outside 
the zones (Warr 1984; Madani 1999).
ROK’s first EPZ was established in Masan in 1970. The zone granted the 
‘standard’ package of EPZ investor incentives, including preferential access to 
imports of intermediate goods and raw materials to domestic firms supplying 
EPZs. Non-fiscal policy tools were also actively deployed (Chang  2009), 
including domestic content requirements, and the zone proactively provided 
technical assistance to domestic suppliers and sub-contractors. A key comple-
mentary measure was the government’s creation in 1973 of the National 
Investment Fund (NIF) to provide funds to financial institutions, which would 
extend preferential lending for long-term investment in heavy and chemical 
industries. From 1974 to 1981, 62 per cent of NIF lending was assigned to the 
Korean Development Bank, and the NIF accounted for 57 per cent of total 
manufacturing equipment loans by financial institutions. By the late 1970s, 
this share rose to 70 per cent, with the creation of large industrial complexes 
around the country (Sakong and Koh 2010: 22).
With this array of policy tools, domestic content in Masan EPZ rose quickly. In 
1971, domestic firms accounted for 3.3 per cent of the materials and intermediate 
goods used by firms in the zone; by 1975, this rose to 25 per cent and would later 
reach 44 per cent. Domestic value-added rose steadily from 28 per cent in 1971 
to  52 per cent in 1979. In 1976, sub-contractors supplying Masan EPZ firms 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/07/19, SPi
144 Asian Transformations
employed an equivalent of 15 per cent of the zone’s workforce; by 1988, this figure 
grew to half. The use of similar tools in Taiwan saw domestic content increase 
from 8 per cent of total imports to 46 per cent over 1969 to 1979 (Jenkins 
et al. 1998: 5–6; Madani 1999: 31–2; Milberg and Winkler 2013: 246–7).9
In these cases, EPZs evolved as part of the country’s efforts to build an indus-
trial base by fostering domestic capabilities in higher value-added strategic indus-
tries, particularly in capital goods sectors and later in high-technology sectors. As 
ROK’s light industry exports began to weaken in the early 1970s, the country also 
faced persistent trade deficits from the industry’s reliance on imports of materials 
and equipment. To ease this structural trade imbalance, the country switched to 
promoting heavy and chemical industries and established a host of specialized 
industrial complexes for specific industries such as steel, refineries and petro-
chemicals, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, and machinery industries. In this 
way, ROK’s industrial complex development is generally associated with the push 
to establish heavy and chemical industries rather than light industries (Lim 2010; 
Jo et al. 2012).
Importantly, East Asian countries relied on traditional industrial policy instru-
ments to support domestic capital goods sectors, while other tools were used to 
promote high-technology sectors in the 1980s, including proactive investments of 
public research and development (R&D) institutes, strategic spin-offs from 
research institutes, and conditional subsidies to public and private R&D.  In 
Taiwan, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) became the govern-
ment’s premier research centre for high-technology industries. Founded in 1973, 
ITRI would support strategic industries with key technology projects, such as in 
semiconductors and personal computers. ITRI also undertook projects with 
major potential to guide private sector investment and would initiate smaller-
scale projects to support the substitution of imports of key components. Thus, the 
government’s efforts to enhance local growth opportunities and local value-added 
were integral to the process of upgrading domestic technological capabilities 
(Amsden 2004: 80).
It is often argued that these earlier episodes of East Asian development are not 
relevant to subsequent development experiences due to changes in international 
trade rules and production systems organized around GVCs. While such changes 
have undoubtedly reduced the policy space available to many countries in the era 
of hyperglobalization, this does not detract from the need for a strategic approach 
to global engagement, but only reinforces the importance of coherent national 
9 In some cases, administrative measures were effectively used to ‘promote’ linkages between for-
eign firms operating in EPZs and domestic suppliers. Wade (2010: 156), for example, recounts the 
case of officials from Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau delaying approvals for imports of glass 
needed by a foreign firm producing televisions, while reminding the company of the advantages of 
switching to domestic suppliers (a proposition the foreign firm had previously refused to consider).
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economic planning in the development process (UNCTAD 2014, 2016a). These 
issues are further explored in the following sub-section.
3.1 Trade and Technology Flows in the Era of Hyperglobalization
As already noted, Southeast and South Asian development paths have exhibited 
considerable diversity in terms of their reliance on exports and FDI, which has 
continued albeit with a general rising trend in both elements since the mid-1980s 
(see Kozul-Wright and Poon 2018: table 1). This trend coincides with the broader 
consensus of letting international market forces and firms determine the pattern 
of integration into the global economy. This broad consensus has led to the rise of 
the era of hyperglobalization characterized by more footloose capital and the pro-
liferation of free trade agreements which together have narrowed the options on 
domestic economic and trade policies. Paradoxically, while this has made it easier 
to establish a shallow export–investment nexus through participation in GVCs, it 
has become more challenging for many developing countries to establish a deeper 
nexus linked to a pattern of diversified development and higher domestic value-
added activities (UNCTAD 2014, 2016a).
Some of the diversity in experiences reflects initial conditions and patterns of 
economic integration inherited from their respective colonial histories, but policy 
choices continue to matter. Most countries in both regions began their post-inde-
pendence development efforts by adopting some form of economic planning, and 
in pursuit of similar objectives, all pursued industrialization through import sub-
stitution. But even as countries in both regions, albeit with differences in timing 
and degree, shifted towards greater openness, the strategic use of controls, both of 
a discretionary and non-discretionary nature, such as employed in East Asia to 
discipline and align the interests of firms with a wider developing strategy, has 
been elusive. The remainder of this chapter compares the three selected countries 
with East Asia in the areas of trade, technology, resource mobilization, and devel-
opment finance.
At the outset, and albeit with important differences in the commitment to pri-
vate property rights and the reach of the price mechanism, policymakers in both 
post-1947 India and post-1949 China adopted Soviet-inspired five-year central-
ized plans that focused on the domestic market, pursued goals of self-sufficiency, 
and prioritized heavy industries led by the public sector. These development 
strategies persisted for several decades before decisive market reforms were 
introduced in the late 1970s in China, and in the early 1990s in India. Both reforms 
were gradual, but they had important differences: China’s began in agriculture 
and continued sequentially in the industrial and financial sectors, whereas India’s 
reforms stretched, from the outset, across all sectors but were also more piecemeal; 
China actively promoted FDI inflows from the 1990s as part of its export push, 
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whereas India’s reforms also attracted FDI but did not greatly alter the economy’s 
focus towards foreign markets.
Post-1957 Malaysia also initially pursued import substitution through five-
year plans, but with a stronger emphasis on private enterprise including a strong 
presence of foreign investors using foreign technologies in primary sectors and 
later in manufacturing sectors. Malaysia’s first phase of import substitution lasted 
ten years from 1957 to 1967 before the promotion of export-oriented manufac-
turing in the 1970s centred on electronics and textiles sectors. A second import 
substitution phase focusing on heavier industries began in 1981, followed by 
another export-oriented phase from the mid-1980s onwards that placed greater 
attention on fostering domestic technologies and know-how.
All countries in the region have used SEZs, or EPZs,10 as part of their opening-
up strategy. In the remainder of this sub-section, each of the three countries’ 
experience with SEZs is briefly examined with emphasis on broad patterns in the 
application of operational controls to align these policy instruments with wider 
development strategy.
India was among the first in Asia to establish an EPZ, in the port city of Kandla 
in 1965, followed by a second EPZ built in a suburb of Mumbai in 1973. Established 
to foster an electronics manufacturing sector, this second EPZ would later also 
include firms in the gems and jewellery sector. Unlike Kandla, this EPZ was 
located in an urbanized area with a history of industrial development and with 
infrastructure facilities. Four more EPZs were set up in 1984–1986, and a fifth in 
1989. At the time, EPZs were owned and managed by the central government 
with three-tiers of administration; it was only in the 1990s that state governments, 
autonomous agencies, and the private sector were allowed to develop EPZs 
(Mukherjee et al. 2016: 53).
Although there were success stories from the first EPZ regime, particularly 
related to the jewellery sector, these zones had difficulty in attracting firms due to 
a lack of government commitment, piecemeal reforms and policy reversals, 
poor site selection and infrastructure provision, weak incentives, and inadequate 
regulation of the zones. It was not until the mid-2000s that the government 
introduced a new SEZ regime with added incentives.
Whereas the old EPZ scheme had fostered industrial enclaves, the new regime 
simplified administrative procedures and promoted an integrated township with 
fully developed infrastructure (Aggarwal  2006). Exports from SEZs have been 
growing, but they still accounted for less than a fifth of the total in 2013–2014 
and remained heavily focused on the information technology sector (Mukherjee 
et al.  2016: 69–75). The new scheme has generally failed to achieve its main 
objectives of increasing manufacturing output, exports, employment, and FDI as 
10 Including other related zones such as free trade zones, industrial parks, free ports, and enterprise 
zones.
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well as improving infrastructure. The main problems related to overemphasis on 
information and communication technology software sectors rather than manu-
facturing sectors, erosion of incentives through free trade agreements, a lack of 
supporting infrastructure, particularly transportation, and complications related 
to land acquisition (Athukorala 2018: 24–5). In response to these challenges, the 
‘Make in India’ initiative seeks to establish five economic corridors to serve as the 
backbone of a globally competitive manufacturing sector. However, in the absence 
of clear operational controls to align private and public investment, it remains 
unclear whether this strategy will be any more successful than past efforts.
In the case of Malaysia, it first established SEZs in 1971 in Penang to attract 
export-oriented FDI in light manufacturing activities such as textiles and 
electronics assembly operations. Though generally regarded as successful, the 
approach did not stimulate a shift from low to high value-added activities in the 
electronics industry. After a brief interlude, the government began a more 
successful second round of export orientation in 1986, attracting FDI inflows 
from Japan and the first-tier NIEs following the Plaza Accord of 1985, which led 
to appreciations in the currencies of Japan, ROK, Taiwan (Province of China), 
and Singapore. By the late 1980s, the electronics industry was the largest generator 
of manufacturing employment, exports, and value-added activities in Malaysia 
(Rasiah 2015: 9–10).
However, increasing export competition from China and other lower-cost 
Asian countries, as well as the Asian financial crisis, exposed key structural weak-
nesses of the Malaysian electronics industry: a heavy import dependence due to 
weak domestic support industries and undeveloped linkages; a heavy reliance on 
export markets; a highly concentrated export basket of products, mainly of low-end 
assembly operations; a declining capacity to generate employment; and a mismatch 
between the demand and supply for labour skills (Ernst 2002: 38–40; Athukorala 
2017: 189–91). Positive operational controls to attract higher value-added activities 
has had some success but shortcomings in government monitoring and evaluation 
have reduced the effectiveness of policy tools: for example, it was only in the mid-
2000s that the provision of government grants was made conditional on the 
achievement of upgrading targets and milestones (Rasiah 2015: 12, 16).
China was a relative latecomer in the use of SEZs, with the first four zones—
Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Zhuhai—created in southern coastal areas in 1980. 
Since then SEZs were scaled up nationwide and their role evolved over time to 
involve more capital- and technology-intensive activities, including production 
and services activities aimed at the domestic market. In the latest phase, established 
zones have adapted to rapid increases in costs by leveraging scale economies, 
insertion with GVCs, and production clusters to move into higher value-added 
production and chain functions. In addition to the traditional benefits provided to 
firms in SEZs, the government also provided measures such as grants, informational 
and professional platforms, and testing centres, which facilitated links between 
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firms and universities/technical institutions to support the economic upgrading 
process (Dinh et al. 2013).
Domestic technology-intensive firms generally benefitted from a package of 
government measures, including imports of foreign technologies, joint venture 
requirements, and incentives for indigenous R&D—promoted through the next 
iteration of the SEZ concept, namely, the high-technology industrial development 
zones (HIDZs). Initiated in 1988 and promoted by China’s Torch Program, HIDZs 
sought to harness the technological capacity and resources of domestic research 
institutes, universities, and enterprises to foster high-technology products and the 
commercialization of R&D. HIDZs have subsequently spearheaded China’s efforts 
to move into new sectors, including through co-operation between Chinese and 
foreign firms (Heilmann et al. 2013) and according to one estimate, by the mid-
2000s, the share of HIDZs in China’s R&D expenditure reached over one-third 
(Fu and Gao 2007). Other studies have emphasized China’s hands-on approach to 
raising domestic value-added in GVC-linked exports by enhancing the indigenous 
R&D capacities of domestic firms (Gallagher and Shafaeddin 2009).
To provide a sense of these trends, Figure 6.1 plots the domestic value-added 
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Figure 6.1 Domestic value-added share of gross exports in computers, electronics, 
and optical equipment for selected countries, 1995–2011.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on OECD (2018).
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for selected countries. Countries such as Japan and the United States exhibit high 
levels of domestic value-added commensurate with their role as core technology 
suppliers. ROK has relatively high domestic value-added, albeit declining from 
72.2 per cent to 57.8 per cent from 1995 to 2011. Over the same period, Malaysia 
and China had lower respective starting points at 54.2 per cent and 32.9 per cent, 
but Malaysia’s share fell to 33.2 per cent, while China’s share rose to 46.2 per cent. 
India’s relatively high level of domestic value-added—declining from 84.6 per 
cent in 1995 to 68.8 per cent in 2011—can be understood in the context of its 
relatively lower level of GVC engagement.
Figure 6.2 provides further insight into country-level trends in trade flows and 
technology structure for the electronics sector—one of the main industries linked 
to GVCs. Given its relatively early engagement with electronics GVCs, ROK can 
be used as a rough benchmark as it maintained a net trade surplus over the years 
even as the share of the electronics sector in total exports has been declining, and 
its trade structure has shifted from consumer electronic equipment and computer 





















































































































































































































































































Misc. (US$) Electronic components (US$) Consumer electronic equipment (US$)
Communication equipment (US$) Computers and peripheral equipment (US$)
Electronics exports (% of total exports)Electronics imports (% of total imports)
Figure 6.2 Electronics industry trade flows and structure for selected countries, 
1990–2016.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UNCTAD (2018) and United Nations (2018).
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later in electronic components (such as integrated circuits). By comparison, trade 
flows and technology structure for the electronics sector in China, India, and 
Malaysia reveal trends that are reflective of each country’s approach to engaging 
GVCs. The cases of China and Malaysia draw the closest similarities to that of 
ROK, in terms of maintaining net export surpluses, albeit with qualifications 
given each country’s overall stage of development in general and in the electronics 
sector in particular.
Beyond the electronics sector, the broader trend appears to be China’s steady 
success in adding more domestic value-added to its manufactured exports while 
this measure of successful upgrading has declined sharply in the other countries 
(Table 6.1).
3.2 Foreign and Domestic Resource Mobilization
There is no straightforward way to comprehensively depict the multi-layered 
policies that comprise a country’s macroeconomic framework and its link to 
sustained resource mobilization, investment, and structural transformation 
(Ocampo and Vos  2008; UNCTAD  2016a). Much conventional analysis sees 
financial deepening—understood as the growing use of ‘financial instruments, 
markets, and intermediaries to ameliorate the effects of information, enforcement, 
and transactions costs by providing broad categories of financial services to the 
economy’ (Loayza et al. 2017: 2) and closely tied to financial liberalization—as the 
key and links this to a faster pace of investment, particularly by attracting more 
FDI, growth, and structural transformation.
As noted earlier, the first-tier NIEs adopted a strategic approach to managing 
foreign capital flows and engaging GVCs with a clear focus on ensuring that 
spillovers from hosting international firms would enhance productivity in the 
rest of the economy. Despite receiving different absolute volumes of inward FDI, 
each country designed policy frameworks to regulate the presence and activities 






China −1.7 −2.8 11.9 −7.4
India 11.6 −3.5 −12.9 4.8
Malaysia 8.7 1.4 −5.8 −4.3
Developing economies 4.2 4.3 −3.5 −5.1
Developed economies 7.2 1.7 −10.1 1.1
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on UNCTAD secretariat calculations from OECD (2018).
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of foreign companies. Each country had its own interpretation of what constitutes 
a ‘strategic sector’, but the effectiveness of FDI restrictions to foster national 
ownership and upgrading of domestic technological capabilities also depended 
on the management of the underlying growth structure of the sector in question 
and of the economy as a whole.
Differences in the operational controls used to manage trade, FDI, and 
technology flows explain much of the Asian divergence. But consideration must 
also be given to broader controls linked to the macroeconomic policy framework 
in which trade, FDI, and technology policies operate and which modulate the 
domestic impact of global financial flows. In particular, the configuration of a 
country’s capital account regime can shape the nature of interaction between 
monetary and exchange rate policies, which carries significant implications in 
terms of animating the profit–investment nexus, the strength of domestic resource 
mobilization, and the structure of domestic growth.
With the proliferation of free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties, 
most latecomer countries have not been able to use the same set of policy tools as 
the earlier cohort of East Asian NIEs and have struggled to adapt to the growing 
prominence of FDI as the main conduit of international economic, technological, 
and knowledge flows. China, which has maintained strategic use of operational 
controls to achieve its rapid catch-up development, appears to be an exception.
In the case of China, rising FDI inflows at the start of the 1990s is associated with 
the country’s encouragement of FDI in SEZs. Since that time, inward FDI flows 
have climbed steadily, but due to the country’s policy framework of maintaining 
high levels of domestic investment, FDI as a share of gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) has been on the decline since reaching a peak of 17 per cent in 1994. By 
2016, gross inward FDI flow was US$133.7 billion but FDI as a share of GFCF was 
2.8 per cent. These trends contrast to those of India and Malaysia, which have both 
received growing FDI inflows over time, particularly since the mid-2000s for India 
and in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis for Malaysia. However, because 
both countries’ growth experiences involved lower levels of domestic investment 
(and higher levels of final consumption), GFCF rates appear more directly 
influenced by (volatile) FDI inflows (see Kozul-Wright and Poon 2018: figure 4).
The difference, in part, stems from the role of national development banks 
(NDBs) in supporting national policy goals such as boosting domestic investment, 
industrial diversification and upgrading, and employment creation. In principle, 
NDBs are potent policy instruments since they operate in market segments at the 
core of the process of structural transformation. Their main function is to address 
imperfect capital markets that are unwilling to bear the risks associated with 
extending finance to large-scale capital-intensive projects (or new sectors, products) 
characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, and long gestation and learning 
periods. As private investors cannot capture the positive externalities often generated 
from such projects, the result is underinvestment in these areas. NDBs can 
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institutionally bridge asset–liability mismatches between long-term investment in 
infrastructure projects and short-term deposits in the banking system. NDBs can 
also play a proactive role by utilizing their accumulation of research, technical 
support, and institutional capabilities to shape and create markets, in anticipation of 
demand and in the co-ordination of domestic supply responses (UNCTAD 2016b).
In practice, the effectiveness of NDBs as a policy tool has been uneven and 
their role remains contested (Studart and Gallagher 2016; Caixin Media 2017). 
One main lesson from past East Asian experiences with NDBs is the adaptability 
of government policies to abandon policies that are not functioning and to adjust 
policies to changing circumstances—that is, adjustments made in the operational 
controls of these institutions. The design of East Asian development finance 
institutions (DFIs) included measures to mitigate their susceptibility to political 
discretion in decision-making and to enhance the likelihood that resources are 
used effectively. Such measures included the use of performance-based criteria 
for credit allocation, applying commercial criteria to firms that receive credit and 
requiring these firms to raise part of their own funds while also contributing their 
own equity (Stiglitz and Uy 1996: 271–3).
Figure 6.3 shows broad trends in the respective use of NDBs in China, India, 
and Malaysia, in contributing to growth patterns that gave rise to the Asian diver-
gence. These rough estimates reveal an increasing domestic role of NDB out-
standing loans as a share of GDP in China and Malaysia. In contrast, outstanding 
loans of NDBs in India have stagnated at low levels over the past decade and have 
fallen dramatically from early 2000 levels. Individual NDB country experiences 
are examined later to further underscore the different approaches in adjusting the 
operational controls of these institutions as part of an overall national development 
strategy. In general terms, trends in Figure 6.3 are consistent with each countries’ 
respective approach to economic (and financial) openness: low for India, medium 
for China, and high for Malaysia.
In China, three NDBs were created in 1994 as part of overall banking sector 
reforms, as government authorities sought to better distinguish between 
commercial-based lending and policy-based lending. The three NDBs were the 
China Development Bank (CDB), the Export–Import Bank of China (CEXIM), 
and the Agricultural Development Bank of China, of which CDB has the largest 
balance sheet and a primary focus on financing large-scale infrastructure and 
industrial projects. Despite initial difficulties, China’s NDBs were backed by state 
resources and political leadership, which allowed them an increasingly prominent 
role as providers of long-term financing at the centre of the country’s high-
investment growth strategy. In terms of its funding sources, CDB is not a deposit-
taking institution, but relies on borrowing from domestic capital markets rather 
than direct government support (UNCTAD 2016b). In 2015, CDB and CEXIM 
received respective capital injections of US$48 billion and US$45 billion to fur-
ther bolster their lending capacity.
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Plans to place CDB on a greater commercial footing through measures to bring 
in an outside strategic investor, take deposits from the public, assume greater 
responsibility for the risks of its investments, and sell shares in an initial public 
offering were halted in the advent of the 2008 global financial crisis—an event in 
which local government financing vehicles, an institutional innovation pioneered 
by CDB since the late 1990s, played a critical countercyclical role. Since the late 
2000s, CDB and CEXIM have also been a major source of China’s overseas 
development finance.
Malaysia’s history with NDBs began with the Malaysian Industrial Development 
Finance, created in 1960 to extend medium- to long-term financing to private 
industrial enterprises. This was followed by subsequent DFIs: Bank Pertanian (the 
agricultural sector), Bank Pembangunan (Bumiputera groups in commerce and 
industry), and Bank Industri (industry and manufacturing sectors), and export-
related DFIs such as the Export–Import Bank of Malaysia (MEXIM). From the 
mid-2000s onwards, Malaysia had thirteen DFIs (Ghani 2005; Islam 2015).
After the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia’s fragmented banking sector was 
consolidated and DFIs were rationalized in the mid-2000s. Aside from concerns 
over financial sustainability, policymakers wanted to increase DFI financing to 
priority sectors and reduce overlapping functions. For instance, the formation of 













































































Figure 6.3 Role of national development banks, 1994–2016.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from China Development Bank (various years), Xu (2016), 
Reserve Bank of India (various years), Bank Negara Malaysia (various years), and International 
Monetary Fund (2018).
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Pembangunan and Bank Industri. The other major DFI consolidation involved 
MEXIM and Malaysia’s export credit insurance agency. In light of the myriad DFI 
entities, at the end of 2005, the sectoral allocation of DFI lending (by assets) sup-
ported both domestic investment and consumption levels, with the latter account-
ing for 40 per cent of the total. DFI funding sources can vary, with some mainly 
drawn from government borrowings and multilateral development agencies and 
others from bank deposits (Bank Negara Malaysia 2006: 178–9, 183).
In the case of India, it has a longer experience with NDBs that can be divided into 
three phases: (i) the late 1940s to mid-1960s, (ii) the 1980s, and (iii) the late 1990s to 
early 2000s. The first phase kick-started industrialization, mainly with the creation 
of long-term nationwide lending institutions: the Industrial Finance Corporation of 
India (IFCI) (1948), the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India 
(ICICI) (1955), and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) (1964). The 
1980s phase featured the creation of refinancing and issue-specific institutions such 
as the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, the National Housing 
Bank, and the Small Industries Development Bank of India. In the third phase, 
however, India’s financial sector underwent major reforms that eliminated DFIs’ 
preferential access to concessional government finance and issuance of government-
guaranteed bonds (Nayyar 2015; UNCTAD 2016b).
These structural changes reduced the role of development finance in India, as 
major DFIs were converted into commercial banks (except for IFCI). Over time, 
the distinction between short-term and long-term finance providers in the Indian 
banking system was blurred (Reddy 2005), which has led to renewed interest in 
reviving DFIs for infrastructure sectors (Reddy  2017). India’s DFIs have 
historically played a strong role, but major challenges remain. In particular, they 
did not focus on infrastructure; and in the sectors in which they did engage, the 
relationships with firms often did not extend beyond lending. Moreover, there 
was little co-ordination between DFIs and industrial policy priorities in terms of 
sectoral focus. This lack of co-ordination has been attributed to weak institutional 
control mechanisms that (i) adjusted incentives according to performance, and 
(ii) provided effective checks and balances to prevent and dissuade rent-seeking 
between governments and firms, or between development banks and firms 
(Nayyar 2015).
4. Concluding Remarks
In a sense, Myrdal’s study of Asia anticipated the Asian divergence even as 
it  missed its genesis; the policy lessons drawn from his work—if broadly 
implemented—would lead a developing country on a growth path that would 
separate it from the rest. While Myrdal did not include East Asia, he did so 
indirectly by outlining the basic institutional, organizational, and policy 
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ingredients needed for sustained development that were already being adopted 
by East Asian policymakers. As such, Asian Drama remains remarkably prescient 
fifty years after its publication, by still providing core insights to understand (if 
not predict) the Asian divergence.
The four concepts of Myrdal’s analysis have been variously integrated into 
mainstream development discourse over time, albeit to different extents. Of the 
four, the soft states concept has arguably received the least attention, but Myrdal’s 
elaboration of operational controls and the need for co-ordination of these controls, 
predated similar concepts of policy space, reciprocal control mechanisms, and the 
export–investment nexus that would become essential tenets of heterodox 
economic policy-thinking.
With the global development discourse gradually progressing from the why of 
conducting industrial policy strategy to the how of implementing it, this chapter 
does not try to comprehensively assess economic openness in the three selected 
Asian countries, but has sought to advance the discussion by triangulating between 
(i) the orientation of selected policy tools in trade, technology, investment, and 
finance in shaping a country’s degree of economic openness (low, medium, or 
high); (ii) the rational co-ordination of operational controls of these policy tools 
to achieve desired objectives; and (iii) the overall development outcomes observed 
in the Asian divergence. The rational co-ordination of operational controls is in 
reference to the strategic use of selected policy tools in the historically successful 
experiences of the East Asian NIEs.
By this measure, evidence presented in this chapter seems consistent with the 
idea that China has adopted and adapted the strategic approach to integration 
from earlier East Asian development strategies. The weakness or absence of similar 
operational controls in the opening up of both the Indian and Malaysian economy 
has hampered efforts to diversify and upgrade.
From a wider perspective, in comparing the opening-up experiences of the three 
Asian countries, each could be considered as separate development pathways based 
on different approaches to economic reforms. In this respect, these cases provide 
insights into the application of the theory of the second best, and the likely role of 
operational controls and their co-ordination, in influencing different reform 
outcomes. Going forward, it is imperative that the scope of operational controls be 
calibrated in each country according to the level of openness appropriate for the 
realization of national objectives at its current stage of development. For China, its 
transition from medium-income to high-income status entails a continued gradual 
path towards greater openness with strategic retention of policy space—particularly 
as it seeks to upgrade its position within existing GVCs and to build its own. At a 
lower income level, India likely needs more doses of pragmatic openness to spur its 
manufacturing sector and to better engage with GVCs; while, at a higher income 
level, Malaysia may need to adopt selective separation from existing GVCs and to 
generate competitive pressure for upgrading by fostering local value chains.
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Perhaps the most striking illustration of a second-best mindset is China’s 
use of DFIs: returned to financial health in the late 1990s without privatiza-
tion, NDBs were at the heart of China’s high-investment industrialization 
drive. By the mid-2000s, China’s DFIs backed the internationalization of 
Chinese firms, and, more recently, are supporting upgrading efforts in the 
Made in China 2025 plan. China also led the creation of two new multilateral 
development banks, which, in conjunction with its NDBs, are spearheading 
China’s Belt and Road initiative—a foreign economic policy focused on 
 building regional infrastructure that could transform development prospects 
in Asia.
While Myrdal’s Asian Drama provided a rich portrayal of development pros-
pects in South and Southeast Asia, this chapter also considers the rapid catch-up 
growth experiences of East Asia, and more recently China, in matching Myrdal’s 
analytical concepts with the few instructive development cases where ‘driving a 
car with the accelerator pushed to the floor’ was co-ordinated with use of the 
brakes. This simple notion goes to the heart of Asian divergence and to ongoing 
episodes of Asian development drama.
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Over the past sixty years, most Asian countries have undergone relatively rapid 
agricultural transformations that helped jump-start broader economic develop-
ment. However, the changes have differed markedly in nature and speed across 
countries of the region. In much of East and Southeast Asia, the Green Revolution 
brought a quantum leap in yields and output of rice and wheat, which boosted 
smallholder farm productivity and profits. Farms became more commercial and 
agricultural value-added per worker rose significantly. Public investment and 
strong support for smallholder agriculture and agrarian reforms through to the 
late 1990s paved the way for manufacturing industries to develop. Gradually, 
aggregate economic growth increasingly depended on dynamics in the service 
and industrial sectors. While the Green Revolution also played an important role 
in South Asia, the processes of agricultural transformation and structural change 
have lagged the ones taking place in East Asia. The service sector has become 
predominant, especially in India, and a mature manufacturing sector has yet to 
develop. Institutional reforms and public support for rural infrastructure were 
less pervasive. As a result, South Asia has been slow in making the shift from low- 
to high-productivity employment, despite the decline in agriculture’s share in total 
gross domestic product (GDP).
These are symptoms of deeper-rooted factors that delayed transformative 
change, including those that concerned Gunnar Myrdal when he wrote his three-
volume Asian Drama (Myrdal  1968). At the time of writing, he saw a kind of 
drama playing out in postcolonial South Asia, and despite the complexities and 
dissimilarities among the different nations of South Asia there was a clear-cut set 
of conflicts and a common theme, as in any drama, trapping people into poverty. 
Myrdal’s other seminal contribution (building on ideas of Wicksell and Kaldor) is 
the concept of circular cumulative causation (Myrdal 1957). From this perspec-
tive, he saw that constraints to natural resource availability, historical traditions of 
production activity, weak institutions, lack of national cohesion, and/or trad-
itional or religious beliefs could conspire to holding back agriculture and broader 
economic development in cumulative causation.
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Myrdal’s analysis—and his pessimism—focused mainly on India, but he extended 
this to Indonesia and other countries as well. He believed that traditional power 
structures were likely to persist. Unless there was change, the chances of eco-
nomic take-off were slim. He perceived governments in the region as too ‘soft’, 
unable to enforce the discipline needed to implement their development plans. 
He doubted whether faster agricultural development, crucial for raising living 
standards in the rural areas and for providing the savings and markets to support 
industrialization, would take place without either radical land distribution or 
consolidation into communes, neither of which he believed was politically feasible 
(Lankester  2004). In such settings, the effect of pushing out labour from trad-
itional activity would initially lead to the reduction of employment, income, and 
demand. The consequent contraction of the markets would have a depressing 
effect on new investments, which in turn would cause a further reduction of 
income and demand and, if nothing happens to modify the trend, there would be 
a net movement of enterprises and workers towards other areas.
In today’s context, the question is how Asian societies managed to break away 
from this cycle and what type of more benign rural transformation process would 
be needed to address today’s challenges of accelerated urban population growth, 
rising inequality, unprecedented size of young populations, limited employment 
prospects, and environmental constraints and threats.
This chapter re-examines Asia’s agricultural and rural transformations in the 
context of economy-wide structural change. It focuses on the different pathways 
Asian societies have taken in terms of agricultural transitions; transformation of 
food systems with rising incomes and urbanization; infrastructure development 
to forge rural–urban linkages; and implications of broader structural economic 
transformations, with the objective of identifying the factors of cumulative caus-
ation explaining why development accelerated in one part of the region and 
lagged in another. In light of the review of evidence presented in this chapter, les-
sons will be drawn as to how to address today’s challenges for the development of 
Asia’s agriculture and food systems and possible pathways for more inclusive and 
sustainable rural transformations in the coming decades.
2. Exiting Agriculture, Patterns of Structural  
Change, and Poverty Reduction
2.1 Agricultural Exit and Structural Change
Economic development has historically been characterized by sustained struc-
tural change, typically initiated by a shift of labour out of agriculture into the 
‘modern’ industrial sector. The result of this process is an increased share of non-
agricultural sectors in GDP, as well as in employment. The Lewis dual-economy 
model provided an early theoretical formulation of this process (Lewis 1954). 
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Investment in modern sector capital would drive economic growth and induce 
excess labour in agriculture (whose marginal product was assumed to be zero) to 
move to the modern sector. For most of Asia and Latin America, this modern 
sector has been industry; rapid growth in Asia has also been spurred by exports 
of industrial products (especially in China and other parts of East Asia). In India, 
in contrast, recent structural transformation has been characterized by greater 
employment in services (both formal and informal), rather than industry (Ashan 
and Mitra 2016).
The shift from agriculture to non-agriculture has also been a common pattern 
of growth pathways in Asia. Japan’s structural change is most advanced with 
agriculture shares of GDP of below 2 per cent and agriculture’s employment share 
below 5 per cent (Figure 7.1, upper panel). Structural change in the Republic of 
Korea started much later, but accelerated from the 1970s to similarly low agricul-
tural shares as prevailing nowadays in Japan. Malaysia’s degree of structural 
change is not far behind. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand still have relatively 
high shares of agricultural employment at around 30 per cent or more, with the pace 
of structural change picking up from the 1990s. In these countries, the labour exit 
from agriculture has lagged the speed in the decline of agriculture’s share in GDP. 
The relative size of Vietnam’s agricultural sector was stagnant at around 40 per 
cent of GDP during the 1970s and 1980s, to start its descent only after the doi 
moi agrarian reform policies of 1987 and 1988 induced a shift away from col-
lective farms to individual private farming (see McCaig and Pavcnik  2016). 
However, the agricultural employment share remained high at 65 to 70 per 
cent of the labour force until the early 2000s. Additional domestic and external 
reforms lifting price controls and restrictions in the mid-1990s induced greater 
adoption of modern farming practices, pushing up agricultural productivity 
growth and accelerating the exit of labour from agriculture. Agriculture’s 
employment share dropped from 65 per cent in 2000 to just over 40 per cent 
in 2016.
In comparison to the other major Asian economies, India’s process of struc-
tural change appears to be a bit of an outlier, as visible in the lower panel of 
Figure  7.1. The Green Revolution pushed up agricultural productivity in the 
country’s expanding commercial farm sector. Agriculture’s share in GDP declined 
with the expansion of non-agricultural sectors and, despite the relatively limited 
labour exit from agriculture, as many (hundreds of millions) smallholders and 
landless agricultural workers were left behind in the agricultural transformation 
process. Between 1960 and 1985, agriculture’s share in GDP declined from over 
60 per cent to about 40 per cent; the sector’s employment share remained near 
stable at around 70 per cent. Agriculture’s employment share declined only slowly 
between 1985 and 2000 to reach 60 per cent at the end of that period. The labour 
exit from agriculture has accelerated since, as the overall pace of growth of the 
Indian economy picked up significantly. Nonetheless, in 2016 there was still about 
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45 per cent of the labour force working in agriculture, on a par (also in terms of 
the degree of structural change) with that of Vietnam. The slow drop in agriculture’s 
employment share signals a decline in agriculture’s relative productivity rate. At 
difference with Vietnam and the rest of the Asian economies, Indian workers 
leaving agriculture have largely sidestepped manufacturing, whose shares in 
GDP and employment remain low at around 12 per cent. Instead, the structural 
change has been towards modern and informal services sectors, with the mod-













































































Figure 7.1 Convergence of declining agricultural value-added and employment 
shares with rising income per capita in China, India, Indonesia, Rep. of Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, 1950–2016.
Note: Period coverage is as follows China (1991–2016); Indonesia (1971–2016); India (1960–2016); 
Japan (1953–2015); Republic of Korea (1963–2016); Malaysia (1975–2016); Philippines (1971–2016); 
Thailand (1960–2016); Vietnam (1991–2016).
Source: Author’s calculations from sectoral national income and employment data from Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre (n.d.) database, World Bank (n.d.) World Development Indicators, 
and ILO (n.d.) ILOSTAT.
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2.2 Structural Change, Growth, and Poverty Reduction
Economic growth in the developing world has led to substantial reductions in 
poverty over the last two and a half decades. Much of this success was driven by 
structural change and associated fast economic growth in Asia. Within the region at 
large, poverty reduction has been more pronounced in most of East and Southeast 
Asia, where structural change also has progressed the most. The average poverty 
headcount for these two regions fell from 60.2 per cent in 1990 to 3.5 per cent in 
2013 (World Bank 2017).1 Around 2015, less than 10 per cent of the world’s poor 
population lived in East and Southeast Asia, down from more than half in 1990. 
The poverty rate also declined significantly in South Asia over this period (from 
44.6 to 15.1 per cent), but not as dramatically as in East Asia and, because of 
faster population growth in South Asia, the sub-region’s share of the world’s poor 
population increased from 27.4 to 33.5 per cent.
Various studies provide evidence showing that, especially in early stages of 
structural transformation, agricultural productivity growth has a larger poverty-
reduction effect than increases in industry or services (World Bank 2008; Ivanic 
and Martin 2018). While impacts vary across countries, also within South Asia, 
agricultural growth seems more important to poverty reduction than growth in 
other sectors. The study by Ivanic and Martin (2018) finds that the impact of 
productivity improvements in agriculture (equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP) would 
reduce poverty in India by 1.6 percentage points, more than three times the 
impact of productivity improvements of the same relative magnitude in industry 
and services. In Bangladesh, the impact of agricultural productivity growth on 
poverty reduction would be even greater (2.6 percentage points) and more than 
six times that of non-agricultural sectors, while, in contrast, in Vietnam, the 
poverty-reduction impact from agricultural growth would be much smaller and 
only marginally higher than that of productivity growth in industry or services. 
This suggests different pathways towards inclusive structural change are possible. 
To understand those, it is important to look at the key factors that influence 
sectoral poverty–growth elasticities.
3. Agriculture and Food System Changes as Conditioners 
of Inclusive and Exclusive Structural Transformation
According to Timmer (2014), three key lessons can be drawn from historical 
pathways of structural transformation. First, structural transformation has shown 
to be an important way for people to climb out of poverty, especially when 
 productivity rises in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors through strong 
1 The poverty headcount is calculated using the World Bank’s poverty line of US$1.90 in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) per person per day.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Rob Vos 165
inter-sectoral linkages (Hirschman 1958; World Bank 2008). Without broad-based 
productivity growth, labour more likely will be ‘pushed’ into low-paying informal 
service jobs, rather than ‘pulled’ out by highly productive manufacturing 
and   services. Second, even with broad-based productivity growth, structural 
 transformation tends to widen the income gap between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors and between rural and urban areas, putting most of the pressure 
on rural societies to adjust. Third, in order to catalyse productivity growth and 
structural change, substantial investments in the agricultural sector are needed 
despite its declining relative importance.
However, the way in which these factors played out in the past, and should be 
expected to play out moving forward, is conditioned on five other transformative 
processes that are taking place in parallel: urbanization, dietary change, agricultural 
technology and farm size change, food market transformations, and rural labour 
market changes (Reardon and Timmer 2014). All of these change processes are 
relevant to structural change in Asia. They should be seen as linked in cumulative 
causation, as Myrdal would argue. These factors will be discussed in the subse-
quent sub-sections, starting with the importance of shifting demographics and 
changing diets, followed by the role of changing farm technologies and farming 
systems, and the dynamics of rural non-farm activities in driving the nature of 
agricultural transformations. The role of policies and institutional reforms in all 
of this will be taken on in section 4.
3.1 Shifting Demographics, Shifting Diets
Myrdal wrote Asian Drama against the prevailing economic and social conditions 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Painted with a broad brush, most Asian economies were still 
strongly agrarian based, with most people living in rural areas, and population 
growth driven by high fertility rates. Land was scarce, though generally fertile, 
such that intensification of staple crop production would be critical to addressing 
both the challenges of food insecurity and poverty. With economic development, 
however, demographic pressures have changed, as population growth has decel-
erated and urbanization rates have gone up. Fertility rates and family sizes have 
fallen with income levels, altering the underlying drivers of economic growth, as 
capital accumulation becomes more important than labour supply. Higher aver-
age urban incomes and larger city populations have led to expanding urban food 
markets and have changed the composition of food demand, as higher incomes 
lead to dietary change: even as food shares tend to fall (Engel’s law), total food 
expenditures typically continue to rise with per capita incomes, as the share of 
dietary energy that comes from typically cheaper cereals and other starchy food 
staples falls while consumption of more expensive animal-sourced foods, fruits 
and vegetables, and processed foods increases (Bennett’s law). These changes 
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associated with urbanization have created new opportunities for farmers in terms 
of larger food markets for products with, generally, higher value-added, meeting 
the needs of a rising Asian middle class (Tschirley et al. 2015). Meats, dairy products, 
and fruits and vegetable production require higher input use (land, water, fertilizers, 
and/or pesticides), inducing changes in land use and requiring farmers to adopt 
new technologies.
The changing demographics and diets have not only changed agricultural 
transformation processes, but also created new challenges. Increased resource use 
may lead to overexploitation of natural resources and accelerate environmental 
degradation, where land and water resources are already scarce (Vos and Bellù 
2019). Where population growth is still strong, expanding rural populations 
may increase population density and reduce average farm size, especially among 
smallholders (Masters et al.  2013). This could induce farmers to diversify into 
 off-farm employment, which could help accelerate positive structural change and 
poverty reduction, if rural non-farm activity expands alongside, and rural–urban 
linkages are strengthened.
On the Asian continent, urbanization has advanced farthest in East Asia, 
where 60 per cent of the population lives in cities today and the share is 
expected to rise to 80 per cent by 2050 (Vos  2018). Importantly, East Asia’s 
rural population started to decrease in absolute terms from around 2005, 
reflective of advanced structural economic change. The Republic of Korea’s 
rural population started to decrease from 1970 and its urban population share 
had already surpassed 80 per cent by 2015 and is projected to reach almost 90 per 
cent by 2050. China’s urban share in the population increased from less than 
20 per cent at the start of its economic take-off around 1980 to 56 per cent in 
2015 and is projected to increase to 75 per cent by 2050. The absolute size of 
China’s rural population has been decreasing since 1995. Korea’s and China’s 
populations are ageing rapidly and their total populations are expected to shrink 
from around 2030 onwards.
In Southeast Asia, Thailand and Malaysia had reached their Lewisian turning 
points around 2000. Indonesia and Vietnam did so more recently, while the 
Philippines—where population growth is still high—is not expected to reach its 
turning point before 2040. South Asia is the least urbanized region (even less so 
than Sub-Saharan Africa) and its rural population is expected to continue to grow 
in absolute terms until about 2030. This is also the case in India.
Due to restrictive population control policies, East Asia (China in particular) 
reached its demographic transition point much earlier than countries in South Asia. 
This is also evident from today’s youth dynamics. South Asia’s youth population is 
expanding at a rate close to the total population’s growth rate, whereas East Asia’s 
youth population is falling in absolute terms and almost as fast as the rural popula-
tion (see Vos  2018: figure 4). These trends set different employment challenges 
across the Asian continent, with those in South Asia being most pressing from a 
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structural transformation perspective, as rural populations are still large and rising 
and vast numbers of young people are entering rural labour  markets every year.
Dietary transitions are also taking place at different speeds across the continent. 
Figure 7.2 shows long-term trends in the per capita quantity of all foods, meas-
ured in calories, and a fraction of those calories that come from foods other than 
starchy staples. Clearly, Asia’s sub-regions start at the bottom left of the chart, but, 
as their incomes have risen, total food energy supply (and apparent consumption) 
have increased starkly since the 1960s. The share of non-starchy staple crops 
started to increase markedly from around 1980. This is most visible in East Asia 
where today over 50 per cent of food energy intake coming from foods other than 
cereals and starchy roots. In South and Southeast Asia, the dietary transition is 
clearly less advanced but has also accelerated over the past two decades.
Increased per capita incomes bring not only increased diversity in the types of 
food, but also the forms in which those foods are consumed (e.g., more process-
ing and packaging). These changes are facilitated by major transformations of 
agri-food supply chains with increased dominance of modern, large-scale food 
processing and wholesale and retail distribution. Higher incomes, urbanization, 
and the structural transformation of the economy have been supported by agri-
cultural productivity increases but impacts on poverty reduction have been influ-
enced by the way in which farm systems have been transformed at the same time 
through mechanization, changing farm size, and crop and product diversification. 













































Figure 7.2 From more food to different foods: the dietary transition by Asia in 
comparison to the rest of the world, 1961–2013.
Note: Europe includes all of the former Soviet Union.
Source: Masters (2018) (with permission), based on FAO food balance sheets data.
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3.2  Agricultural Technology Change and Farm Size
Agricultural output growth has been rather robust over the past half-century, 
especially in East Asia (China in particular), but—from the 1970s—also in 
Southeast Asia and more recently also in South Asia. As shown in Vos (2018: 
table 1), in recent decades (from the 1990s), total factor productivity growth has 
become the main driver of agricultural output growth in Asia, as much as in other 
parts of the world, whereas output growth in previous decades was mainly driven 
by increasing the use of inputs (land, labour, fertilizers).2
Important changes in Asia’s farming systems have underpinned agricultural 
productivity growth and efficiency gains over the past four to five decades. 
Reardon and Timmer (2014) summarize the evidence as showing that farms have 
become commercial, agricultural production has diversified (away from grains, 
mirroring the dietary change, as discussed later), even as individual farms have 
become more specialized (into cropping, or livestock, poultry, and aquaculture), 
and farmers have shifted from non-purchased to purchased input use (i.e., from 
human to animal to machine power, from manure, by-products, and residues to 
chemical fertilizer, and to use of more pesticides and herbicides). The degree and 
speed of these changes has varied across locations. These changes occurred 
earliest and fastest in the ‘classical Green Revolution’ zones, particularly lowland 
rice systems and irrigated wheat areas. During the 2000s, a second wave of 
intensification and commercialization occurred in areas that were ‘catching up’ 
with the initial Green Revolution zones, such as in Uttar Pradesh in India, northern 
Bangladesh, and northeast China, in rice, potato, and horticulture (Reardon et al. 
2012). Gulati et al. (2004) document the diversification of agricultural production 
in parts of India with the development of horticulture in the 1990s and 2000s.
More recently, capital intensity of Asian agriculture has increased, significantly 
reflected in increased use of mechanization and less use of labour. Dawe (2015) 
finds the uptake of machine use in agriculture (for preparing soils and harvest-
ing) among small and larger farms alike. The development of rental markets for 
agricultural machinery has facilitated this process. These changes have not been 
across the board and, especially in many parts of South Asia, the process of com-
mercialization-intensification/diversification-mechanization has been slower, 
explaining in part the slower structural transformation.
The impact on rural wages and off-farm employment of these processes of 
change in farm systems is relevant to the dynamics of the structural transform-
ation process. Reardon and Timmer (2014) see an important influence running 
from rural non-farm employment growth and rural wage increases to greater 
capital intensity. Greater income from off-farm activity allows farmers to buy or 
2 See also Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012), Fuglie (2015), FAO (2017a), and Vos and Bellù 
(2019) for a corroboration of these trends.
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rent machinery. Conversely, mechanization frees labour for both migration to 
cities and rural non-farm activities.
Improved infrastructure, like rural roads, electricity, irrigation, and communi-
cations, has been a critical factor in increasing total factor productivity in China 
and other parts of Asia over the past three decades (Fan et al. 2004; Fan 2008). 
Production areas well served by rural roads, and those closer to urban areas, have 
lower transaction costs of getting inputs, and higher use rates.
These changes (commercialization, modern inputs use, mechanization, improved 
infrastructure) have helped raise both land and total factor productivity. Growth 
in labour productivity has been relatively slow in South Asia, as visible from the 
rather steep upward-sloping land-labour productivity curves in Figure 7.3.
This holds for India, Pakistan, and Nepal, in particular; and to a lesser extent 
for Bangladesh, where labour and land productivity have moved at a similar pace, 
albeit both from low levels. Land and labour productivity in Indonesia, Thailand, 
and the Philippines initially also followed similar growth paths, but giving way 
for faster agricultural labour productivity and wage growth from the mid-1990s 
as their industrialization processes further moved up the ladder. In China, land 
and labour productivity growth have moved in tandem since 1980, as visible 













































Figure 7.3 Land versus agricultural labour productivity in selected Asian countries, 
1980–2015.
Note: * The curves for Indonesia and the Philippines, not shown here, by and large coincide with that 
for Thailand.
Source: Author’s calculations based on FAO (n.d.) FAOSTAT for data on agricultural land, World 
Bank (n.d.) World Development Indicators for data on agricultural value-added, and ILO (n.d.) 
ILOSTAT for agricultural employment.
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marketable surpluses and labour to move into non-agriculture were instrumental 
to this development (see section 4). In contrast, the curves are virtually flat for 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, which had already reached a stage of deep 
structural change by the beginning of the 1980–2015 period, shown in Figure 7.4. 
In Malaysia, extensive plantation-based agriculture carries an important 
weight and its export-orientation provided a push for labour-saving productivity 
improvements.
Slow agricultural labour productivity growth is likely also associated with 
insufficient expansion of employment opportunities outside agriculture in low- 
and lower-middle-income countries, including those in South Asia. Despite the 
impacts of mechanization in parts of agriculture, on average, labour inputs per unit 
Figure 7.4 Agricultural and rural development support indicators in selected Asian 
countries, 1970–2015.
Note: The relative rate of assistance (RRA) to agriculture is defined as the percentage by which 
government policies have raised gross returns to agriculture above what they would be without the 
government’s intervention as a ratio of government support to non-agricultural sectors. A negative 
RRA means support to non-agriculture is greater than that to agriculture.
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (n.d.) World Development Indicators for net 
enrolment rate and rural electrification, and Laborde et al. (2018) for public expenditures per farmer 
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of land have continued to increase in South Asia, which has contributed to higher 
land productivity while holding back rural wage and labour productivity growth.
Slow agricultural labour productivity growth is further associated with reduc-
tions in farm size in Asia. During Europe’s earlier stages of structural change, 
gains in agricultural labour productivity were associated with land consolidation. 
In South Asia, but also in Southeast Asia, such a process of land consolidation is 
yet to set in. Instead, the number of landholdings continues to increase resulting 
in further declines in the average size of landholdings. Vos (2018: figure 8) shows 
this trend for India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Even in Thailand, 
the wealthiest of the four, and the more land abundant and advanced in terms of 
structural transformation, the number of holdings in 2013 was still greater than 
in 2003. In India, the average size of landholding was cut in half over the past 
four decades, falling from 2.3 ha in 1970 to 1.15 ha in 2010. In China, in contrast, 
average farm size has been on the rise since 2002, though only slightly at best: it 
increased from 0.55 ha in that year to 0.60 ha in 2008, an increase of just 0.05 ha 





























































China Indonesia Malaysia Republic of
Korea
Vietnam India





























































China Indonesia Malaysia Republic of
Korea
Vietnam India
Relative rate of assistance to agriculture (median)
Figure 7.4 Continued
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The broader trends towards further fragmentation of farm units is taking place 
in a context of continued unequal land distribution. In South Asia, 60 per cent of 
farmland is operated by farm units with more than 2 ha of land. In Southeast 
Asia, the ‘larger’ farms (those with more than 2 ha) cultivate 77 per cent of farm-
lands (Eastwood et al. 2009). Most explanations of the persistence and growth of 
small landholdings point at several factors: continued rural population growth 
leading farm families to divide up land and distribute among children; the earlier-
mentioned lack of non-farm employment opportunities; diversification to higher-
value-added crops (e.g., horticulture) allowing even very small farms to be viable; 
and institutional restrictions on land transactions (see Deininger and Jin 2009; 
Gulati et al. 2004; Eastwood et al. 2009; Reardon 2013). This is not to deny that 
large farms are forming as well. Land rentals are contributing to these changes. In 
China in 1988, just 1 per cent of land was rented in, but this had grown to 18 per 
cent by 2008 (Jia 2013).
Yet, continued growth in the number of holdings, coupled with ever more 
pressing land scarcity in much of Asia, suggests that it is unlikely that farm sizes 
will typically become much larger for the foreseeable future. This could have two 
key implications. First, as labour shortages increase, mechanization will likely 
spread more widely, but will need to work at much smaller field scales than in 
other parts of the world. In addition, given credit market constraints and high 
fixed costs involved in owning farm machinery, most farmers would need to 
access machinery through rental markets.
Second, even if the trend towards fragmentation reverses soon, it will be hard 
to foresee massive increases in farm size to an extent that will make a substantial 
impact on increasing farm incomes. Thus, to avoid farm income growth from 
falling further behind non-farm income growth, (smallholder) farmers would 
need to shift to higher value-added crops (non-staples) and/or diversify their 
incomes into non-farm sectors (or leave farming entirely).
All of these change processes are already taking place throughout Asia. The 
spread of rental markets for agricultural equipment was referred to earlier and 
further documented in Dawe (2015) and FAO (2017b). Crop diversification is 
also taking place as noted earlier, as visible, for instance, in the rapidly increasing 
domestic farm supply of non-grains (fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, and dairy) 
(Pingali 2007). Rao et al. (2006) and Reardon and Timmer (2014) note for the 
case of India that there is a strong correlation between agricultural diversification, 
on the one hand, and the urban share and road and population density, on the 
other. China has also seen substantial crop diversification during the past forty 
years, much of it in response to changes in dietary patterns. Land use for the cul-
tivation of fruits, vegetables, and pulses has doubled since 1990 and now accounts 
for more area than any single cereal (although much less than all cereals taken 
together) (Dawe 2015).
Income diversification has become a more common feature of Asia’s rural 
economies. Haggblade et al. (2010) estimate that rural non-farm employment and 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Rob Vos 173
remittance income from internal migration could make up as much as 51 per cent 
of total rural household income, based on survey data for Bangladesh, China, 
India, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. According to these estimates, 
rural non-farm employment is by far the main source of income diversification.
None of these relatively recent transformative changes by themselves are 
guarantees for broad-based economic growth and accelerated poverty reduction. 
Where these trends have been slow to develop, major economic and social chal-
lenges remain. Declining farm sizes reduce farmers’ resource base, limit their 
access to finance, and prevent investment in new technologies (Jayne et al. 2010), 
prompting a ‘premature’ exit from agriculture, where smallholders abandon farming 
even though profitable technologies and markets exist. Even those who remain in 
agriculture may not be able to take advantage of rising urban demand, particu-
larly farmers in more remote rural areas or where urban centres have better access 
to imported food (Hazell 2013). Falling farm sizes and import competition have 
further weakened agriculture’s historically strong linkage to poverty reduction, 
given that most of the world’s rural poor are smallholder farmers. Similarly, where 
rapid urbanization has outpaced urban economic growth and job creation, this has 
led to greater pressure on urban infrastructure and services and growing numbers 
of urban poor. Finally, the influx of young job seekers into the workforce—a 
‘youth bulge’ (as applies to much of South Asia)—could stimulate economic growth, 
but it also raises concerns about an economy’s capacity to create jobs—especially 
the kinds of jobs that match the aspirations of younger generations. Conversely, 
countries in developing East Asia have already experienced their demographic 
transition and now face the prospect of an ageing agricultural and rural workforce.
3.3  Labour Markets and Rural and Agri-Food 
System Transformations
Not only farm systems have changed in Asia. ‘Post farm-gate’ parts of food 
 supply chains (wholesale/brokerage/logistics/cold chain, processing, and retail) 
have undergone major transformations as well, with important implications for 
employment, income diversification, and poverty reduction among rural house-
holds. These agri-food system changes are closely related to urbanization pro-
cesses, as much of Asia’s food supply is already moving from rural to urban. This 
is creating new income and employment opportunities in wholesale, retail, pro-
cessing, and the logistics of providing food to growing urban populations. Such 
opportunities can be critical in defining pathways to climb out of poverty for 
those exiting agriculture or seeking to diversify incomes during processes of 
agricultural transformation and structural change. The way rural–urban linkages 
are shaped is crucial for poverty reduction and broader economic development. 
Rural–urban linkages have long been recognized as a key aspect of economic 
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development (Lewis 1954; Haggblade et al. 2007). Urban industrial and service 
sector growth provides employment for workers who exit agriculture, while 
increases in agricultural production can help avoid an increase in food prices and 
wages that could slow the pace of industrialization. Agricultural growth can also 
spur non-agricultural growth in both rural and urban areas through demand for 
both inputs and intermediation services, as well as consumer goods.
In areas with still widespread low-productivity agriculture, such as in many 
parts of South Asia, low aggregate demand is likely to generate the development 
of low-return rural non-farm employment. The low aggregate demand may not 
only result from poor agriculture, but also growing agriculture with poor links to 
cities (see e.g., Deichmann et al. 2009, for the case of Bangladesh; Lanjouw and 
Shariff 2004 and Tiwari 2015, for the case of India) or to export markets so that 
the farmers cannot ‘realize’ sufficient profit from agricultural development. Such 
areas continue to see persistent poverty in a context of increasing shares of low-
income non-farm employment and stagnant agricultural production.
Much of rural off-farm employment tends to be generated in the proximity of 
cities and towns. Recent studies further suggest that dynamic structural change 
through agri-food system development (characterized by both rapid agricultural 
productivity growth and rural non-farm wage and employment growth) is more 
likely to occur when taking place close to smaller towns and intermediate cities 
(see e.g., FAO 2017b; IFPRI 2017). Based on evidence for Bangladesh, Deichman 
et al. (2009) similarly find that high-potential agricultural production areas that 
are near to cities tend to generate more and higher-return rural non-farm 
employment (both for wage earners and self-employed), while where the high-
potential farm area is far from the city, low-return rural non-farm employment 
predominates, mostly only in informal services. Moreover, most of urban food 
demand in Asia is concentrated in smaller urban areas: about 60 per cent, accord-
ing to FAO estimates (FAO  2017b), suggesting there is a large potential for 
dynamic rural non-farm employment creation through agri-food business devel-
opment. In fact, during rapid structural transformation in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam, food processing industries have played an important role in pulling 
labour into off-farm activity and account for about one-sixth of total manufacturing 
employment around 2010 (FAO  2017b). In Vietnam, employment in agri-food 
processing more than doubled between 1999 and 2009. While still most of the 
employment growth (about 53 per cent) was generated in small, household-based 
enterprises in rural areas and small towns, employment growth in modern private 
enterprises was higher in relative terms (McGaig and Pavcnik  2016), reflective 
of broader changes in agri-food systems taking place in Vietnam as much as else-
where in Asia.
These transformations involve modernization of the midstream of food supply 
chains with the emergence of large-scale wholesale and retail food distributors 
(‘supermarket revolution’) and vertically integrated food processing companies, 
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and reduced roles for state-operated food distribution networks (Reardon and 
Timmer  2014). In much of Southeast Asia (outside Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
and Myanmar), wholesale sector transformation started in the 1970s, while 
processing transformation took off in the 1980s. Retail transformation (the 
‘supermarket revolution’) did not start until the mid-to-late 1990s. China, India, 
and Vietnam had their growth and urbanization spurts mainly in the 1990s/2000s 
or opened up food industries no earlier than during the 1990s.
The massive proliferation of wholesale markets, the extension and improvement 
of rural roads, and the regulatory liberalization of their operations in most coun-
tries opened the door to what Reardon and Timmer (2014) label as ‘progressive 
disintermediation’ in the rural areas and in supply chains. This trend is seen to 
have been driven by two main factors. The first of these is regulatory changes 
(such as in some states in India and privatization of state-owned businesses in 
Vietnam) that have freed up wholesale markets and provided incentives to large-
scale traders, distributors, and food companies to establish direct links to farmers 
(e.g., through contract farming or supermarket-led collection centres). The second 
is the diffusion of wholesale markets in towns near or in rural areas, and the 
improvement of road systems connecting rural areas to urban wholesale markets. 
In many locations, however, this has undercut small-scale village traders in 
diverse settings and further stimulated direct purchase from farmers by wholesale 
market traders who previously procured via village traders.
The broader agri-food supply chain transformations have been influenced by 
urbanization and diet change, as discussed earlier. The agri-food system changes 
themselves, in turn, influence both the change processes taking place downstream 
(in urban food markets and diets) and upstream (in factor markets and farming). 
As mentioned, they are bringing sources of new dynamics in the form of off-farm 
employment demand in processing and distribution services and a source of 
income diversification for farmers, bringing extra cash for investing in farm 
 productivity and mechanization. However, where rural–urban linkages have 
remained weak, rural livelihoods have been undermined. Large-scale urban 
manufacturers catering for mass markets have also displaced (and are displacing) 
small-scale businesses in food processing and distribution in rural areas and near 
or in cities, thereby diminishing non-farm rural employment without generating 
sufficient new jobs for the displaced workers. This problem is particularly press-
ing in areas with low agricultural potential and poor connectivity to urban mar-
kets and is holding back poverty reduction.
4. The Role of Policies
At the time when Myrdal (1968) wrote Asian Drama, most of developing Asia 
faced some similarity in initial conditions in the early stages of their economic lift 
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off, characterized by high birth rates and relatively fertile but scarce agricultural 
land. The Green Revolution brought new high-yielding varieties for staple crops, 
facilitating substantial farm productivity increases, even for smallholders, to 
jump-start agricultural transformations and structural change. While broadly 
adopted across the region, the speed of adoption of the new technologies and 
success in ‘pushing’ broader economic development through agricultural 
 productivity growth has varied depending importantly on policies and institu-
tional reforms. Despite policy differences, a common feature across the region 
has been the fading of the direct role of Asian governments in agricultural pro-
duction and other stages of the food chain. The parallel development has been the 
growth of off-farm, private sector small and medium-sized agri-food businesses 
and services, which have stepped into the void left by parastatals. Policy reforms 
further enabled entry of large-scale domestic and foreign firms such as processors 
and supermarket and fast food chains. Many governments took on another role 
in supporting transformative change, including through large infrastructure pro-
grammes that helped strengthen rural–urban linkages and food supply chain 
development.
Laborde et al. (2018) and Vos (2018) explain different rates of ‘success’ with 
agricultural transformations by key differences in agricultural price incentives, 
public spending priorities for investing in agricultural research and development 
(R&D), rural infrastructure, education and health, and reforms of rural institu-
tions (including land reform and credit schemes) across developing-country 
regions and over different periods of time since 1970. According to Laborde 
et al. (2018), the more critical factor appears to be the degree of coherence and 
 complementarity across these areas of intervention to promote sufficient agricul-
tural  productivity growth to facilitate (‘push’), a take-off of non-agricultural 
 sectors by freeing up labour and savings, and by overcoming population pressures 
on food security.
Based on studies for Asia’s major economies, Vos (2018) concludes that 
institutional reforms were critical in initial stages to unleash farm-level pro-
ductive forces, while input subsidies (for seeds and fertilizers) and infrastructure 
development were important to promote the adoption of Green Revolution 
technologies from the 1970s. The returns to these public support measures have 
diminished over time and the push for deeper agri-food system transformations 
was influenced by agricultural price policy reforms and privatization of food dis-
tribution and processing networks. These more recent transformations have 
helped accelerate poverty reduction and underpin broader economic develop-
ment, where these were supported by public investment in basic services and 
infrastructure that strengthened rural–urban linkages and enabled non-farm 
economic development. Agricultural and rural transformations have been slow 
and have failed to accelerate poverty reduction where policies and institutional 
reforms, supportive of agricultural productivity growth, fell short on these counts.
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Key changes in indicators of public support for agriculture and rural  development 
over 1970–2015 are displayed in Figure  7.4. The Republic of Korea, for instance, 
maintained a high level of spending, as did China and Malaysia. In all rapidly 
transforming countries there was a strong focus on complementarity with 
public investments, including complementary support to agricultural develop-
ment through public investments in research, extension services, primary education, 
and rural infrastructure, such as irrigation, electricity, and roads. Direct price 
interventions also played a key role in the agricultural transformation process for 
all countries, but the price interventions were first marked by an apparent strong 
anti-agricultural bias, as indicated by the relative rate of assistance (RRA) in 
Figure 7.4. Over time, Asian countries saw a strong shift from negative to positive 
price supports for agriculture. However, as becomes clear from the country 
 narratives below, just looking at the relative price (including support measures) of 
agriculture vis-à-vis non-agriculture may be misleading if not considering other, 
complementary forms of support to agricultural development, especially through 
reforms of agrarian institutions and development of rural infrastructure, as the 
following country narratives try to make clear.
Institutional reforms in the Republic of Korea, China, and Vietnam, in particular, 
were critical in unleashing agricultural productive forces and labour for industry 
in the early stages of their growth accelerations (see also Ocampo and Vos 2008: 
chapter 5), though the impact of these reforms likely would have been much less 
if they were not complemented by strong public support for the development of 
non-agricultural (industrial) sectors.
The land reform introduced by the South Korean government with support of 
the United States in 1949 led to relatively equitable land distribution (Tsakok 
2011). Combined with effective and sustained public support to smallholder 
agriculture, this proved effective to substantially lift agricultural productivity and 
develop commercial farming. In the Republic of Korea, significant public rural 
investments were already made during the Japanese colonial period. Over 1910 
through 1945, investments went mostly in support of the development of the rice 
sector. This was part of a strategy to secure Japan’s food self-sufficiency. In the 
immediate post-Korean war period, public investment prioritized research and 
extension services leading to the early introduction of new high-yielding varieties 
and the expanded use of chemical fertilizer and irrigation, compounding the 
productivity-enhancing effects of the land reform (Tsakok 2011). Korea sustained 
its relatively strong support to the agricultural sector in subsequent decades 
(Figure 7.4). After a brief spell of anti-agriculture bias during the initial import-
substitution stage of industrial development in the 1960s, price incentives shifted 
in agriculture’s favour with the shift to export-led industrialization in the 1970s, 
as visible from the strongly positive RRA in Figure 7.4 (Honma and Hayami 2009). 
The main objective of the Korean government was to keep food prices low and, 
hence, real urban wages down.
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China prioritized import-substituting industrial development until 1979, which 
proved detrimental to agricultural development. This radically changed with the 
introduction of the household responsibility system, which entitled farmers and 
town and village enterprises to manage and commercialize production them-
selves and earn profits. According to one study, this institutional reform alone 
would explain 60 per cent of agricultural growth in China between 1978 and 1990 
(EIU 2008). The reform was complemented by policies introduced in the 1980s 
that allowed freer labour mobility and rural–urban migration, facilitating the exit 
of labour resources out of agriculture and into both rural and urban non-farm 
employment (Tsakok  2011). During the 1990s and 2000s, China stepped up 
public expenditures in support of agriculture and rural development, with most 
of the spending going to rural education (33 per cent), irrigation and water 
control (30 per cent), and other infrastructure, including power supply and 
roads (20 per cent). Fan et al. 2004 find a significant impact of public investment 
on agricultural growth and rural poverty in China either directly by stimulating 
agricultural production or indirectly by creating improved employment oppor-
tunities in the non-farm sector. These support measures were complemented by a 
gradual build-down of the anti-agriculture bias in price incentives. During the 
period of the Great Leap Forward, until 1979, agricultural incomes were squeezed 
through taxes and administered prices, while farmers were not allowed to market 
their production surpluses (Tsakok  2011). After 1979, purchase prices of most 
agricultural products were lifted and in-quota and above-quota prices for grains, 
oil crops, cotton, sugar, and pork were raised. In the 1990s, subsidies on various 
crops, including soybeans, were introduced. As a result, the RRA moved out of 
negative territory, turning positive in the 2000s (Figure 7.4).
In Malaysia, government support to large-scale tree-crop plantation agricul-
ture (rubber, palm oil, coconut) has been a critical ingredient of natural resource-
led growth and structural transformation. Government policies have underpinned 
productivity growth on large-scale plantations through significant R&D spend-
ing, land development, and infrastructure investment promoting the vertical 
integration with processing industries. In parallel, however, the Malaysian gov-
ernment also invested heavily in smallholder agriculture through price support 
schemes, input subsidies, and low-interest rate credits. Between 1971 and 1995, 
the share of public expenditures allocated to agriculture and rural development 
averaged 17 per cent. The New Agricultural Policy of 1984 provided a further 
push to agricultural income growth, commercialization of farming, and overall 
economic transformation through agricultural market development, R&D, and 
incentives to diversification from rice to agro-industrial crops, including rubber 
and palm oil (Tsakok 2011).
In Vietnam, collective farming was replaced with family farming during the 
period of doi moi (the policy of renovation) in the 1980s. Under the new system, 
farmers were allowed to sign contracts with the government on parcels of land for 
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up to 15 years—in effect, they leased the land—and were given the freedom to sell 
their products as they wished. As in the case of China, other reforms proceeded at 
the same time, including domestic market and trade liberalization, allowing 
for the introduction of market-based transactions in agricultural and non-
agricultural products and entry of foreign direct investment. Vietnam’s institu-
tional reforms were complemented with significant public investment in rural 
infrastructure (roads and electrification), as well as in basic social services, 
including primary education, vocational training, and healthcare. These 
investments paid off by the 1980s, as visible in accelerated agricultural 
 productivity growth and fast growth of non-agricultural sectors (Van Arkadie 
and Duc Dinh 2004).
In the case of India, in contrast, land reform was limited to a stricter enforcement 
of the existing tenancy law. The government had enacted a land reform act in 
1955. However, it did not enforce the law largely because of the lack of adminis-
trative and legal resources. This, combined with low-level public investment in 
infrastructure and rural development, was probably a key factor in holding back 
agricultural productivity growth and rural transformation in most of India until 
at least the 1990s, after which such investments were stepped up (Ocampo and 
Vos  2008). Public spending per farmer also increased recently in India, but to 
levels no higher than those in Vietnam and well below levels spent by faster agri-
cultural transformers in Asia. Spending was stepped up only decades after the land 
reform of the 1970s and the lack of complementary support through improved 
rural infrastructure may well have contributed to the failure of that reform to 
spur agricultural productivity growth. Traditionally most of India’s public support 
to agriculture has been for input subsidies for fertilizers and irrigation water with 
much less priority for investments in rural infrastructure. More recently, such 
investments have been stepped up, leading to increased rural road density and 
access to electricity, helping to accelerate agricultural growth. Yet, at about 
60  per cent, rural electrification coverage in India remains well below that in 
other parts of Asia where agricultural and rural transformations have progressed 
earlier and at a faster pace (Figure  7.4). Also, the relative rate of agricultural 
assistance has remained negative to date (Figure 7.4), despite high input subsidies 
on, especially, fertilizer use. Public procurement of staple crop purchases for food 
reserve holdings and food distribution schemes tilted agricultural support in 
favour of consumers.
Regulatory changes to other parts of the agri-food system have been important, 
too, in facilitating transformative change of agriculture and rural economies. In 
developing East Asia (other than China), development and opening up of whole-
sale distribution and food processing came with broader industrial development 
and urbanization during the 1960s to 1980s. China, India, and Vietnam opened 
up food industries no earlier than during the 1990s. The bigger changes in most 
parts of the region took place from the mid-1980s on the wave of economic 
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liberalization and globalization. During these phases, agri-food systems modern-
ized and many parts of supply chains saw the emergence of large-scale 
 operators in retail (‘supermarket revolution’), wholesale, and food processing, as 
well as greater vertical integration of food market value chains, as mentioned in 
the  previous section.
5. The End of the ‘Asian Drama’?
Both international experience and economic theory show that structural change 
is an essential component of long-term economic development. Urbanization and 
industrial growth are key features of this structural change. Along the way, rural 
labour and savings are being pulled into higher productivity sectors to underpin 
broader economic growth. With some variation across countries, this process was 
key to the remarkable acceleration of economic growth in East Asia over the past 
half-century or more, belying Gunnar Myrdal’s notion of an Asian drama. 
However, this ‘miracle’ could not have come about without strong agricultural 
productivity growth and agrarian change in initial stages of economic take-off. 
The Green Revolution, reforms of agricultural and rural institutions, and public 
investment in rural infrastructure have been critical factors in East Asia’s take-off. 
In subsequent stages, industrial and other modern sector development took over 
as the drivers of economy-wide growth, while at the same time pushing agriculture 
and rural economies to deeper transformative change, as, inter alia, urbanization 
and income growth have induced major dietary change and pushed for more 
industrial organization of food systems at large.
This process is also taking place in South Asia, albeit at a slower and delayed 
pace. Myrdal’s concerns with India’s and other South Asian countries’ structural 
impediments to development, including land scarcity, historical traditions of pro-
duction activity, weak institutions, and a ‘soft state’, indeed held back agricultural 
growth and broader economic development in cumulative causation, certainly in 
comparison with other parts of Asia. Yet, as these constraints were lifted, partially 
at least, faster growth was unleashed. However, moving forward, fewer of the les-
sons from East Asia’s experience may hold for India and the rest of South Asia.
Some patterns will likely remain the same. All countries will see agricultural 
employment become less and less important. This decline is consistent with agri-
cultural productivity growth and the wider spread of mechanization, as well as 
with agri-food transformations and dietary change with increased demand for 
processed food and importance of off-farm activity related to food chains. But the 
pace of these changes has been different and will be different across countries (as 
much as across regions within countries).
Structural transformation is already most advanced in the countries of devel-
oping Asia, but pathways have differed starkly. In Malaysia, agricultural export 
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growth and extensive farming have driven the rapid labour exit from agriculture, 
leading to a faster declining agricultural employment share than the sector’s 
GDP share. Elsewhere, as in India, much of South Asia, and to a lesser extent in 
Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, the decline of agriculture’s 
employment share has lagged the drop of agriculture’s share in GDP. These 
 contexts are further characterized by increased fragmentation of landholdings. 
Agricultural labour productivity growth has been slower in consequence and 
could slow down poverty reduction if not offset by other drivers. Employment 
growth in non-farm (agri-food and other manufacturing) activities as well as 
agricultural exports have been important other drivers for poverty reduction in 
the Southeast Asian countries. Such factors have been less dynamic in recent dec-
ades in the countries of South Asia, warranting the expectation that poverty 
among their populations will be far from eradicated in the coming decades.
The ability of small farms to be efficient and dynamic agri-food systems to 
develop so as to underpin dynamic and inclusive structural change have been 
strongly conditioned by public investments and policy choices, as discussed in 
section 4.
Ongoing urbanization and modernization of agri-food systems are changing 
the nature of rural transformations. Farm efficiency and rural employment 
opportunities are increasingly influenced by what happens beyond the farm gate 
and the strength of rural–urban linkages. But this unlikely will suffice to put an 
end to the Asian drama. Land scarcity combined with continued population 
pressure has led to further fragmentation of landholdings and to added pressure 
on already degraded land and water resources (Vos and Bellù 2019). Such con-
straints imply that continuation along past development pathways will hit on 
environmental constraints. Likewise, while structural change has dramatically 
brought down poverty and undernourishment in Asia, dietary and food system 
changes have brought new malnutrition challenges as overweight and obesity are 
on the rise.3
Finding the appropriate balance between an effective public role and an 
efficient private role in the modernization of agriculture and the entire food sys-
tem has always been a difficult challenge. The balance not only needs to focus on 
underpinning economic growth and development with more productive agricul-
ture and food systems, but also on doing so in a sustainable way and avoiding 
new burdens of malnutrition and disease to take away from economic progress. 
The political economy of pathways will be tricky. Myrdal’s notion of cumulative 
3 While still significantly lower than in high-income countries like the United States, the preva-
lence of obesity has increased steeply in most Asian countries. It has doubled or tripled in Thailand 
and Malaysia between 2000 and 2016 to affect well over 10 per cent of adults. Obesity has also (near) 
tripled in China and Indonesia in the same period. Data based on age-standardized body mass index 
estimates of the World Health Organization (WHO 2017).
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causation remains valid for understanding today’s trade-offs, despite the remarkable 
economic progress made since he wrote Asian Drama.
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Industrialization and Development
Ha-Joon Chang and Kiryl Zach
1. Introduction
Fifty years ago, in the freshly published Asian Drama, Gunnar Myrdal was cau-
tious, if not outright sceptical, about the industrialization prospects of the Asian 
economies in the upcoming decades, pointing to the many institutional, social, 
political, and economic barriers they faced. In this light, it is fitting to call the 
industrialization successes in a number of Asian economies in the last five dec-
ades ‘development miracles’. From today’s vantage point of view, the phenomenal 
growth of China or the industrial prowess of the East Asian ‘tigers’ may appear as 
a natural, or even inevitable, outcome of the region’s culture or other uniquely 
favourable initial conditions. Yet this had not been so when South Korea (hence-
forth Korea), fresh from the destructions of the Korean War (1950–1953), was 
denounced as a ‘bottomless pit’ in an internal memo of the United States Agency 
for International Development (Chang 2007). Taiwan faced the threat of military 
intervention from China, which itself was often politically isolated by the Western 
powers, and its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was barely half that of 
India. None of these, or other ‘developing’ Asian economies in South or Southeast 
Asia, had any significant industrial capacity at the time.
It was a tall order to achieve this success. The developing economies of Asia1 
had aspirations of seemingly Icarian heights: to close, in a single generation, the 
huge gap in industrial development that separated them from their old colonial 
masters. This feat was to be achieved against the tides of rapid population growth 
and persistent trade deficits without the benefits provided to the earlier industri-
alizers by colonial possessions.
Even though not all odds were stacked against them, we cannot explain the 
industrialization achievements of the more successful developing Asian economies 
only by structural factors.2 Likewise, it is just as inadequate to credit structural 
1 The ‘developing Asia’ category excludes Japan and Israel, as well as the Asian part of the USSR due 
to a lack of reliable data for the period. The ‘developing economies’ are defined following the definition 
by UNCTAD (2017).
2 For a rebuttal of the ‘cultural’ arguments, see Chang (2007: chapter 9) and Chang (2011a), which 
also discusses ‘institutional’ arguments. For a rebuttal of explanations involving other types of initial 
conditions (e.g., natural resources, human resources, infrastructure, geopolitical factors), see Chang 
(2006: chapter 4).
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barriers and conditions as the only causes of relatively less successful industrialization 
of other Asian economies. To understand the differences in the structural trans-
formation3 of different Asian countries (as well as the differences between the 
Asian and other developing countries), one needs to look at the differences in 
their choices of overall development strategy and industrial policy.
In section 2,we provide a bird’s-eye view of Asia’s industrial transformation in 
the last five decades. We explore: (i) the progress of industrialization, measured by 
value-added (henceforth VA) indicators; (ii) the changes in employment patterns 
and manufacturing VA (henceforth MVA) indicators; and (iii) industrial upgrad-
ing, with the use of export indicators. In section  3,drawing on insights from 
Myrdal’s work, we discuss the role played by industrial policy in industrialization, 
outline experiences of four notable cases—Korea, Malaysia, China, and India—
and discuss some of the general factors behind a successful industrial policy.
2. Asian Industrial Development in Numbers
2.1 The Extent of Industrialization in Developing Asia
In the last five decades, the manufacturing sector in Asia has become the largest 
in the world, which happened in tandem with other important developments, 
including the continent’s increasing share in global trade and rapid urbanization. 
All Asian regions have industrialized faster than the global average during that 
period, but most startlingly the ‘developing’ East Asian region, while being mar-
ginal in terms of industrial development in 1970, became the world’s largest ‘core’ 
industrial region by 2015.
These changes were by no means predestined. Asia of the 1960s was a  continent 
of subsistent farming with a few ‘enclaves’ of modern industry. In 1970, the devel-
oping Asian economies produced around 32.98 per cent of their VA in agriculture, 
compared to the world average of 9.46 per cent,4 while the share of their MVA in 
GDP was lower than that of Africa (10.57 per cent vs. 12.89 per cent). MVA con-
stituted less than a third of Asia’s total industrial VA (henceforth IVA), typically 
for extractive-industries-dominated postcolonial economies (see Table 8.1; also 
see UNCTAD (2017) for data on Africa). In 1970, developing Asia accounted 
for only 4.15 per cent of the world’s MVA, despite holding over half the world’s 
population (Table 8.1).
3 Structural transformation is defined in this chapter as the series of economic and social changes 
resulting from changes in the production structure. These involve notably transition in employment 
towards manufacturing and modern industries, new organization of production, technological 
upgrading, and related changes in social conditions, such as urbanization. For discussion of industrial 
transformation in Asia, see ADB (2013).

























Table 8.1 Comparing developing Asia in 1970 and 2015






































Developing Asia’s share of global GDP 6.2% 22.7% 264%
Developing Asia’s share of global exports 8.42% 35.87%a 326%
Developing Asia’s inward FDI flows  
as a % of global totalb 7.1% 29.2% 310%
















Notes: (a) For 2016; (b) Asia’s FDI flows numbers are 1970–1974 and 2010–2015 averages.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UNCTADstat (UNCTAD 2017) and WDI Database Archives (World Bank 2017).
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In the five decades that followed, Asia experienced rapid industrialization, 
outpacing every other continent by a big margin. From 1970 to 2015, while the 
world’s MVA grew by 286 per cent, Asia’s grew by a staggering 3,160 per cent. The 
bulk of this came from developing Asia, which expanded its share in global MVA 
from 4.15 per cent to 35.06 per cent, pulling ahead of both Europe and the 
Americas (26.35 per cent and 25.81 per cent respectively). In doing so, it also 
became the only ‘developing’ continent whose share in global MVA outgrew its 
share in IVA (35.06 per cent to 34.13 per cent, with 1.80 per cent to 3.02 per cent 
for Africa, and 5.01 per cent to 6.42 per cent for developing Americas (UNCTAD 
2017)). This means a transition away from dependence on extractive industries to 
manufacturing as the engine of development.
Most of the expansion in Asia’s share of global MVA was concentrated in devel-
oping East Asia. From 1970 to 2015, the region expanded its share in global MVA 
from a mere 1.60 per cent to 25.30 per cent. Although other Asian regions have 
also expanded their global share of MVA their increases were much less dramatic 
by comparison. In South Asia it grew from 0.97 per cent to 3.83 per cent, in 
South-Eastern Asia from 0.75 per cent to 3.56 per cent, and for Western Asia 
from 0.88 per cent to 2.37 per cent (for more detail see Chang and Zach 2018: 
table A1).
The importance of these facts cannot be overemphasized. In less than five 
decades, developing East Asia has gone from having a globally marginal 
 manufacturing base to eclipsing the industrial capacity of other Asian regions 
and rising above the world average in per capita terms. It has also pulled ahead of 
the old industrial centres of the world economy—Europe and the Americas—in 
terms of total MVA. In other words, East Asia has emerged as the largest indus-
trial ‘core’ region in the world. In contrast, Southeast Asia is at best halfway 
towards that goal, and South Asia is just beyond the starting line.
In 1970, there was nothing in East Asia’s ‘initial conditions’ that would have 
allowed us to predict such a dramatic industrial expansion in the subsequent fifty 
years. Their comparative advantages were in products using cheap labour. Given 
the low levels of GDP per capita, there was also little potential to generate capital 
from savings. A sharp ideological divide, military tensions, and low share in 
international exports at that time made the region uninviting for foreign  investors. 
Heavy state involvement in the economies in the region (and not just in centrally 
planned China) was seen by many as being inimical to the growth of domestic 
private capital. By any conventional economic standards the region in 1970 was 
destined to stay at a low level of development for the foreseeable future.
Table  8.2 shows the industrialization trends in the selected Asian countries. 
Between 1950 and 2005, agriculture’s share of output in all Asian countries fell 
by more than it did in Africa, despite the fact that in the 1950s and the 1960s 
Asia was the most ‘agricultural’ continent (measured by agriculture’s share in 
























Table 8.2 Structure of production in selected Asian countries, 1950–2005 (gross value-added in main sectors of the economy 
as % of GDP at current prices)
 1950 1980 2005 Per capita GDP  
1970–2015, %
 agr ind mf sv agr ind mf sv agr ind mf sv 1970 2015 growth
South Korea 47 13 9 41 16 37 24 47 3 40 28 56 1,869 25,280 6.0
Taiwan 34 22 15 45 8 46 36 46 2 26 22 72 1,862 22,481 5.7
Turkey 49 16 11 35 27 20 17 54 11 27 22 63 3,124 8,943 2.4
Malaysia 40 19 11 41 23 41 22 36 8 50 30 42 1,201 7,622 4.2
China 51 21 14 29 30 49 40 21 13 48 34 40 150 4,187 7.7
Thailand 48 15 12 37 23 29 22 48 10 44 35 46 616 3,853 4.2
Sri Lanka 46 12 4 42 28 30 18 43 17 27 15 56 477 2,470 3.7
Indonesia 58 9 7 33 24 42 13 34 13 47 28 40 349 2,043 4.0
Philippines 42 17 8 41 25 39 26 36 14 32 23 54 826 1,734 1.7
India 55 14 10 31 36 25 17 40 18 28 16 54 259 1,279 3.6
Pakistan 61 7 7 32 30 25 16 46 21 27 19 51 371 904 2.0
Bangladesh 61 7 7 32 32 21 14 48 20 27 17 53 271 653 2.0
World             4,283 8,178 1.4
Averages:                
Asia 49 14 10 36 25 33 22 42 13 35 24 52    
Latin America 22 28 16 50 10 40 24 50 7 37 18 56    
Africa 44 19 9 36 25 32 14 43 26 30 12 45    
Developing countries 41 19 11 40 21 35 20 44 16 34 18 51    
16 OECD countries 15 42 31 43 4 36 24 59 2 28 17 70    
Notes: (a) Agr—agriculture, ind—industry, mf—manufacturing, sv—services; (b) earliest year for which data are available: 1950; except for Taiwan and 
Thailand, 1951; Japan and China, 1952; South Korea, 1953; Malaysia, 1955; (c) Bangladesh 1950–1959, same data as Pakistan; (d) the countries are 
arranged by their 2015 per capita incomes.
Source: Adapted from Szirmai (2009) and authors’ calculations based on data for GDP per capita at constant 2005 US$ are from UNCTADstat 
(UNCTAD 2017).
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 manufacturing in GDP increased continuously between 1950 and 2005. Thus, in 
2005, the share of non-manufacturing industry in GDP in Asia was similar to that 
of the OECD (both 11 per cent), whereas those in Latin America and Africa were 
much higher (19 per cent and 18 per cent respectively), suggesting the dominance 
of extractive industries.
All in all, at the continental, the regional, and the country levels, the Asian 
experience shows that the most rapid per capita growth is associated with the 
highest degree of industrialization. This is both consistent with the historical record 
of currently rich countries (Chang 2002; Szirmai 2009) and with the arguments 
that manufacturing serves as an engine of growth for the rest of the economy, 
which we discuss in the next section.
2.2  The Trajectory of Industrialization Among  
the Asian Economies
The main impact of industrialization on economic development comes, in the 
classical formulation, from the transfer of labour from sectors with low and slowly 
growing productivity to the industrial (and especially manufacturing) sector, as 
discussed by Myrdal (1968: chapter 24). Most notably, this was formulated as 
Kaldor’s (1966) first growth law, positing that GDP growth is positively  correlated 
with manufacturing growth, owing to such transfer. This is supported by two other 
propositions—second and third laws—which state, in turn, that the productivity 
of the manufacturing sector is positively related to manufacturing output growth 
(due to static scale economies and learning-by-doing) and that the productivities 
of other sectors are positively related to the size of the manufacturing sector (due 
to technological spillovers). This would suggest that the richest and the fastest-
growing economies would be the ones with the largest manufacturing sectors.
In this section, we look at how far and how fast different Asian economies have 
increased their manufacturing employment (see Table  8.3) and manufacturing 
value-added (see Figure  8.1). We find that the experience of the major Asian 
economies is in line with Kaldor’s prediction; the currently richest major Asian 
economies (Japan and the first-tier Newly Industrialized Countries—NICs5) are 
the ones that have increased the most their manufacturing employment share 
relative to total employment and population. We find that the key to their success 
lies in the ability to sustain the growth of manufacturing production.
In Table 8.3, we see that the peak of per capita employment in manufacturing is 
an accurate predictor of income levels of that country in line with Kaldor’s first 
5 In the chapter we mention first-tier NICs—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong—and 
























Table 8.3 Peaks in manufacturing employment share in total employment and in total population in selected Asian economies 
(employment, population, and MVA growth prior to and after reaching the manufacturing employment ‘peak’ relative to total population)
 Data entries ‘Peak’ in mf  
share in total 
employment
‘Peak’ in mf empl  
as a proportion of  
total population
Pre-peak growth  
rates (regards the  
‘population’ peak, %)
Post-peak growth  
rates (regards the  
‘population’ peak, %)
 year % year per 1,000 empl pop MVA empl pop MVA
Japan 1953–2012 1969 24.5 1969 135.2 4.6 1.1 13.0 −1.2 0.5 2.6
Singapore 1970–2011 1981 30.4 1982 142.8 8.0 1.6 9.5 1.4 2.5 6.3
Hong Kong 1974–2011 1976 45.3 1981 197.3 6.1 2.8 12.5 −6.4 1.1 0.4
South Korea 1963–2010 1988 28.1 1991 116.4 7.8 1.6 14.6 −0.8 0.7 6.7
Taiwan 1963–2012 1987 33.7 1987 144.1 7.4 2.1 13.8 0.2 0.7 3.1
Malaysia 1975–2011 1997 24.9 1997 100.5 7.4 2.5 10.5 0.2 2.0 3.7
China 1952–2011 2010 19.2 2010 107.3 4.5 1.5 14.4 n/a n/a n/a
Thailand 1960–2011 2007 15.1 2007 84.5 5.1 1.9 8.9 n/a n/a n/a
Indonesia 1971–2012 1994 13.5 1994 62.5 6.1 2.2 12.1 1.2 1.4 3.3
Philippines 1971–2012 1971 12.0 1975 40.6 n/a n/a n/a 1.6 2.3 3.1
India 1960–2010 2002 12.5 2003 49.7 2.8 2.1 5.5 −0.2 1.5 8.7
US 1950–2010 1953 25.6 1953 106.0 n/a n/a n/a −0.7 1.3 2.8
Notes: (a) mf—manufacturing, empl—employment, pop—population; (b) Bold Underlined numbers indicate that the ‘peak’ is within the last 5 years of the 
period covered, and therefore that it could go higher. Double-underlined numbers indicate that the ‘peak’ is within the first 5 years of the period covered and 
therefore that it might have been higher before. The growth rates prior to ‘bold underlined’ peaks, as well as after ‘double-underlined’ peaks, are omitted 
(marked n/a), either due to lack of data or because they may be reflecting short-term fluctuations rather than longer-term trends in growth; (c) The MVA 
growth rates and the employment growth rates are calculated for the same years, except for Japan (whose post-peak MVA growth rate is for 1969–2011) due to 
data availability; (d) Countries are ranked according to their per capita GDP in 2015 from the richest to the poorest (UNCTADstat 2017 database), except for 
the US, which serves as a reference.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on employment and MVA at constant 2005 national prices data from GGDC 10-Sector Database, Timmer et al. (2015); 
population data from UN DESA Population Division (2017) database.
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proposition. This applies to Japan and the first-tier NICs, but also to the richest 
second-tier NIC, Malaysia.
Relatively rapid rates of employment and output growth in the manufacturing 
sector were significant in the rise of the currently industrialized East Asian coun-
tries to their ‘peak’ industrializations. This is consistent with Myrdal’s (1968: 
appendix 2) assertion that, in order to achieve sustained economic growth, a 
country needs to overcome the ‘threshold’ of initial institutional and economic 
inertia (more on this in section 3). However, contrarily to Myrdal’s assertion, 
simply achieving such rates of growth does not seem to be a sufficient, not to 
speak of being necessary, condition for successful industrialization. For instance, 
Indonesia and Malaysia have achieved similar, or higher, rates of employment 
and output growth than those of some East Asian ‘tigers’, but Indonesia has not 
been able to sustain its manufacturing employment growth and Malaysia’s indus-
trial dynamism started to wane at levels of per capita income and of MVA signifi-
cantly short of those of the East Asian ‘tigers’. China, in contrast, has been able to 
reach a high (and still growing) level of employment in manufacturing, despite 
having a significantly lower growth rate of employment in manufacturing than 
most of the countries in the sample. This suggests that it is not the high rates of 
growth in manufacturing employment or output per se but the ability to sustain 
them that matters.
Interestingly, the countries that have had lower ‘peak’ employment shares have 
had weaker manufacturing productivity growth performance afterwards (3.5 per 
cent or lower with the exception of India) than the richer (Japan and first-tier 
NICs) countries (3.8 per cent and higher, with the exception of Taiwan). In theory, 
this can be partially attributed, as in the second Kaldor’s law, to the smaller 
dynamic scale economies and fewer intra-industry linkages.
Particularly notable is the fact that, in the industrialized East Asian countries, 
manufacturing output has expanded through continued productivity growth, 
even while manufacturing employment in absolute terms has declined.6 However, 
as seen earlier (Table  8.2), in the South and the Southeast Asian economies, 
manufacturing employment has been growing in absolute terms even after the 
‘peak’ in terms of the employment share (except for India recently), suggesting 
that their manufacturing employment growth cannot keep up with the growth in 
workforce. At the same time, their manufacturing sector is still not large enough 
to drive overall development through its productivity growth.7 We can notice 
these different patterns of loss of industrialization dynamism in Figure 8.1.
6 This is also due to shedding sunset industries, which are often more labour-intensive.
7 It is not to say that sustaining employment growth in manufacturing is desirable under any 
conditions. If employment in the protected manufacturing sector is expanded without raising its com-
petitiveness, the result may be larger loss of employment if such a sector is exposed to international 
competition, as it will have little ability to withstand it. This can create higher unemployment in the 
longer run, which would be difficult to absorb quickly.
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Figure 8.1 visually presents some of the previous points. First, it shows that at 
the heart of the industrialization success of Japan and first-tier NICs was their 
ability to sustain the rapid expansion of manufacturing output, well beyond their 
manufacturing employment peak (marked by the black point on the trend line).8 
Second, it shows that, in the case of Southeast Asia (especially Malaysia and 
Indonesia), the loss of industrial dynamism happened around the time of the 
employment peak. Beyond it, their industrial growth performance weakens and 
is increasingly disrupted by contractions.
Most Asian economies in the figure (China and India are the exceptions) 
 experienced a slowdown and even a decline in the growth of MVA following the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, despite being at very different levels of MVA per 
capita.9 Beyond the ‘dip’ due to the crisis, the affected countries have experienced 
a lasting loss of industrial dynamism. The likely cause of this deterioration is the 
8 Hong Kong is the exception. It began to rapidly financialize in the 1980s and especially in the 
1990s to provide financial services for the gradually liberalizing Chinese economy.
9 Japan at around US$6,800, Japan and Taiwan at around US$3,800, Malaysia at US$1,300, and 















Figure 8.1 Per capita MVA in selected East Asian economies (in constant 2005 US$).
Notes: (a) The black point indicates the year in which economy had its manufacturing employment 
‘peak’ as a percentage of population; (b) Graph done in logarithmic scale to illustrate growth rates; (c) 
Original data is in national currencies at constant 2005 prices—converted to 2005 US$ prices using 
‘Treasury Reporting Rates of Exchange as of December 31, 2005’.
Source: Authors’ calculations from MVA at 2005 national prices data from Timmer et al. (2015), 
population data from UN DESA Population Division (2017) and exchange rates of national currencies 
to US$ from US Department of Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service (2005).
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change in economic policies and institutions towards the neo-liberal direction, 
introduced in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis (see Shin and Chang 2005).
One of the main effects of the policy changes after the crisis was on the rate of 
investment. For both the Southeast and the East Asian regions, gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) as a proportion of GDP fell significantly between 1991 and 
1995 and 2001 and 2005 and stayed close to that level in the next decade with the 
exception of Indonesia (see Chang and Zach 2018: table A2). It fell by the equiva-
lent of about 6 per cent of GDP for Japan, 7 per cent for Korea and Indonesia, 
almost 8 per cent for Singapore, and over 16 per cent for Malaysia and Thailand. 
It remained at that level, except in Malaysia, Thailand, and Hong Kong, where it 
bounced back a little. This decline takes the GFCF/GDP ratio of most of those 
countries below the world average, around 20 per cent, for the first time since the 
1970s. The only major Asian economies with a GFCF/GDP ratio over 30 per cent 
in that period were Korea, China, and Vietnam.
Interestingly, with this decline, most of those countries have converged to the 
GFCF/GDP levels of the slower industrializers, like the South Asian economies 
and the Philippines. This suggests that the inability to sustain the growth in the 
share of manufacturing in total employment among the Southeast Asian countries 
after 1997, on the one hand, and the South Asian countries and the Philippines in 
the earlier period, on the other hand, have similar origins—that is, investments 
were inadequate to generate manufacturing employment growth faster than the 
growth of the workforce.
The experiences of China and Vietnam give even more weight to this reasoning. 
From 2000 to 2010 (and for China in 2010 to 2015 as well), both countries main-
tained the highest (alongside Korea) rates of GFCF as a proportion of GDP in the 
region (Vietnam around 30 per cent, China around 40 per cent—see Chang and 
Zach 2018: table A2), which coincided with them being the only two major econ-
omies of the region that experienced growth ‘miracles’ during the period. In the 
same period, they significantly improved their MVA per capita level relative to 
other economies of the region, with China approaching the Malaysian level and 
Vietnam nearing the Indonesian level.
2.3 Upgrading and Diversification of Industrial Production
Continued upgrading of industrial production is essential for sustaining both 
industrialization and growth in the standards of living. Industrialization creates 
demands for a variety of complex machinery and intermediate goods. In an open 
economy, this can be—and often should be—met by imports, which require foreign 
exchanges. The rising standards of living lead to an increase in the demand for 
imported consumer goods and thus for foreign exchanges. The challenge is then 
to sustain industrialization in the face of rising demands for foreign exchanges 
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(due to increased needs for imports) and of falling abilities to earn them (due to 
higher wages).
Initially, developing countries earn the necessary foreign exchanges by expand-
ing the exports of existing primary commodities or basic manufactures. However, 
these will prove insufficient. First, as wages grow, the competitiveness of these 
goods will deteriorate, as they tend to be more labour-intensive. At the same time, 
the possibilities for cutting costs become more limited, as these ‘basic’ goods 
 benefit less from the scale economies than complex ones and have less room for 
cutting costs through capital investments. Second, the demands for technologically 
complex goods grow faster than those for primary commodities, structurally con-
straining their export growths (see Palma 2005).
Thus, the more viable strategy for alleviating the balance of payments (BoP) 
constraints lies in the diversification of production structure. ‘Horizontal’ diversi-
fication, entailing the expansion of other primary commodities or basic manufac-
turing goods, increases the economy’s foreign exchange earnings, while also 
‘hedging’ the economy against price fluctuations of specific goods. More important, 
however, is ‘vertical’ diversification, especially that which involves ‘upgrading’ 
towards more technology-intensive industries. It alleviates BoP pressure by mak-
ing the export basket more ‘demand-dynamic’, thereby generating more foreign 
exchanges than it would otherwise. Some studies indicate that the quicker this 
process occurs, the better the growth outcomes are (e.g., Felipe et al. 2012; also 
see discussion in Chang and Lin 2009).
In Table 8.4, we can see the change in the leading export items for major Asian 
economies. We see that the currently industrialized economies have upgraded the 
most—with high- and medium-technology goods dominating exports. This is 
especially surprising in the case of Singapore or Korea, which had been exporters 
of low-tech and resource-based manufactures in 1965. At the same time, no 
country that has upgraded only moderately has experienced significant industri-
alization success.
Furthermore, the experiences of China and Vietnam support the idea that 
countries which upgrade aggressively at relative low-income levels subsequently 
experience faster rates of economic growth. These countries moved from primary 
commodity dependence in 1965 to the dominance of mostly high-tech products 
in 2016. Countries like the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand have an even 
higher concentration of export share in electronic products. However, they, 
including Malaysia, still significantly depend on primary commodities.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, countries that have not industrialized or grown as 
rapidly have generally witnessed fewer changes in their exports baskets. Pakistan, 
for instance, upgraded from plant fibre to garments and from jute to cotton, 
but  is still a largely agro-products exporter. India and Indonesia have largely 
upgraded from agro-products to mined commodities and natural-resource-based 
manufactures—into diamonds and jewellery (India) and coal and petroleum 
(Indonesia)—but have not gone beyond that.
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Table 8.4 Technology intensity of top five exports in selected countries in 1965 and 
2016 (SITC4 classification)
Country 1965 2016
Japan Ships and Boats (7932) 7.0% Cars (7810) 15%




Finished Cotton Fabrics (6522) 3.6% Vehicle Parts and 
Accessories (7849) 5.4%
Universals, Plates and Sheets, of  
Iron or Steel (6740) 3.1%
Machinery for Specialized 
Industries (7284) 4.0%
Motorcycles (7851) 2.0% Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 3.0%
Singapore Natural Rubber (2320) 34% Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 24%
Petroleum Products, Refined (3340) 9.7% Unclassified Transactions 
(9310) 5.9%
Fuel Oils (3344) 5.9% Machinery for Specialized 
Industries (7284) 2.3%
Light Oils (3341) 3.4% Aircraft Parts and 
Accessories (7929) 2.2%




Veneers, Plywood, Improved Wood and 
Other Wood, Worked, Nes (6340) 9.1%
Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 11%
Universal Plates of Iron or Steel (6741) 7.4% Cars (7810) 8.2%
Men’s and Boys’ Outwear, Textile Fabrics 
Not Knitted or Crocheted (8420) 5.7%
Ships and Boats (7932) 5.5%
Unbleached Cotton Woven Fabrics  
(6521) 5.1%
Vehicle Parts and 
Accessories (7849) 4.8%
Miscellaneous Non-Ferrous Ores (2879) 
4.8%
Telecom Parts and 
Accessories (7649) 4.7%
Malaysia Natural Rubber (2320) 40% Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 14%
Unwrought Tin and Alloys (6871) 17% Palm Oil (4242) 5.4%
Non-Coniferous Sawlogs (2472) 7.4% Liquified Petroleum Gases 
(3413) 4.3%
Iron Ore and Concentrates (2810) 5.2% Diods, Transistors and 
Photocells (7763) 3.8%
Non-Coniferous Worked Wood (2483) 3.4% Crude Petroleum (3330) 3.4%
China Finished Cotton Fabrics (6522) 5.3% TV and Radio Transmitters 
(7643) 5.8%
Soy Beans (2222) 5.0% Personal Computers (7522) 
4.1%
Milled Rice (0422) 4.7% Telecom Parts and 
Accessories (7649) 3.1%
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Thailand* Milled Rice (0422) 30% Computer Peripherals 
(7525) 5.4%
Natural Rubber (2320) 14% Cars (7810) 4.7%
Tin (2876) 7.0% Trucks and Vans  
(7821) 4.1%
Maize (0440) 6.9% Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 3.4%
Jute (2640) 6.0% Vehicle Parts and 
Accessories (7849) 3.3%
Indonesia Crude Petroleum (3330) 26% Palm Oil (4242) 10%
Natural Rubber (2320) 21% Coal (3222) 8.6%
Tin (2876) 6.3% Crude Petroleum 
(3330) 3.5%
Coffee (0711) 6.1% Footwear (8510) 3.2%
Fuel Oils (3344) 5.0% Liquified Petroleum Gases 
(3413) 3.1%
Philippines Non-Coniferous Sawlogs (2472) 20% Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 25%
Copra (2231) 20% Computer Peripherals 
(7525) 8.2%
Refined Sugars (0612) 14% Carpentry Wood 
(6353) 5.2%
Coconut Oil (4243) 7.7% Diodes, Transistors and 
Photocells (7763) 4.3%
Copper Ores (2871) 6.1% Electric Wire (7731) 4.1%
India Tea (0741) 14% Diamonds (6672) 10%
Jute Woven Fabrics (6545) 13% Precious Jewellery 
(8973) 5.5%
Iron Ore and Concentrates (2810) 7.4% Medicaments (5417) 5.2%
Textile Bags (6581) 5.6% Cars (7810) 2.8%
Oilcake (0813) 4.7% Milled Rice (0422) 2.3%
Vietnam* Natural Rubber (2320) 42% TV and Radio Transmitters 
(7643) 16%
Coal, Lignite and Peat (3220) 17% Footwear (8510) 7.6%
Pig and Cast Iron (6712) 3.9% Telecom Parts and 
Accessories (7649) 3.5%
Green Groundnuts (2221) 3.8% Personal Computers (7522) 
2.7%
Tea (0741) 3.4% Electronic Microcircuits 
(7764) 2.6%
Pakistan Jute (2640) 35% Linens (6584) 12%
Raw Cotton (2631) 12% Milled Rice (0422) 8.2%
Table 8.4 Continued
Country 1965 2016
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Table 8.5 confirms these observations at a more aggregated level. The table looks 
at the shares of four main groups of export goods—agricultural goods, both primary 
and processed (Agr), minerals and oil (M&O), garments, textiles and fabrics 
(GTF), and hi-tech products like machinery and electronics (M&E).10
All the economies in Table 8.5 have seen a very significant decrease in the share 
of agricultural commodities, both primary and processed (Agr). Excluding Korea 
(where it was only 20 per cent), these constituted 45–84 per cent of merchandise 
exports in 1965, but only 2–21 per cent in 2016. This decline was accompanied 
initially by an increase in exports of garments and textiles (GTF) and, in some 
countries, mined commodities (M&O). In the case of the four richest countries in 
the Table, as well as the Philippines and more recently Vietnam, another change 
was taking place after that initial shift, which was a marked expansion of elec-
tronics and machinery (M&E) exports. In these countries, these constituted 
<1–3 per cent of merchandise exports in 1965 but 39–61 per cent in 2016.
Despite large variations within the trend, we can see that those countries that 
were growing faster (see Table 8.2 for their respective growth rates) were those 
that experienced the most dramatic transformation in their export baskets and 
went through the changes described above most rapidly. This could be seen most 
clearly in the cases of Korea, Malaysia, China, Thailand, and more recently 
Vietnam, which all have seen a drastic transition from dominant group Agr to 
10 See note (a) to Table 8.4 for the breakdown of each group. The commodities included in each 
group are not all goods of a similar nature (for instance, group Agr could also include processed foods 
and group M&E could also include aircraft). However, we did not include all OEC-SITC2 commodity 
groups, partly due to the limits of the OEC software, partly because some SITC2 groups encompass a 
much more diverse range of goods, and partly because some groups had only marginal shares of 
exports across all selected economies.
Textile Bags (6581) 10% Finished Cotton Fabrics 
(6522) 6.8%
Jute Woven Fabrics (6545) 6.3% Cotton Yarn (6513) 6.1%
Cotton Yarn (6513) 4.9% Miscellaneous Textile 
Articles (6589) 5.2%
Bangladesh Jute (2640) 53% Cotton Undergarments 
(8462) 23%
Jute Woven Fabrics (6546) 21% Men’s Pants (8423) 17%
Textile Bags (6581) 12% Knitted Underwear (8451) 
11%
Crustaceans and Molluscs (0360) 3.0% Miscellaneous Feminine 
Outerwear (8439) 7.1%
Finished Leather (6118) Men’s Shirts (8441) 7.0%
Notes: (a) Products coloured by technology intensiveness. High-tech manufactures, medium-tech 
manufactures, low-tech manufactures, natural resource-based manufactures, primary commodities. 
Based on Lall (2000) classification; (b) Countries marked with * use data for 2015—latest available. 
Bangladesh uses data for 1972 and 2011—first and last entries available; (c) Countries ordered from 
richest to poorest (2015 per capita GDP UNCTADstat 2017 data).
Source: Authors’ construction, Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) software, based on 
























Table 8.5 Merchandise export shares of selected commodity groups in selected Asian economies 1965–2016, %
Year 1965 1985 2000 2016
Commodity group(a) Agr M&O GTF M&E Agr M&O GTF M&E Agr M&O GTF M&E Agr M&O GTF M&E
Korea 20 12 33 3 4 1 31 28 2 1 10 57 <1 2 3 61
Malaysia 49 11 1 1 23 27 4 19 4 7 3 69 9 11 2 49
China 45 3 23 3 15 21 33 7 3 2 27 45 2 1 17 52
Thailand* 76 3 <1 <1 56 6 16 10 16 4 11 47 13 6 4 50
Indonesia 49 31 2 <1 12 67 3 <1 10 25 15 20 21 27 12 15
Philippines 52 10 4 <1 30 12 14 22 3 2 11 75 6 5 7 61
India 54 13 18 2 30 24 23 7 15 22 29 10 14 21 17 17
Vietnam* 66 20 <1 <1 86 7 2 <1 22 28 34 7 13 4 27 39
Pakistan 68 <1 23 1 39 <1 46 2 13 <1 76 3 20 2 64 3
Bangladesh* 84 <1 15 <1 56 <1 37 <1 12 <1 84 <1 7 <1 89 <1
Notes: (a) Commodity groups based on SITC2 groups as in OEC software: Agr—cereals and vegetable oils, cotton, rice, soy beans and others, fish and seafood, fruit, leather, 
meat and eggs, misc. agriculture, tropical treecrops and flowers; M&O—oil, coal, mining, precious stones; GTF—garments, textiles and fabrics, M&E—machinery and 
electronics; (b) Countries marked with * have data for other years included—Bangladesh has 1972 instead of 1965 and 2011 instead of 2016; Thailand and Vietnam have 
2015 instead of 2016; (c) The shares are calculated with the exclusion of  ‘not classified’ group. The only exception is 1965 Vietnam data, which includes Coal, Lignite and Peat 
(SITC4 code 3220) into group B, since it constitutes a very significant portion of exports in that year (17 per cent); (d) Countries are ordered from the richest to the poorest 
based on their 2015 per capita GDP, as reported in UNCTAD (2017).
Source: Authors’ calculation with use of OEC software, based on Simoes and Hidalgo (2011).
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M&O, GTF, and then M&E. There are exceptions to this, such as the Philippines, 
which did not manage a similarly high overall growth rate, or Thailand, which 
moved directly from agricultural commodities and products to machinery and 
electronics without much expansion in groups M&O and GTF. However, Table 8.2 
shows that none of the countries that did not significantly expand their group 
M&E exports have managed successful industrialization.
As we have seen in this part of the chapter, the Asian development experience 
of the past five decades has been defined by remarkable degrees of  industrialization 
and the resulting structural transformation. In the next section, we will examine 
how the industrial policy approaches adopted by Asian economies during that 
period have been crucial in that process.
3. Industrial Policy in Asia
3.1 The Purpose of Industrial Policy in the Framework  
of Circular and Cumulative Causation
To understand the role of industrial policy for industrial development, let us start 
by considering Myrdal’s conceptualization of the development process as that of 
circular and cumulative causation. It means that a number of positive (or nega-
tive) impacts of changing socio-economic conditions reinforce the process in the 
direction of the initial change. Thus understood, the process of industrial devel-
opment is underpinned by a number of economic objectives whose achievements 
contribute to the achievement of others,11 notably:
• sustaining a high investment rate and maximizing their development impacts
• expansion of manufacturing employment
• expanding the scales of production to reap scale economies
• vertical diversification into higher-technology sectors
• expanding and deepening inter-sectoral linkages
• acquisition of cutting-edge technologies and the development of research 
and development (R&D) capabilities by domestic producers
• acquisition of organizational, managerial, and technical capabilities by 
domestic producers
• increasing international market share.
In theory, success in meeting these objectives drives industrialization. In practice, 
however, the ‘virtuous spiral’ of cumulative causation rarely happens  automatically. 
11 As described by Myrdal, industrial development is also strongly related and dependent on insti-
tutional and social factors, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. For discus-
sion of these aspects in relation to Asia, see Chapters 5 and 13, this volume.
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This is especially true for developing countries that lack potent domestic industrial 
enterprises. According to Myrdal (1968), this is due to various institutional 
factors—attitudes, scarcity of certain economic inputs, and political demobilization, 
which create strong inertia—all of which require a powerful impulse to be 
overcome, especially through state intervention. State intervention becomes even 
more necessary if military objectives or ideological aspiration requires acceleration 
of the pace of structural transformation or if there are counterforces or shocks 
pushing the economy in the opposite direction. Given all these, Myrdal points out 
that the core purposes of development planning are: (i) to cause such a ‘virtuous 
spiral’ to arise; (ii) to introduce (where missing) and strengthen the forces of 
cumulative causation that drive it; (iii) to preserve it in the face of bottlenecks, 
counterforces, or shocks; and (iv) to use newly arising opportunities to propel it 
further. Correspondingly, the purpose of industrial policy is to guide industrial 
development in the same manner, using a broad range of policies (for examples, 
see Chang 2011b).12
In the following section, drawing on Myrdal’s insights, we will provide overviews 
of industrial policy in four major Asian economies—in Korea, Malaysia, China, 
and India—and discuss how and why it has contributed (or not) to industrializa-
tion in those countries.13
3.2 Selected Case Studies of Industrial Policy in Asian Countries
3.2.1 Republic of Korea
The ‘classic’ Korean industrial policy started in the 1960s, motivated by 
 revanchism against Japan and by the military threat from its communist neigh-
bours. It was heavily influenced by the industrial planning ideologies of Japan, the 
USSR, and China, despite the widely advertised allegiance to the ‘free world’ by 
its new military government. It was structured by the (indicative) five-year plans 
of the Economic Planning Board (EPB), with detailed sectoral plans provided by 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Chang 1994).
The Korean government provided a range of strong incentives to expand into 
hi-tech sectors at a relatively low level of development—the Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialization programme was launched in 1973 when the country’s per capita 
income was just over 5 per cent of the US level. First, the government protected 
12 The need for co-ordination and for the management of a range of interlinked economic and 
non-economic processes is one of the reasons why it is difficult, if not outright misleading, to try to 
define industrial policy in terms of the tools. Such attempts usually yield excessively long lists. We 
argue that it is better to define it in terms of its goals (that is, industrial development) and in terms of 
its modus operandi (i.e., selective—and sequential—development of various industrial sectors).
13 Within the scope of this chapter, we focus on overviewing most standard selective industrial 
policies. The effect of other policies on industrial development, including macroeconomic and 
exchange rate policies are explored by Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 in this volume.
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‘infant’ industries from international competition through trade restrictions; 
quantitative restrictions were prevalent until the 1980s and the average manufac-
turing tariff was 30–40 per cent until the 1970s (Chang  2005). Second, the 
government rationed foreign exchanges, giving priority to importers of  capital 
goods and intermediate inputs. Third, subsidies, including export subsidies, were 
provided conditional on improving the export performance or developing R&D 
capabilities and retracted whenever the recipient failed to perform. Fourth, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was heavily regulated to promote capability acquisition 
by domestic firms. FDI was banned in many industries and majority ownership 
was not allowed outside the Export Processing Zones (EPZs), while investors 
were put under various performance requirements regarding local contents and 
technology transfer. Fifth, where the private sector was unwilling to invest in 
sectors deemed strategic, the government set up state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—
the most notable example being POSCO (set up in 1968 and privatized in 2001), 
which is now the fourth largest steel-maker in the world.
In implementing industrial policy, the government promoted the chaebols, the 
large and highly diversified conglomerates. This policy allowed the concentration 
of scarce capital and managerial resources while ensuring scale economies and 
long investment horizons. While promoting fierce competition among the chaebols 
through innovation, the Korean government also regulated their investments and 
pricing in order to reduce inefficiencies resulting from ‘excessive competition’.14 
It also set up deliberation councils to co-ordinate private investment goals with 
national targets.
Moderated in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Korea’s ‘classic’ industrial 
policy approach was largely dismantled in 1993, when the EPB was abolished and 
five-year plans terminated. Soon after that, industrial policy was even more 
diluted by liberalization following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, resulting in 
the loss of industrial dynamism. By that time, however, Korea had already become 
a rich industrialized economy.
3.2.2 Malaysia
In its initial phase (1957–1969), Malaysia’s industrial policy was aimed at expand-
ing domestic manufacturing employment and alleviating BoP pressures through 
import-substitution. This was realized by direct and indirect government 
 financing of factory construction in industrial zones. However, there was little to 
no strategic targeting aimed at things like vertical diversification, technological 
upgrading, or scale economies in production. There was little pressure for infant 
industries to ‘mature’ (Jomo et al. 1997).
14 It was understood to be a situation in which a large number of firms competed in one sector, 
leading to a waste of resources due to things like unnecessary scrapping of sector-specific capital 
goods as a result of more frequent bankruptcies, duplication of R&D, and the lack of technology 
sharing. On the concept of ‘excessive competition’, see Chang (1994) and Amsden and Singh (1994).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/08/19, SPi
204 Asian Transformations
The approach changed in the 1970s to an export-oriented one. While there 
were attempts to expand comparative-advantage-conforming export industries, 
like palm oil and petroleum, great efforts were made to enter hi-tech sectors 
(especially electronics) by attracting multinational companies (MNCs) into free-
trade zones. Export-oriented local firms were also given lucrative tax incentives 
(including deductions on R&D and training), although there was no policy to 
expand local supply linkages (Jomo et al. 1997). These efforts were combined with 
the New Economic Policy, aimed at ethnic redistribution. Instead of supporting 
the most able industrialists (mostly Chinese), the government set up SOEs and 
subsequently privatized them to Bumiputera owners (the country’s majority eth-
nic group). These enterprises were supported by the industrial licensing system, 
which handicapped Chinese-owned businesses.
Malaysia’s industrial policy took a brief turn towards prioritizing the expansion 
of domestic productive capabilities with the introduction of the heavy 
 industrialization policy in 1980–1985, which targeted sectors like cement, steel, 
and automobiles. This effort was mostly abandoned in 1985–1986 due to the poor 
performance of the targeted industries.
Even after the 1986 liberalization, however, industrial policy continued. The 
Industrial Development Agency used a variety of tax incentives and investment 
subsidies to deepen local supplier linkages and technological transfer (Lall 1995). 
Although less ‘heavy-handed’ than before 1986, the government continued to 
support selected sectors, identified in the industrial master plans, launched for 
1986–1995, 1995–2006, and 2006–2020, on the bases of growth and technological 
potentials. Support to these industries was largely provided through ‘horizontal’ 
industrial policy measures (e.g., subsidies for R&D, physical investment, worker 
training), but some trade protection (heavier for more processed products) was 
also used. Export tariffs on some strategic industrial inputs, such as crude palm 
oil (which provided targeted support to the oleo-chemical industry reliant on it), 
were maintained. Investment licensing was continued, favouring capital-intensive 
investments through rules regarding the minimum investment per worker. 
Investment incentives were actually extended rather than reduced, after 1986. For 
example, the pioneer status, which allowed, among other things, exemption from 
corporate income tax for five (extendable to ten) years for firms entering new 
industries, was granted to 12–17 per cent of investments in 1983–1985 but to 
24–28 per cent of investments in 2001–2003 (Gustafsson 2007). Although yielding 
limited success in the expansion of domestic productive capabilities, these policies 
helped the vertical and horizontal diversifications of the Malaysian economy.
3.2.3 China
Initially, China was a Soviet-style administrative-command economy with 
 industrialization efforts geared primarily towards developing the capital goods 
sector through direct state ownership of enterprises and through state control 
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over the supply, distribution, and pricing of industrial production (Ellman 2014). 
After the 1978 reform, this evolved towards an activist strategic industrial policy 
in the context of the market system, private property, and production for profit.
During 1978–2004, China’s industrial policy was strongly shaped by two 
motives—the increased pressure, both international and internal, for economic 
liberalization, and the need to transform the planned economic system into an 
internationalized market economy (Heilmann and Shih 2013). By the end of that 
period, China became one of the most open among the world’s major  economies—
the share of its exports and imports reached 71 per cent of GDP in 2005 (second 
only to Germany) and its average tariff was reduced to 40.6 per cent in 1992 and 
4.9 per cent in 2005 (Dahlman 2009).
However, liberalization was done gradually and selectively. China rejected the 
‘shock therapy’ and used a range of policies to develop domestic productive 
 capabilities while protecting and restructuring domestic industries. One such 
strategy was the targeted use of FDI in EPZs. The Chinese government attracted 
FDI into specific sectors with the use of tax incentives, while extracting (formal 
and informal) concessions from the MNCs regarding local sourcing, joint ventures, 
technology transfer, and workforce training. The government actively encouraged 
domestic enterprises—through direct control of SOEs, various  subsidies, or direct 
negotiation with the management—to use EPZs’ exposure to actively integrate 
domestic producers into the international market. For example, enterprises pre-
sent in EPZs were encouraged to expand their supplier networks to include a 
larger number of domestic firms into the supply chain of EPZs-based MNCs. 
They were also integrating into international supply chains, learning organiza-
tional capabilities, or upskilling of technical staff. At the same time, the large 
network of EPZs enabled the country rapidly to expand manufacturing employ-
ment and its foreign exchange earnings, which were then used for importing 
more advanced technologies (machines or technology licences).
Over the course of liberalization, China has continued to promote infant indus-
tries. This has been done through a significant degree of state ownership (roughly 
30 per cent of Chinese firms in 2013 were state-owned), the use of  subsidized 
credit through state-owned banks, an extensive system of public procurement, 
various trade barriers for non-EPZ areas, and public investments (Dahlman 2009). 
It has tried to develop large-scale domestic firms by  encouraging and facilitating 
mergers in an effort to create ‘national champions’ (Nolan 2001). The most com-
prehensive support was provided to sectors deemed important for national security, 
technological advancement, and the secure supply of strategic inputs (especially 
coal, electricity, telecommunications, and aircraft) (Chang et al. 2013).
Following the success of initial restructuring and the build-up of domestic pro-
duction capabilities, China’s strategy turned towards the development of native 
R&D capacity, the expansion of domestic linkages, and vertical diversification. 
These were the main goals of the sectoral industrial policies and national indica-
tive planning programmes, which followed the establishment of the National 
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Development and Reform Commission in 2003–2004. The number of national 
industrial policy programmes annually adopted rose from nil in 2003 to 15 in 2011.
Three such programmes deserve special mention. The first, the 2006 Medium- 
and Long-Term Programme of Science and Technology, provided funding for 
sixteen megaprojects in hi-tech sectors, such as pharmaceuticals,  semiconductors, 
large commercial aircraft, and military industries (Chen and Naughton  2016). 
The second programme, Strategic Emerging Industries launched in 2010, aimed 
to develop twenty industries in seven broad categories, building on the aforemen-
tioned megaprojects. These industries accounted for 8 per cent of Chinese GDP 
by 2015 and 15 per cent by 2020 (Chen and Naughton 2016). Lastly, in 2015, the 
Made in China 2025 initiative was launched, geared towards upgrading Chinese 
industries and achieving domestic contents of core components and materials of 
40 per cent by 2020, and 70 per cent by 2025. It prioritizes high-tech sectors like 
aerospace, robotics, IT, energy, and pharmaceuticals.
3.2.4 India
India’s industrial policy of the early postcolonial period aimed to achieve eco-
nomic independence through industrialization (Felipe et al. 2013). Its occupation 
of industrial ‘commanding heights’ allowed the Indian government to directly 
control investment (Singh  2008). Its development vision was implemented 
through the five-year plans of the Planning Commission, whose primary emphasis 
was on the development of capital goods industries, to enable indigenous indus-
trialization. These and other key industries were to be state-owned. The private 
industrial sector was allowed but was to fully conform to the five-year plans 
through the so-called ‘licence raj’ system, which controlled all the key aspects 
of the business (scale and location of investments, minimum and maximum 
outputs, and imports).
Focused on achieving a high degree of self-reliance, India put little emphasis 
on competing in international markets and pursued an aggressive import-substi-
tution (IS) policy, supported by high tariffs (the average weighted tariff was 83 per 
cent in 1990) and comprehensive import controls. FDI was highly restricted, 
especially following the 1973 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Such a degree of 
protection from international competition, when coupled with price controls, 
ensured significant margins to industrial enterprises, but there was no East-
Asian-style government compulsion to improve performances. Some industrial 
policy measures during the IS period were successful. For example, the Indian 
government promoted the generic pharmaceutical industry by ‘freeing’ product 
patents through the 1970 Patent Act, setting up the Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research labs, and introducing restrictions on MNCs (Chaudhuri 2013).
However, in many cases, industrial policy was constrained by ideological con-
siderations. For example, in the electronics hardware industry, the policy 
favoured native innovation, even when it would have been much more effective 
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to first acquire more advanced technologies through foreign licensing and then 
build on them, as did the East Asian countries.15 As another example, the Indian 
government restricted the scale of investment of large firms in order to protect 
small-scale enterprises, which were favoured for ideological reasons, rather than 
ensuring scale economies of factories set up, as was done in East Asia. Most of 
these policies were later liberalized. In the 1980s, restrictions on imports of  capital 
goods and on production capacity were relaxed, and targeted FDI became 
more widely used (Rodrik and Subramanian  2004; Kohli  2006; Nayyar  2006). 
A  more dramatic shift came with the 1991 reform. The investment licensing 
system and state monopoly were abolished in almost all industries. FDI was 
allowed in the majority of sectors (at first up to 49 per cent and later up to 100 per 
cent of ownership). Industrial location policy and the Monopoly and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act were abolished (Kohli  2006; Felipe et al.  2013). Trade was 
gradually liberalized—the average weighted tariff fell from 83 per cent in 1990 to 
14.5 per cent in 2005.
More recently, the pendulum has swung back to an extent, with more activist 
national industrial policy plans. The first major such plan was the 2011 National 
Manufacturing Policy, which aimed to increase MVA in GDP from 16 per cent to 
25 per cent by 2022, with the use of the so-called national investment and 
 manufacturing zones, tax exemptions (e.g., exempting suppliers to Special 
Economic Zones from indirect taxes), and other incentives (e.g., covering the 
costs of filing for international patents) (Warwick 2013). Another was the 2014 
Make in India initiative, aimed at attracting MNCs to set up production and 
design facilities through measures like further sectoral de-licensing, the building 
of industrial corridors, and the facilitation of greater government–business 
 co-operation (especially through the Investor Facilitation Centre and the Invest 
India initiative).
3.3 Evaluating Industrial Policy Experience in  
Asia—What Can Be Learnt?
3.3.1 The Choice of Policies
Although the use of industrial policy in the post-Second World War period has 
enabled the majority of Asian economies to achieve sustained GDP per capita 
growth, it has yielded dramatically better outcomes in some countries.
It is clear that neo-liberal policies—based on the principles of privatization, 
liberalization, and stabilization—have commonly brought about a decline in 
15 However, some of the investments made in establishing elite engineering institutes and domestic 
hi-tech hubs (most notably in Bangalore) later created the basis for the success of Indian ITC indus-
tries (Balakrishnan 2006).
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industrial dynamism. It is also clear that central planning has proven very 
 ineffective in most areas. However, beyond that, there is no policy that has 
worked—or not worked—everywhere. Infant industry protection worked very 
well in Taiwan but failed in Pakistan. Export-orientation and FDI-friendly policies 
have helped Malaysia, but less so the Philippines. Regulation of domestic 
investment promoted rapid industrialization in Korea but hindered it in India. 
Moreover, some countries have been able to sustain good growth performance 
despite significantly changing their policies over time, while others have produced 
uneven results across time despite a consistent industrial strategy.
The point here is not that you can use any policies to succeed, but rather that 
the same policy tools can be used poorly or even misused. In other words, the 
difference between success and failure stems not only from which policies were 
used but for what purpose and how they were used. More specifically, the policy 
approaches of poorer performers have often neglected or abandoned the 
 objectives crucial to industrial catch-up, whereas successful countries have been 
willing to use any means at their disposal to pursue them.
Let us consider this in relation to some of the objectives listed at the beginning 
of section  3. For example, to achieve economies of scale in production, the 
Chinese government facilitated the mergers of smaller enterprises to create 
‘national champions’, while the Korean state used industrial licensing to encour-
age the establishment of large-scale factories. In India, in contrast, the same tools 
were often used to protect small-scale enterprises, with serious negative implica-
tions for industrial efficiency and dynamism. As another example, subsidized 
credits in Korea were rationed in a way that maximized the developmental  benefits 
of the resulting investments. In Malaysia, their rationing was largely guided by 
ethnic considerations, often restricting the growth of more capable (Chinese-
owned) firms. As yet another example, Korea, Taiwan, and India all restricted 
FDIs and put conditions on them, but the East Asian economies did so to maxi-
mize the development of domestic productive capabilities, while India did the 
same to minimize the involvement of foreign capital.
In short, what distinguishes the less successful performers is less the policy 
tools used than the neglect of the objectives crucial for achieving industrial catch-up, 
such as the achievement of scale economies and the development of domestic 
productive capabilities.
3.3.2 Pragmatism and Adaptability
Common to the success stories of industrialization in East Asia was the degree of 
pragmatism characterizing their policies. They were willing to adopt any tools or 
approaches deemed beneficial for industrial catch-up, even when they went 
against their overall ideological position.
In all the successful industrializers, industrial policy was built neither on blind 
trust in markets nor on its full substitution by state control. For example, the 
Korean state severely regulated many markets, but this was done to ensure scale 
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economies (investment licensing) or to prevent ‘wasteful competition’ (price 
controls, government-sanctioned recession cartels). While protecting national 
firms from international market forces through infant industry protection and 
 subsidies, it exposed them to international market forces by pushing them to start 
exporting early. As another example, despite its initial ideological opposition to 
capitalism, China liberalized its economy through the dual-track pricing system, 
which provided (temporary) protection to SOEs from market forces, while allow-
ing them to sell for profit and learn to compete in the market.
We can see the same kind of pragmatism in the choice of concrete policy tools. 
For example, despite the very aggressive general stance they took against FDI, 
Korea and Taiwan were flexible enough to actively court MNCs in industries like 
garments, shoes, stuffed toys, and electronics assembly, in the early days of 
 industrialization, recognizing their abilities to generate the extra foreign exchanges 
needed for industrial upgrading. Singapore very much relied on FDI, but was 
selective, rather than ‘even-handed’, in choosing which firms in which sectors to 
host. China has relied far more heavily on FDI and imposed far fewer formal con-
ditions on MNCs regarding ownership and performance requirements (e.g., local 
sourcing, export) than Korea or Taiwan have, but has fully exploited its strong 
bargaining position (coming from large domestic markets, good quality infra-
structure, and workers with good skills) to impose many informal conditions 
regarding technology transfer, local sourcing, worker training, and so on.
As another example, the Korean government had a clear preference for domes-
tically owned private sector enterprises, but willingly set up SOEs when necessary 
(see the case of POSCO referred to earlier), nationalized private sector firms in 
trouble (although usually privatized them again when they were nursed back to 
health), and granted 100 per cent foreign ownership to MNCs in the EPZs. The 
Singapore government may have used free-trade policy and welcomed MNCs, 
but it heavily uses SOEs (they produce around one-fifth of GDP—one of the high-
est such ratios outside of the oil economies) and owns 90 per cent of the land (and 
aggressively exploits the position for industrial policy purposes).
Furthermore, the more successful East Asian economies were willing to 
quickly and/or significantly adapt their policies to changing internal and external 
conditions. Korea, despite its huge success in labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries (textiles, garments, shoes, wigs, and stuffed toys) in the 1960s, started 
developing heavy and chemical industries in the early 1970s, when the wage costs 
showed a sign of rising, even though the country was able to remain competitive 
in most of those industries (except wigs) well into the 1980s. Had it not taken 
early action to develop a new generation of export industries (e.g., shipbuilding, 
automobiles, electronics), Korean industrialization may have fizzled out by the 
1980s. The most dramatic example of adaptability is China’s liberalization. At the 
turn of the 1990s, the Chinese economy was unable to compete in the  international 
capitalist trading system. However, after rejecting the then prevalent neo-liberal 
‘shock therapy’ in favour of a gradualist approach to industrial policy reform, not 
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only did its economy avoid the traumatic collapse and then the prolonged slump 
experienced by the USSR and its satellites, but it has become one of the most suc-
cessful industrializers in recent history.
3.3.3 Enabling Conditions
The question as to why some countries have more effective industrial policy 
regimes has been discussed broadly in the literature on the so-called develop-
mental state (see Evans 1995; Leftwich 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999, among others). 
Two broad factors are worth mentioning here.
First, it has been frequently emphasized that the existential threat that the East 
Asian countries faced from their communist neighbours forced their leaders to 
prioritize industrial catch-up and enabled them to impose ‘harsh’ but necessary 
policies for rapid industrialization, such as suppression of wage demands, repres-
sion of consumption, low welfare spending, and restrictions on civil liberties. The 
logic driving such thinking is perhaps best captured by the quote of Sun Yat-sen 
that ‘the nation without foreign foes and outside dangers will always be ruined’ 
(Wade 1990). In Myrdal’s terms, existential threats contributed to the changes in 
the attitudes of both the (political and economic) elites and the population at 
large, thereby enabling the institutional changes and policy reforms necessary for 
economic development.
The importance of existential threat, however, should not be overstated, as 
there is no inevitable relationship between external threat and successful 
 industrialization. The existential threat posed to each other by Pakistan and India 
has not led to the emergence of developmental states, while the Korean state itself 
was not ‘developmental’ in the 1950s, despite having the same (or an even more 
serious) existential threat as that of the 1960s. These examples show that human 
agencies (both of the elites and people) are critical in determining the effect of 
external threats on industrialization. Moreover, independently of external threats, 
nationalism—often expressed in the form of revanchism against the Japanese—
was a key motive in countries like Korea and (later) China (see Chapter 14, this 
volume, on the role of nationalism on development in Asia).
Second, the more successful Asian countries have exhibited higher state 
 capacity. Two aspects are important here. One is the technical capacity—namely, 
the ability of the policymakers to design and implement the context-sensitive and 
technically demanding policies described above. The other is the political  capacity 
to maintain what Evans (1995) calls the ‘embedded autonomy’—namely, the abil-
ity of the policymakers to resist the pressure of sectional interests in formulating 
and implementing industrial policy while being attentive to the needs of different 
economic actors.16
16 Interestingly, the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ defines the opposite situation to what was 
described by Myrdal (1968) as a ‘soft state’. He describes it as a situation where the state is not able to 
enact or enforce its policies against the interests of social groups.
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However, it should be noted that high state capacity in East Asia was developed 
alongside success in industrialization, rather than prior to it, as is often believed. 
A good case in point is Korea, which until the late 1960s was sending its bureau-
crats for extra training to the Philippines and Pakistan. It is also not as if China’s 
rapid industrialization since the 1980s was preceded by a vast upgrading of the 
country’s administrative apparatus. It has only been over a period of a couple of 
decades that these countries have been able to transform their corrupt and 
incompetent bureaucracies into some of the most efficient state machinery (see 
Chang 1994 for the Korean and the Taiwanese cases).
4. Conclusion
In the five decades following the publication of Myrdal’s Asian Drama, develop-
ing Asia has witnessed a remarkable structural transformation. Its experience has 
conformed to the two tenets of early development economics—the belief in 
industrialization as the key motor force behind economic development and the view 
that an active industrial policy is instrumental for guiding industrial development.
Each of the Asian growth miracles has been underpinned by comprehensive 
industrialization. At the same time, while all Asian regions—and almost all Asian 
economies—have industrialized faster than the world average, there are stagger-
ing differences between their performances. The most successful cases, apart 
from Hong Kong, have been based on activist industrial policy of one kind or 
another. Even though these countries have seen significant policy liberalization 
since the 1990s, they still have more active industrial policies than their counter-
parts elsewhere. Moreover, the fastest-growing major economy since the 1990s—
China—has had one of the most comprehensive industrial policies in the region, 
and indeed in the world.
Although the activist industrial policy has been a common feature among 
more successful industrializers, what set them apart has been a striking degree of 
pragmatism in the pursuit of developmental objectives. Their choice of policies, 
rather than being dictated by dogmas, often strayed from the ideological prefer-
ences. Instead, these economies were willing to change policies whenever they 
were proving to be insufficient or to adapt them to changes in domestic and 
international conditions. These observations remain just as relevant for the decades 
ahead. Those sceptical of the continued relevance of industrial policy point to 
changes in the global production landscape (especially the dominance of ‘global 
value chains’ controlled by MNCs from rich countries) and the narrowing of the 
policy space under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and various bilateral and 
regional trade and investment agreements (Pack and Saggi 2006; Warwick 2013). 
Yet the rejection of industrial policy on such bases amounts to interpreting it as 
another dogmatic policy template.
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Even though it is true that a narrower policy space makes some of the old tools 
of industrial policy (e.g., export subsidies, local content requirements for FDI) 
unavailable, many of them can still be used. A number of industrial policy measures 
are not related to trade and are therefore beyond the WTO’s jurisdiction (e.g., 
targeted subsidies for investment or skills development, promotion of strategic 
M&A), while many of the trade-related measures are still allowed (e.g., tariffs, 
R&D subsidies, technology transfer requirements for FDI) (for further discussions, 
see Chang et al. 2016: chapter 5). In these circumstances, the pragmatism in policy 
design and its adaptability—that have marked the performance of successful 
Asian policymakers—remain just as important in future years.
The increased importance of global value chains does make it more difficult for 
developing economies to compete against MNCs in final goods markets. However, 
global value chains also create opportunities for those countries to specialize in 
intermediate goods. Rather than making industrial policy obsolete, this creates 
new roles for it. More policy measures will be needed to help firms develop 
 capabilities in quality control, abilities to co-ordinate R&D with buyer firms, and 
workers’ skills (as intermediate goods tend to be more skill-intensive than final 
goods), among others. Once again, successful industrial catch-up in the face of 
these and other challenges will require an ability to skilfully adapt a country’s 
industrial policy.
These considerations are present to a varying degree in the cases of new activist 
industrial policy initiatives unveiled in countries of the region such as China or 
India. Although their effectiveness remains to be seen, the upcoming challenges 
of this century, including the need to face the environmental crisis, require per-
haps an unforeseen degree of adaptability in guiding structural change, and 
 policymaking going beyond established dogmas.
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As a multidimensional historical process, the development of a country involves 
economics, politics, society, technology, environment, and culture. Such a process, 
if forced for long, would create serious distortions, but also becomes sustainable 
over timethrough strong internal reinforcing mechanisms. Macroeconomic pol-
icies have the role of helping this process with supporting government initiatives 
and institutional set-up, while involvement of the people is at the core. This reso-
nates to some extent with Gunner Myrdal’s vision of development in his Asian 
Drama as the merging of many economic, social, and political processes that result 
in ‘cumulative causation’ to usher in an overall process of development. Similar, 
although narrower visions, restricted mostly to the economic aspect, are also to be 
found in Young (1928), who linked economic progress with ‘increasing returns’, 
and Kaldor (1972), who attempts to capture industrialization, especially manufac-
turing, as a process of ‘dynamic increasing returns’ characterized by a mechanism 
of mutually reinforcing strong positive feedbacks. Myrdal’s intellectual ventures 
(1957, 1968/1977) had consistently been wider, integrating many aspects cutting 
across artificial intellectual boundaries of academic disciplines.
History is essential to this perspective because these processes work on histor-
ically inherited specific ‘initial conditions’. Consequently, any discussion of usual 
macroeconomic policy instruments like monetary, fiscal, or exchange rate policies 
can be misleadingly limiting, unless placed in this wider framework proposed by 
Myrdal to reckon adequately with the initial conditions and institutional require-
ments. The objectives of development, as well as the relevant instruments and 
institutions, are interrelated in an inextricable manner, shaped by the context. 
Policies and economic performances focusing exclusively on particular aspects 
like the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), rapid industrialization, or 
international competitiveness might trivialize the problem if they fail to capture 
adequately the transformative process operating on initial conditions.
From this point of view, the role of macro policy needs to be viewed not merely 
in terms of economists’ traditional preoccupation with efficient allocation of given 
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scarce resources among alternative means and the efficacy of the price mechanism. 
It must concern itself also with measures needed to augment and transform the 
resource base for the purpose of development, its utilization through expansion 
of markets, as well as accompanying income and wealth distribution. The inherited 
initial conditions set limits but also provide opportunities. Their interplay is the 
story of successes and failures in development, as would be seen from compara-
tive experiences of various Asian countries.
Reckoning with the variety of factors that come into play in the making of 
these stories necessarily implies that macroeconomic policies for development are 
not mere application of a given set of instruments aimed at a given set of targets 
(Tinbergen 1954). The instruments and their supporting institutions, as well as the 
targets, are moving over time, with evolving initial conditions throwing up new 
challenges and opportunities. The perspective on developmental macroeconomic 
policies presented here attempts to cope with this broader view of development as 
a dynamic process involving moving targets, instruments, and institutions over 
time. If the developmental experience of a particular country is captured by time 
series, experiences of several countries provide a moving cross-section of the 
grand ‘Asian Drama’ of development unfolding over time.
Since the capability of a country is always limited in some ways, a major question 
facing macroeconomic policy for development is the sequence and relative prior-
ities to be assigned to augmenting and transforming resources. The traditional 
view might leave it to the price mechanism, but that is usually inadequate and, at 
times, even misleading. To illustrate the point, immediate employment expansion 
linked to productive asset and infrastructure creation may have priority in the 
time sequence in situations of vastly underutilized and unemployed manpower, 
which coexist extensively with precarious livelihoods. The priority would be to 
deal simultaneously with both resource augmentation and distribution through 
labour utilization. Human capital development through better education, health, 
and housing may acquire similar priority in some other situations, while expan-
sion of the market for skilled labour might be an equally pressing need. Other 
situations may call for access to foreign capital inflow, technology and industrial 
policy, and strategic integration with the world economy on a priority basis.
Each one of these examples would usually require creating or strengthening 
supporting institutions as well as different policies like fair price rationing of 
essential goods for the poor, land reform, agricultural credit or services reform, 
nature and degree of decentralization, environmental policy linked to decentral-
ization and livelihood, as well as regulatory reforms. They go beyond the reach of 
standard macro policy instruments relating to monetary, fiscal, or exchange rate 
policies. These examples also illustrate why actual experiences of development 
seldom respect the artificial neat boundaries of academic disciplines, and a better 
appreciation of historical experiences requires us to travel through less chartered 
territories of macro policies for development.
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The strategy we follow is to take up some major themes that have repeatedly 
arisen in diverse development experiences in Asian countries and comment on 
their significance from the viewpoint of macroeconomic theory and policy. The 
discussion in section 2 begins with the question of how to strike a balance between 
our theoretical understanding and historical description of ‘initial conditions’ 
using the diversity of the economies of Asia as background. History enters in an 
essential way insofar as policies have to be tailored to the stage of development. 
For instance, utilization of vast surplus labour is often a priority in the early stage 
of development, which is discussed in section 3 as labour utilization through the 
strategy of extensive growth followed by some Asian countries. This leads to a 
macroeconomic discussion in section 4 of the constraints that operate on such 
labour utilization strategies. Productive utilization of surplus labour also raises 
the issue of the size and nature of the market that can absorb the output produced. 
This is discussed in section5 under the issue of domestic versus foreign markets.
The relative importance assigned to them concerns the strategy of export promo-
tion versus import substitution, which in turn is related to issues of technological 
capability, acquisition of foreign technology, extent of external indebtedness, and 
international competitiveness. These interrelated issues are the themes of sections 
6 and 7. However, usual discussions of these issues overlook decentralization, par-
ticularly in large countries, which can add a different policy dimension. The nature 
of decentralization, which can have a direct bearing on the question of popular 
involvement in development, is explored in section8, while section  9 discusses 
the issue of economic and social inequality, which in turn has a direct bearing on 
decentralization. The concluding observations in section 10 recapture some of the 
main points. Asian experiences emphasize how some successful experiments with 
development policies have often meant going against conventional wisdom in 
development thinking, but invariably paying attention to the specificities of initial 
conditions and evolving economic context.
2. Initial Conditions
Emphasis on initial conditions has strong deterministic overtones of classical 
physics. Some decades after the spectacular success of Newtonian mechanics, the 
great French mathematician Laplace claimed with chilling arrogance that one 
could completely predict the future and the past on the basis of scientific laws of 
motion, if only one had knowledge of the initial conditions of all particles. When 
emperor Napoleon asked how God fitted into this scheme, Laplace is said to have 
replied that he did not need that particular hypothesis. Replace ‘God’ by ‘uncer-
tainty’ and we encounter similar arrogance in a deterministic view of modern 
macroeconomics. On the assumption of a representative, all-knowing, all-seeing 
representative rational agent, temporal and inter-temporal optimization techniques 
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are applied to describe the macroeconomy, whose assumed optimal properties 
naturally minimize the economic role of government intervention and serve an 
ideological purpose by claiming implicitly that we live in the best of all possible 
worlds, in which the working of a free market economy cannot be improved upon 
(Lucas 1983; Sargent 1987). Ironically, this amounts to the same case once made 
for bureaucratic centralized planning. The distinction between an economy guided 
by planning from the top and by the market from below is obliterated, merging 
logical extremes in a display of mathematical virtuosity.
However, the starting point of discussion must be the undeniable fact that his-
torical processes are typically non-repetitive, unlike motions of deterministic 
classical mechanics, or even that of less deterministic quantum theory at sub-atomic 
level. The indeterminacy goes deep in economics. Experimental economics at the 
level of the individual shows not only the limitation of the rationality postulate, 
but its ambiguity and the pitfalls of viewing economic actions and policies in terms 
of individual rationality. At the macro level that problem gets hugely magnified as 
we look for repetitive patterns involving interactions among numerous individ-
uals and groups with diverse interests and power.
With hindsight it might be possible to identify some of the sources of the irregu-
larity of historical processes, but far more difficult to decide how best to deal with 
them. If macroeconomic policies are viewed as experiments, usually not replic-
able, a policy may have different outcomes in different situations. Such ambiguity 
and unpredictability are summed up as ‘differences in initial conditions’, which arise 
partly from the inescapable incompleteness of specifying initial conditions. It reso-
nates with the great French mathematician Poincare’s (1908) oft-repeated warning: 
‘we could still only know the initial situation approximately . . . It may happen that 
small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phe-
nomenon . . . Prediction becomes impossible’ (English translation by Gandolfo 
1996: 504).
Given the incompleteness, it usually becomes the historian’s prerogative to 
choose critical elements to characterize the initial condition. At the formal level, 
the use of a priori (Bayesian), ex ante subjective probability in place of statistical 
frequency distributions is one such attempt; introducing critical nonlinearities 
may be another. Myrdal’s more historical approach laid particular emphasis on 
analysing the consequences of distortions caused by colonial rule and traditional 
hierarchical stratification of caste, gender, etc., in India (Myrdal 1977). However, 
the critical elements would be different when initial conditions differ.
Drawing an analogy from non-linear dynamical systems, one could think of 
these critical elements as being similar to ‘bifurcation points’ whose small perturba-
tions tip the balance dramatically. In some cases macro policies can set in motion 
cumulative changes, due to small changes in some parametervalues, whichaffect 
the ‘structural stability’ by altering thequalitative properties of a system. They might 
give rise to such phenomena as discrete jumps or ‘catastrophic change’,‘hysteresis’, 
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and ‘chaotic’ dynamics, of which many examples are available, even in simple 
macroeconomic models (e.g.,  Day  1983; Bhaduri and Harris  1987). Popularly 
known as ‘the butterfly effect’, such sensitivity to initial conditions picturesquely 
captures how the flap of the wings of a butterfly could create a storm across the 
ocean in some distant land. In a parallel vein, an insignificant-looking initial advan-
tage of a firm can add up cumulatively to such decisive advantage as to transform 
the market structure from competition to monopoly (Sraffa 1926) or make an ini-
tially inferior technology dominate others under increasing returns (Arthur 1994; 
David 1995).
The purpose of macro policy analysis would lie in searching for such critical 
tipping points in relation to initial conditions, so that meaningful policy perturb-
ation can set in motion cumulative causation for escaping from underdevelopment. 
However, indeterminacy would arise in economic policy precisely because the 
same policy might not have the same effect of tipping the balance in relation to 
other initial conditions. Subject to this qualification, some policies in develop-
ment economics search for greater generalization for breaking the ‘vicious cycle 
of poverty’ by tapping unutilized surplus labour (Nurkse 1953). A ‘big push’ for 
industrialization’ (Rosenstein Rodan 1943; Murphy et al. 1989), advocating simul-
taneous investment on a range of related industries to create mutual positive feed-
backs, and the ‘spread effect’ on the supply as well as demand side (Myrdal 1977) 
is another such idea.
Some specific aspects ofinitial conditions may be identified in the Asian con-
text to analyse their possible role as ‘critical points’ for understanding diversity in 
development experiences across countries in Asia. They relate to:
(a) Difference in size and natural resource endowment (especially oil).
(b) The initial nature of their political economies—from Chinese and 
Vietnamese socialism evolving towards one-party market economies, to 
the strong market orientation of Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines, democratic planning trying to combine market and state in 
India and Sri Lanka and tilting increasingly towards the market, to South 
Korea’s authoritarian model moving towards multiparty democracy, and 
countries of Central Asia who rather abruptly ceased to be parts of the 
former economy of the Soviet Union.
(c) Similarities and differences in colonial experience under Britain, Japan, 
France, Spain, and later the US, which left imprints on the respective col-
onies as examples of ‘hysteresis’.
(d) Culture, identities, and social stratification. India for instance is prolifically 
full of such divisions—religious, caste, and ethnic. Comparatively, most other 
countries are more homogeneous, but many also have to deal not merely 
with distinct minorities but manufactured identities for political purposes. 
Korea, despite being politically divided, appears more homogeneous in 
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many cultural aspects. While many would argue that considerable similarity 
exists between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in many respects, their 
differences play a significant role. How the overall situation is shaped, 
resulting in conflict, cohesion, and co-operation for mutual benefit, must 
be an integral part in the orientation of macroeconomic policies.
Although the influence of history through initial conditions is crucial, it does not 
have a decisive influence. Elements of unpredictability, arising from low-probability 
events like ‘black swan’ and non-foreseeable sensitivity to initial conditions like 
‘butterfly effects’, defy incorporation in a rigidly predetermined policy framework. 
A striking example in Asia is the contrasting experiences of oil-rich Gulf States 
and similarly endowed parts of Central Asia. Their policies towards natural resource 
extraction and trading shaped by initial conditions of geopolitics differed, leading 
to unpredictably large macroeconomic differences. They often led to ‘hysteresis’in 
the sense that the effects persisted even when the initial cause was removed.
Since policies towards economic openness and development were conditioned 
in large parts of Asia by the geopolitics of the Cold War, preferential access, par-
ticularly to the North American external market, played a part in making outward-
looking industrialization more successful in some countries (e.g.,  South Korea, 
Taiwan). Similarly, initial land reform by an authoritarian occupation force (the 
US) and wider access to basic education as an initial condition created by some 
colonial powers (especiallyJapan) created unforeseeable preconditions for more 
balanced industrialization at later stages, when contrasted with the spread of edu-
cation in some Central Asian countries that were part of the former Soviet Union. 
Indeed, when asked why India could not carry out a thorough land reform like 
Japan or South Korea, former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was said to 
have retorted that carrying out reform on someone else’s land was much easier 
than on one’s own.
Because chance elements that cannot be foreseen, even with best available infor-
mation about initial conditions, matter in the development process, it should be a 
humbling lesson against detailed optimality calculation on paper. It is often more 
desirable to maintain flexibility to respond to unforeseen conditions with policy 
designed for trade-off between efficiency and flexibility, as suggested in ‘bounded 
rationality’ and ‘satisfying behavior’ (Simon 1979). From this angle we need to con-
sider several important issues usually left out of the development debate, like decen-
tralization, economic social and political mobility, and livelihood opportunities.
3. Labour Utilization and Extensive Growth
The foremost requirement of inclusiveness in development is rapid expansion of 
employment and livelihood opportunities in situations of huge surplus labour and 
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mass unemployment. Assuring fuller utilization of labour with high employment 
in the shortest possible time has been achieved most successfully in post- 
revolutionary situations in China and Vietnam. Using a strategy of ‘extensive growth’, 
they showed how underutilized massive ‘surplus’ labour can be fruitfully absorbed 
for capital formation in a short time through huge, centralized public projects like 
building irrigation dams, roads and waterways, infrastructure for production, 
and delivery through agricultural communes. This helped in taking the first step 
in development. With various schemes of quantity and price rationing of essential 
goods, the market mechanism was largely replaced. The link was strong between 
centralized one-party political systems and institutional support for extensive 
growth, and this strategy runs the danger of excessive state authoritarianism. 
Nevertheless, a moderate variation of this model through decentralized pro-
grammes could be attempted with smaller projects being decided and implemented 
by local communities in accordance with their local priorities.
Financial autonomy and respect for traditional local knowledge are necessary 
prerequisites. India’s rural employment guarantee scheme (2005) was a step in 
that direction, but failed to realize its full potential, partly due to rigid rules set by 
higher levels of bureaucracy and politicians. The loss of flexibility was visible in 
many ways: delays in the release of funds for payment of wages; the definition of 
rural asset creation according to uniform rules set by a bureaucracy distant from 
the local reality, like 100 days of work per year; payment according to amount of 
soil moved by manual labour; applying a uniform ratio of human to mechanical 
power irrespective of soil conditions; and uniform local child care arrangements 
for female labour. More importantly, perhaps, a lack of arrangements for on-the-
spotaccess to public distribution of essential goods reduced the effectiveness of 
the policy. Generating income without creating locally useful productive assets 
became normal, as did corruption by following rules on paper without substance. 
Enormous variation in the performance of the employment guarantee scheme 
across Indian states pointed not merely to the differences in efficiency and interest 
taken by bureaucrats and politicians but to the importance of mobilization of public 
involvement through local activists. At least in India, this showed how greater local 
involvement of elected representatives at ‘Panchyat’ and ‘Gram Sabha’ levels (for 
which the Indian constitution had made provisions in law) was crucial but largely 
thwarted by attempts to maintain party control in the competitive multiparty 
democracy. The broad political economy lesson for macro policy formulation is the 
need for greater flexibility through greater local autonomy by factoring in more 
carefully the political compulsions that are typically generated by such schemes.
It is also instructive to note in this context that a ‘minimum income support 
scheme’intended to raise the purchasing power of the poor might strengthen 
the bureaucratic tendencies further through a‘patron–client’ relation between 
the state and poor, leaving even less space for popular initiatives and participa-
tion. A decentralized employment guarantee scheme driven by local initiatives 
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on the other hand would have the potential of impacting both income generation 
and local production, while strengthening a sense of the economic rights of 
the poor.
4. Macroeconomic Constraints on Labour Use
A critical requirement for any extensive growth strategy is the downward flexibility 
of the real wage rate. Its purpose is to make ‘redistribution of limited wage goods 
from the already employed to the unemployed’ (Kahn 1972), a politically feasible 
proposition through some version of rationing. The issue of redistribution, if left 
unattended by macro policy, might get resolved by the market through ‘forced 
saving’ imposed on the workers. This is undesirable because it also finances greater 
consumption out of profit by the rich through ‘profit inflation’ (Keynes 1930, 1940), 
or results in a persistent ‘inflationary barrier’ in the case of downward flexibility 
of the real wage (Robinson 1956). For financing such programmes, even a direct 
tax on wages can be more equitable than redistribution through inflation against 
workers (although its apparently unjust nature makes it politically undesirable), 
while taxing profit is considered politically unwise in capitalist democracies 
(Bhaduri 1986). However, this unjust nature of forced saving due to inflation is not 
a justification for fiscal austerity in financing such programmes. Instead, it calls 
for rationing of essential consumption goods through the extension of the public 
distribution system, as was done in post-revolution China and Vietnam or even 
in immediate post-war Britain.
The basic model of the inflexible real wage rate with unlimited supply of labour 
in a dual economy was proposed by Lewis (1954). He viewed the shift of labour 
from traditional agriculture to industry as a voluntary process induced by a higher 
wage in industry until the ‘turning point’ is arrived at when all excess labour in 
agriculture is absorbed by industry (Fei and Ranis 1964). Because of the down-
ward inflexibility of the real wage rate throughout the process, relative price, or 
the terms of trade, regulates the pace of industrial growth. If it becomes too high, 
the relative price of agricultural goods rises in relation to industrial goods and 
reduces industrial profitability. The first order condition for profit maximization 
requires the marginal product of labour in industry to equal the product wage 
rate, that is, MPL w p w p p pi i c c i= = ( )( ), , where w  is money wage rateand pc  
and pi  are price levels of consumption and investment goods respectively. 
A  constant real wage rate in terms of consumption goods w pc( )  would entail 
lower product wage in industry w pi( )  if the terms of trade p pc i( )  move in favour 
of agriculturalgoods. This would lower profit-maximizing demand for industrial 
labour and slow down the pace of industrialization. The main lesson is that agri-
cultural surplus becomes the binding constraint when real wage is insufficiently 
flexible in terms of consumption goods.
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In such cases, production technique maximizing investible surplus (or profit) 
would also maximize long-run economic growth (Dobb 1960; Sen 1960). However, 
this can be misleading (Kalecki 1993). If limited agricultural surplus is the prob-
lem in a predominantly agricultural economy like China, India, Indonesia, or 
Pakistan in their early stage of industrialization, then the emphasis should be on 
combining some rationing measures with raising current agricultural output by 
focusing on decentralized local investments for raising productivity of land rather 
than that of labour.
In contrast to wage goods, if availability of capital goods is identified as the 
binding constraint, the macroeconomic policy has to be directed towards choice 
of industries rather than production techniques. In situations of limited capacity 
to produce or import capital goods due to foreign exchange constraints, the com-
pulsion to industrialize faces barriers of unavailability of capital goods. China and 
India, despite differences in their political systems, tried to overcome the constraint 
by expanding rapidly their capacity to produce capital goods. China’s justification 
for this lay in one of the ‘ten great relationships’ propounded at that time (1950s) 
following the Marxian scheme of ‘expanded reproduction’, which assigns a ‘lead-
ing role’ to capital goods producing Department 1. A similar path was followed 
by India using a two-sector (later four-sector), non-shiftable, capital goods model 
(Mahalanobis 1953) closely resembling the Soviet model of industrialization for-
mulated originally by Feldman (Domar 1958).
Nevertheless, a very significant difference arose between China and India. In 
post-revolutionary China, land reform, agricultural communes, large-scale irriga-
tion, and a transport network created through ‘extensive growth’ significantly 
increased the productivity of land and agricultural surplus. Early excesses with 
the ‘Great Leap Forward’ for industrialization in China caused acute food shortage 
and famines that were tackled through liberalization of agricultural communes in 
the 1980s. In contrast, land reform in post-independence India was moderate, 
mostly replacing former large revenue-collecting intermediaries for the colonial 
state by large farmers and moneylenders as Myrdal had perceptively observed 
(Myrdal 1977). As a result, India faced a chronic balance of payments deficit on 
account of food imports until the ‘Green Revolution’ eased the situation in the 
1980s. This was followed in the early 1990s with economic liberalization, when 
India was able to attract sufficient inflow of foreign private capital to cover its 
continuing current account deficits. China, in contrast, started to have persistent 
export surplus, with increased openness to trade from around the same time.
5. Domestic versus Foreign Markets
A country’s domestic and foreign markets are linked mostly through trade surplus 
or deficit. An export or import surplus would magnify positively or negatively the 
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size of the domestic market through the foreign trade multiplier. However, when 
the export surplus is a small fraction of total domestic demand (Y C I E M= + + − , 
in usual notations), which is usually the case with large countries, it provides 
relatively weak support for expanding the domestic market. It is wiser in such cases 
to view export promotion as a way of facilitating primarily international pay-
ments and earning foreign exchange. The situation is usually reversed for small 
countries.
However, while this broad direction for openness in trade in relation to the 
domestic market size might be the guideline for trade policies, national govern-
ments’ control over them has been weakened not only because of new institutions 
like the World Trade Organization but also by intra-firm trade by transnational 
corporations, which accounts for over 60 per cent of foreign trade. As a result, 
much of the exports generated by corporations become structural, spreading 
demand as well as employment to various international locations, driven by com-
pulsions of sub-contracting, the international supply chain, and the pull of coun-
tries with lower corporate tax rates. This, in turn, has weakened revenue collection 
by national governments encouraging the ideology of fiscal austerity.
At the same time, to enhance their international competitiveness in a global 
market, the focus of large corporations shifted from employment generation to 
raising labour productivity for lowering unit cost, quality control, and on-time 
delivery through mechanization, automation, and robotization. The main conse-
quence has been a widening gap between output and employment growth. 
Independent small and even medium-sized firms in developing countries are at a 
disadvantage insofar as finance, technology, and access to the international supply 
network are concerned, even when they are better placed to provide more employ-
ment. With large corporations as their main players, two of Asia’s most populated 
countries, China and India, succeeded in raising their share in the world econ-
omy in manufacturing value-added and export. During their high-growth years 
(roughly 1993–2013) China grew by nearly three times (approximately 9 per cent) 
and India two times (approximately 7 per cent) the world average, but regular 
employment grew by barely more than 1 per cent in China, and slightly less than 
1 per cent in India.
The inter-connections of corporate-led jobless growth, rural–urban migration, 
destitution, an expanding informal sector, and environmental degradation can be 
illustrated briefly with an arithmetical example (Bhaduri 2018). Suppose ten trad-
itional livelihoods with a low average labour productivity of two are destroyed for 
land acquisition from traditional agriculture, typically to let corporations have 
cheap access to natural resources like minerals, rivers and water bodies, village 
commons, forests, mountains, and coast lines, etc. However, given the limited size 
of the domestic and foreign markets, corporations with their higher labour 
 productivity, say six times more, that is, twelve, can absorb only two persons. The 
result is higher output at 12 × 2 = 24, but employment is lower at two, with eight 
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unemployed. For corporations to absorb all, displaced labour, the domestic and 
international market have to be of a much larger size of 12 × 10 = 120. And yet, the 
more corporations try to capture the international market through greater inter-
national competitiveness, the greater the pressure for raising labour productivity 
and the stronger the negative pressure on job creation, leading to a growing 
informal sector where displaced jobless persons try to make a desperate living by 
encroaching on natural resources, urban space, and infrastructure. Congestion 
costs reduce corporate efficiency through shortages of regular water, electricity, 
and space, lowering corporate competitiveness to complete the vicious circle. This 
range of problems is increasingly faced by many high-growth Asian countries.
Such Asian experiences of jobless high growth contradict Schumpeterian opti-
mism about ‘creative destruction’ as well as the Lewisian vision of approaching a 
‘turning point’ at which all surplus labour is absorbed in high productivity industry. 
With unemployment growing, rural to urban voluntary migration, due to the pull 
of higher expected industrial wages, is usually not the dominant factor (Harris 
and Todaro 1970). Instead, the major problem arises from destroyed rural liveli-
hoods, exacerbated by degrading of environment and the taking over of traditional 
village commons by corporations to produce natural resource-intensive outputs. 
Adam Smith’s observation that the extent of division of labour is limited by the 
size of the market seems more in conformity with recent Asian experiences when 
growing pressure on environment and rural livelihood is factored in, rather than 
with either Schumpeter’s or Lewis’s versions. The emphasis on the importance of 
the domestic market particularly in large economies is its main lesson.
6. Import Substitution versus Export Promotion
While the two largest countries of Asia focused on building the domestic base for 
capital goods production in their early phase of industrialization, some smaller 
countries successfully followed different paths. The geography of their smaller size 
had an influence, buttheir initial conditions in other respects might have exerted 
an even bigger influence.
The spectacular success of export-promoting industrialization in a group of 
Southeast and East Asian countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Malaysia deserves special attention, while Thailand and the 
Philippines followed a similar path somewhat less successfully. These countries 
had a distinctly greater orientation towards economic openness from the begin-
ning without concentrating on capital goods industries and import substitution. 
Although two relatively large countries among them, South Korea and Taiwan, 
developed quite early some heavy industries with import substitution potential, 
they maintained their outward orientation, and shifted gradually through quality 
improvement to outward-looking export promotion policies. While China and 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Amit Bhaduri 227
India followed a similar trajectory, their import-substituting heavy industrialization 
policies lasted longer.
The real contrast is the two little city states of Singapore and Hong Kong. They 
were poor in land and other natural resources, and depended decisively on inter-
national trade in goods and services from the very beginning as an integral part 
of industrialization, but shared with Korea and Taiwan a massive education drive, 
and systematically nurtured an industrially skilled labour force. Singapore fol-
lowed the innovative strategy of using its geographical location by placing itself 
strategically in the various international supply chains of multinationals, as did 
Malaysia at a later date. It started with trade in goods but gradually included related 
services, finally extending to financial services. Hong Kong was more naturally 
placed as a ‘port’ for the huge hinterland of China. Both city states have managed 
to traverse the path of development with considerable skill, which becomes clear 
when contrasted with the experiences of some other similarly placed small South 
Asian countries like Sri Lanka, particularly because it is comparable on several 
social indices like high literacy. In general, small countries that seem to succeed 
internalize the external market, whereas large countries externalize their internal 
markets; exports by firms become the beginning of the market expansion path of 
the former, but are the end destination for the latter (Nayyar 2013).
Developing a domestic capital goods production base in the early phase would 
be easier the less severe is the foreign exchange constraint. The role of an under-
valued currency or exchange rate as a policy instrument tends to be overempha-
sized due to exclusive focus on the price mechanism. Instead it might be noticed 
that many East and Southeast Asian countries were placed in a relatively advanta-
geous position regarding foreign exchange availability because of their geopolitical 
situations, which were absent to varying extents for countries like China, Vietnam, 
India, and Indonesia, particularly in the early phase. As a result, the compulsion of 
building a domestic capital base was stronger and lasted longer. This was often 
exacerbated by the wrong policy of not producing sufficient agricultural surplus, 
which also needed foreign exchange. In contrast, many Southeast and East Asian 
countries had a more favourable situation due to their political economy, mostly 
dictated by geopolitics, which privileged them with preferential trade treatment and 
access to greater capital inflows. However, this in no way belittles their imaginative 
macro policies that helped them to exploit these advantages more successfully 
compared to some others in Asia, such as Pakistan, the Philippines, or Thailand.
An inference about macroeconomic policy might be drawn from these varied 
experiences. It points to the importance of getting the time sequence right in mov-
ing towards economic openness. Successful industrialization of many large and 
medium-sized countries had an early phase of building infrastructure and a capital 
goods industry for import substitution, followed by potential for export promo-
tion. The sequence acted as a disciplining device on quality control. Countries that 
failed were saddled with unwanted ‘infant industries’, partly discrediting the 
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strategy. However, reversing the sequence would be a mistake of oversimplification. 
They do not produce the same result, somewhat like ‘non-commutivity’ (of 
matrix multiplication) where AB and BA are usually not the same. Unfortunately, 
the importance of time sequence is often forgotten in many econometric cross-
country analyses, leading to oversimplified debates about import substitution 
versus export promotion.
7. Technological Capability and Capital Account Openness
Prior to financial globalization involving large private capital flows, Asian coun-
tries mostly had to depend on aid and grants. With the US dollar as international 
‘money’, countries more closely aligned politically to the United States typically 
faced fewer problems. Nevertheless, technological capability for industrial success 
is not a readily purchasable commodity on the international market. Both South 
Korea and Taiwan developed much of their industrial base simultaneously with 
domestic technological absorptive capacity and a strong emphasis on education 
and skill formation. South Korea, like Japan after the Second World War, relied 
heavily on commercial borrowing instead of direct foreign investment, paying 
required licence fees while accumulating a very high level of per capita foreign 
debt. However, it gradually generated a sustained export surplus to pay back and 
became a member of the OECD with full capital account convertibility, almost 
like a textbook success story. Singapore and Malaysia also attained comfortable 
foreign exchange positions with consistent balance of payments surpluses (aver-
aging about 2 per cent of their GDP over two decades), but the latter still maintains 
some capital account control, which left it relatively unaffected by the late 1990s’ 
(1997) financial crisis in Asia.
State-led industrialization under tariff and non-tariff protection in China and 
India during the early phase of industrialization moved towards increasing 
openness in trade under globalization. Both have diversified their exports and 
increased their share of manufactured goods in world trade, along with six other 
newly industrialized Asian countries over the last quarter century (Nayyar 2013). 
However, there are important differences in that China built up huge foreign 
exchange reserves from the time it gradually opened up its capital account. It 
attracted foreign investment and increasingly invested abroad. India, too, attracted 
large foreign capital inflows, but with a high proportion of relatively short maturity 
portfolio investment to enjoy an apparently comfortable foreign reserve position 
covering a continued current account deficit. On the trade front, the services 
sector, especially less-advanced software services rather than manufacturing, 
has been India’s most important export earner since early 2000, and much of its 
manufactured exports are to other developing countries (Ghose 2016)—whereas, 
China, like South Korea and Taiwan, is penetrating increasingly into the 
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export market of developed countries. This suggests India’s comparatively lower 
technological capability as a result of its industrial policy in transiting from the 
import substitution to export promotion phases.
Some of the more successful smaller exporters in Asia had a different industrial 
policy. Singapore and Hong Kong placed themselves strategically in international 
supply chains fairly early and became integrated in them. Some others in the 
ASEAN region received considerable foreign investment related to supply networks 
first from Japan, then South Korea, and now increasingly from China. Along with 
trade, they had a high degree of openness in foreign investment and to a lesser 
extent in finance. Their technological capability was typically influenced by for-
eign investors’ requirements. Occasionally described as the ‘flying geese pattern’, 
in which the position vacated by the leading bird is taken over by a follower, the 
acid test for these countries would be their ability to acquire sufficient independ-
ent technological capability. The role of the state also has to change byguiding 
investment towards channels considered more promising for either attracting 
foreign investment or directly promoting domestic investment for economic 
development through a combination of the budgetary, fiscal, and monetary ‘car-
rot and stick’ policy that had been typical of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The 
East and Southeast Asian countries, perhaps best exemplified by South Korea, 
seemed more successful in this respect. This often verged towards authoritarian 
‘managed democracy’ with restrictions on real wages and long working hours in 
the early phases, and has emerged only gradually out of this phase (Amsden 1989; 
Wade 1990; Chakravarty 1993).
Borrowing from private rather than official sources under financial globaliza-
tion created both unprecedented opportunities for attracting massive inflows 
coupled with the danger of capital flights. This has become a major challenge for 
the appropriate fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policy mix in all countries. 
Most Asian developing countries have used various degrees of direct control over 
their capital accounts in addition to these standard policies. Assuming sensitivity 
of capital flows to interest rate variation, the argument was made that monetary 
rather than fiscal policy would generally be more effective under flexible exchange 
rates (Mundell 1968). Fiscal policies based on borrowing heavily from the market 
were discouraged due to their possible impact in raising the rate of interest, espe-
cially in a flexible exchange rate regime, but such fiscal discipline was used very 
flexibly in the successful cases of East and Southeast Asia. In the cases of accumu-
lated foreign debt with a high fraction of short maturity debt, as in India and 
Indonesia, expansionary fiscal and monetary policies became more restrictive to 
comply with the sentiments of international financiers to avoid sudden capital 
flights. Keynesian policies for fighting unemployment became the most import-
ant casualty as austerity was imposed in the name of fiscal discipline.
The ability to service debt depends on several factors, but ultimately on the 
ability to generate enough export surplus. This requires acquiring technological 
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capabilities through continuous up-gradation and the ability to build complex 
goods where price competitiveness is not the only factor. Building such a techno-
logical niche where product novelty captures increasing market share becomes 
the goal (Lall 1987). That path was traversed in Asia initially by Japan and later by 
South Korea and Taiwan, and now probably China. Availability of foreign exchange 
is not enough to reach this destination, as it requires effective industrial policy. 
Some oil-rich Middle-Eastern Asian countries with export surplus have so far not 
been able to acquire similar technological capability, pointing to a gap between 
their industrial and financial power. Some oil-rich Central Asian countries that 
were part of the former Soviet Union suffered distortions in industrial develop-
ment partly due to industrial policy based on regional division. They produced 
components of heavy and complex industrial products (e.g., large tractors, rockets, 
space ships, etc.) in a centralized system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
these industrial sites became largely useless for the newly born sovereign coun-
tries, with insufficient reorientation of skills to suit altered demand patterns. The 
lesson needs to be learnt that availability of external finance is at best a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for successful industrial policy.
Serviceability of debt becomes critical particularly when countries with limited 
foreign exchange pursue independent industrial policies. Suppose one unit is 
borrowed at interest rate i ; if invested, it produces a steady flow of b  units of 
output (incremental output–capital ratio). Assuming a constant fraction s of out-
put is saved, 1 0> >s  would be the country’s ability to repay, and for sb, the 
repayment becomes viable. Since, by definition, the growth rate of the economy, g 
equals sb, this implies g has to exceed the interest rate i for servicing debt. This 
rule provides a useful benchmark against overdependence on foreign borrowing. 
It may be supplemented by the analogy with a firm whose cash flow may require 
occasional outside finance, normally manageable as ‘hedge finance’ from expected 
profit flows. More frequent dependence on external finance over longer periods 
becomes ‘speculative’ but continuous dependence on injections from outside 
indicates ‘Ponzi’ finance and financial fragility (Minsky 1985).
However, the problem of debt servicing has been almost reversed in recent 
years as poorer East Asian countries with high growth and persistent surpluses on 
current accounts (e.g., South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and now China) have been lending, that is, exporting capital to richer countries 
(Prasad et al. 2007). In this context, confusion between ‘capital’ as finance and as 
physical equipment needs to be avoided. Lucas (1990), for example, puzzled as to 
why sufficient ‘capital’ does not flow from relatively capital-abundant-rich coun-
tries to relatively capital-poor countries, since the former have lower compared to 
the latter’s higher marginal product of capital. Capital in this context means 
physical capital, whereas international capital mobility refers to financial capital. 
It is not only that physical capital does not have that kind of mobility, the very 
proposition that marginal product of physical capital equals the rate of profit was 
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proved logically unacceptable outside a one-commodity world precisely on 
account of this confusion between the physical and value of capital (Sraffa 1960; 
Samuelson 1966).
8. The Role of Decentralization in the  
State versus Market Debate
Successes and failures in Asian experiences teach us that recognizing the limits of 
economic and social engineering in formulating industrialization strategy is as 
important as being flexible in the use of fiscal and monetary policies to suit differ-
ent circumstances. Overly rigid macroeconomic policies are faulty in their very 
design, not merely in implementation. And yet, experience shows that centralized 
policy formulation in several Asian countries often erred in this respect. At times 
they have overemphasized rule-bound, bureaucratically top-heavy execution. Such 
faultily designed policy, even if well implemented by a bureaucracy or a party, 
soon loses momentum.‘Great Leap Forward’ in China in the 1950s might be such 
an example. Another example from India and elsewhere might be insistence on 
forcible population control in the 1970s and insistence on large dams causing mas-
sive displacement and dispossession. Asia has had its share of such ‘authoritarian 
high modernism’ associated with undertaking giant projects due to bureaucratic 
oversimplification in centralized decision-making (Scott 1998).
The problem is avoidedin the mythical worldof a perfectly competitive market. 
With numerous atomistic individuals having no price-setting power and working 
in a complete set of future markets that avoids all hazards of uncertainty, the 
market economy settles to a Pareto optimal equilibrium (Debreu 1953).Whilethis 
construction begs most real-life questions this ideologically powerful view of the 
market economy continues to dominate development discourse with its implied 
message that government interventiondisturbs optimality, rather ‘leaving it to the 
market’ with a minimalist state is optimal.
In reality, however, both the state and the market are open to manipulative 
abuses of power, and the design of economic policy has to start by escaping the 
simplistic binary choice between the state and the market. Counter-posing the 
state and the market in a ‘double movement’ for balance against excesses by either 
is desirable (Polanyi 1944) but has the strong possibility of oneoverpowering the 
other in many political circumstances.Exploration ofalternatives in decentraliza-
tion is imperative, particularly in constitutional democracies of large countries. 
This means bringing communities more directly into decision-making in a wider 
three-tier federal structure. The counter-argument that there is a large trade-off 
between efficiency and decentralization is often fictitious. A centralized large dam 
or a nuclear power project run by a few highly skilled technocrats may appear more 
efficient, but a larger number of smaller projects for water or unconventional 
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sources of power management that allow greater community participation may 
turn out to be more efficient in practice due to their greateradaptabilityto local 
conditions.
The basic logic for decentralization in large countries where the central power 
isremoteaims atincorporating implementability into the plan, because success 
often eludes without the involvement ofinterested local communities. The state 
would still have the role of co-ordinating, resolving disputes, providing assistance 
to less able communities, and preventing elite capture of local institutions. However, 
the paradigm of macroeconomic policies for development has the important task 
of placing the institutions of the state, the market, and the decentralized com-
munities in an effective functioning arrangement. Although the extent to which 
this is feasible remains an open issue and the jury is still out, not always with a 
favourable verdict (Crook and Manor  1998; Bardhan and Mukherjee  2006; 
Brancati 2006), the undeniable importance of the issue in the light of experience 
requires its integration into the macroeconomic thinking about development.
The problem may be approached from three different angles. The first chal-
lenge is creating powerful group incentives for development without leaving it 
either to the market mechanism or a distant authoritarian bureaucracy. The big-
gest obstacle is that groups are divided by opposing interests of gender, caste, and 
religion, which is indeed a replica of society. Typically, such incentives are more 
likely to be effective when they do not come into sharp conflict with other sectional 
interests. Perhaps the clearest example of this has been the preservation of forests 
and the environment by local participants against a few profit-seeking outside 
contractors. Other examples are the local rather than centralized storage of grains, 
nurseries suited to local environments, and water conservation. Indeed, during 
the extensive growth phase of labour utilization, such decentralization may be more 
effective and less authoritarian. The market solution has often meant the familiar 
‘free rider’ problem and the tragedy of the commons, which would also appear here. 
Decentralized planning is not merely the intermediate level of planning between 
the state and market, but a way of exploring how to find the maximum feasible 
level of achieving direct democracy in developmental projects by raising aware-
ness of the rights and self-regulating capability of citizens against free-riding.
The second challenge lies in dealing with the typical failures of centralized 
bureaucracy for the delivery of basic needs in areas such as public distribution 
of food, education, health, housing, child care, and old age insurance. The oppos-
ite failure of the market is most glaring in poor countries where poorer sections 
are excluded through the price mechanism, denying them market access to basic 
needs. This is the same market logic of ‘one dollar one vote’that discourages the 
production of the most needed goods, such as safe drinking water, basic preventive 
medicines, and health care, because they are unprofitable. To counter such exclu-
sion in production and consumption, decentralization could be designed to 
providenovel instruments, like the concept of social rather than private wages 
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paid in terms of improved community services in elementary and preventive 
local health care, facilities for child and old age care, and better local common 
schooling. They typically provide labour-intensive employment and greatly help 
poorer members of the community in particular. One very important characteris-
tic of a social wage that is seldom stressed is that it can achieve a very high degree 
of incentive compatibility between the provider and the user of these goods and 
services, and might avoid many of the abuses (e.g., asymmetric information) of 
either an anonymous bureaucratic or market system. Similarly, community needs 
are often better served by small and medium local firms, rather than multinational 
large firms.
Finally, both capitalist multiparty democracies as well as more authoritarian 
one-party democracies are increasingly showing tendencies of converging insofar 
as interests of large corporations are concerned. They span diverse areas like glo-
balization of trade, investment and finance, obsessive concern with international 
competitiveness, and neglect of employment for higher labour productivity 
through acquisition of latest technology. The rules of the game are increasingly 
biased in favour of corporations, to the neglect of traditional knowledge and local 
possibilities. Strengthening communities through greater awareness of their 
duties and rights and use of community traditional knowledge through partici-
pation in the development process can at least partly act as countervailing 
power,almost a compulsion of our time. This perhaps is the most pressing justifi-
cation for exploring the role of decentralization in the more conventional state 
versus market debate.
9.  Economic and Social Inequality
The oft-told story of a Latin American military dictator who reported to the 
American president that his country’s economy was doing well, but not its people, 
sums up the usual consequences of the strategy of ‘growth at any cost’. The strat-
egy suits large corporations more than the people because the benefits of growth 
donot automatically trickle down in the absence of supporting policies. Slow 
growth in formal employment, livelihood-destroying policies and transferring of 
common resources to incentivize corporate investment enormously increased 
corporate wealth, but at the cost of higher inequality. Both China and India wit-
nessed unprecedented growth in their GDPs along with significant increases in 
inequality of income and wealth during the same period. And yet, several other 
Asian experiences have shown that reasonably stable income distribution, with 
social mobility through measures like initial land reform, improved public health, 
and education, along with labour-intensive infrastructure for generating employ-
ment, created preconditions for high growth. An almost exclusive focus on labour 
productivity and reduction of unit cost, without concern for employment levels, 
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imposes severe restrictions on the home market, pushing economies towards 
the foreign market.
In this zero-sum game of increasing globalmarket share, even the losers, due to 
their dependence on large multinational corporations, ignorethe importance of 
enlarging the home market through greater income equality by raising the level 
of employment. Instead, social inequality of various kinds based on caste, race, 
gender, ethnicity, region, and religion tend to increase in situations of shrinking 
employment and income opportunities. Gender equality suffers greatly, as evi-
denced in the Indian case, in a disproportionately large fall in the participation 
rate of women in the work force in times of shrinking employment opportunities. 
Under pressures of legitimization by the majority or dominant minority, govern-
ment follows discriminatory policiesencouraging majoritarianism. . Examples are 
religious conflicts in Sri Lanka (Tamil–Singala), India, Pakistanin contrast to multi-
ethnic, multicultural Singapore or Malaysia where similar traditional tensions 
decreased with greater prosperity. Democratic multiparty politics often has the 
unfortunate tendency to magnify such tensions, while the one-party totalitarian 
solution is suppression by force. And yet, rapid employment-generationsocial 
mobility is seldom considered as part of the solution. ‘Structural’ anthropology 
suggests that tensions of different cultures are often subsumed under wider gov-
erning principles like the linked kinship system (Levi-Strauss  1963). Increased 
local employment opportunities under decentralization, which also reduce alien-
ation, and family separation of migrant workers, could be an important compo-
nent of a similar governing principle.
Several Asian experiences point to the importance of health care, education, 
land reform, and infrastructure as ways of moving towards more equitable devel-
opment. And yet, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for social cohe-
sion or development. For instance, some Central Asian countries of the former 
Soviet Union, which had attained many of these conditions, have not yet been on 
a trajectory of sustained development. In particular, their examples show that 
human capital development through education under the former Soviet regime 
did not lead to realization of productive potential in the absence of an adequate 
market on the demand side. Creating better supply conditions including human 
capital development is like making more powerful boats whichis not useful unless 
there is enough water in the river. Myrdal’s observation sums it up: ‘Supply does 
not create its own demand, while demand does not call forth its own supply’ 
(Myrdal 1977: 227). In more successful cases, the state played a key role in match-
ing demand with supply measures conditioned by its political economy. The mix-
ing of market forces with monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies of the state 
often focused on private investment and directly undertook public investment for 
economic and social infrastructural development. The idea of ‘crowding out’ of 
private investment by public investment and blanket rules of a ceiling on fiscal 
deficit or public debt found little support.
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Based on the experiences of East and Southeast Asian countries, even if 
industrialization in general is considered to be at the core of the process of devel-
opment, the importance of manufacturing must be put into proper perspective. 
The macropolicy framework must not overlook either the need for developmental 
prerequisites or the unfolding negative implications for employment and the envir-
onment of corporate-led emphasis on the growth of manufacturing. Nevertheless, 
creating the prerequisites of development often runs the danger of a ‘managed’ 
democracy with paternalistic overtones. Several economically successful Asian 
countries have had this experience, from which some are gradually finding their 
way out, while in the worst cases paternalism persists without the developmental 
prerequisites. Even greater income equality in face of relatively less-developed pol-
itical rights generates tension. While multiparty democracies in South Asia might 
appear better at protecting the political rights of ordinary citizens, their economic 
rights are diminished greatly by massive poverty and social inequality magnified 
bysocial divisionfor capturing votes at election times. Thus, the challenge of how 
best to combine economic with political and social, especially gender, equality-
facesdevelopment inAsia.
10. Concluding Observations
Increasing inequality of income and wealth presents serious problems along 
the trajectory of development. The tensions generated are not only political and 
social, but also economic.Matching demand with supplymay beaccepted as a gen-
eral principle but, increased inequality in favour of the richshrinks the size of the 
domestic market. The rich save more in financial assets and on up-market imported 
goods which are detrimental to the expansion of the volume as well as thepattern 
of demand in a poor country.
In relatively large South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, 
the priority must be to utilize particularly rural labour more effectively as much 
as possible in rural areas without following the conventional wisdom that indus-
trialization led by corporations with external market orientation would someday 
solve the problem. Under democratic accountability at regular intervals of elec-
tions, the time permitted to any elected government is not compatible with this 
macroeconomic strategy because labour absorption in high productivity industry 
is a much slower process. The compulsions for democratic legitimization without 
moving towards authoritarianism require shifting attention to the domestic market 
and production of goods needed by ordinary citizens. This is how macroeconomic 
policies might hope to bring a closer together economic, political, and social 
equality. However, this requires providing rural areas with better production and 
earning opportunities, necessitating at least some reforms in land use and owner-
ship rights coupled with land-improving investments for small-scale agriculture. 
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Whenever necessary, this has to be supplemented by public works providing 
electricity, infrastructure, and connectivity, but as far as possible on a decentral-
ized basis with smaller, short-yielding, locally operated projects by smaller firms. 
It would absorb the maximum amount of labour in the shortest possible time.
However, even within the same region of SouthAsia, the policy mix has to be 
different for small countries with relatively small domestic markets like Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, orland-locked Nepal. They have to rely more on imports and devise 
ways of increasing their export earnings through location advantages in inter-
national supply chains, tourism, and exploitation of forest and marine resources, 
accompanied by development of food- andlocalnatural resource-processing indus-
tries. When they are able to meet this challenge like some of the smaller Southeast 
and East Asian countries, they will have a road map pointing to outward-oriented, 
export-led development.
As a general rule, instead of obsessive concern for catching up with the industri-
ally advanced countries through greater international competitiveness, the focus 
of industrial policy should be on producing goods compatible with the purchas-
ing power of the ordinary people in the domestic market and its up-gradation 
through improved technology. Macroeconomic policies for industrialization have 
to reckon with the problem of producing improved quality goods for the domestic 
market in poor countries where the vast majority have purchasing power far below 
the international standard. Otherwise, wrong policies will be promoting inequal-
ity by concentrating investible resources on a composition of goods biased in favour 
of the richer sections, even when they achieve balance between demand and supply. 
For an alternative macroeconomic policy paradigm, the defining issue for more 
equitable and inclusive developmentrequiresviewing output growth as the out-
come of decentralized high employment growth, rather than employment growth 
as the outcome of high output growth.
However,emphasiswill vary from case to case, depending on the specificity of 
the initial conditions and stage of development of a country. In East and Southeast 
Asian countries that have already achieved greater prosperity and have a greater 
outward orientation, the consumption pattern of ordinary citizens in many ways 
would be closer to that of high-income countries, and their path to industrializa-
tion and service sector development would be different. Not only catching up, but 
overtaking, may well become their objective. The main lesson to be learnt from the 
diversity of experiences of Asian countries is that inclusive development requires 
compatibility between the level of prosperity of average citizens in a country and 
the domestic production pattern which must technologically improve over time 
without undue concern for international image and position. It is not wise in this 
respect for any country to try to skip the stages of its developmental history by 
ignoring the majority. This is the essence of strategic, not blind integration with 
the global economy in terms of openness in trade, investment, and finance, as 
well as industrial policy and technology acquisition.
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In the course of development as a historical process, the meaning and  content of 
the notion of development itself must change. Recalling Wittgenstein, we might say 
words, utterances, as well as signs acquire their meaning not as abstractions, but 
through use in an appropriate ‘form of live’ (Wittgenstein 1958: 8–14). The word 
‘development’ is no exception. Asian countries are a vast laboratory of experiments 
that attempt to develop in different ways. Some are more successful than others, 
but all have lessons for us. We are invited to observe this changing and fascinating 
scene, which was opened to us by Gunner Myrdal half a century ago.
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Poverty and Inequality
Guanghua Wan and Chen Wang
1. Introduction
Poverty reduction featured most prominently among the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) as well as in the post-2015 development agenda of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). And containing inequality was added to the latter. 
Against this background, the primary objective of this chapter is to construct and 
discuss poverty and inequality profiles in Asia1 for the past 50 years or so. While 
data on inequality are available from the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) of UNU-WIDER, consistent poverty estimates do not exist for the early 
years. Thus, household consumption data from the Penn World Table (PWT 
 version 9) have been combined with the inequality observations of WIID to gen-
erate poverty profiles for Asia, its sub-regions, and individual economies.2 The 
poverty lines are set at US$1.90 and US$3.20 per person per day, adjusted by the 
2011 purchasing power parity exchange rates. They correspond to the extreme 
and moderate poverty lines of the World Bank, respectively.
Our analytical results demonstrate that, contrary to Myrdal (1968) who was 
rather pessimistic about the future of Asia, Asia has achieved remarkable growth and 
miracle poverty reduction since the mid-1960s. Beginning with Japan’s taking off 
after the Second World War, followed by the emergence of the four ‘tigers’ of Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s, Asia’s re-rise received 
a huge boost when China embarked on its reform and opening-up journey in late 
1978, reinforced later by the fast growth of the Indian and other Asian economies. 
Consequently, Asia’s share in global gross domestic product (GDP) has been rising 
rapidly (see Nayyar 2013). The share is expected to rise further (ADB 2011), and 
could reach more than 76 per cent by 2040 according to Fogel (2007).
The fast growth has helped lift billions of Asians out of poverty. According to 
the estimates presented in section  2.3, Asia’s poverty rate under the US$3.20 
poverty line dropped from 73.57 per cent in 1965 to 9.69 per cent in 2014. 
1 Unless otherwise specified, Asia or region in this chapter refers to the following economies: 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan from East Asia; Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam from Southeast Asia; and Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka from South Asia.
2 See https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database and https://
www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/ (accessed 1 July 2018).
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The corresponding decrease under the US$1.90 poverty line is from 48.52 per cent 
in 1965 to 2.58 per cent in 2014. In fact, the MDG on poverty reduction would 
not have been achieved if Asia were excluded (ADB 2014).
On the other hand, however, the fast growth has been accompanied by rising 
inequality.3 For Asia as a whole, the Gini index, an indicator of inequality, increased 
from 38.43 per cent in 1965 to 42.80 per cent in 2006 before declining in recent 
years. The recent decline may be attributable to the financial crisis that began in 
2007/2008 (see more discussions later in the chapter). In particular, inequality 
worsened significantly in the most populous countries of Asia: China, India, 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka (see section 2.2).
The rising inequality has far-reaching implications. It can offset the benign 
effect of growth on poverty (Ravallion and Chen 2004). Furthermore, in highly 
unequal societies, the elite may hijack the power of the state, adversely affecting 
the provision of public goods and services that tend to benefit the poor more 
(Bourguignon and Dessus 2009). Most fundamentally, inequality is expected to 
undermine future growth through various transmission channels (Wan at al. 2006). 
In particular, it may raise the likelihood of financial crises and stimulate current 
account deficits (Rajan 2010; Acemoglu 2011).
Clearly, the interwoven relationship between growth, poverty, and inequality—
coined the growth–poverty–inequality triangle by Bourguignon (2004)—is an 
important and complex subject worth careful examination. While much has 
been published on Asia’s phenomenal growth, Asia’s poverty profile is largely 
absent if one extends the time horizon back to the 1970s or 1960s. Further, 
existing studies on income inequality are mostly centred on within-country 
inequality. Even the flagship publication of ADB (2012) and ESCAP (2018) did 
not take into consideration income gaps between economies. This is regrettable 
as Asia’s welfare depends not only on growth and inequality within individual 
economies but also on disparities between economies (Sen 1973). In short, to 
gain a good understanding of the development process in Asia requires a com-
prehensive and coherent analysis of the growth, inequality, and poverty issues 
for Asia, its sub-regions, and individual economies.
In addition to the provision of poverty and inequality profiles, this chapter 
addresses three related issues: what were the impacts of growth and inequality on 
poverty reduction in Asia? What are the drivers of absolute poverty and inequality? 
And what is the relationship between growth and inequality? The last two 
issues will be addressed by estimating various regression models while the first 
question will be tackled using the framework of poverty decomposition, initially 
developed by Datt and Ravallion (1992) and modified by Zhang and Wan (2006). 
This framework can attribute a change in poverty to contributions that are made 
3 This chapter only considers inequality of income, which is generally more equally distributed 
than wealth but more unequally distributed than consumption due to smoothing.
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by growth and inequality, respectively (see section 3 for details). It is important to 
point out that poverty will be estimated using per capita consumption data from 
the latest PWT. This is recommended by Feenstra et al. (2015) and Anand and 
Segal (2015) and is also more consistent with the World Bank that uses consump-
tion not income data from household surveys to estimate poverty. However, the 
level of consumption reported in PWT is usually higher than that from house-
hold survey. Also, Asia on average is more developed than Africa. Thus, we focus 
on results based on the US$3.20 poverty line unless specified otherwise. Our use 
of the PWT data is supported by Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2016).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses profiles of 
growth, inequality, and poverty for Asia, its sub-regions, and individual economies. 
Section  3 focuses on sources of poverty reduction while section  4 is devoted 
to  the study of inequality, with a special emphasis on the costs and drivers of 
inequality. Finally, section 5 provides a summary and policy recommendations.
2. Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Profiles
According to Sen (1973), the overall well-being of a region such as Asia depends 
on two variables: regional average income/consumption and regional distribution 
of income/consumption. The latter can be represented by an indicator of inequality 
such as the Gini or Theil index. Further, the two variables completely determine 
the level of poverty for a given poverty line. The aim of this section is to depict the 
development process of Asia for the period 1965–2014 by constructing and pre-
senting these three interrelated profiles.
2.1 Growth Profile
The importance of growth requires no justification at all. As pointed out by 
Myrdal (1968), growth is likely to improve almost all other conditions, even  attitudes 
and institutions. In the context of this chapter, growth leads to lower poverty and 
welfare gains, holding income distribution or inequality constant.
To demonstrate the role of Asia’s economic growth in a global picture, 
Figure 10.1 shows the growth trends of Asia, its sub-regions, and non-Asia countries, 
where non-Asia countries include both developing and developed countries. As 
expected, Asia’s growth has been phenomenal since the mid- or late 1960s. It out-
paced non-Asia countries except during the second energy crisis of the late 1970s 
and the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. This is particularly true in the late 
1960s when the four tigers took off and became even more significant when 
China began its expansion in the late 1970s, with contributions from India and 
other Asian economies. However, different sub-regions performed quite differently. 
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East Asia has been the star performer, and, for most years, Southeast Asia per-
formed well too.
Not surprisingly, heterogeneity in growth performance is even more significant 
when comparing different individual economies. As figure 2 of Wan and Wang 
(2018) shows, economies in East Asia not only grew fast but also were relatively 
stable. The growth fluctuations were more synchronized within Southeast Asia 
than economies in other sub-regions.
2.2 Inequality Profile
The fast growth in Asia does not necessarily lead to welfare improvement unless the 
poor gain equally or more than the rich. Societal welfare could even decrease if the 
growth benefits the rich at the cost of the poor (Sen 1973). In other words, the more 
the poor benefit, which implies declining inequality, the larger the welfare gains for 
the society. Unfortunately, growth is often accompanied by rising inequality, as 
pointed out by Kuznets (1955) and Lewis (1955) and as happened in Asia.
To assess whether Asia’s growth was accompanied by worsening distribution, it 
is necessary to construct an Asia-wide inequality profile, ideally based on house-
hold or individual data. In the absence of such data, the methodology derived in 
appendix B of Wan and Wang (2018) is used to convert the Gini estimates of 
WIID into Theil estimates (Theil 1967).4 Adding up these Theil estimates weighted 
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Figure 10.1 Growth of per capita GDP: Asia and sub-regions.
Note: Asia contains countries from East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia; Non-Asia includes all 
countries except for countries from East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on PWT data.
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by population shares gives rise to the so-called within-economy inequality. Using 
per capita GDP of individual economies, a Theil estimate representing the so-called 
between-economy inequality can be obtained. The sum of these two components 
is the overall inequality (Theil index) for Asia, which can be converted back into 
the Gini coefficient.
Figure 10.2 depicts Asia’s inequality profile which exhibits an inverted-U  pattern. 
The curve at the bottom shows the simple unweighted average of Gini estimates 
of individual economies. The gap between this curve and the regional Gini reflects 
two impacts: gaps between economies and the importance of  population weights. 
It is clear that the conventional wisdom of using the unweighted Gini is misleading. 
More realistic estimates of the regional inequality (the top two curves in Figure 10.2) 
paint a much more serious picture. Apart from severe underestimation, the 
unweighted Gini even produces different inequality trends.
An interesting finding from Figure 10.2 is the decreases in inequality during 
crises, initially noted by Wan (2001). Inequality in Asia grew successively from 
1965 until the first oil crisis of 1973. The decline in inequality during this crisis 
was small and short-lived. Afterwards, regional inequality resumed its climbing 
trend until the onset of the second oil crisis that began in 1979. This time, 
the  inequality decline lasted several years until the mid-1980s. The decrease in 
 inequality during the 1997 Asian financial crisis was also short-lived. Most 
importantly, the prolonged and lingering global crisis of 2007/2008 is associated 
with successive declines of Asia’s inequality.
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year















Figure 10.2 Regional inequality in Asia.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on PWT and WIID data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Guanghua Wan and Chen Wang 245
As Lopez-Acevedo and Salinas (2000) demonstrated, the rich usually suffer from 
severe capital losses during crises, seriously affecting their income. Also, crises 
cause more income damage to workers of non-tradable sectors such as financial 
services and to individuals in the top income decile. These can be confirmed by 
the drop in the income share accruing to top income earners. According to the 
World Inequality Database, from 2008 to 2009, the share of pre-tax income of the 
top 1 per cent earners dropped from 12.7 to 11.2 per cent in France, 29.3 to 27.4 
per cent in Brazil, 11.4 to 9.7 per cent in Taiwan, 11.3 to 10.4 per cent in Japan, 
and 15.2 to 13.7 per cent in Singapore. Similarly, from 2008 to 2009 the income 
share of the top 10 per cent earners dropped from 37.3 to 35.6 per cent in France, 
56.2 to 55.0 per cent in Brazil, 36.9 to 33.7 per cent in Taiwan, 43 to 41.3 per cent 
in Japan, and 43.6 to 39.6 per cent in Singapore. Of course, social protections kick 
in during crises, helping moderate after-tax income inequality.
Figure  10.3 shows the within- and between-economy components of Asia’s 
inequality. The latter dominated total inequality and yet it has been neglected by 
the public, the policy, and even research communities. Further, the trend of Asia’s 
inequality is almost completely driven by the between-component. For example, 
the early ascent of the total inequality was accompanied by the increasing between-
component. And the post-1990s decline was accompanied by the decreasing 
between-component despite the rising within-component.
















Figure 10.3 Regional inequality in Asia: Theil index decomposition.
Note: Total inequality is the sum of within-country inequality (Theil index (within)) and between-
country inequality (Theil index (between)).
Source: Authors’ estimation based on PWT and WIID data.
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The sub-regional profiles differ from the regional counterpart and from each 
other. Referring to figure 5 of Wan and Wang (2018), several findings are  discernible. 
First, very much like the regional picture, sub-regions experienced inequality 
rises and significant declines, with a peak around the height of the second oil crisis. 
They also experienced an upward trend starting from the mid-1980s. Unlike the 
inverted-U pattern of the regional profile, East Asia and South Asia exhibit an M 
pattern. Moreover, the overall inequality is lower in South Asia while East Asia is 
most unequal. Second, for East Asia, the main contributor of inequality is the 
between-component while in South and Southeast Asia, the within- component 
dominates and economies in these two sub-regions are relatively more homoge-
neous in terms of development level. In fact, the between-component in South 
and Southeast Asia is relatively stable. Third, East Asia is unique in the sense that 
the latest declining trend occurred much earlier than in other sub-regions. This is 
related to the dominance of the between-component in East Asia and is driven by 
the catching up of China with its two neighbours of Japan and Korea, particularly 
after 1988 when Japan began to experience the lost decades.
As expected, the inequality profiles at the individual economy level are more 
diverse, see figure  6 of Wan and Wang (2018). It is interesting to observe that 
economies within each sub-region share similar inequality trends while trends 
differ across sub-regions, making one wonder if cultural factors may play a role in 
driving inequality. In addition to cultural factors that are difficult to quantify, level 
of development, technical change, unemployment, urbanization, globalization, 
and ageing are potential drivers of inequality (see section 4 for more details). Note 
that economies in Southeast Asia experienced more erratic changes in inequality 
while East Asia (excluding China) and South Asia witnessed more stable distribu-
tions with one or two outliers.
Among the most populous economies, inequality in China was low in the 
 pre-reform period and even declined in the early period of reform but rose quite 
substantially since the mid-1980s until recently. While growth in China was 
accompanied by rising inequality, this is not the case for Japan, which experi-
enced fairly equal distribution until the early 1980s. Inequality in Japan did grow 
since then but the level remained low. Inequality in India fluctuated more and 
stayed at relatively high levels until recently. The trend of inequality in Bangladesh 
is similar to that in China, while inequality in Indonesia also grew. These countries 
represent more than 90 per cent of Asia’s population. It is worth noting the spatial 
dimension of inequality in large countries such as China, India, and Indonesia 
where the rural–urban divide contributes significantly to national inequality (see 
Shorrocks and Wan 2005). In China, this contribution amounted to more than 
50 per cent of total inequality (see Wan 2007; Wang et al. 2014).
Another indicator of income distribution is the labour share in national income. 
Analytically, a decline in the labour share implies rising inequality as labour 
income is usually more equally distributed than capital income (Jacobson and 
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Occhino 2012; Piketty 2014; Luo et al. 2018). Based on PWT data, except Hong 
Kong, Mongolia, and Singapore, all other economies in Asia experienced decreases 
in the labour share, with the largest decline observed in India (from 71.75 per 
cent in 1975 to 49.54 per cent in 2011).
2.3 Poverty Profile
While the impact of growth on inequality is uncertain, its impact on poverty is 
always benign provided that the distribution does not deteriorate. Since inequal-
ity has risen in many parts of Asia (see section 2.2),the poverty profile cannot be 
determined a priori despite the general growth trends in Asia.
A formidable challenge in constructing the poverty profile lies in the lack of 
household or individual data. However, under a reasonable assumption, poverty 
can be estimated using the Gini estimates of WIID and the per capita household 
final consumption data from PWT (see appendix B of Wan and Wang  2018). 
Ideally, the Gini estimates should be based on consumption rather than income 
data. However, if consumption is proportional to income, income and consumption 
inequalities would be identical. In reality, due to consumption smoothing, its 
inequality is generally smaller than income inequality. Nevertheless, consumption 
is highly correlated with income, justifying to a certain extent the mixed use of 
income Gini estimates from WIID. Note that interpolation and extrapolation 
were necessary to fill in some of the missing Gini estimates.
Figure 10.4 presents the poverty head count ratios or poverty rate for Asia and 
its sub-regions under the US$1.90 and US$3.20 poverty lines. It is striking to see 
that in 1965, 73.57 per cent of Asians lived under the US$3.20 poverty line and 
half of Asians lived with less than US$1.90 per day. After 50 years of development, 
Asia has eliminated extreme poverty using the 3 per cent threshold of the World 
Bank, although Asia is still some way from ending moderate poverty. In 2014, 
there are still 421.48 million moderately poor in Asia.5
Not surprisingly, the poverty profile differs considerably across sub-regions 
(see figure 9 of Wan and Wang 2018) although they all share a similar declining 
trend. In terms of poverty rate, in 1965 Southeast Asia was the poorest. By 2014, 
however, South Asia, which had not managed to end extreme poverty under the 3 
per cent threshold of the World Bank, became the poorest. The general declining 
trends imply the dominating growth impact of poverty reduction. However, the 
trend became flatter for East Asia since the mid-1980s and for Southeast Asia 
since the early 1980s. The former may be related to the fast-rising inequality in 
China and the latter may be explained by growth moderation combined with 
increases in inequality in Southeast Asia.
5 Asia’s total population is 4,349.6 million, according to United Nations (2015).
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It is useful to note some episodes of poverty increases. For example, South Asia 
became poorer from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. This is due to the inde-
pendence of Bangladesh in 1971 and socio-economic instabilities afterwards. 
Also, Sri Lanka experienced poverty increases from the early 1970s to the mid-
1980s due to a series of wars.
There are large heterogeneities in both the level and fluctuations in the poverty 
rates across economies (see figure 10 of Wan and Wang 2018). Apart from Japan, 
all other economies suffered from abject poverty back in 1965. Under the 3 per 
cent threshold, Taiwan and Hong Kong eliminated extreme poverty in late 1960s, 
Singapore mid-1970s, followed by South Korea in early 1980s, Malaysia late 1990s, 
and Thailand and Indonesia in the new millennium. By contrasting the poverty 
profiles with the corresponding growth profiles, the correlation appears to be 
quite high, implying that poverty reduction is largely driven by growth. Changes 
in inequality only played a supplementary role, as discussed further in section 3.
3. Sources of Poverty Reduction
Having provided the poverty, growth, and inequality profiles, this section explores 
the poverty–growth–inequality triangle, focusing on sources of poverty reduction. 
This can be achieved by decomposing a poverty change into the  growth and 
inequality components or effects. The methodology to be used here is based on 
Zhang and Wan (2006) who modified the decomposition framework of Datt 
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Figure 10.4 Asia’s poverty.
Source: Authors’ estimation based on PWT and WIID data.
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and Ravallion (1992). Let ΔP denote a change in poverty P between period 0 
and period T:
 ∆P P Y I P Y IT T= ( ) − ( ); ;0 0  (1)
where Y denotes average consumption and I denotes distribution or inequality. 
By definition, the growth component of ΔP is the change in poverty due to a 
change in Y holding I constant. The inequality or redistribution component is the 
change in poverty due to a change in the distribution I while holding Y constant. 
Let P(Yi, Ij) be the poverty estimate from a hypothetical distribution, i = 0 or T, j = 0 
or T and i ≠ j. The growth component can be defined as:
 Growth component P Y I P Y IT= ( ) − ( ), ;0 0 0  (2)
or, alternatively as
 Growth component P Y I P Y IT T T= ( ) − ( ); ,0  (2a)
Similarly, the inequality component can be defined as:
 Inequality component P Y I P Y IT= ( ) − ( )0 0 0, ;  (3)
or
 Inequality component P Y I P Y IT T T= ( ) − ( ), ; 0  (3a)
Different combinations of the alternative growth and inequality components 
produce four distinct decompositions of ΔP. If Equations (2) and (3) are used, 
period 0 is considered as the reference point. By contrast, choosing equations (2a) 
and (3a) implies the use of period T as the reference point. The results from the 
two decompositions need not agree, and both are inexact in the sense that the two 
components do not add up to ΔP. If the combination of Equations (2a) and (3) or 
(2) and (3a) is used, the decomposition will be exact since:
 
P Y I P Y I Growth component Inequality componentT T; ;( ) − ( ) =   + 0 0    
 = ( ) − ( ) +  ( ) − ( )[ ; , , ;P Y I P Y I P Y I P Y IT T T T0 0 0 0  (4)
 
= ( ) − ( )  + ( ) − ( ) P Y I P Y I P Y I P Y IT T T T, ; ; ,0 0 0 0  (5)
However, the inequality and growth components are measured against different 
reference points in Equations (4) and (5), which may produce different results. 
A solution to the reference point problem is to take the average of Equations (4) 
and (5) to arrive at:
 
∆P P Y I P Y I P Y I P Y I
P Y




0 0 0 0
0
. ; , , ;
. , ; ; ,I P Y I P Y I P Y I
Growth componen
T T T T( ) − ( )  + ( ) − ( ) { }
=
0 0 0
t Inequality component{ }+{ }  (6)
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Note that the above decomposition of Zhang and Wan (2006) does not have the 
annoying residual term and is not path-dependent, as in Datt and Ravallion (1992).
The decomposition results for Asia under the US$3.20 poverty line are shown 
in Figure 10.5, with a positive effect reflecting poverty reduction. Note that the 
estimated inequality effect is positively correlated with poverty reduction—a rise 
in inequality implies poverty rise and vice versa. On the contrary, the estimated 
growth effect is negatively correlated with poverty reduction—growth implies 
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(c) South Asia
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poverty reduction and vice versa. For Asia, the inequality effect is mostly 
 poverty-increasing, echoing the general trend of rising inequality. Meanwhile, the 
growth effects are negative in most years. Comparing the two effects, the benign 
growth effect clearly dominates. Therefore, it can be concluded that the impressive 
achievement in poverty reduction in Asia is largely accounted for by growth. The 
inequality effect has been detrimental, but it is small in absolute values.
As far as East Asia is concerned, the growth effect for South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Taiwan was large in the early years and began converging to 
zero since around the early 1990s. In China and Mongolia, the growth effect 
was also positive although the contributions appeared relatively small. This is 
not surprising, as China is well known for high savings rate or low consump-
tion rate despite its miracle growth in the last four decades. Inequality improved 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the early 1970s, reinforcing the benign growth 
impact of growth. In South Korea, the inequality effect also helped reduce pov-
erty in most years, corresponding to the declines in its inequality; see figure 6 of 
Wan and Wang (2018).
Turning to Southeast Asia, on average the growth effect was larger than that 
for East Asia although it declined over time. Singapore witnessed the largest 
growth effect in the mid-1970s, reducing the poverty rate by more than 20 per cent. 
In Laos and the Philippines, the growth effect has been significant in recent 
years. Inequality effect in Southeast Asia was similar to that in East Asia, being 
close to zero.
As far as South Asia is concerned, the pattern of growth effect was opposite to 
that for most of the other Asian economies where the growth effect decreased over 
time. For example, in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, the growth effect increased 
over time.
Except in East Asia, redistribution effects are close to and fluctuate just above 
zero, and the growth effects are mostly positive and dominate the total changes in 
poverty. The growth effect in different sub-regions became small over time in 
Southeast Asia but expanded in South Asia. Such a difference is attributable to 
three factors: differences in the growth rate of per capita consumption, the growth 
impact on poverty, and the base-period level of poverty.
Since the magnitude of the growth effect depends on the growth rate and its 
impact on poverty, it is useful to divide the growth effect by the growth rate to 
obtain the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. The results (not presented 
here due to space consideration) demonstrate the diminishing impact of 
growth on poverty reduction over time: a same 1 percentage point of growth 
(in consumption per capita) leads to less and less poverty reduction over 
time—a typical phenomenon of ‘ripping the low-hanging fruits first’. This is 
why the growth impact is related to the base-period level of poverty.
To further explore fundamental drivers of poverty, Table 10.1 reports regres-
























Table 10.1 Drivers of poverty
 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
 Poverty 3.2 Poverty 3.2 Poverty 3.2 Poverty 3.2 Poverty 3.2 Poverty 3.2 Poverty 3.2














Ln(GDP per capita)2 10.226*** (1.018) 12.402*** (1.230) 11.630*** (1.652) 11.548*** (1.703) 12.325*** (1.814) 12.021*** (1.815) 10.020*** (1.772)
Total factor 
productivity (TFP)
 −18.952* (10.367) −36.242** (17.564) −45.298** (19.845) −45.832** (19.643) −29.720 (18.086) −34.982** 
(15.680)
Unemployment rate   0.171 (0.368) 0.282 (0.348) 0.329 (0.338) 0.482 (0.332) 0.372 (0.317)
Urbanization    −0.250 (0.227) −0.264 (0.215) −0.199 (0.202) −0.286 (0.195)
Trade     −0.042* (0.024) −0.037 (0.026) −0.051* (0.028)
Foreign direct 
investment (FDI)
     −0.231** (0.116) −0.152 (0.104)
Population share  
aged >65 years















Country dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 190 145 125 125 125 125 125
Adjusted R2 0.963 0.953 0.943 0.944 0.945 0.947 0.953
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
Source: Authors’ estimation based on PWT, WDI, and WIID data.
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dependent variable. The result shows a U-shaped relationship between GDP 
per  capita (in logarithm) and poverty. Since GDP per capita (in logarithm) 
ranged from 6.92 to 11.82 in our data, the estimated marginal effect of economic 
growth is always below zero, confirming that growth is good for the poor in Asia. 
Technological progress and trade exposure also helped poverty reduction. Also, 
as expected, ageing is positively related to poverty.
In addition, the unemployment rate is positively correlated with poverty 
although the coefficient is insignificant. As noted by Gustafsson and Johansson 
(1999), a weak or non-existent relationship could be attributable to income losses 
from unemployment, which are masked by unemployment benefits or by 
increased labour market activity of other family members. Nevertheless, the poor 
largely live on returns to labour rather than capital. Thus, growth with employ-
ment creation reduces poverty far more than jobless growth.
Needless to say, policy matters too. To demonstrate the relevance of policy 
measures, we take China and India as case studies. In 1986, China set up the 
Poverty Alleviation Office under the State Council, taking the overall responsibil-
ity for poverty alleviation. Early efforts targeted areas inhabited by minorities, 
remote and border regions, and revolutionary bases. In 2001, the government 
issued a document entitled ‘Outline of Poverty Alleviation and Development for 
the Rural Area (2001–2010)’ and in 2012 it issued the document ‘The Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan for Poverty Alleviation and Development for Whole Villages’. In 
India, the government proposed strategies, such as ‘The National Social Assistance 
Programme’ in 1995, ‘Indira Awaas Yojana’ in 1996, and the ‘Public Distribution 
System’, introduced in 1944, was replaced by the ‘Targeted Public Distribution 
System’ in 1997. More recently, India launched the ‘Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’ in 2005. These policies helped generate 
jobs for the poor or directly transferred income or consumption to the poor.
4. Drivers and Costs of Inequality
Inequality not only erodes the growth impact, it may directly lower growth itself. 
In this section, we first model drivers of inequality and then gauge the costs of 
inequality in terms of lost GDP and poverty that could have been reduced if 
inequality did not rise.
4.1 Drivers of Inequality
To examine the driving forces of inequality, we run a number of pooled time series 
cross-section regression analyses. The equations are specified as follows, where 
Asia denotes a dummy variable:
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
256 Asian Transformations
 
Inequality GDP GDP TFP Unemployment Urbanization
Trade
= f( , , , , ,
,
2
FDI Ageing GDP Asia GDP Asia
TFP Asia Unemployment Asia










, , )  (7)
Besides GDP, Equation (7) includes a number of socio-economic variables. 
Technological progress tends to favour capital over labour and skilled labour over 
unskilled labour—the so-called capital or skill bias. Meanwhile, as an economy 
becomes more technology and capital intensive, those with capital and skills are 
paid more. The simultaneous increases in the quantities and prices of capital and 
skill naturally raise the capital share in the national pie at the cost of the labour 
share. This leads to worsening distribution because capital income is more 
unequal than labour income (Piketty 2014) and because the capitalists and the 
skilled tend to be in the upper segment of the income ladder. To control for technical 
change, we use total factor productivity (TFP) from PWT.
The linkage between globalization and income distribution has been analysed 
extensively (Mahler  2004). From the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, exposure to 
international markets raises demand for skilled labour, causing larger wage gaps 
(Burgoon 2001). Two measures are included to account for the effect of globaliza-
tion, namely trade openness (share of import + export over GDP) and net foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows as a percentage of GDP. Also, an increase in the 
elderly dependency ratio implies less employment and fewer taxes (Lam  1997; 
Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). Meanwhile, the elderly are usually located at the 
lower part of the income ladder. Thus, ageing could lead to a rise in income 
 inequality (Lindert 1978; Repetto 1978; Razin et al. 2002). Therefore, we control 
for the percentage of population aged sixty-five years.
Finally, the unemployment rate is added to assess the impact of jobs on inequality. 
Given the urban–rural gap and different levels of inequality in rural and urban 
areas, urbanization rate is included. Data for 217 countries and the period 1965 to 
2014 are used. Except the Gini coefficient sourced from WIID and TFP from 
PWT, other variables are from World Development Indicators (WDI).
Table  10.2 presents the estimation results. For Asia, a significant inverted-U 
shape is found between GDP per capita and the Gini coefficient, confirming the 
Kuznets hypothesis, although this is not the case when a global sample is used. 
More significantly, the unemployment rate and population ageing are found to be 
associated with higher inequality, forcefully demonstrating the importance of 
jobs in containing inequality.
However, the globalization variables are insignificant, possibly because their 
impacts changed around 1980 when the current wave of globalization began, but 
limited data points for the pre-1980 period do not permit separate modelling for 
the two periods. However, we can simply plot inequality-globalization variables 
























Table 10.2 Drivers of inequality
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln(GDP per capita) −45.418** (12.155) −34.511** (13.225) −74.941*** (10.710) −73.633*** (10.133) −72.331*** (12.220) −76.151*** (12.306) −81.083*** (11.557)
Ln(GDP per capita)2 2.539** (0.710) 2.097** (0.688) 4.321*** (0.641) 4.268*** (0.614) 4.188*** (0.701) 4.404*** (0.721) 4.558*** (0.669)
TFP  −6.910 (4.346) −7.594 (3.836) −8.691* (4.128) −8.573 (4.270) −8.865 (4.433) −7.325 (4.550)
Unemployment rate   0.188** (0.072) 0.199** (0.068) 0.194** (0.069) 0.200* (0.079) 0.178* (0.086)
Urbanization    −0.103 (0.100) −0.097 (0.121) −0.074 (0.110) −0.061 (0.107)
Trade     0.004 (0.012) 0.010 (0.015) 0.007 (0.015)
FDI      −0.002 (0.002) −0.002 (0.002)
Population share  
aged >65 years
      0.573*** (0.133)
Asia × Ln(GDP  
per capita)
74.637*** (13.534) 74.770*** (15.722) 119.925*** (7.524) 115.175*** (6.633) 113.592*** (9.711) 116.420*** (9.948) 122.236*** (9.717)
Asia × Ln(GDP  
per capita)2
−3.998*** (0.754) −4.273*** (0.846) −6.752*** (0.435) −6.401*** (0.423) −6.294*** (0.559) −6.397*** (0.578) −6.601*** (0.557)
Asia × TFP  14.014*** (3.169) 20.927*** (3.341) 20.063*** (3.613) 19.813*** (3.750) 17.233** (4.874) 16.250** (4.728)
Asia × Unemployment 
rate
  −0.097 (0.109) −0.029 (0.071) −0.020 (0.083) −0.058 (0.114) −0.054 (0.124)
Asia × Urbanization    −0.014** (0.004) −0.018 (0.012) −0.025 (0.014) −0.024 (0.015)
Asia × Trade     −0.016 (0.088) −0.040 (0.076) −0.047 (0.070)
Asia × FDI      0.062 (0.041) 0.071 (0.041)
Asia × Population  
share aged >65 years
      −0.425** (0.130)
Constant 187.117*** (45.555) 132.742* (57.864) 287.351*** (42.268) 289.373*** (33.577) 284.322*** (42.595) 295.917*** (42.919) 316.460** (40.262)
Country dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1344 1106 987 982 982 960 960
Adjusted R2 0.841 0.867 0.898 0.901 0.901 0.900 0.900
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
Source: Authors’ estimation based on PWT, WDI, and WIID data.
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that both trade and FDI are positively correlated with inequality in Asian coun-
tries in both periods.
What about the effect of land reform? Land reform broadly means regulation 
of ownership, operation, leasing, sales, and inheritance of land (Ghatak and 
Roy 2007). Several countries are known to have undertaken land reform in Asia: 
China, India, Japan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam 
(see appendix C of Wan and Wang 2018). To estimate the effect of land reform on 
inequality, a dummy variable (land reform = 1) interacted with the reciprocal of 
time trend (to ensure that the impacts of land reform possibly decline over time) 
is added to Equation (7). Here, the country fixed effect must be removed, other-
wise the effect of land reform is not estimable. figure 15 of Wan and Wang (2018) 
indicates that land reform did help reduce inequality. However, this effect was 
only visible in the first few years after land reform began and it diminishes over 
time and converges to 0, much as expected.
4.2 Costs of Inequality
Inequality can be detrimental to growth (Wan et al. 2006). First, a higher inequality 
implies more individuals facing credit constraints under an imperfect capital market. 
Consequently, they cannot carry out productive investments (Galor and Zeira 
1993; Fishman and Simhon  2002). Second, worsening distribution generates a 
rise in the fertility rate among, and less investment in human capital of, the poor 
(De La Croix and Doepke 2004). Third, increasing inequality may lead to weaker 
domestic demand, constraining the economy. This is particularly relevant to Asia, 
which saves more and consumes less. Fourth, growing disparity increases the 
pressure for redistribution, deterring investment incentives (Alesina and Rodrik 
1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994). Fifth, enlarged gaps mean a more unstable socio-
political environment for economic activities (Benhabib and Rustichini 1996). 
Finally, rising inequality adversely affects crime rate and health (Li et al. 2019; Yao 
et al. 2019). Empirically, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) find that a 1 percentage point 
rise in the income share of the top 20 per cent lowers GDP growth by 0.08 per-
centage points in the following five years. On the contrary, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the income share of the bottom 20 per cent is correlated with a 0.38 
percentage point rise in economic growth.
To quantify the effect of inequality on economic growth, the following model 
can be estimated:
 
GDP per capita Gini Capital stock Human capital TFP
Sector r
= f ( , , , ,
atio Trade Gini Asia Capital stock Asia
Human capital Asia
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where sector ratio is defined as the share of value-added of the manufacturing 
industry to value-added of the primary industry (see Bourguignon and Morrisson 
1998). Other variables are self-explanatory.
Results in Table 10.3 confirm the adverse effect of inequality on GDP per capita. 
This relationship is rather robust and stable. More specifically, every 1 percentage 
point increase in the Gini coefficient leads to a decline of GDP per capita, on 
average, by US$209. Other estimation results are largely consistent with a priori 
expectations.
As discussed earlier, rising inequality means higher poverty for a given economic 
pie because transfers from the poor to the rich push more people into poverty. 
This can be defined as the poverty cost of inequality. This cost can be easily simu-
lated by holding GDP at the level in the base or current year and letting inequality 
change from the base year level to the latest level. Table 10.4 presents the results, 
in total, 248.4 million (under US$3.20 poverty line) and 145.09 million (under 
the US$1.90 poverty line) people who could have been but were not lifted out of 
poverty due to rising inequality. The cost largely came from China (212.57 million 
and 114.18 million), followed by India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.
5.  Summary and Conclusions
It is useful to note several limitations of this chapter. First, multidimensional 
poverty is not considered, largely due to data unavailability. Second, UNU-WIDER 
is working on the next version of the WIID database, which will provide more 
and better inequality estimates. One may examine the robustness of our results 
using the improved database when it becomes available. Finally, the poverty 
decomposition framework overlooks the dynamic nature of the growth–poverty–
inequality triangle. Changes in inequality may affect future growth, indirectly 
influencing poverty in subsequent years. In particular, it is possible that the higher 
the initial inequality, the smaller the effect of the same growth on poverty. How 
to incorporate these dynamics into poverty decomposition represents a topic 
for future research. Despite these limitations, some important findings and con-
clusions can be drawn from the analyses and discussions of this chapter, as 
summarized below.
Asia has experienced rapid growth in the post-Second World War period, 
where East Asia has been the star performer. Asia’s fast growth has contributed to 
significant poverty reductions in the region. According to our estimates, Asia’s 
poverty rate under the US$3.20 poverty line dropped from 73.57 per cent in 1965 
to 9.69 per cent in 2014. The corresponding decrease under the US$1.90 poverty 
line is from 48.52 per cent in 1965 to 2.58 per cent in 2014, implying eradication 
of abject poverty at the aggregate regional level under the 3 per cent threshold of 
the World Bank. At the sub-regional level, in 1965 Southeast Asia was the poorest. 
























Table 10.3 The effect of inequality on growth
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gini coefficient 108.434* (45.961) 25.289 (41.634) 38.611 (33.510) 43.223 (23.206) 43.695 (25.741) 29.962 (22.742)
Capital stock per capita  9.4e+04*** (1.2e+04) 9.3e+04*** (1.3e+04) 1.0e+05*** (9261.137) 5.3e+04*** (1.1e+04) 5.0e+04*** (6765.451)
Human capital index   −1.6e+03 (4081.721) 263.301 (3717.562) 176.738 (3897.517) −1.3e+03 (3569.102)
TFP    1.2e+04*** (2608.077) 1.1e+04*** (2628.943) 1.2e+04*** (1865.266)
Ratio of manufacturing 
industry to primary industry
    394.522*** (32.538) 346.926*** (34.701)
Trade      43.786*** (6.678)
Asia × Gini coefficient −211.995** (60.709) −137.154** (48.045) −160.447*** (33.972) −231.866*** (47.420) −223.370*** (47.829) −209.261*** (41.207)
Asia × Capital stock per capita  2.8e+04*** (3100.348) 5.3e+04** (1.8e+04) 4.6e+04** (1.8e+04) 6.5e+04*** (1.2e+04) 6.9e+04*** (1.1e+04)
Asia × Human capital index   −3.2e+03 (3517.043) −2.9e+03 (2373.827) −788.000 (2605.179) 229.355 (1470.570)
Asia × TFP    −3.8e+03 (2046.457) −3.8e+03 (2412.322) −4.2e+03** (1337.840)
Asia × Ratio of manufacturing 
industry to primary industry
    −367.360*** (37.677) −317.682*** (39.385)
Asia × Trade      −37.259** (9.935)
Constant 2.0e+04*** (1554.350) 1.5e+04*** (2053.074) 2.1e+04 (1.1e+04) 4199.864 (9355.659) 4345.825 (1.1e+04) 5266.407 (1.0e+04)
Country dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1343 1309 1224 1105 1027 1018
Adjusted R2 0.979 0.985 0.986 0.988 0.991 0.992
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.
























Table 10.4 The impact of inequality on poverty (in millions)





















poverty due to 
inequality 
change
Gini t0 Gini t1 Gini t1– 
Gini t0
Bangladesh 1973–2010 0.00 3.97 3.97 0.00 16.57 16.57 32.44 41.56 9.12
Bhutan 2003–2012 0.10 0.00 −0.10 0.06 0.00 −0.06 46.78 35.95 −10.83
China 1981–2013 0.00 212.57 212.57 0.00 114.18 114.18 31 47.3 16.3
Hong Kong 1966–2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49 48.7 −0.3
Indonesia 1984–2014 0.00 12.80 12.80 0.00 4.73 4.73 30.98 37.34 6.36
India 1965–2012 0.00 32.22 32.22 0.00 15.94 15.94 31.9 34.1 2.2
Iran 1986–2009 4.33 0.00 −4.33 2.06 0.00 −2.06 47.42 37.35 −10.07
Japan 1985–2008 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.92 36.18 0.26
Cambodia 1994–2012 1.47 0.00 −1.47 1.13 0.00 −1.13 38.5 30.76 −7.74
South Korea 1965–2012 0.58 0.00 −0.58 0.58 0.00 −0.58 37.13 30.7 −6.43
Laos 1992–2012 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.23 0.23 34.31 37.89 3.58
Sri Lanka 1973–2012 0.00 1.35 1.35 0.00 0.55 0.55 37.67 46.29 8.62
Maldives 2002–2010 0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.00 −0.01 41.31 37 −4.31
Mongolia 1995–2014 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.2 32.04 −1.16
Malaysia 1979–2014 1.39 0.00 −1.39 0.59 0.00 −0.59 51 38.23 −12.77
Nepal 1984–2010 0.00 0.58 0.58 0.00 0.99 0.99 30.06 32.84 2.78
Pakistan 1987–2013 3.96 0.00 −3.96 1.10 0.00 −1.10 33.3 30.7 −2.6
Philippines 1965–2012 4.39 0.00 −4.39 2.89 0.00 −2.89 48.78 44.77 −4.01
Singapore 1966–2011 0.04 0.00 −0.04 0.02 0.00 −0.02 49.8 47.3 −2.5
Thailand 1969–2013 1.12 0.00 −1.12 0.68 0.00 −0.68 41.95 37.85 −4.1
Taiwan 1968–2013 0.06 0.00 −0.06 0.02 0.00 −0.02 32.6 30.8 −1.8
Vietnam 1992–2014 0.00 2.06 2.06 0.00 1.06 1.06 35.65 37.59 1.94
Total — 17.47 265.86 248.40 9.17 154.26 145.09 — — —
Source: Authors’ estimation based on WIID and WDI data. 
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to end extreme poverty, became the poorest. Under the 3 per cent criterion, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong eliminated extreme poverty in the late 1960s, Singapore 
in the mid-1970s, followed by South Korea in the early 1980s, Malaysia in the late 
1990s, and Thailand and Indonesia in the new millennium. However, Asia is 
still some way away from ending moderate poverty. In 2014, there were still 
421.48 million moderately poor (with a poverty rate of 9.69 per cent) in Asia.
On the other hand, however, the fast growth has been accompanied by 
 inequality changes. For Asia as a whole, the Gini index increased from 38.43 per 
cent in 1965 to 42.80 per cent in 2006 before declining in recent years. At the 
sub-regional level, South Asia is most equal while East Asia is most unequal. 
Like the regional picture, the sub-regional inequality all exhibited an inverted-U 
pattern. Further, Asia’s inequality is mainly driven by the between-economy dis-
parities. Inequality profiles of individual economies share common trends with 
their sub-regional counterparts, notwithstanding significant heterogeneity of 
inequality trends across economies and sub-regions. In particular, inequality 
worsened significantly in the most populous countries of Asia, including China, 
India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.
Drivers of inequality include level of development, technical change, unemploy-
ment, urbanization, globalization, and ageing. In particular, unemployment and 
ageing are found to be positively associated with higher inequality, forcefully 
demonstrating the importance of employment in containing inequality. Regarding 
poverty drivers, it is not surprising to find that growth led to poverty reduction 
but this benign impact is found to have diminished as economies grow. That is, a 
same 1 percentage point of growth led to less and less poverty reduction over time—
a typical phenomenon of ‘ripping the low-hanging fruits first’. Other poverty-
reducing factors include technological progress and trade exposure. Ageing and 
unemployment are also found to be positively correlated with poverty, once again 
demonstrating the importance of employment in fighting poverty.
Despite its recent declines, rises in inequality had cost Asia dearly. Modelling 
results in our chapter indicate that every 1 percentage point increase in the Gini 
coefficient led to a decline of GDP per capita by US$209 on average. The cost of 
inequality also includes offsetting the benign effect of growth on poverty: a 
higher initial inequality is associated with smaller impacts on poverty of subse-
quent growths. In total, 248.4 million (under the US$3.20 poverty line) and 
145.09 million (under the US$1.90 poverty line) Asians could have been lifted 
out of poverty but were not, due to rising inequality in the region. This cost 
largely came from China (212.57 million and 114.18 million), followed by 
India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.
Looking ahead, regardless of the ongoing de-globalization tide and possible 
clashes between the old and new global powers, growth of India is expected to 
accelerate and growth of China may re-accelerate (Lin et al. 2016), both providing 
major impetus for continuous development in Asia and beyond. The expected 
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growth is likely to lead to future declines in inequality, based on our confirming 
the applicability of the Kuznets curve in Asia. Both the continued growth and 
predicted improvement in income distribution will lead to further poverty 
reduction in the region (see appendix B of Wan and Wang (2018) for more 
details), holding other things constant. According to our baseline projection, the 
moderate poverty rate could decline to 9.4 per cent in 2015, below 3 per cent in 
2028, and 0.6 per cent in 2040. Appendix B of Wan and Wang (2018) also provides 
alternative inequality and poverty projections, depending on the different growth 
scenarios that are assumed.
Nevertheless, Asia should not be complaisant with the growth prospect and 
the declining trend in inequality. As the benign growth impact diminishes, the 
adverse impact of inequality on poverty will gain more importance. Moreover, 
inequality could undermine growth and the cost of inequality in terms of lost 
growth and poverty reduction is quite substantial in Asia.
Apart from confirming the inequality-reducing role of land reform and 
 inequality-rising role of globalization, this chapter concludes that technical change 
is one of the most important drivers of inequality. Consequently, Asia should 
remain on high alert as artificial intelligence, big data, and information and com-
munications technology (ICT) continue to advance, displacing manual labour 
and benefitting the skilled and the capitalists. How to generate jobs and reverse or 
at least halt the declining labour share in national income is a formidable challenge 
facing policymakers in Asia and beyond (Piketty 2014). On the other hand, these 
technology progresses may be used to help fight poverty and lower inequality. For 
example, ‘accurate poverty reduction’ recently invented and adopted in China 
relies on big data and ICT for poverty targeting and monitoring among others, 
which can be more effective than traditional modality of policy interventions.
Another finding worth reiteration is the role of employment in lowering  inequality 
and poverty. This appeals for more public resources on education and training, 
upgrading the skills and enhancing the human capital of the disadvantaged. Closely 
related to this is the challenge of ageing, which directly reduces labour supply and 
worsens poverty. Postponing the retirement age and strategic retraining of older 
workers ought to be added urgently to the policy agenda of relevant governments.
It can be said that inequality plays a pivotal role in disentangling the growth–
inequality–poverty triangle. While market may be most efficient in discovering 
prices for resource and output allocations, these allocations need not be optimal 
for maximizing social welfare. Thus, governments must step in when it comes to 
solving the distributional issue. However, the conventional wisdom of relying on 
fiscal tools has been proven to be insufficient. Measures or interventions at the 
stage of primary distribution must be considered. From this perspective, ground-
breaking theories and practice (such as the basic income guarantee) are needed to 
raise the returns to labour relative to capital and raise the returns to the less 
skilled relative to the highly skilled.
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The transformation of Asia’s education and health profile over the past fifty years 
has been breathtaking. Myrdal (1968) had not expected this. Comparing the 
countries of Asia1 with the developed countries, Myrdal noted several disadvan-
tages in the initial conditions prevailing in Asia. That led him to believe that 
development of the social system in Asia, including health and education, would 
be very challenging.
We now see that his assessment was overly pessimistic. Asia transformed at an 
unprecedented pace despite the disadvantages of its initial conditions. Ironically, 
social development has been the most striking in East Asia, a sub-region he 
unfortunately excluded from his canvas (World Bank  1993; ADB  1997; Sen 
1998a). However, Asia’s experience has fully validated Myrdal’s ‘institutional 
approach’ of seeing development as the upward movement of a social system 
through circular causation of all its constitutive elements. Several key constraints 
he had identified and the consequences he had anticipated are very much in evi-
dence today.
The central idea of the institutional approach, as Myrdal put it, ‘is that history 
and politics, theories and ideologies, economic structures and levels, social stratifi-
cation, agriculture and industry, population developments, health and education, 
and so on, must be studied not in isolation but in their mutual relationship’.2 
Myrdal described this process as development of the social system as distinct 
from the narrower concept of economic development that primarily focuses on 
the rise in per capita income.
Three aspects of this approach are particularly important for this chapter. First, 
initial conditions, that is, elements of the social system, lay down the boundaries 
of what is possible (Myrdal  1968: chapter  14). Second, education and health—
investment in man as Myrdal called it—were central to his conception of 
1 Myrdal’s study was limited to countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia. He called the whole 
region South Asia and referred to today’s South Asia as either the Indian subcontinent or ‘India and 
Pakistan’. The coverage of this chapter is limited to mainland Asia, excluding West Asia, the Central 
Asian republics and island economies of the Indo-Pacific region.
2 Myrdal (1968: preface).
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development (Myrdal 1968: vol. III). Third, in the process of cumulative  causation 
the spread of education and healthcare are to be seen not in isolation but in 
their relationship with all the other elements of the social system (Myrdal 1968: 
appendix 2).
This chapter traces the spread of education and healthcare in Asia during the 
past fifty years through a similar methodological lens. After the Second World 
War, new postcolonial states came to power across much of Asia. Most were 
‘developmental states’ aspiring to lead the transformation of their countries into 
developed societies at the quickest possible time.3 Development of education and 
health services were important components of this agenda. This was partly 
because of their intrinsic value in improving the quality of life, as was recognized 
by Myrdal (1968) and much emphasized subsequently by Sen (1998a, 1999). But 
possibly more importantly it was because political leaders of the time recognized 
the instrumental value of education and health for promoting growth, the human 
capital relationship that was originally highlighted in modern economic literature 
by Schultz (1961) and later incorporated in the endogenous growth theories of 
the 1990s (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Pack 1994; Romer 1994).4
There were differences in the initial conditions under which development 
 programmes were launched in different countries, including differences in levels 
of income, the nature of the postcolonial states and the specific policies they 
 followed. By the late 1960s there were already large differences in the education 
and health status of different Asian countries. There were also large differences in 
the pace of their subsequent development. Social development in South Asia 
lagged behind social development in Southeast Asia, which lagged behind social 
development in East Asia, with some important exceptions to this general pattern.
Trends common to most countries are discussed in this chapter, along with the 
variations across countries. Section 2 presents a comparative analysis of the spread 
of education across countries along with some country experiences. Section  3 
presents a similar comparative analysis of trends in health conditions across 
countries and some country experiences.5 Section 4 pulls together the threads of 
the analysis to draw some conclusions, admittedly tentative, on why the social 
development outcomes of different countries/sub-regions in Asia have differed 
3 Chalmers Johnson (1982) originally formulated the concept of a ‘developmental state’ in the con-
text of Japan. He contrasted the ‘plan rational’ state which led state-guided capitalist development to 
the Western liberal concept of the ‘market rational’ state that enabled market-led capitalist development. 
The concept was subsequently applied to South Korea (henceforth Korea) and Taiwan by Amsden 
(1989) and Wade (1990) among others. A large body of literature has since emerged applying the con-
cept to other countries, the central idea being that of key state actors committed to the goal of rapid 
development. Accelerated industrialization and industrial policy aimed at achieving global competi-
tiveness in selected industries were core components of their strategies. But, typically, their goal was a 
wider agenda of comprehensive national development (Wade 2018b).
4 On the relationship between education, human capital formation, and growth in a specifically 
Asian context see Tilak (2002).
5 More detailed country experiences are presented in appendices 1 and 2 of Mundle (2018b). These 
accounts capture the rich variety of country experiences across the whole region.
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widely. Based on these conclusions some speculations are offered about possible 
trends during the next twenty-five years.
2. The Spread of Education
2.1 The Observed Trends Across Countries
A quantitative picture of the spread of education is presented in Tables  11.1 
and 11.2.6 The spread of primary education is best captured by the net primary 
enrolment rate (PER), which corrects for enrolment of children older than the 
normal primary education age cohort. By 1971, most countries in East Asia, the 
richest sub-region, had already achieved a near universal PER (>95 per cent). 
China is the only country in the sub-region that experienced some regression. 
Net primary enrolment in China rose to 94 per cent by 1987 then regressed to 
89 per cent (2014).
In South Asia, the poorest sub-region and demographically the largest, PERs in 
1971 were among the lowest in Asia, amounting to only 60 per cent, 50 per cent 
or even less.7 But the rates have improved significantly in all South Asian coun-
tries over the past fifty years. Bangladesh, India and Nepal are approaching near 
universal PERs now (2014). Sri Lanka is a remarkable positive outlier, having 
achieved a net PER of over 78 per cent by 1977 and a near universal PER by 1985. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are still a long way away from this milestone, but enrol-
ment rates have improved significantly in both countries.
PER trends in the countries of Southeast Asia lie between the trends in East 
and South Asia, with large variations around this general pattern. A near universal 
PER had already been achieved by 1971 in Singapore and soon thereafter in the 
Philippines (1976) and Vietnam (1977). But 1971 PERs were quite low in Lao PDR 
and Myanmar.8 Most countries in the sub-region had achieved near universal 
net  PER by 2014. The exception is Indonesia, where the net PER has regressed to 
89 per cent after having peaked at 98 per cent in 1985.
The robustness of enrolment trends has been checked against trends in primary 
completion rates (PCRs)9 since dropouts can be quite significant in low per capita 
income countries. In some countries the initial PCR was very low but increased 
rapidly over the next fifty years. In other countries the PCR was already high 
in  1971. In China, the PCR in 2014 was lower than in 1987, similar to the 
6 The years 1971, 1985, 2000, and 2014 in the Tables are approximate benchmarks. For some coun-
tries the data refer to the years nearest to these benchmark years for which they are available. Details 
are given in the notes to Tables 11.1 and 11.2.
7 Afghanistan, for instance, had a net PER of only 27% reported in 1974.
8 No estimate is available for Cambodia until 2000.
9 The PCR is the ratio of the number of students at the end of the final primary year, net of students 
repeating the year, to the size of the corresponding age cohort. It does not net out students older than 
























Table 11.1 Primary education
Country Population 
(millions)
Per capita  
GNI (at 
current  
prices in  
US dollars)





parity index  
(GPI)





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
2016 2014 1971 1985 2000 2014 1971 2014 1970 1985 2000 2014 1971 2014
East Asia 1,559.9 10,827 98.3 94.7 90.2 90.1 0.9 1.0 102.4 102.1 86.5 96.8 1.0 1.0
Japan 127.0 39,195 99.3 99.4 97.8 98.3 1.0e 1.0f 105.1g 99.4 102.4 102.1j 1.0 1.0l
Republic of Korea 51.2 28,099 95.9 98.6 99.0 94.6 1.0 1.0f 96.0g 105.2 103.6 96.5 1.0 1.0
Mongolia 3.0 3,842 – 94.4b 90.0 95.1 1.0e 1.0 95.7g 98.0h 87.0 98.3j – 1.0
China 1,378.7 7,588 – 94.1b 89.1c 89.1 0.9e 1.0f – 102.2h 84.4i 96.3 – 1.0
Southeast Asia 638.2 4,034 79.7 95.4 93.3 93.0 0.9 1.0 56.5 87.6 92.2 100.3 0.8 1.0
Singapore 5.6 55,107 – 96.1b 95.7 99.9d 0.9e 1.0 95.1 – – 98.7 1.0k –
Malaysia 31.2 10,814 86.7 97.2b 98.4 99.6 0.9e 1.0f 80.6g 93.9 100.6 101.9 0.9k 1.0
Philippines 103.3 3,445 96.8a 94.4 89.5c 95.7d – 1.0f – 89.2 100.4i 101.0 – 1.1l
Thailand 68.9 5,633 75.5a – 98.9c 90.9 0.9 1.0 37.5g 71.4h 84.9 93.3 – 0.9l
Vietnam 92.7 1,916 97.3a 91.1 97.2 98.0d 1.0e – 81.5g – 99.0 106.2 – 1.0
Indonesia 261.1 3,484 70.1 97.8 92.0c 88.9 0.9 1.0 51.9g 94.2 93.8i 102.9 – 0.9
Cambodia 15.8 1,032 – – 92.4 95.1 0.8 1.0 – 46.0h 51.1i 96.3 – 1.0
Myanmar 52.9 1,272 63.7 – 92.2 96.2 0.9 1.0f 35.7g – 76.5 85.1 0.7 1.0l
Lao PDR 6.8 1,929 – 64.9b 75.6 97.2 0.6 1.0 – 42.1 67.5 100.3 – 1.0
South Asia 1,765.2 1,500 59.7 74.7 78.7 89.9 0.6 1.0 35.0 58.6 69.8 93.2 0.5 1.3
























India 1,324.2 1,557 61.4 77.5b 79.8 92.3d 0.7 1.0f 39.7g 63.2h 71.8 97.5 0.5 1.1
Bangladesh 163.0 1,158 50.8a 61.1 91.7c 90.5d 0.5e 1.0f 43.3g 28.5h 64.4i 98.5j 0.5k 1.2l
Pakistan 193.2 1,418 – – 58.9c 72.7 0.4 0.9 – – 64.5i 73.7 – 0.8
Nepal 29.0 709 – 60.6b 72.7 94.1 0.2e 1.0 – 46.9h 67.2 104.1 – 1.1
Afghanistan 34.7 657 27.1a 28.2b – 85.7 0.2e – 16.8g 19.2 29.6i – 0.2k –
Notes: Data are sorted with respect to mean years of schooling in 2014.
Some figures are not for the exact same year mentioned in the Table. Details are given below.
a Afghanistan 1974; Bangladesh 1970; Philippines 1976; Sri Lanka 1977; Thailand 1973; Vietnam 1977.
b  Afghanistan 1993; China 1987; India 1990; Lao PDR 1988; Malaysia 1994; Mongolia 1987; Nepal 1984; Singapore 1990 (from data.gov.sg); Sri Lanka 1986. Earliest 
available data for Cambodia are for 1997 and the value of NER at primary level was 83.12.
c Bangladesh 2005; China 1997; Indonesia 2001; Pakistan 2002; Philippines 2001; Sri Lanka 2001; Thailand 2006; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
d Bangladesh 2010; India 2013; Philippines 2015; Singapore 2016; Vietnam 2013.
e  Afghanistan 1974; Bangladesh 1970; China 1976; Japan 1972; Malaysia 1970; Mongolia 1975; Nepal 1970; Singapore 1970; Sri Lanka 1970; Thailand 1973; Vietnam 1976. 
Data collected from Econstat for Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.
f  Bangladesh 2010; China 2007; India 2013; Japan 2013; Korea Republic 2013; Malaysia 2006; Myanmar 2010; Philippines 2013. Data collected from Econstat for Cambodia, 
China and Malaysia. Data for Singapore collected from data.gov.sg.
g  Afghanistan 1974; Bangladesh 1976; India 1971; Indonesia 1972; Japan 1971; Korea, Rep. 1971; Malaysia 1974; Mongolia 1978; Myanmar 1971; Thailand 1975; Vietnam 1979.
h Bangladesh 1981; Cambodia 1994; China 1989; India 1987; Mongolia 1983; Nepal 1988; Thailand 1981.
i Afghanistan 1993; Bangladesh 2005; Cambodia 2001; China 2004; Indonesia 2001; Pakistan 2005; Philippines 2001; Sri Lanka 2001.
j Bangladesh 2015; Japan 2012; Mongolia 2015; Philippines 2013; Thailand 2015.
k Afghanistan 1974; Bangladesh 1976; Malaysia 1974; Singapore 1975 (collected from Econstat).
l Bangladesh 2015; Japan 2012; Myanmar 2010; Philippines 2013; Thailand 2015.
Region
East Asia: Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and China.
Southeast Asia: Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR.
South Asia: Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Afghanistan.
Regional averages are calculated by applying the population share.
























Table 11.2 Secondary and tertiary education

















Mean years of  
schooling  
(primary or higher)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
1971 1985 2000 2014 1971 2014 1971 1985 2000 2014 1971 1985 2000 2014 1971 2014 1971 1985 2000 2014
East Asia 42.0 38.7 65.6 95.1 0.7 1.0 82.4 57.6 79.7 98.3 1.8 5.6 13.4 43.2 0.5 1.1 – 4.6 6.7 7.6
Japan 86.5 94.9 101.8 101.7 1.0 1.0 98.5 99.4 103.2i – 17.6 29.0 48.7 63.4 0.4 0.9 – 9.6 10.7 12.5
Republic of 
Korea
39.7 90.6 98.4 98.5 0.6 1.0 44.4 96.5 98.2 100.1 7.2 31.6 78.4 94.2 0.3 0.8 5.4 9.4 10.7 11.6s
Mongolia 64.0 87.5b 65.1 91.5d 1.0e 1.0f 52.7g 84.6h 62.7 106.6j 21.0 23.8 30.2 64.3 – 1.4 – 7.7q 9.0 10.0s
China 38.0 31.4 61.0 94.3 0.7e 1.0 – 52.3h 76.9i 98.2 0.1k 2.5 7.7 39.4 0.5o 1.2 – 4.0q 6.2 7.0s
Southeast Asia 26.3 39.5 57.7 83.9 0.7 1.0 13.9 40.3 66.3 83.9 5.0 10.4 18.8 32.3 0.6 1.2 3.4 4.2 6.8 7.9
Singapore – 95.1b 98.7 108.1 – 1.0 – – – – 6.5k 23.5 45.3m 86.6 0.4o 1.1 – 3.9q 10.5r 11.3
Malaysia 35.2 53.7 66.2 77.7 0.7 1.1 – 90.8h 87.7 84.7 3.9k 5.6 25.7 27.6 0.6o 1.5 4.0 4.0q 8.6 10.1s
Philippines 47.5 67.2 74.7c 88.4d – 1.1f – 66.0h 67.7i 82.2j 17.6 27.8 30.3m 35.8 1.3 1.3 5.0 6.3 7.7 9.1s
Thailand 18.1 30.6 62.8c 127.7 0.7 1.0 23.0g – 81.3i 84.0j 2.9 20.7 34.9 52.5 0.7o 1.3 2.8 3.7q 7.2r 8.3
Vietnam 35.9 34.8b 57.8c 78.4d 1.0e – 11.4g – 68.3 93.8 1.7k 1.9l 9.4 30.5 0.7o 1.0 6.3 6.3q 4.0r 7.8s
Indonesia 18.6 34.3 55.1 82.5 0.6 1.0 12.9 38.8 69.1i 91.2j 2.9 6.1 14.9 31.1 0.4o 1.1 2.3 3.1q 7.8 7.8
Cambodia 8.4 27.8b 17.2 45.1d 0.4 0.9f – – 17.4i 45.1 1.4 0.3 2.5 13.1n 0.3o 0.8p – 5.2 5.7 5.8s
Myanmar 20.1 23.1 36.3 51.3 0.6 1.0 12.9 – 32.6 48.7 1.7 4.8 10.6 13.5n 0.6o 1.2p 1.4 2.7q 3.1 4.7
Lao PDR 3.7 21.3 34.2 57.2 0.4 0.9 1.4 22.0h 35.3 53.9 0.2 1.5 2.7 17.3 0.2 0.9 – 2.5 3.9 4.6
South Asia 22.7 33.5 42.5 69.5 0.4 1.0 20.3 42.0 50.8 79.0 4.2 5.3 8.1 22.2 0.3 1.0 1.3 2.1 4.2 5.3
Sri Lanka 48.3 61.1 76.5c 99.7d 1.1e 1.0f 37.6 73.7 89.4i 96.2 1.1 3.7 4.8 19.3 0.7 1.3 4.7 5.7q 10.5r 10.9
























Bangladesh 20.5a 20.1 48.1 63.5d 0.3e 1.1f – – 53.2 67.6j 2.1k 5.0 5.4 13.4 0.1o 0.7 1.1 2.1q 4.2r 5.2
Pakistan 16.7 19.6 22.9c 41.6 0.3 0.8 – – 33.4i 50.5 2.3 3.0l 2.7m 10.4 0.3 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.7r 5.2
Nepal 11.1a 26.8 36.0 66.9 0.2e 1.1 – 31.6h 42.7 82.8 1.6k 3.4 4.2 15.8 0.3o 1.0p 0.2 0.6q 2.4 3.3s
Afghanistan 9.4 13.5 13.0c 55.7 0.1 0.6 9.7g 13.6 17.0i – 0.9 2.2l 1.3m 8.7 0.2o 0.3 0.7 0.8q 2.1 3.1s
Notes: Data are sorted with respect to mean years of schooling in 2014.
Some figures are not for the exact same year mentioned in the Table. Details are given below.
a Bangladesh 1973; Nepal 1972; Vietnam 1976.
b Cambodia 1991; India 1986; Mongolia 1986; Singapore 1990 (from data.gov.sg); Vietnam 1990.
c Afghanistan 2001; Pakistan 2003; Philippines 2001; Sri Lanka 1995; Thailand 2001; Vietnam 1998; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
d Bangladesh 2015; Cambodia 2008; Mongolia 2015; Philippines 2013; Sri Lanka 2013; Singapore (from data.gov.sg); Vietnam (data for 2008 from London 2011).
e Bangladesh 1973; China 1976; Mongolia 1974; Nepal 1972; Sri Lanka 1976; Vietnam 1976.
f Bangladesh 2015; Cambodia 2008; Mongolia 2015; Philippines 2013; Sri Lanka 2013; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
g Afghanistan 1973; Mongolia 1974; Thailand 1975; Vietnam 1979.
h China 1990; India 1987; Lao PDR 1988; Malaysia 1998; Mongolia 1980; Nepal 1988; Philippines 1990.
i Afghanistan 2005; Cambodia 1997; China 1997; India 2002; Indonesia 2002; Japan 1994; Pakistan 2004; Philippines 2001; Sri Lanka 2001; Thailand 2007.
j Bangladesh 2013; Indonesia 2015; Mongolia 2010; Philippines 2014; Thailand 2015.
k Bangladesh 1970; China 1970; Malaysia 1979; Nepal 1974; Singapore 1970; Vietnam 1976.
l Afghanistan 1986; Pakistan 1986; Vietnam 1986; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
m Afghanistan 2003; Myanmar 2001; Pakistan 2003; Philippines 2001; Sri Lanka 1994; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
n Cambodia 2015; Myanmar 2012; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
o  Afghanistan 1972; Bangladesh 1972; Cambodia 1972; China 1974; Indonesia 1972; Malaysia 1979; Myanmar 1972; Nepal 1976; Singapore 1970; Thailand 1976; Vietnam 1976.
p Cambodia 2015; Myanmar 2012; Nepal 2015; Singapore (from data.gov.sg).
q  Afghanistan 1979; Bangladesh 1981; China 1982; India 1981; Indonesia 1980; Malaysia 1980; Mongolia 1990; Myanmar 1983; Nepal 1981; Singapore 1980; Sri Lanka 1981; Thailand 1980; 
Vietnam 1979. Data collected from the Human Development Report (UNHDR) for Cambodia, Japan, Lao PDR, and Mongolia.
r  Bangladesh 2001; Pakistan 2005; Singapore 2005; Sri Lanka 2001; Thailand 2004; Vietnam 1989. Data collected from the Human Development Report (UNHDR) for Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Japan, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Nepal.
s  Afghanistan 2012; Cambodia 2012; China 2010; India 2011; Republic of Korea 2010; Malaysia 2010; Mongolia 2010; Nepal 2011; Philippines 2013; Vietnam 2009. Data collected from the 
Human Development Report (UNHDR) for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Japan, and Lao PDR.
Region
East Asia: Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and China.
Southeast Asia: Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR.
South Asia: Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Afghanistan.
Regional averages are calculated by applying the population share.
Source: Author, based on data from the World Development Indicators Database and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (Education Dataset).
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regression in PER noted earlier. But it bottomed out in 2004 and is now recovering. 
This is discussed further below.10 In Indonesia, another country that  experienced 
regression, the PCR has now gone up to over 100 per cent after having regressed 
slightly in 2001.
Secondary gross enrolment rates (GERs) were much lower than PERs through-
out Asia in 1971 (Table 11.2).11 But by 2014 East Asia had achieved a near universal 
secondary GER at 94 per cent. Secondary enrolment had also increased very sig-
nificantly by 2014 in Southeast Asia and South Asia at 85 per cent and 70 per cent 
respectively. But there are large variations around these averages. In Southeast 
Asia it ranges from only 45 per cent in Cambodia to 128 per cent in Thailand. In 
South Asia it ranges from 42 per cent in Pakistan to 100 per cent in Sri Lanka.
Completion of basic education, six years of primary education plus two years 
of lower-secondary education, is an important milestone since many countries 
have mandated eight years of compulsory basic education. Streaming of students 
between ‘academic’ education at higher secondary and tertiary levels and 
 technical and vocational education (TVE) also begins at this stage, setting the 
boundaries of their life chances for the future. East Asia had achieved a near 
universal lower-secondary completion rate of 98 per cent by 2014. The countries 
of Southeast Asia and South Asia were not too far behind with 84 per cent and 
79 per cent respectively. But again, there are large variations around these aver-
ages. It ranges from 45 per cent in Cambodia to 100 per cent in Singapore in 
Southeast Asia, and from only 17 per cent in Afghanistan to 96 per cent in Sri 
Lanka in South Asia.
Barring a couple of countries, the general trend of access to primary and sec-
ondary education in Asia is one of convergence. The countries of Southeast Asia 
and South Asia have been catching up with East Asia. The tertiary enrolment rate 
(TER) picture is different. Starting from negligible levels in 1971, the TER in East 
Asia went up to 41 per cent by 2014. Southeast Asia and South Asia had some-
what higher TERs initially (Table 11.2) but were then left behind by East Asia. 
The average TERs in Southeast Asia and South Asia are 32 per cent and 22 per cent 
respectively.
As usual there are large variations around these sub-regional averages. In East 
Asia, Korea has achieved a near universal TER. In Southeast Asia, Singapore has a 
very high TER of 87 per cent. Philippines already had a high TER of 18 per cent 
in 1971 and this has risen further to 36 per cent. Cambodia and Myanmar on 
the other hand have TERs of only 13 per cent. In South Asia, India had a TER of 
10 See also the China country note in Mundle (2018b: appendix 1).
11 This is despite the fact that we are comparing gross enrolment rates at the secondary level with 
net enrolment rates at the primary level, which are by definition lower than gross rates. Unfortunately 
net enrolment data comparable across countries are not available at the secondary or tertiary levels. 
Since the numerator in gross enrolment rates does not correct for enrolment of students older than 
the age cohort used for the denominator, gross enrolment rates can sometimes exceed 100%.
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5 per cent in 1971 that has now risen to 26 per cent.12 At the other end, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan have TERs of only 10 per cent and 9 per cent respectively.
There was significant gender disparity in PERs and PCRs in the initial period 
in many countries, especially in South Asia. However, these had been largely 
eliminated by 2014 (Table 11.1). The picture is very similar for gender disparity 
in secondary enrolment rates (SERs) and TERs (Table 11.2). The exception is 
Afghanistan, where there was considerable gender disparity in 1974 in the PER 
and PCR. Afghanistan being a post-conflict country with patchy information, 
more recent data on PER or PCR is not available. But estimates available for SER 
and TER indicate that significant gender disparity still persists.
The quality of education is much harder to assess. The standardized global test 
Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA) conducted by the OECD 
enables some limited cross-country comparisons of education quality (OECD 
2018). Unfortunately, only six Asian countries participated in the latest 2015 PISA 
test for mathematics, science, and reading—China, Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. Malaysia did participate but was not rated because it did not 
meet the required testing standards. India participated in the 2009 test, performed 
very poorly, being ranked near the bottom, and then pulled out of the tests.
Of the participating Asian countries, Singapore was ranked 1st among seventy-
seven countries in mathematics, science and also reading. Korea was another 
high performer, ranked 7th, 11th, and 7th in mathematics, science, and reading 
respectively. China was ranked 6th in mathematics, 10th in science, and 27th in 
reading. But it has been pointed out that it was represented by the provinces of 
Jiangsu, Guangdong, Beijing, and Shanghai, which are more advanced than most 
other Chinese provinces and therefore not representative. Vietnam also performed 
above average, being ranked at 22, 8, and 32 respectively for the three tests. 
Thailand performed below average with ranks of 55, 56, and 59. Indonesia’s 
 performance was near the bottom with ranks of 65, 64, and 66 in mathematics, 
science, and reading.
We cannot generalize about education quality in Asia from the results of 
just  the six participating Asian countries. However, the non-participation in 
 international quality tests itself indicates that most Asian countries have given 
priority to the quantity of education supply rather than its quality. This is also 
confirmed by individual country studies.
2.2 Key Experiences of Selected Countries
The education experiences of a large number of individual countries have been 
summarized in Mundle (2018b: appendix 1). Here only some of the key  experiences 
12 On this see the India country note in Mundle (2018b: appendix 1).
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of a few selected countries are presented to animate the quantitative picture 
 presented above.
2.2.1 The Best Performers: Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka
Korea’s education policy priorities gradually shifted from primary to secondary 
to tertiary education as it developed (Mundle 1998). Another notable feature is its 
focus on cost efficiency, based on high pupil–teacher ratios, control of teacher 
salaries, etc. Despite Korea’s high public education expenditure, resource con-
straints and rising costs have led to increasing dependence on private provision 
and private spending. That has, in turn, led to rising inequality in access to both 
higher secondary and higher education.
Singapore’s special feature in education policy is the public financing and pro-
vision of education as a merit good, all the way up to tertiary education, and the 
emphasis on quality through teacher excellence. It is possibly the only country where 
teacher salaries are comparable to those of doctors, lawyers, and engineers.
Vietnam and Sri Lanka stand out because of their excellent education 
 performance despite their low levels of per capita income. Education development 
proceeded in Vietnam only after the war ended in 1975, but it has made remarkable 
progress since then. Its performance in PISA quality tests is already above average. 
However, despite its rapid growth, public spending has not kept pace with the 
spread of education. There is increasing dependence on private spending, leading 
to increasing disparity in access to education between rich and poor regions, 
rural and urban areas, and rich and poor households. Sri Lanka’s most notable 
policy feature is the public financing of education as a merit good, all the way up 
to university.
2.2.2 The Weakest Performers: Afghanistan and Pakistan
Afghanistan’s education system collapsed during the 1980s in the wake of the 
civil war. The worst period was during the Taliban rule of 1996–2001, when 
misogyny peaked. That is still evident in the gender disparity reported in 
Tables 11.1 and 11.2. Supported by external donors, the present government is 
attempting to rebuild the education system, with public provision of free, com-
pulsory education for eight years.
Pakistan is the worst performer in Asia after Afghanistan. The country has 
been ruled for many years by a military dictatorship, which retains effective power 
even during periods of civilian rule. Education has evidently been a low priority. 
It remains to be seen whether this will change under the recently elected civilian 
government.
2.2.3 The Largest Countries: China, India, and Indonesia
China’s education policy since 1977 has been based on the three pillars of 
 decentralization, market orientation, and mass higher education. Decentralization, 
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combined with the ‘private responsibility’ system in agriculture, led to the  collapse 
of the primary education system and eventually a decline in primary enrolment 
(Table 11.1). The village government responsible for delivering primary education 
no longer had the resources to do so after the reforms. Primary education is now 
recovering after being reassigned to the county government. The combination of 
decentralization and market orientation, that is, private provision and private 
spending, has also led to growing disparity between rich and poor provinces, 
rural and urban areas, and between rich and poor households. Finally, China has 
ring-fenced an education system for especially meritorious students13 from ‘key’ 
schools to 100 higher education institutions (Project 211) and a few world-class 
universities (Project 985). This has created another dimension of disparity between 
elite students and the rest.
India’s education policy is striking for its elitist bias, the high priority given to 
higher education instead of universal primary and secondary education. This 
 situation has improved following the Right to Education Act of 2009, which man-
dates universal free education for eight years. However, the focus on expanding 
quantity has led to severe neglect of quality. Annual surveys show that learning 
outcomes are abysmally low and have declined over time.
Indonesia’s education services witnessed a massive expansion during 1975–
1987, aimed at providing universal primary education. A wave of decentralization 
reforms followed since 2000 that empowered the local bureaucracy to deliver 
 primary education. The constitutional amendment of 2002, earmarking 20 per cent 
of government spending for education, was another remarkable move. It has 
greatly improved access to education, especially among poor children. However, 
quality has been a casualty, stemming largely from poor teacher quality and the 
incapacity of the local bureaucracy. Inequality in access to secondary and tertiary 
education, accentuated by differences of gender, ethnicity, or location is the other 
major challenge.
2.3 The Spread of Education: Stylized Facts and Major Challenges
In summary the spread of education in Asia during the past fifty years has been 
dramatic. It has been mostly led by postcolonial developmental states as part of 
their strategies of development.14 Initial conditions varied, as did the motives and 
capacities of the governments, and so did the pace of education development. 
However, the similarities in patterns of change are more striking than the differ-
ences. The principal goal was to increase the access to education, and universalize 
access to primary education. Barring Afghanistan and Pakistan, all others have 
now achieved this goal. The access to secondary education has also seen vast 
increases throughout the region. Many countries, especially in East Asia, have 
13 Though reports suggest that children of rich parents also manage to slip inside the fence.
14 That includes Thailand, which was never formally colonized but was very much a part of the 
colonial system.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































achieved near universal access to secondary education while a few others have 
lagged behind. Many countries of the region have also achieved very significant 
expansion of tertiary education. Moreover, as the leading countries have approached 
the limits of improvement, the lagging countries have been catching up.15 There is 
a tendency towards convergence.
An important aspect of Asia’s education development experience is the tension 
between resource requirements and resource availability. Several countries have 
significantly raised the education share of government spending, but usually this 
has not been enough. Most countries, barring Singapore and Sri Lanka, have seen 
the rapid growth of private spending. This has generated a pattern of nested dis-
parities in the access to education: disparity between more and less prosperous 
regions, disparity between rural and urban areas within each region, and disparity 
between rich and poor households within rural and urban areas.16 Another major 
challenge is the quality of education. Asian governments have mostly focused on 
quantitative expansion at the expense of quality. Several countries are now begin-
ning to address the problem of poor quality.
Finally, many Asian governments recognize that the content of education 
needs to be completely overhauled for the emerging knowledge-based society of 
the twenty-first century. But for most Asian countries, barring Singapore, Korea, 
China, and Vietnam, a knowledge-based society remains an aspiration not an 
operational goal.
3. The Spread of Health Services
3.1 The Observed Trends Across Countries
The improvement in Asia’s health profile during the past fifty years has been 
remarkable. There were differences among individual countries in their initial 
conditions and the pace of change has varied. But large improvements in health 
conditions have been registered in all countries of the region.
These changes are tracked using a set of demographic indicators (Table 11.3) and 
a set of nutrition and anthropometric indicators (Table 11.4).17 Life  expectancy is 
taken as the principal indicator of health conditions. Sen (1998b) has suggested that 
this is, in fact, the true measure of a country’s economic success. Life expectancy 
15 There are obviously upper limits to these quantitative indicators. Net enrolment rates (NERs) 
cannot exceed 100%.
16 This is evident in the countries discussed in Mundle (2018b: appendix 1). Several studies con-
firm this also for other Asian countries. See, for instance, Government of Malaysia (2013), Sagarik 
(2014), Saw and Schneider (2015) and UNESCO (2013).
17 Comparisons across sub-regions or individual countries need to be interpreted with caution 
because data are not available for some countries for the indicated benchmark years. In such cases the 































prices in  
US dollars)
Life expectancy at  
birth, total (years)
Gender parity index 
(GPI) of life expectancy 
at birth (years)
Infant mortality rate  
(per 1,000 live births)
Maternal mortality rate 
(modelled estimate, per 
100,000 live births)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
2016 2014 1970 1985 2000 2015 1970 1985 2000 2015 1970 1985 2000 2015 1990 2000 2014
East Asia 1,559.9 10,827 60.21 69.18 72.84 76.93 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.05 74.13 38.78 27.18 8.42 87.92 52.91 25.72
Japan 127.0 39,195 72.0 77.7 81.1 83.8 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.08 13.4 5.5 3.3 2.0 14 10 6
Korea, Rep. 51.2 28,099 62.0 68.5 75.8 82.2 1.12 1.13 1.10 1.08 48.0 20.7 6.4 3.0 21 16 12
China 1,378.7 7,588 59.1 68.5 72.0 76.1 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.04 80.6 42.4 30.1 9.2 97 58 28
Mongolia 3.0 3,842 55.3 58.4 62.9 69.1 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.13 119a 94.6 48.6 16.1 186 161 46
Southeast Asia 638.2 4,034 56.73 63.38 67.68 70.84 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.08 88.72 60.34 35.94 21.67 307.87 189.21 107.19
Singapore 5.6 55,107 68.3 73.9 78.0 82.6 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.06 22 8.8 3.0 2.1 12 18 10
Vietnam 92.7 1,916 59.7 68.9 73.1 75.9 1.19 1.14 1.14 1.13 54.3 42.3 23.6 17.6 139 81 54
Malaysia 31.2 10,814 64.5 69.5 72.8 75.2 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.06 42.2 18.7 8.7 7.0 79 58 41
Thailand 68.9 5,633 59.4 67.9 70.6 75.1 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.11 71.6 38.7 19.6 10.8 40 25 21
Indonesia 261.1 3,484 54.5 61.5 66.2 69.0 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 112.7 73.6 41.1 22.9 446 265 133
Philippines 103.3 3,445 60.8 63.8 67.2 69.0 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.10 55.5 49.8 30.0 22.1 152 124 117
Cambodia 15.8 1,032 41.6 50.4 58.4 68.5 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.06 177.4a 86.6 79.6 27.5 1,020 484 167
Myanmar 52.9 1,272 51.0 56.9 62.1 66.4 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.07 119.3 89.4 65.6 41.4 453 308 184
Lao PDR 6.8 1,929 46.2 51.0 58.9 66.3 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 141.0a 123.0 82.5 50.4 905 546 213
South Asia 1,765.2 1,500 48.13 55.99 62.82 68.48 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.04 144.11 103.93 68.45 38.75 558.80 382.17 186.51
Sri Lanka 21.2 3,760 64.3 69.2 71.1 75.0 1.06 1.09 1.11 1.09 54.4 25.2 14.1 8.3 75 57 31
Bangladesh 163.0 1,158 47.5 55.6 65.3 72.2 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.05 149.2 117.9 64.0 29.7 569 399 188
Nepal 29.0 709 40.5 50.1 62.3 69.9 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.05 176.8 119.5 60.3 29.6 901 548 275
India 1,324.2 1,557 47.7 55.8 62.6 68.3 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.05 142.6 100.5 66.6 36.2 556 374 181
Pakistan 193.2 1,418 52.9 58.6 62.8 66.3 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.03 144.2 115.3 88.1 65.7 431 306 184
Afghanistan 34.7 657 36.7 45.6 55.5 63.3 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 204.8 141.3 90.8 54.9 1,340 1,100 425
Notes: Data are sorted with respect to life expectancy at birth in 2015.
a Mortality rate, infant: figures for some countries are other than 1970. Cambodia 1975; Lao PDR 1978; Mongolia 1978.



































Prevalence of stunting,  
height for age (percentage  
of children under five)
Prevalence of 
stunting, height 




Prevalence of wasting,  
weight for height  
(percentage of  
children under five)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
2016 2014 1991 2000 2014 2015 1971 1985 2000 2014 2014 1971 1985 1995 2014
East Asia 1,559.9 10,827 23.24 14.76 9.07 9.17  35.77 17.28 8.99 8.51  4.50 4.99 2.25
Japan 127.0 39,195 – 2.5 2.5a –  8.3c – 7.1e 6.5f  1.2h – 2.3j
Korea, Rep. 51.2 28,099 5 5 5 5   2.5d 2.5e 2.7f  – – 0.9j
China 1,378.7 7,588 23.9 16.2 9.8 9.3  38.3c 17.8 9.4e 8.9f  4.8h 5.0 2.3j
Mongolia 3.0 3,842 29.9 38.2 21.5 20.5   29.8 10.8e 14.7f  – 2.3i 1.0j
Southeast Asia 638.2 4,034 29.62 22.61 10.06 9.74 57.7 47.9 38.0 30.2 30.1 9.8 8.5 8.4 9.7
Singapore 5.6 55,107     10.7b  4.4   7.7g – 3.6 –
Vietnam 92.7 1,916 45.6 28.1 11.8 11  64.1c 43.4 23.3e 23.2f  11.1h 13.5i 4.4
Malaysia 31.2 10,814 5.1 5 5 5   20.7d 17.2e   – 15.3i –
Thailand 68.9 5,633 34.6 19 7.9 7.4  25.3c 18.1d 16.3e 16.3f  6.0h 6.7 6.7j
Indonesia 261.1 3,484 19.7 17.2 7.6 7.6   42.4 36.4e 35.5f  – 5.5 13.5j
Philippines 103.3 3,445 26.3 21.3 13.9 13.5 60.2b 44.7c 38.3d 30.3e 29.1f 9.9g 5.7h 9.1i 7.9j
Cambodia 15.8 1,032 32.1 32 15 14.2   49.2 33.5 32.6  – 13.4i 9.2
Myanmar 52.9 1,272 62.6 52.4 14.9 14.2  55.1c 40.8 35.1e 33.4f  12.9h 9.4i 7.9j
Lao PDR 6.8 1,929 42.8 39.2 18.9 18.5   48.2 43.8e 42.1f  – 12.3i 6.4j
South Asia 1,765.2 1,500 24.88 18.95 16.36 16.24 74.2 65.8 49.7 39.3 37.9 19.5 21.1 18.5 14.5
Sri Lanka 21.2 3,760 30.6 29.9 22.9 22 50.4b 31.2c 18.4 14.7e 14.6f 15.9g 13.3h 15.3 21.4j
























Nepal 29.0 709 22.8 22.2 7.7 7.8 75.0b – 57.1d 37.4 39.5f 15.2g – 7.5 11.3
India 1,324.2 1,557 23.7 17 15.3 15.2 75.1b 66.2c 51.0d 38.7 37.9 20.3g 21.3h 19.3i 15.1
Pakistan 193.2 1,418 25.1 22.4 22 22 70.5b 62.5c 41.5d 45.0e 41.7f 15.2g 24.0h 17.2i 10.5j
Afghanistan 34.7 657 29.5 45.2 26 26.8  – 53.2d 59.3e –  – 18.2i –
Notes: Data are sorted with respect to life expectancy at birth in 2015.
Prevalence of undernourishment, 2014:
a Figure for Japan is from https://knoema.com/atlas/Japan/topics/Health/Nutrition/Prevalence-of-undernourishment.
Prevalence of stunting, height for age:
b Figures for some countries are other than 1971: India 1977; Nepal 1975; Pakistan 1977; Philippines 1973; Singapore 1974; Sri Lanka 1978.
c  Figures for some countries are other than 1985: Bangladesh 1986; China 1987; India 1989; Japan 1980; Myanmar 1984; Pakistan 1986; Philippines 1987; Sri Lanka 1987; Thailand 1987; 
Vietnam 1984.
d  Figures for some countries are other than 2000: Afghanistan 1997; India 1999; Korea, Rep. 2003; Malaysia 1999; Nepal 2001; Pakistan 2001; Philippines 1998; Thailand 1995.
e  Figures for some countries are other than 2014: Afghanistan 2004; China 2010; Indonesia 2013; Japan 2010; Korea, Rep. 2010; Lao PDR 2011; Malaysia 2006; Mongolia 2013; Myanmar 2009; 
Pakistan 2012; Philippines 2013; Sri Lanka 2012; Thailand 2012; Vietnam 2010.
Prevalence of stunting, height for age, female:
f  Figures for some countries are other than 2014: China 2010; Indonesia 2013; Japan 2010; Korea, Rep. 2010; Lao PDR 2011; Mongolia 2010; Myanmar 2009; Nepal 2011; Pakistan 2012; 
Philippines 2013; Sri Lanka 2012; Thailand 2012; Vietnam 2010.
Prevalence of wasting, weight for height:
g Figures for some countries are other than 1971: India 1977; Nepal 1975; Pakistan 1977; Philippines 1973; Singapore 1974; Sri Lanka 1978.
h  Figures for some countries are other than 1985: Bangladesh 1986; China 1987; India 1989; Japan 1980; Myanmar 1984; Pakistan 1986; Philippines 1987; Sri Lanka 1987; Thailand 1987; 
Vietnam 1988.
i  Figures for some countries are other than 2000: Afghanistan 1997; Cambodia 1996; India 1997; Lao PDR 1994; Malaysia 1999; Mongolia 1992; Myanmar 1994; Pakistan 1994; Philippines 
1993; Vietnam 1994.
j  Figures for some countries are other than 2014: China 2010; Indonesia 2013; Japan 2010; Korea, Rep. 2010; Lao PDR 2011; Mongolia 2013; Myanmar 2009; Pakistan 2012; Philippines 2013; 
Sri Lanka 2012; Thailand 2012.
Source: Author, based on the World Development Indicators.
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data are supplemented by data on infant mortality rates (IMRs) and maternal 
mortality rates (MMRs). The anthropometric indicators include measures of the 
incidence of undernutrition, stunting, and wasting.
East Asia has achieved the maximum progress, followed by Southeast Asia, 
 followed by South Asia. Average life expectancy, for instance, has risen to 76 years 
in East Asia, 71 years in Southeast Asia and 69 years in South Asia (Table 11.3). 
There are of course large variations around sub-regional averages. Thus, life 
expectancy ranges from 63 years in Afghanistan to 84 years in Japan. However, 
there are technical limits to the achievable standards of health.18 Hence lagging 
countries are gradually catching up with the leading countries as the latter asymp-
totically approach these limits. There is no gender bias in life expectancy; it is now 
higher for women compared to men in all countries of the region. However, son 
preference is exercised by aborting girls before birth in some countries and this is 
reflected in their distorted sex ratios.19 Nutrition trends also show large improve-
ments over the period. But disturbingly high levels of undernutrition, stunting, 
and wasting persist in several countries.
3.2 Key Experiences of Selected Country Experiences
The healthcare experiences of a large number of individual countries have been 
summarized in Mundle (2018b: appendix 2). Here, only a few key features are 
highlighted to provide some context to the quantitative picture presented above.
3.2.1 The Best Performers: Singapore, Korea, and Thailand
Singapore’s health outcomes are among the best globally and these have been 
achieved cost effectively. Singapore’s health expenditure is less than 4 per cent of 
GDP as compared to the OECD average of 9 per cent. The public sector  dominates 
the provision of healthcare, accounting for over 70 per cent of hospital admis-
sions, and 75 per cent of beds are subsidized. The most interesting aspect of 
Singapore’s healthcare system is its financing arrangement through Medisave, 
carved out of the compulsory provident fund system, Medishield for catastrophic 
care, Eldershield for the elderly and Medifund for poor families. Costs are kept 
low through co-payments, which minimize moral hazard, and competition among 
private insurance providers.
Korea’s health system is best known for its social insurance (SI) system, which 
covers virtually the whole population. However, there is a disproportionate con-
centration of health services in urban areas, with service deficits in rural areas, 
especially in less-developed provinces. Also, private providers who account for 
18 For instance, the IMR or MMR cannot decline below zero. Longevity is also bounded by the 
present state of medical knowledge even under optimal living conditions.
19 See Sen (1990).
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90 per cent of hospital beds push services, drugs, and diagnostic tests not covered 
by SI, thereby pushing up the burden of out-of-pocket (OOP) spending. This deters 
low-income patients from seeking treatment, thereby skewing the incidence of SI 
benefits in favour of the rich. The rising incidence of chronic non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs) requiring expensive treatment, a consequence of ageing and 
increasing incomes, is another challenge testing the viability of the SI system.
Thailand’s healthcare system is increasingly seen as a model for other develop-
ing countries. Despite its low per capita income, Thailand has a very high standard 
of health. This has been achieved with remarkably low and declining OOP spend-
ing. Thailand has universal health coverage which is entirely SI financed. In the 
government and corporate sectors, the SI premium is financed through payroll 
taxes whereas the SI premium for the poor, the informal sector, and others is tax 
financed. Patients choose their primary care units and SI provides a comprehen-
sive benefit package for a capped capitation fee plus a case-based payment for 
inpatient and outpatient care. There is almost no co-payment and balance billing 
is also not allowed. OOP spending is now down to 18 per cent of total health 
spending.
3.2.2 The Weakest Performers: Afghanistan and Pakistan
Afghanistan is a post-conflict but still violent country where the delivery of 
essential public services is challenging. The donor-supported government has 
attempted to deliver an essential package of hospital services (EPHS) in urban 
areas and a basic package of health services (BPHS) in rural areas delivered through 
non-government organizations and contract service providers. But the EPHS is 
mainly limited to Kabul, and the BPHS covers about 60 per cent of the population 
at best. Service provision is very patchy because of the shortage of health workers 
and medicines. OOP spending accounts for over 73 per cent of total health 
expenditure and patients need to travel to Pakistan or India for treatment of any 
serious ailment.
Pakistan has an elaborate 3-tier structure for public sector health service delivery, 
from basic rural health units to tertiary care hospitals in the main cities. However 
the quality of public health services is weak, especially in rural areas. Underfunded, 
not easily accessible and staffed by unco-operative personnel, healthcare centres 
also often do not have the required stocks of medicines. Consequently, private 
service providers now dominate the field, with OOP spending accounting for 
about 75 per cent of total health expenditure.
3.2.3 The Largest Countries: China, India, and Indonesia
China’s health indicators lag behind those of the best performers in Asia but are 
better than the rest. It has separate 3-tier systems of healthcare provision for urban 
and rural areas. The urban system has been mostly state funded through the 
Government Health Insurance System and Labour Health Insurance Scheme for 
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different population segments. Rural communities have had to provide for 
themselves through the Cooperative Medical System (CMS), with shortfalls being 
met by the village government. The system worked well until the 1979 reforms, 
which combined the private responsibility system of agriculture with decentral-
ization, bankrupted the village governments. The CMS, the backbone of the rural 
healthcare system, collapsed. Hospitals in urban areas also faced financial crisis 
with soaring drug prices. They started charging for expensive services and drugs, 
and some doctors started accepting fees informally.
With increasing dependence on OOP spending, disparities between rich and 
poor provinces, rural and urban areas within provinces, and rich and poor house-
holds, soared. In April 2009, the market-oriented reforms were reversed through 
fresh reforms and the CMS has been revived. The new reform is still work in pro-
gress. SI now covers over 92 per cent of the population, but SI coverage excludes 
many services and drugs. OOP spending accounts for 50 per cent of inpatient 
care and 60 per cent to 70 per cent of outpatient care.
India’s health and nutrition standards have improved markedly over the past 
fifty years, but lag well behind those of the best performing countries. It has an 
elaborate 3-tier public sector healthcare system from a base of village-level pri-
mary health centres up to federal hospitals that provide secondary and tertiary 
care. But the system is overloaded, the referral system is broken and patients wait 
in long queues in overcrowded hospitals to receive treatment from overburdened 
and uncooperative medical staff. Treatment is supposedly free, but drugs are 
often out of stock and inpatient beds may not be available for weeks. So even poor 
patients, when they can afford it, seek private care, which is a flourishing busi-
ness. Over 80 per cent of total health spending is OOP spending. This has led to 
rising disparity in access to healthcare and a high incidence of household impov-
erishment due to expensive catastrophic care. A National Health Mission set up 
to address the increasing inequity in access to healthcare proved inadequate. 
Some states started their own SI schemes and the federal government is now initi-
ating a nationwide scheme. Unfortunately these SI schemes are designed for 
 inpatient care when the bulk of OOP spending is for outpatient care.
Indonesia’s local health centres, called pasekamas, constitute the vital base of 
its 3-tier public healthcare system. They provide preventive services, primary 
care, as well as referrals for higher-level care. The Jamkesmas SI programme intro-
duced for the poorest 30 per cent of the population, together with pre-existing 
schemes for the formal sector, provided insurance cover to about 55 per cent of 
the population. But the middle 45 per cent of informal sector workers and the rest 
of the population were left out. District officials, significantly empowered by the 
2001 decentralization reforms, introduced the Jamkheda SI scheme for them. In 
2014, the government integrated all three SI schemes into the Jaminan Kesehatan 
Nasional (JKN) scheme, which seeks to achieve universal SI coverage by 2019. 
Unfortunately, JKN mainly addresses curative care and its coverage excludes 
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many services. Hence, OOP spending still accounts for 60 per cent of total health 
expenditure. The heavy dependence on private provision and private financing 
has inevitably led to growing disparity between Java and the other islands, espe-
cially the remote outer islands, between the cities and rural areas and between 
rich and poor families.
3.3  The Development of Healthcare: Challenges and Responses
To summarize, the spread of healthcare during the past fifty years has been 
remarkable. Postcolonial governments recognized that a collective good like health 
services could not be left to the market. But the public provision of health services 
was constrained by the availability of public resources. This compelled most 
 governments to turn to private provision of health services. But that in turn was 
constrained by the limited capacity of households to meet OOP expenses.
In addition to the tension between the goal of expanding healthcare provision, 
the limited resources of governments and the budget constraints of households, 
other important considerations include the contingent nature of demand for 
healthcare, the asymmetry of information between patients and physicians and 
the impoverishing impact of catastrophic OOP spending. These necessitated the 
ex ante pooling of risk through health insurance (Arrow  1963; Mundle  1998). 
Adverse client selection by profit-driven private insurers raised the need for uni-
versal SI.
These factors have collectively led to the emergence of a variety of health 
 systems in Asia, ranging from maximum dependence on public funding and 
public provision as in Singapore and Thailand to maximum dependence on OOP 
private spending and private provision as in most of the South Asian countries. 
Some issues arising from the experience of this variety of health systems are 
 summarized below.
The rising burden of NCDs while the burden of communicable diseases (CDs) 
is yet to be eliminated is a major challenge. Unfortunately, public health meas-
ures, such as immunization, that are equitable and cost efficient in dealing with 
CDs have been neglected, their share of public health expenditure typically being 
less than 10 per cent. Consequently the benefit incidence of public healthcare 
spending has been regressive in most countries (O’Donnell et al. 2007).
In most Asian countries this policy bias in favour of expensive curative care 
has put intolerable pressure on the delivery capacity of public health systems 
based on a foundation of poorly trained village health workers. It has broken the 
referral system and overburdened secondary and tertiary hospitals that have 
ended up providing poor services. Patients have therefore increasingly opted for 
paid private services when they can afford it. The shift to private health provision, 
mostly financed by OOP spending, has in turn generated several challenges. 
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Typically, private providers push over-treatment, expensive diagnostic tests and 
medication apart from high doctors’ fees, leading to huge escalation in treatment 
costs. The catastrophic impact of high OOP spending has often driven house-
holds to impoverishment. Comparisons show that the incidence of catastrophic 
health episodes has been lower in countries that have tried to contain the share of 
OOP spending (Doorslaer et al. 2006; Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011).
Rising costs of medical care have forced poorer households to progressively 
withdraw from seeking medical care as treatment costs have risen. This has 
resulted in increasing inequality in access to medical care between more and 
less prosperous regions, rural and urban areas, and rich and poor households. 
In response to this rising inequality of access, most Asian countries have moved 
towards SI, with governments often paying the premium. But SI by itself has not 
prevented private providers from driving up costs. The consequent thinning of 
SI coverage, co-payments and coverage caps has resulted in continuing heavy 
reliance on OOP spending. A WHO assessment concluded that a viable SI system 
requires a separate dedicated safety net programme for vulnerable households 
and an allocation of 4 per cent to 5 per cent of GDP for health expenditure, of 
which OOP spending should not exceed 30 per cent to 40 per cent (WHO 2009). 
In comparison, OOP spending in most Asian countries ranges from 60 per cent 
to as much as 80 per cent. The high dependence on OOP spending and conse-
quent inequality of access is the principal challenge facing healthcare provision 
in Asia today.
4. Social Development, Disparity, and the State
Some features stand out clearly in the foregoing account of social development in 
Asia. The outstanding feature is the remarkable transformation of Asia’s education 
and health profile. Some countries, and regions within countries, have lagged behind. 
Others have surged ahead. But there were impressive gains in social development 
in all countries compared to their own initial conditions. Second, as the leading 
countries approach the feasible limits of such development the lagging countries 
are gradually catching up, a process of convergence is underway.20 There are, of 
course, variations in the pace at which the different lagging countries are catching 
up with the leading countries. Finally, within most countries a pattern of nested 
disparities has emerged in the access to education and healthcare: disparity 
between more and less prosperous regions, disparity between rural and urban 
areas within a region, and disparity between rich and poor households within the 
urban and rural areas. These disparities have increased with the increasing shift 
20 See footnotes 15 and 18.
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from public to private provision of education and healthcare in most countries, 
though there are important exceptions. However, these disparities are likely to 
decrease over the long term with continuing social development like the variations 
across countries and for the same reasons.
What accounts for these large variations across countries? Partly, it is differences 
in initial conditions. This would include differences in colonial legacies21 or a 
legacy of conflict in some countries that influenced the course of future develop-
ment. Equally important are the initial differences in standards of education and 
health. The close association between initial and current levels of education and 
health across countries will be evident from Tables 11.1–11.4. Another important 
factor is the close association between levels of income, hence income growth, 
and the spread of education and health services. This is also evident from the 
same tables. As we know from the human capital literature cited earlier, here the 
causality runs in both directions.
Another critical element that has determined the pace of social development in 
Asia is the nature of the state. In postcolonial Asia, social development has been 
led by developmental states.22 Thus, the spread of education and healthcare was 
very much a function of the priorities and capacities that reflected the nature of 
the state. To better understand this relationship, a taxonomy of the different types 
of states is helpful. The nature of a state is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon 
not easily amenable to classification in a single taxonomic category. Some charac-
teristics of the state may fit one category and other aspects may better fit another 
category. Also, the nature of the state can change over time. Nevertheless, framing 
the discussion within a taxonomy of the different types of Asian states is a helpful 
analytical device.
To develop such a taxonomy, I start with the binary concepts of extractive 
 versus inclusive institutions and political versus economic institutions that 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have employed, among other important concep-
tual innovations, to explain why most nations fail to develop. Simple modifica-
tions of the Acemoglu–Robinson (AR) framework give us an alternative taxonomy 
that can help explain the differing impacts of different types of developmental 
states on the development of education and health.23 AR maintained that, except 
in transitional conditions, extractive or inclusive economic institutions match 
with the corresponding political institutions.24 They argued that most nations 
21 Breman and Mundle (1991) had initially drawn attention to the very different legacies of 
European colonialism in South and Southeast Asia and Japanese colonialism in East Asia, and their 
differentiated impact on agrarian transformation. This idea has now been revived and much extended 
by Duara (2018) and Wade (2018a).
22 See the Introduction to this chapter, especially footnote 3.
23 For an earlier attempt along these lines to explain the long-term growth prospects of twenty-five 
emerging economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America see Mundle (2018a).
24 The similarity of this idea with the somewhat more complex idea of necessary correspondence 
between relations of production and the superstructure of a society in Marx’s theory of historical 
materialism (Marx 1859) is obvious. However, a failure of such correspondence was one of the drivers 
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failed to develop because predatory states drained them of resources and enterprise 
through extractive political and economic institutions. The few developed nations 
are exceptions where states have maintained inclusive political and economic 
institutions that enabled development. Johnson’s conception of the developmental 
state, which not only enabled but also led the process of development, is the 
antithesis of AR’s rather passive ‘night watchman’ conception of the ideal state.25
Let us extend ARs concept of economic institutions to also include social 
institutions and allow the possibility of stable social systems where exclusive26 
 political institutions are combined with inclusive economic and social institu-
tions or, conversely, inclusive political institutions are combined with exclusive 
economic and social institutions. These simple modifications yield a taxonomy 
of different types of states, especially developmental states, which is rich enough 
to capture the observed variations in the nature of states in Asia.
In reading my taxonomy it is important to understand how I have interpreted 
some key concepts. By inclusive political institutions I mean institutions that allow 
political competition; the existence of a judiciary; a legislature and a free press 
that are independent, not controlled by the executive; and protection of human 
rights. A system of political institutions that fails to pass this test would be con-
sidered exclusive. Authoritarian regimes ruled by a dictator or a single party would 
obviously be exclusive. But an apparent multiparty democracy with an elected 
government where real power is controlled by a deep state that faces no political 
competition would also be considered exclusive. Similarly, when the same party 
led by the same individual or family continues to ‘win’ election after election and 
rules for decades this, too, would point to the prevalence of exclusive political 
institutions. However, it must be noted that without the centralized exercise of 
power, political competition in highly polarized or fractionalized polities can become 
a hindrance to collective action. The need to accommodate many competing 
interest groups can fritter away the state’s resources and its capacity to deliver col-
lective goods.27
The demarcation of exclusive and inclusive socio-economic institutions is more 
difficult. One clear indicator is whether the pre-existing landed and business 
elites were protected or removed through land reform and other measures by the 
new postcolonial states that came to power. Another indicator is the prevalence 
of change in Marx’s theory of history while for AR it is part of a binary classification between nations 
that develop successfully and those that fail.
25 This conception of a minimalist, non-interventionist state protecting free market and property 
rights is similar to those of North and Weingast (2000) and Besley and Persson (2011) among others. 
For a compelling critique of this paradigm see Bardhan (2013).
26 I am here replacing AR’s term ‘extractive’ with the term ‘exclusive’, which I find more appropriate 
as the opposite of ‘inclusive’.
27 On this see, among others, La Porta et al. (1999), Besley and Persson (2011) and Mundle et al. 
(2012).
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or social acceptance of differentiation based on identity such as caste, religion, 
ethnicity, or language. A third indicator would be effective state action to provide 
or finance collective goods, such as universal basic education and universal 
healthcare, to mitigate the impact of wealth and income inequality. These indica-
tors are only illustrative not exhaustive.
Finally, the concepts of hard and soft states need to be reintroduced with some 
precision. Myrdal (1968, 1970) introduced the concept of the ‘soft’ state, a state 
that has the intention but lacks the capacity or the will to enforce its agenda of 
state-led development in the face of multiple constraints and competing claims 
for the resources of the state. By inference, a hard state is one that has the capacity 
and will to enforce its agenda. Several scholars have since attempted to give some 
precision to this basic idea in different ways. Evans has introduced the concept of 
‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans  1995; Evans and Heller  2018). Wade (2018a) has 
distinguished between ‘special interest’ states and ‘common interest’ states. Khan 
(2018) has written about ‘enforcement capacity’ as a function of ‘the political set-
tlement’. Bardhan (2016) has sought to define a measure of state strength in terms 
of ‘commitment ability’. Building on these constructs, especially Bardhan, and the 
concepts of the developmental state and inclusive versus exclusive political and 
socio-economic institutions discussed above, I bring back the concept of hard 
and soft states in presenting the following taxonomy:
1. The hard developmental state combines exclusive political institutions 
with socio-economic institutions that are inclusive. Countries with such 
states experience rapid social development:28 China, Malaysia (until the 
recent election that has ended the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO) party’s monopoly of power), Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, (also 
Korea and Taiwan in their pre-democratic period).
2. The soft developmental state combines inclusive political institutions with 
exclusive socio-economic institutions. Countries with such states are likely 
to experience slow social development: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Mongolia, Nepal, and Philippines.
3. The inclusive developmental state where political and socio-economic 
institutions are both inclusive. Countries with such states are likely to 
 experience rapid social development: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka.
4. The predatory state which is not developmental at all and where political 
and economic institutions are both exclusive. Countries with such states are 
likely to lag behind and experience very slow social development: Cambodia, 
Pakistan, Myanmar (also presumably North Korea, but that country is not 
analysed here).
28 By social development I mean specifically the spread of education and healthcare.
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To understand the differences in the nature of these states it is necessary to 
 recognize the geopolitical conditions under which these different states came into 
existence. Mundle (2017), Duara (2018) and Wade (2018a) have underlined the 
importance of the US-led Cold War in Asia in shaping the nature of many of 
these states.29
Wade has shown how the US supported Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the front-
line states in the war against communism, in securing themselves internally through 
comprehensive land reforms that swept away the landed elite, and in curbing and 
disciplining the business elite. Externally, the US protected these states through 
its security cover, large-scale development assistance, and  privileged access to the 
vast US market to enable their rapid industrialization and growth. He has pointed 
out the subtle difference in the scale of US support to these states and the 
Philippines, which was also an ally against communism but not a frontline state. 
There the strong landed elites were protected as US allies in containing the domes-
tic spread of communism. The scale of military, financial and other assistance, or 
preferential access to US markets, was also not  comparable to US assistance to the 
frontline states.
Duara has argued that this same model of US support on a more moderate 
scale applies to its allies in Southeast Asia, that is, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore.30 Mundle has pointed out that while the US allies were driven by 
the fear of communism, the communist states in China and Vietnam were driven 
by the opposite fear of US domination and the overthrow of communism. On 
both sides of the Cold War it was the existential threat of that war which  legitimized 
these authoritarian states31 and also drove them to aggressively pursue strategies 
of rapid, inclusive growth. Most of these states have been classified as hard devel-
opmental states in our taxonomy.
In some cases the replacement of dictatorships by inclusive political institutions 
led ironically to the emergence of soft states with little ability to transform exclusive 
economic relations. In the Philippines, the predatory state of the Marcos era was 
replaced by a soft state with the return of democracy. In Indonesia, Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule, and rent collection by a narrow elite of family and friends, was 
combined with otherwise inclusive economic policies (Timmer  2018). Political 
competition following the fall of Suharto led to the emergence of a soft state that 
lacks the capacity to transform the prevailing exclusive economic institutions.
But the classic example of a soft state is India, the country that led Myrdal to 
formulate the very concept of the ‘soft state’. The Indian state came to power 
 following a remarkable, non-violent independence movement in which Gandhi 
mobilized all sections of society, including the landed and business elites. The 
29 Which became a very hot war with huge casualties in Korea and later Vietnam.
30 In its early years, the new Singaporean state may also have perceived an existential threat from 
Malaysia, from which it had broken away.
31 Duara discusses how nationalism was a powerful legitimizing ideology in this context.
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corollary was the continuing dominance of these elites over public policy and the 
protection of landed and business interests. In addition to elite interests the 
Indian state has also had to continuously navigate its way through the conflicting 
interests of a highly fractionalized polity of different castes, religions, regions, and 
classes.32 Securing political consensus among all these interests led to what Joshi 
has described as collective action gridlock (Joshi 2016). Accommodating the many 
competing interests also exhausted the state’s resources in large transfers and 
 subsidies, resulting in persistent fiscal stress and lack of resources for  financing 
collective goods like basic education, healthcare, or infrastructure. India also has 
an elaborate, multi-layered bureaucracy stretching down to the millions of villages, 
but this bureaucracy still functions with a colonial mentality of masters ruling 
over subjects and its incentive system is designed to ensure loyalty to superiors, 
not delivery of public services.
The classification of states presented above reflects judgements based on the 
literature cited earlier, the data, the country notes in Mundle (2018b) and my 
 earlier research (Mundle  2017,  2018a). Can these judgements be scrutinized 
against some objective criteria? The nature of the state is a complex notion not 
easily measurable by any simple metric. However, public provision or financing of 
social services is one of many competing demands for the limited resources of the 
state. Hence, the allocation of public resources for social expenditure is a possible 
indicator, admittedly crude, of the inclusiveness of the state.
Panel A in Figure 11.1 presents a scatter diagram of the education share of gov-
ernment spending against mean years of schooling, taken as a representative 
measure of education development. Panel B presents a scatter diagram of the 
share of healthcare in government spending against life expectancy, taken as a 
representative measure of health standards in a country. It turns out that most of 
the countries classified as soft developmental states or predatory states spend less 
than or close to the median share of public expenditure on education and health 
services. For the least inclusive countries, clustered in the lower left quadrant of 
both panels, this has happened even when the achieved standards of education 
and health are below the regional median. The exceptions that need explanation 
are Afghanistan and Nepal, and Indonesia in the case of education. Conversely 
most of the countries classified as inclusive or hard developmental states allocate 
more than the median share of public expenditure on education and health ser-
vices. The exception requiring explanation here is Japan in the case of education.
Afghanistan and Nepal are the poorest countries in the region and heavily aid-
dependent. The high share of social services in these two countries reflects donor 
priorities rather than the character of the state. The high allocation for education 
in Indonesia started with policy reforms in 1975, when Indonesia was a hard 
32 On this see, among many others, Bardhan (2010); Kohli (2012); Varshney (2013); Mundle 
(2017, 2018a).
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Figure 11.1 Achieved standards and public expenditure shares of education and 
health in Asian countries.
Note: Country codes: AFG = Afghanistan; BGD = Bangladesh; KHM = Cambodia; CHN = China; 
IND = India; IDN = Indonesia; JPN = Japan; KOR = Korea, Rep.; LAO = Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic; MYS = Malaysia; MNG = Mongolia; MMR = Myanmar; NPL = Nepal; PAK = Pakistan; 
PHL = Philippines; SGP = Singapore; LKA = Sri Lanka; THA = Thailand; VNM = Vietnam.
Source: Author, based on World Development Indicators Database and UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (education database).
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developmental state under Suharto, not the soft state it is today. Japan has already 
reached the feasible ceiling of schooling per child at over 12 years and it is also a 
rich country with nearly US$40,000 per capita income. At revenues correspond-
ing to this high level of income the low share of public expenditure allocated to 
education is evidently adequate to maintain the high education standard Japan 
has already achieved. With these explanations for the exceptions, it appears that 
the empirical criteria applied here is consistent with the classification of state 
character suggested above. It would be interesting to verify the robustness of the 
classification against other quantitative indicators of state character.
5. A Concluding Remark
The increasing dependence on private provision of education and health services 
has led to increasing disparity in the access to education and health services in 
most countries as has been described above. However, the dominant long-term 
trend is the rapid spread of these services and rising standards of education and 
health in all the countries of the region. Also there is convergence. The leading 
countries Japan, Singapore, and Korea have already reached or are approaching 
the best feasible standards of education and health. The lagging countries are 
gradually catching up. There are, however, large variations among them both in 
existing standards and in the pace at which they are catching up. An important 
determinant of these variations, apart from initial conditions and income levels, 
is the nature of the state in each country. If the classification suggested here is 
appropriate, it is likely that countries led by the inclusive and hard developmental 
states—China, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Vietnam—will catch up over the 
next decade or so. Countries led by soft developmental states will follow. Within 
this large group, countries with less political fractionalization, stronger commit-
ment ability and greater state capacity will catch up faster than the others.33 The 
predatory states are unfortunately likely to catch up last.
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Rolph van der Hoeven
1. Introduction and Overview
This chapter provides a retrospect of, and prospects for, development, labour 
market, and employment issues in Asia, triggered by Myrdal’s Asian Drama, pub-
lished fifty years ago. Following this introduction and overview, section 2 firstly 
conceptualizes labour markets, employment, underemployment, and  unemployment 
at the time when Asian Drama was written. It then traces the evolution of thinking 
about labour markets and employment in a more or less chronological order up 
until the adoption of the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 
before setting out the analytical approach on development and labour markets 
followed in this chapter.
Section 3 shows how various sub-regional groups and countries in Asia fared 
from 1965 to 2015 with respect to economic and labour market issues. The first 
sub-section, compares Asian sub-regions to other developing regions and the 
 second sub-section analyses developments in Asian countries themselves. Asian 
countries are classified into categories of fast-growing countries with good labour 
market outcomes, fast-growing countries with weak labour market outcomes, 
and those that have not grown fast and have weak labour market outcomes.
Section 4 analyses how and why in certain Asian countries policies and institu-
tions have reinforced each other, leading to faster growth and better labour 
market outcomes—something that Myrdal labelled as ‘cumulative causation’. 
Section 5 discusses six, not entirely independent, factors determining future devel-
opments of economies and labour markets in Asia: demographic trends, migra-
tion, technology, the future of work, social developments, and income inequalities. 
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Analytical Framework
2.1 Concepts of Employment and Labour Markets at the 
Time of Asian Drama
Asian Drama (Myrdal 1968) had, at the time of publication, a great influence on 
thinking on employment and related issues. Asian Drama was the only publication 
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with two chapters in the seminal bundle Third World Employment (Jolly et al. 1973). 
Myrdal’s understanding of employment issues should, though, be set in the con-
text of his time (decolonization and independence). He is vigorous in rejecting the 
colonialist or mercantilist approach to economic development and its interpret-
ation of the labour market. However, he is also critical of the ‘modern approach’, 
which purports fast growth in the modern industrial sector profiting from a large 
reserve pool of labour. The modern approach, as depicted by Myrdal, resembles 
Lewis’s theory of unlimited supply of labour, although Myrdal barely makes refer-
ence to the writings of Lewis (1954) himself. Myrdal is not fully convinced of the 
unlimited supply of labour argument. In various passages, especially in part V 
(Problems of Labour Utilization), he contests the notion of a labour reserve, as 
substantial parts of the labour force (with different intensity in Asian countries 
and most pronounced in India) are unable to work in industry because of admin-
istrative, caste, and religious practices and a lack of basic skills (because of insuffi-
cient education) and stamina (because of ill health and sanitary conditions).
Myrdal questions a mechanistic interpretation of the notion of underemploy-
ment and emphasizes issues like duration and productivity of work. He favours 
the concept of a dual labour market driven by different and separate activities 
in the so-called formal and informal economies. Under certain conditions, the 
modern industrial sector can even face a situation of labour shortage, similar to 
that in developed countries. Myrdal also rejects a strict economic interpretation 
of the development challenge and prefers an integrated approach combining eco-
nomic with sociological and political analysis. He emphasizes initial conditions 
and cumulative causation as explanatory factors for different patterns of develop-
ment and employment creation.
Myrdal, advancing the work of Mahalanobis (1958), criticizes (in appendix 16) 
those labour market analyses that studied in-depth unemployment but neglected 
to take a broader view of employment and development. His analysis gave support 
to the concept of the informal sector and informal employment. Myrdal, though, 
did not use the term ‘informal sector’ himself, a concept firstly observed by the 
Indian economist Rao (1938) and later also brought to attention by Lewis (1954). 
It is unclear whether Myrdal built on the ideas of Rao and Lewis or whether he 
came to similar conclusions.1
The notion of the informal sector has not been uncontested, however. For some 
scholars the informal sector is a temporary phenomenon that would disappear 
with the transition from agriculture to industrialization. Giving this sector too 
much attention would only cause a country’s development path to deviate. Yet reality 
was and is different, as Myrdal and several other studies at that time showed. 
Neglecting the informal sector, and those working in the informal sector, would 
1 Hart (1971), after Myrdal had published Asian Drama, introduced the term ‘informal sector’, 
which was also brought to a larger public by ILO employment reports on Kenya, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines, and Colombia in the 1970s.
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bypass a large, and often the poorest, part of the population. But for some others 
(de Soto 1989; Maloney 2004), the informal sector is not seen as a problem but as 
a solution. These authors lament the overbearing role of the central state and local 
authorities in halting private sector initiative. Supporting and stimulating the 
informal sector is thus not seen as a way of helping workers in a transition pro-
cess, but rather as an important way of liberalizing the economy, and so, in the 
optic of these proponents, of fostering growth through liberalization.
Although the International Labour Organization (ILO) sponsored various 
analyses and studies on the informal sector, the informal sector remained a con-
tested issue for many years, even in the ILO. Only in 2003 did the ILO develop a 
comprehensive classification of informal sector activities and employment patterns 
(ILO 2013). That classification rejects the existence of an informal sector per se, but 
rather acknowledges the existence of informal activities and an informal economy 
that are sometimes closely intertwined with the formal economy. There can be 
informal employment in the formal sector (Breman 2013).
Myrdal also emphasizes the capability of the labour force as an important factor 
in development. At various places, he is critical of the labour surplus theory, argu-
ing that, because of restraining factors such as bad health, low literacy, bad living 
conditions, and cultural inhibitions, a labour reserve army is not fully operational 
to function properly in all sections of the economy, giving rise to the human capital 
approach to development. One of Myrdal’s closest collaborators Paul Streeten, 
together with various analysts at the Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex and the ILO, expanded the human capital approach to the 
‘basic needs’ approach (or basic human needs) as an objective of development.
Whereas in the human capital approach the quality of employment, measured 
by education and health, was seen as instrumental for achieving economic growth, 
the basic needs approach saw the removal of poverty, gainful employment, good 
education, and health as development objectives in themselves (Hopkins and van 
der Hoeven 1983). The notion of basic needs was well established in Indian plan-
ning (Srinavasan and Bardhan 1974). The basic needs approach, however, was 
not entirely accepted. According to some developing countries, the basic needs 
approach focused too much on the poorest developing countries and gave too little 
attention to international measures to foster national economic growth (van der 
Hoeven 1988). This fear was fed as structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) started 
to dominate development thinking and  financing in the major international finan-
cial institutions. Emphasis shifted back to economic growth, to the neglect of 
employment and basic needs.
2.2 Evolution of Thinking on Labour Markets and Employment
The notion of employment and related issues gained traction again towards the end 
of the twentieth century, being the main subject of the World Summit for Social 
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Development in Copenhagen in 1995. The summit called for renewed attention to 
poverty reduction, employment, and social inclusion. It contained explicit recom-
mendations for incorporating political, legal, economic, and social factors to foster 
productive employment and to reduce income inequality. Yet these recommenda-
tions were not to avail five years later, as full employment was absent in the original 
formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000—first, because 
employment was allegedly difficult to measure and second, because concentration 
on direct poverty alleviation measures led to a relative neglect of policies dealing 
with employment in general (Amsden 2011). However, political pressure increased 
on the UN and in 2005 full employment was incorporated into MDG1 as a sub-
goal to poverty alleviation but without any indication of necessary structural 
changes to create more productive employment (see van der Hoeven 2017).
In dealing with the impact of globalization and contributing to the debate on 
the MDGs, the ILO (1999) and various scholars (e.g., Stiglitz 2002) advanced the 
notion of productive employment by developing the concept of ‘decent work’, which 
emphasizes four elements: employment, social security, workers’ rights, and social 
dialogue. Employment refers to work of all kinds and has both quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions. In order to foster coherence of various national policies for 
decent work and to measure progress, Ghai (2005) suggested creating a decent work 
index; that was, however, never accepted as there was no agreement within the 
ILO on which indicators such an index should contain.
In preparing for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015 
and successor to the MDGs, successful proposals were made to give productive 
employment more promise in the process of international goal setting (Martins and 
Lucci  2013; Nayyar 2013a; van der Hoeven  2014). Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs 
incorporate a labour market perspective by elaborating on the themes of prod uct iv-
ity and employment and by adding the perspective of labour rights. The SDGs also 
advocate a redistributive growth path and policies that promote equality of oppor-
tunity and outcome (Luebker  2017). Since the SDGs also intend to foster vast 
improvements in education and health, as well as participation in decision-making, 
the concerns expressed by Myrdal about labour market issues have never been 
accentuated more in international discourse. However, as Myrdal also argues, what 
is in the benevolent planner’s mind is often not translated into actual policies, as 
economic, social, cultural, and religious power have a great influence on development 
in general and also on that in the labour market.
2.3 Analytical Approach
The next sections analyse how various sub-regional groups and countries in Asia 
have fared in economic and labour market issues since 1965, first by compar-
ing Asian regions to other developing regions, and second by looking at growth 
and labour market dynamics in Asian countries themselves. Sets of countries are 
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constructed that have grown fast with good labour market outcomes, those that 
have grown fast with weak labour market outcomes, and those that have not grown 
fast and have poorer labour market outcomes.
Various indicators are used that Myrdal proposed in Asian Drama to define 
what good labour market and employment outcomes are. Economic growth is 
measured by growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and economic 
structure by the percentage of workers in agriculture and industry. Poverty rates 
and the percentage of working poor are indications of socio-economic progress. 
Indicators of labour market performance are employment-to-population rate, 
labour force participation rate, unemployment rates, and the percentage of wage 
and salaried workers, all broken down by gender (something which Myrdal did 
not apply). Literacy rates and secondary school completion rates are not only 
indications of the quality of the labour force, contributing to higher productivity, 
but are also worthwhile goals in themselves. Using such an elaborate set of labour 
market indicators to get a picture of the employment problem acknowledges that 
in the relationship between labour markets, employment, and development, the 
causation runs in both directions, thus considering development, good labour 
markets, and employment both as a means and an end.
The classification of Asian countries into sets of countries with different growth 
and labour market regimes provides, in the following sections, a basis for analysing 
from a macroeconomic perspective how policies and institutions in certain coun-
tries have reinforced each other, leading to superior outcomes—something that 
Myrdal did not quite provide in his analytical framework.
3. The Development Experience
3.1 Asian Regions Compared with other Developing Regions
One can question the conclusion of Asian Drama that Asian countries are con-
strained in their development potential and their ability to create employment. 
Comparing developments in Asia with other major developing regions suggests 
that the drama was perhaps developing much more strongly in other regions than 
in Asia. Asian Drama paints a rather pessimistic picture of development in Asia. 
A few decades after its publication, other publications painted a rather different 
picture. A World Bank publication in the early 1990s spoke of an East Asian Miracle 
(World Bank 1993). It singled out five countries and two city-states in East Asia 
that underwent rapid development in terms of growth and employment. Of the 
fourteen developing countries to which Nayyar (2013b) attributes the potential to 
catch up with developed countries, seven are located in Asia.
Over the fifty-year period 1965–2015 one notices a different picture than 
Myrdal predicted (van der Hoeven 2018: table 1). In comparing developing coun-
tries in four regions—East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America, and 
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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—the East Asia and Pacific region, with initially the 
lowest per capita income of all four regions, shows an average annual GDP per 
capita growth of 6.2 per cent, which accelerated to 8.1 per cent over the period 
from 2000 to 2015. Its GDP per capita in 2015 thereby surpassed both that of South 
Asia and of SSA. Although much lower than in East Asia and the Pacific, average 
per capita growth over the fifty-year period 1965–2015 in South Asia was 3.1 per 
cent per annum, which also accelerated to 5.4 per cent in the period from 2000 to 
2015. In contrast, annual per capita growth from 1965 to 2015 in the other major 
developing regions was much slower: 1.4 per cent in Latin America and only 
0.2 per cent in SSA. Annual per capita growth in these regions during the 2000 to 
2015 period was also much higher; in effect, SSA’s growth rate of 2.6 per cent 
surpassed that of Latin America, which had the lowest rate (2.2 per cent) of that 
period. These superior growth patterns and the patterns of diversification in Asian 
economies have been a steady process over the last fifty years as shown by Ocampo 
et al. (2009: figure 3.1).
Developing country regions also show a great variation in the employment-to-
population rate (van der Hoeven 2018: table 1). Concentrating on comparable and 
reliable figures from 2000, the fastest-growing region (East Asia and the Pacific) 
shows the highest employment-to-population ratio, and although the ratio declined 
from 72.1 per cent in 2000 to 67.7 per cent in 2015, it remained the highest of all 
the developing regions. South Asia was the lowest of all in 2000 with 57.0 per cent, 
declining to 52.8 per cent in 2015. The difference between the fastest-growing Asian 
region and the slower-growing Asian region is thus striking. Labour has played a 
much greater part in the fast-growing Asian Pacific region than in the South Asian 
region. This can also be seen in the poverty figures, for which comparable data are 
available from 1980 to 2015. Using the US$3.20 per day poverty line, the percent-
age of people in poverty in the Asian Pacific region dropped from a staggering 
93.5 per cent in 1980 to 17.6 per cent in 2015, while in the South Asian region it 
dropped from 84.2 per cent to only 52.0 per cent in 2015—a much slower pace of 
poverty reduction, which is more in line with that in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America. The two Asian sub-regions also have lower unemployment rates. In 2000 
and 2015, the East Asia and Pacific region and the South Asian region had figures 
well below 5 per cent, while those of the other two developing regions were, 
though declining, much higher.
Khan (2012) explains the superior performance of the Asian sub-regions, espe-
cially that of East Asia, by continued employment intensive growth, which was 
stimulated initially by a transformation in agriculture, caused by more egalitarian 
landholdings, and by a consequent increase in industrial activities, with initial 
high output employment elasticities stimulated by a strong final demand regime 
either through exports or through internal consumption. The next sub-section 
analyses how these and other factors have played out in different categories of 
Asian countries.
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3.2 Diverse Developing Experience in Asian Countries
This sub-section analyses labour market performance and development in South 
and East Asian countries over the last fifty years and deals with the diversity of 
Asian experience, covering, unlike Myrdal’s study, a substantial number of coun-
tries. It traces these countries’ various development paths and labour market per-
formance. The analysis examines factors underlying success or failure in labour 
market performance by constructing a set of Asian countries classified by high or 
low growth and by good or weak labour market performance that experienced: 
(a) rapid economic growth with good labour market performance; (b) rapid eco-
nomic growth with weak labour market performance; or (c) neither rapid economic 
growth nor good labour market performance, where underemployment persisted 
in the subsistence sector and grew in the urban informal sector. A fourth theoret-
ical possibility of a country with low growth and good labour market performance 
can be excluded, based on actual experience over the last decades. Furthermore, 
because of the great diversity in growth performance in Asia, it is more appropriate, 
for analytical purposes, to distinguish not two but three different country group-
ings with various growth performances.
3.2.1 Growth Regimes
Van der Hoeven (2018: tables 2, 4) constructed for thirteen East, South, and 
Southeast Asian countries, based on growth and labour market outcomes from 
1965 to 2015, different country categories:2
• 4 fast growers, with an average per capita growth rate of more than 4.5 per cent
• 5 steady growers with an average per capita growth rate of between 4.5 and 
3 per cent
• 4 slow growers with a per capita growth rate of less than 3 per cent.
The first group, in descending order of per capita growth, is: China, South Korea, 
Vietnam (data for 1965 to 1985 missing), and Thailand. However, these countries 
showed considerable variation in growth performance over the fifty-year period. 
South Korea had the second highest growth per annum rate of all countries from 
1965 to 1975 (8.73 per cent). But, its growth rate was somewhat affected by the 
financial crisis in 2007, with its annual growth rate being only 2.73 per cent over 
the period 2006 to 2015, which was more in line with growth in the developed 
countries in the group to which it belonged in that period.
2 For lack of consistent time series Cambodia, Bhutan, and Myanmar were not retained, while 
Taiwan also was not retained, as it is not included in the available comparative databases. Furthermore, 
for reasons explained in Nayyar (2013b), the city economies of Singapore and Hong Kong have not 
been retained either.
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China shows an opposite trend, starting with an annual growth rate of 4.26 
per cent in the 1965–1975 period, rising to annual growth rates of over 8 per cent 
during the 1986–1995, 1996–2005 and 2006–2015 periods. Thailand had steady 
growth of 4 per cent during the first two periods from 1965 to 1975 and 1976 to 
1985, which peaked in the decade from 1986 to 1995 and then fell back, partly as a 
consequence of the Asian crisis in 1998, to more modest growth rates of 2.5 per cent 
and 2.75 per cent in the 1996–2005 and the 2006–2015 periods. Vietnam’s growth 
rate (as measured over the ten-year periods from 1986) was continuously steady 
at around 5 per cent.
The second group, that of steady growers, contains Laos, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, and India. Laos (1965–1985 data missing), though starting at a lower 
annual growth level of 2.93 per cent in the period 1986–1995, gradually increased 
annual growth to 6.37 per cent in the period 2006 to 2015. In contrast, Malaysia 
had strong annual growth during the first three periods (1965–1975, 1976–1985, 
and 1986–1995), but then tapered off over the last two ten-year periods, dropping 
to below 4 per cent. Indonesia also grew annually by more than 4 per cent for 
the first three 10-year periods, but had exceptionally weak performance of only 
0.85 per cent annual growth during the period 1996–2005. India and Sri Lanka 
both showed increasing annual growth levels over the five ten-year periods. India 
started from a low base of 1.25 per cent and 1.83 per cent growth from 1965 to 
1975 and from 1976 to 1985, rising to 5.84 per cent from 2006 to 2015. Sri Lanka 
started on a somewhat better footing with 2.41 per cent annual growth from 1965 
to 1975, gradually nudging up to above 5.49 per cent from 2006 to 2015.
The group of slow growers consists of Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the 
Philippines. Pakistan started with modest annual growth during the first three 
ten-year periods, falling to low levels of 1.61 per cent and 1.08 per cent during the 
last two ten-year periods. Bangladesh shows the opposite pattern, starting from 
strong negative annual growth of −2.30 per cent from 1965 to 1975 and moving to 
higher growth during the period 2006 to 2015. Nepal shows a similar pattern. The 
Philippines has a more erratic growth pattern, starting the 1965–1975 period with 
annual growth of 2.41 per cent, followed by two decades of almost no or negative 
growth, but only nudging up to 3.64 per cent in 2006–2015. As this description of 
growth performance over the fifty-year period 1965–2015 shows, development in 
the countries under consideration was neither uniform nor linear. Some coun-
tries did better in the earlier part of the fifty-year period, while others, because of 
the end of war, internal turbulence, or changes in policies, did better in the more 
recent decades.
Looking at a more recent period (1986–2015), the picture of economic devel-
opment changes only slightly. Only three countries are classified differently. In 
the 1986–2015 period, India belonged to the group of high-growth countries 
instead of the group of medium-growth countries, Bangladesh to the group of 
medium-growth countries instead of the group of low-growth countries, and 
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Thailand to the group of medium-growth countries instead of the group of 
high-growth countries (Table 12.1).
Thus, out of the thirteen countries, only two made it to a higher-growth league 
in the later period, while only one degraded. So, the growth dynamism that Asian 
countries had shown over 1965–2015, at the time when Asian Drama was written 
was reinforced, with a few exceptions, in the period from 1986 to 2015.
3.2.2 Labour Market Regimes
How do the growth regimes in the various countries relate to their labour market 
regimes? As noted by Myrdal, consistent and comparable information on social 
development and labour markets is much harder to come by than that on economic 
development. Thanks to efforts of Asian scholars like Amartya Sen and Mahbub 
al Haq, consistent and comparable information on social development has grad-
ually become more available since the 1990s. So, in order to appraise how labour 
markets have performed under different growth regimes in Asian countries, 
we concentrate the discussion on the 1986–2015 period rather than on the full 
1965–2015 period.
Myrdal cautioned against using the Western concept of unemployment to 
appraise the employment or labour market situation (Myrdal 1968: 998, 1,118, and 
2,221), as did Turham (1970). The question is whether such caution is still relevant 
today. This is indeed the case. Ghose et al. (2008) have convincingly shown that the 
unemployment rate is not an appropriate measure to distinguish whether a country 
belongs to a good or weak labour market regime. In countries without any decent 
form of unemployment benefits, poor and middle-income workers cannot afford 
to be unemployed, whereas richer workers are often listed as unemployed while 
they are waiting for more highly paid jobs (Ghose et al. 2008: 79). A country like 
China, with a rapidly expanding labour market, has consistently higher unemploy-
ment figures than India, Nepal, or the Philippines (van der Hoeven 2018: table 4). 
Thus, the unemployment rate is not a very  accurate measure to compare the func-
tioning of labour markets in Asian developing countries. In order to establish 
whether a country belongs to a good or weak labour market regime, van der 
Hoeven (2018: tables 2, 4) uses a mixed set of labour market indicators such as 
Table 12.1 Country classifications by economic growth: 1965–2015 and 1986–2015
  High growth Medium growth Low growth
1965–2015 China, S. Korea, 
Vietnam, Thailand




1986–2015 China, S. Korea, 
Vietnam, India
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh
Pakistan, Nepal, 
Philippines
Note: Countries in italics do not have information for all time periods.
Source: Based on van der Hoeven (2018: table 2).
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working poor, employment in agriculture, employment-to-population ratio, male 
and female labour force participation rates, percentage wage and salaried workers 
by sex, literacy rate, and secondary school completion, as indicators of the quality 
of the labour force itself.
The group of fast growers over the 1986–2015 period (China, Korea, Vietnam, 
and India) show a mixed pattern in terms of labour market regime.
China, Korea, and Vietnam show:
• fast declining poverty rates (down from 86.8 per cent over the 1986–1995 period 
to 23.7 per cent over the 2006–2015 period in China and down from 78.3 
per cent to 28.1 per cent in Vietnam, while poverty is non-existent in Korea);
• a fast declining percentage of working poor;
• a rapid or steady decline of the percentage of workers in agriculture (down 
from 17.7 per cent to 6.6 per cent in Korea, from 63.8 per cent to 46.5 per cent 
in Vietnam, and 58.2 per cent to 35.5 per cent in China);
• high and increasing literacy rates (China 95.1 per cent and Vietnam 93.5 
per cent in 2015); and
• a high employment-to-population rate of over or near 70 per cent in 2015.
Furthermore, China and Korea have a high percentage of wage and salaried workers. 
Yet, the share of wage and salaried workers in Vietnam falls in the same range as 
that of countries in the group of steady growers and slow growers. However, India’s 
structural and labour market profile resembles more that of countries with a lower 
growth rate: high levels of poverty, high percentage of workers working in agricul-
ture, lower levels of labour force participation rate, low levels and only gradually 
increasing levels of wage and salary workers, and low and only slowly increasing 
literacy rates. The only indicator where India levels with the other countries in the 
group of high-growth countries is that of secondary school completion rates.
The labour market outcomes of the group of steady growers are rather diverse. 
In Laos and Bangladesh, the poverty rate has declined by less than in other coun-
tries, resulting in a still substantial level of working poor. Sri Lanka, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia have had much faster poverty reduction than Laos and 
Bangladesh. Literacy rates have declined in Laos and, though growing, remain low 
in Bangladesh. Only in Malaysia is the share of wage and salaried workers high. 
The number of individuals who have completed secondary school education varies 
substantially in this group of steady growers, with the lowest in Bangladesh 
(17.1 per cent) and highest in Malaysia (56.1 per cent).
The group of slow growers all have still high poverty rates ranging from 37.9 
per cent in the Philippines, to 47.3 per cent in Pakistan, and 50.9 per cent in Nepal. 
Pakistan and the Philippines also have low employment-to-population rates 
(Pakistan’s being the lowest of all countries considered at 47.6 per cent). The rate 
in Nepal in contrast is the highest in the region. The percentage employed in 
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agriculture varies considerably in this group, with relatively lower rates in Pakistan 
and the Philippines (43.9 and 33.0 per cent) and a rather higher rate in Nepal 
(73.9 per cent). Literacy rates and secondary school completion rates are also very 
low in this group, except for the Philippines, which has high literacy and second-
ary school completion rates. The considerations discussed here lead to the follow-
ing country groupings, which depict various growth and labour market regimes 
(Table 12.2).
3.2.3 Wages, Productivity, and Wage Shares
How wage developments relate to productivity growth is also important for the 
characterization of a good labour market regime. If wages lag behind productivity 
growth, this implies that workers profit less from the growth in the economy, 
causing in most cases a reduction in final demand, unless the increased profits are 
invested fully and effectively, leading to rapid future employment creation, in which 
case lower wages are ‘compensated’ with higher employment (see also Nayyar 2014). 
Unfortunately, for most of the countries and time periods  considered, there are 
no complete data sets of wages and productivity, nor of the wage shares in GDP, 
so analysis of these issues needs to be restricted to a smaller number of countries 
and also to a shorter time period.
ILO (2016: figure B1) provides information for the 2006–2014 period for Korea, 
China, India, and Indonesia, countries where the majority of the population con-
sidered in this chapter live. Productivity grew fastest in China (80 per cent) and 
India (60 per cent), but less in Indonesia (about 40 per cent) and Korea (20 per cent). 
In all countries, real wages grew more slowly than productivity, with the discrep-
ancy being much greater in India than in the other countries, confirming the 
classification of India as a weak labour market regime.
3.2.4 Female Employment and Labour Force Participation
Another striking point in the classification by growth and labour market regimes 
is the different position of women in the labour market. The most striking case is 
that of the group of countries in the fast-growing regime. Countries in this group 
that also have a good labour market regime all have a much higher female labour 
Table 12.2 Country classifications by growth and labour market regime: 
1986–2015














Source: Based on van der Hoeven (2018: tables 2, 3, 4).
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force participation rate than the countries with a weak labour market regime (for the 
2006–2015 period: China 64.0 per cent and Vietnam 72.9 per cent, compared to India 
29.5 per cent). Also, the difference in the percentage of wage and salaried workers 
is higher on average for the fast-growing countries with a good labour market regime 
than for those with a weak labour market regime. In general, countries with lower 
female labour force participation rates belong, whatever their growth regimes, to the 
group of countries with a weak labour market regime (van der Hoeven 2018: table 4).
As explained earlier, because of country-specific anomalies and a correlation 
with the state of the economy, we did not consider the unemployment rate as a 
useful indicator to compare Asian countries over a long time period, but the rela-
tion between male and female unemployment rates gives a strong indication of 
the labour market regime in a particular country. In countries with a high- or 
medium-growth regime and with a good labour market regime, female unemploy-
ment is similar to male unemployment, while in countries with a slow or medium-
growth regime female unemployment is higher and sometimes substantially higher 
(Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) than in other country groupings. Thus, the way 
women are treated in the labour market has a clear effect on the economic and 
social status and growth potential of Asian countries (Table 12.3).
4. Policies, Institutions, and Outcomes
Can we distinguish specific policies and institutions for the group of countries with 
high or medium growth and good labour market outcomes? Common character-
istics of the fast-growing countries with good labour market outcomes (Korea, 
China, and Vietnam) are that these countries did not rely exclusively on the 
market for allocation of resources and that their macroeconomic policies did not 
correspond to neoclassical macroeconomic prescriptions. Another important char-
acteristic was their initially low household income inequality. Their low household 
income inequality was itself the result of more equal factor distribution of income, 
labelled by Adelman (1979) as redistribution before growth. The most salient 
Table 12.3 Female and male unemployment rates: 1996–2015
  Female unemployment 
rate lower or equal to 
male unemployment rate
Female unemployment 
rate larger than the male 
rate but less than 1.5 
times the male rate
Female unemployment 
rate larger than 1.5 
times the male rate












Source: Based on van der Hoeven (2018: table 4).
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examples of equal factor distribution were programmes of land redistribution and 
early investment in education. This distribution in land and human capital assets 
resulted in higher factor rewards for workers and peasants when the economic 
process started to take off, and left fewer factor rewards for capital owners, thus 
creating spells of virtuous growth.
Amsden (2011) in her assessment of the early developments in East Asia argues 
that the institutions in these countries constrained, in the development process, 
the influence of capital (‘taming capital’), not through social contracts or labour 
market agreements, as happened in the equitable high-growth episode in Europe 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, but through state interventions by 
enlightened bureaucracy, which either directly (China) or indirectly forced firms 
to invest, to expand, and to create employment. However, the effect was the same: 
productivity gains were used to invest, to expand employment, and to increase 
wages. Taylor (2010) labels such a virtuous growth regime as mildly profit-led, 
where there is room for wage growth and where profits were reinvested in the 
economy, which on the one hand added to a demand impulse, but also led, through 
productivity gains, to an expansion of supply (the so-called Kaldor–Verdoorn 
mechanism). This virtuous growth pattern of the fast-growing Asian countries was 
the result of what Khan (2007) calls growth-enhancing governance. Khan contrasts 
this growth-enhancing governance with market-enhanced governance, a set of 
policies advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s and 1990s as 
part of the Washington Consensus.
Two important observations are in order. First, although the fast-growing 
countries with good labour market regimes started their development process 
with low-inequality regimes, in some countries household inequality has since 
risen substantially (for example, in China where income inequality is reaching a 
Gini ratio of 0.5 or more, UNU-WIDER n.d.). This begs the question of the sus-
tainability of current growth regimes, an issue that we will take up in more detail 
in the section on future prospects. A second observation is that several countries 
that did not manifest a high-growth regime, also have, or had at least in the past, 
a low-inequality regime. Hence, a low-inequality regime is a necessary but cer-
tainly not a sufficient condition for a virtuous growth and employment pattern.
Therefore, another common element in the three fast-growing and the three 
medium-growing countries with good labour market outcomes must be sought 
in the drivers of growth. All countries in this group made use of external markets 
to sustain a demand-led growth regime. However, as in the case of their invest-
ment regime, external demand was not left to an invisible hand. On the contrary, 
firms were encouraged to export, with clear export targets. Korean firms were not 
allocated foreign exchange or further export licences if they had not met earlier 
agreed export targets and investment (Amsden 2007). All the virtuous growing 
countries defied the lessons from the ‘Washington Consensus’, which came to 
dominate policy advice from the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s (van 
der Hoeven and Taylor 2000).
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Government policies to increase agricultural productivity through land 
redistribution, investment, subsidies, and the provision of ‘public goods’ for 
agriculture and for human development have also been a turning point in 
countries with fast and medium growth and with a good labour market regime. 
In the case of China, Saith (2016: 85–6) argues:
Chinese advantage originates not in the market reforms era, but in the socialist 
period when the countryside was organized in rural collectives. In India, rural 
institutions were generally obstructive, sticky and posed a constraint to policies 
of rapid transformation; in China, the institutional profile, far from setting a con-
straint, was itself converted into a policy instrumental variable, where institutional 
features were designed and periodically redesigned primarily using the criteria 
of their functional appropriateness for generating rural accumulation and growth.
The countries with fast and median growth with a good labour market regime, 
despite different political constellations, manifested a Lewisian development pro-
cess where labour could move to industry—a process that Myrdal himself had 
cast doubt upon because of the inability of the rural workforce to be productively 
engaged in industry. The above makes clear that countries with an explicit growth 
regime based on strong demand impulses, and managing a fair income distribu-
tion regime, showed better performances in the labour market, as employment 
generation and increasing rewards on the labour factor made a virtuous growth 
path possible.
The issue of labour intensity in sectors of the economy cannot be left unaddressed. 
Myrdal himself, in discussing cottage industries (Myrdal 1968: chapter 25), refers to 
this at various instances and favours development of cottage industries. Designing 
policies for labour-intensive activities is often heralded together with programmes 
for poverty alleviation as the magic key to solve the unemployment problem in 
developing and emerging countries (for an insightful and critical discussion, see 
Amsden  2011).  However, in the countries with virtuous growth patterns, the 
stimulating cottage industries played a lesser role than in the countries that did not 
manifest a virtuous growth pattern. The formal industry sector in India is less 
labour intensive than in the other countries in the group of fast-growing countries 
(Ghose 2016; Verick 2016). Breman (2013) argues furthermore that maintaining a 
large informal workforce is a necessary element in India to keep workers’ wages low.
Comparing the trajectories of India and China shows the importance of well co-
ordinated industrialization policies for good labour market outcomes. The success 
of China in industrialization compared to India is well demonstrated by Felipe 
(2012: 101): whereas the actual share of manufacturing to total output in China is 
higher than its predicted share based on its GDP per capita level (34.5 per cent 
versus 27.3 per cent), the actual share in India is lower than the predicted share 
(15.85 per cent versus 19.55 per cent, figures for 2000). Female labour force 
participation, the percentage of wage and salaried workers, employment-to-
population rate, and literacy rate are all higher in China than in India.
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While India has made efforts to boost industrialization since 2000, its share of 
manufacturing remains below its potential. Various policies have contributed to this. 
Nayyar (2018) points to the low level of loans from development banks in India, 
where the percentage of outstanding loans from development banks to GDP dropped 
over the period 2000 to 2010 from 7.4 per cent to 0.8 per cent, while the percentage 
rose in China from 6.2 per cent to 11.2 per cent. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2006: 
278–9) point to the success of the more dirigisted macroeconomic policies in China:
There is an overarching conclusion, of wider relevance, that can be drawn from 
the comparative analysis of the experiences of macroeconomic management in 
China and India. Discussions on macroeconomic policies counterpose the policies 
adopted in the dirigiste period, ostensibly characterized by financial repression, 
with a framework characterized by a reduced role for fiscal policy and for state 
expenditure and a greater role for the liberalized financial sector in mobilizing 
and channeling investment. The Chinese experience makes it clear that such 
either-or dichotomies are not inevitable. India’s experience suggests that relent-
lessly pursuing the transition to a marketist macroeconomic framework makes 
it difficult to sustain investment and growth and to translate the benefits of that 
growth into better outcomes with regard to employment and poverty reduction.
The amalgam of economic and labour market policies in China led to a process of 
‘cumulative causation’ (as Myrdal labelled such processes) that fostered effective 
transformation and good labour market outcomes, as compared to India.
In order to flesh out why some of the other countries in Asia had high growth 
and good labour market outcomes and some not, Box 12.1 compares development 
and labour market patterns in Bangladesh and Vietnam. Because of past wars, these 
countries shared tremendous development challenges in the 1970s and even later. 
Bangladesh (created in 1972) and Vietnam (unified in 1975) both emerged from ser-
ious armed conflicts costing many lives and destroying large chunks of infrastructure, 
and needed to transform their economies and society. Box 12.1 concludes that the 
gradual and interventionist policies in agriculture and manufacturing in Vietnam led 
to a virtuous growth path and better labour market  outcomes than in Bangladesh.
Box 12.1 Transformation policies and labour market outcomes 
in Vietnam and Bangladesh
After unification, Vietnam adopted a very centralized planning economy. Its first 
five-year plan was somewhat of a failure. Therefore, in 1986 Vietnam adopted 
a home-grown reform programme, Doi Moi, which resulted in the opening up 
of the economy, but with a strong role for the communist party, with a fair 
amount of government intervention in agriculture and with vigorous industrial 
Continued
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5. Future Prospects
Myrdal’s predictions and the subsequent developments in the majority of Asian 
countries show that predicting a long-term development trajectory of a country 
or of a region, and the evolution of the labour market therein, is hazardous. As 
Myrdal observed, development depends on economic, social, cultural, and religious 
factors as well as on strengthening institutions for a developmental state. The 
policies (Tarp 2017: chapter 1). Bangladesh also started with a strong socialist-
oriented government, but after a period of military rule and later a more 
democratic regime, free market fundamentals were restored in Bangladesh. 
Export-processing zones were established from 1983 and Bangladesh became 
one of the world’s largest exporters of garments (Jenkins and Sen 2006).
The interventionist agricultural policy in Vietnam resulted in a system where 
out of around 2,000 of all rural households 41% were farming purely for the 
market, 18% were farm labourers, with the remaining households having diver-
sified income sources. In Bangladesh, rural households were dominated by rural 
households with diversified income (48%) and by households living on farm 
labour (40%) with only 6% purely engaged in farming (World Bank 2008: 76; 
Fields 2012). In the 1986–1995 decade the labour market structures were similar 
in Vietnam and Bangladesh. However, the interventionist industrial policy in 
Vietnam paid off. While in 1990 the shares of manufacturing in GDP in Vietnam 
and Bangladesh were more or less the same (12.3% and 13.3% respectively), in 
2005, Vietnam’s share had greatly surpassed that of Bangladesh (20.6% versus 
16.5%) (Szirmai 2012: 406–20).
These different transformation paths in Vietnam and Bangladesh also resulted 
in better labour market outcomes in Vietnam. In the 1986–1995 period, the shares 
of agricultural employment and manufacturing employment were the same in 
both countries (around 64% and 14%). This pattern changed over 2006–2015 to 
the extent that the share of agricultural employment declined in both countries 
to around 47%, but the share of manufacturing employment became larger 
in Vietnam (around 22%) than in Bangladesh (18%). Higher prod uct iv ity in 
manufacturing in Vietnam also resulted in drastic changes in poverty profiles. 
Whereas the percentage of people living below the poverty line in the 1986–1995 
period was about the same (78% in Vietnam, 80% in  Bangladesh), the rate 
drastically decreased in the 2006–2015 period in Vietnam to 28%.
Hence, while both countries became export-oriented, the gradual inter-
ventionist policies in agriculture and manufacturing in Vietnam led to better 
economic and labour market outcomes than in Bangladesh.
Box 12.1 Continued
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previous sections showed how a positive mix of these factors lead in some fast-
growing countries to a virtuous development path with good labour market out-
comes, but also how a negative mix can lead to slower development and weaker 
outcomes in the labour market.
We see six, not entirely independent, factors determining future development 
of economies and labour markets in Asia, which all point to the need for a continu-
ation or for a stronger adoption of the demand-led growth which was so successful 
in some Asian countries.
5.1 Demographic Trends and Challenges
Asian economies have witnessed a substantial lift from demography. Demographic 
dividends—characterized by falling child dependency, a growing working-age 
population, and a moderate rise in old-age dependency—have contributed up to 
2 per cent to annual GDP growth (ADB 2018). The transition to an older popula-
tion in the foreseeable future will deprive the region of a main driver of its eco-
nomic success. While demographic dividends are vanishing in China and Thailand 
today, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are expected to lose their dividends by 
the 2020s. India and the Philippines should be able to benefit from their youthful 
populations for a little longer—possibly up until 2030 (Scherpf 2015).
Demographics are not a fate, and countries can develop coping mechanisms 
that facilitate a sustainable transition towards older societies (ADB 2018). Such 
mechanisms include immigration and enhanced productivity. In addition, the 
participation of older people and women in the labour force needs to be encour-
aged (Scherpf 2015). Across emerging Asia, the retirement age is still fairly low 
(55 in Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Thailand, 60 in China and Vietnam, 62 in 
Singapore, and 65 in the Philippines). Against the background of increasing life 
expectancy, a rise in the legal retirement age can be a simple yet effective policy 
response. Eventually, countries need to find meaningful and fair ways to transfer 
resources from the working population that generate savings to retirees with 
inadequate income to sustain their consumption. Given the changes in traditional 
family-based support structures, the development of comprehensive public trans-
fer schemes has to be a key policy priority (Scherpf 2015). Asia’s financial systems 
still lag substantially behind the region’s dynamic real economy, and many Asian 
countries have labour markets that discourage employers from hiring older work-
ers (Park et al. 2015).
5.2 Migration
Demographic developments also affect international migration. But migration is 
even more affected by economic and political factors. ESCAP (2016: 51) observes 
a great divergence between countries in the Asian region and classifies the region 
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into three groupings: those with a GDP per capita below US$10,000 (PPP in 2012 
US$), those with a GDP per capita between US$10,000 and US$20,000, and those 
with a GDP per capita greater than US$20,000. In countries in the last group, 
which contains, for example, South Korea and Malaysia, in-migration is greater 
than out-migration; in the middle-income group (containing, for example, China 
and Thailand), in- and out-migration are more or less equal; and in the lowest 
income category (containing all the other countries we analysed in section 3) out-
migration still predominates. For these countries, remittances (from countries in 
as well as outside the Asian region) still remain a considerable part of GDP. For 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, remittances still 
contributed over 5 per cent to GDP in 2016 (ADB 2018: 56). However, as other 
countries in the region that have grown quickly have shown, out-migration and 
remittances can change quickly.
The UN estimates that, based on population and economic projections, China, 
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka will need immigrants to maintain 
dependency rates and economic growth, while countries in South Asia as well as 
Indonesia and Laos can ‘afford’ out-migration (The Economist 2017). Furthermore, 
technological development also changes the characteristics of migration. The World 
Bank (2009: 158) observes that skilled out-migration from East Asia and the 
Pacific and from South Asia is already over 60 per cent, the highest for all regions 
in the world. Binding labour shortages in the Asian region over the next 25 years 
can only be avoided, if Asian countries improve their collaboration for an orderly 
migration regime.
5.3 Technology, Industrialization, and Labour Replacement
Technological development and industrialization have played a major role in 
the fast-growing Asian countries with a virtuous growth path and superior 
labour market outcomes (Lin 2012). For the fast-growing countries that have 
reached a certain level of industrialization and with good labour market per-
formances (like China), the question is whether further industrialization should 
be pursued or whether more attention should be given to developing various 
activities in the high-end service sector, as manufacturing costs are rapidly rising 
(McKinsey 2017a). In the transition to more service-oriented activities, artifi-
cial technologies can dramatically boost productivity. McKinsey (2017b) argues 
that this increased productivity could be a crucial capability for China to sustain 
its future economic growth as the country’s working-age population declines. 
It  estimates that automating workplaces with artificial intelligence could add 
0.8 to 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth annually, depending on the speed of 
adoption. However, realizing this potential in China also depends on automating 
workplaces across China’s traditional industries and not just among the technology 
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giants. If China manages to combine this with its continued demand-based 
economic growth, it will become a strong growth pole for the whole Southeast 
and East Asian region. Countries in Asia at the lower end of development would 
still gain from industrialization. A recent World Bank report (Hallward-Driemeier 
and Nayyar 2017: 6) concludes:
With reform priorities becoming more urgent, one key lesson is that new 
technologies and changing globalization patterns increase the complementarities 
between economy wide and targeted approaches. Yet it may be more feasible, 
at least in the immediate future, to meet the requirements to be competitive by 
targeting locations and sectors rather than attempting to reform and provide 
public investments throughout the whole economy and that given the growing 
uncertainty about the pace of technological change, horizontal policies that 
develop transferable skills would reduce risks in the future.
5.4 Future of Work
A related issue to technological development is the future of work in Asian coun-
tries. The discussion on the future of work is often couched in terms of how 
automatization is affecting the high-end and profitable manufacturing industries 
in Asia and how robots are penetrating the industrial production processes. Yet 
this seems mainly to apply to China and South Korea. UNCTAD (2017) observes 
that robotization has been primarily employed in the automotive, electrical, and 
electronics industries, but that in many labour-intensive industries, such as garment 
making, widespread automatization is not yet suitable and that in countries with 
large numbers of low-skilled workers entering the labour force (as in the set of Asian 
countries with low growth and weak labour market regimes considered in this 
chapter) automatization may still drive up production costs. Governments in these 
countries therefore need to apply judicious policies for encouraging new tech-
nologies but not rely on the effects of these solely, or massively subsidize these 
technologies. The experience of China of ‘walking on two legs’ when it developed 
its industrial base while maintaining agricultural output and employment, could 
also be applied by combining more traditional labour-intensive manufacturing 
and high technological activities.
5.5 Social Development, Education, and Health
A strong improvement in literacy and secondary education is a common char-
acteristic of Asian countries with high or medium growth rates and good labour 
market outcomes. This conclusion has at least two important pointers for the 
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future development of Asian countries. First, in countries that lag behind in 
achieving full literacy and secondary education, growth and productive employ-
ment will remain constrained. Attaining full literacy and investment in education 
as part of an overall growth strategy is warranted in these countries. Second, 
countries that have progressed well in these areas need to be cognizant of the fast 
changes in the labour market caused by the technological development discussed 
above. This requires changes in school curricula and in developing systems of 
continuous learning and upgrading of skills. Failing in this will lead to a slow-
down of growth, deteriorating labour market conditions, and increasing wage 
and income inequality.
5.6 Income and Wealth Inequalities
Income inequality, in most of the Asian countries analysed, went up or 
remained stable over the period considered. Most notable is the increase in 
India and China where the Gini ratio increased from the 0.26 to 0.35 range in 
the 1966–1970 period to the 0.45 to 0.55 range in the 2011–2015 period, while 
in other countries the Gini ratio went up one range or stayed in the same range 
(UNU-WIDER n.d.).
Income inequality has increased for various reasons, but a strong contributing 
factor is the declining wage share, indicating that capital owners capture prod uct-
iv ity gains to a larger degree than workers. This, combined with increases in wealth 
inequality, is leading to an increase in the income share of the top one per cent of 
the population. McKinsey (2017b) argues that the fast-growing artificial intelli-
gence in China and in other fast-growing Asian countries will raise the premium 
placed on digital skills, while reducing demand for medium- and low-skilled work-
ers, potentially exacerbating income inequality. It is difficult to predict whether 
this trend of rising inequality will continue, but there are clear signs that a con-
tinuing rise in inequality is socially and economically untenable. Few countries 
in the region have explicit policies to reduce income and wealth inequality. With 
growing inequality, the economic growth of the past is not sustainable (van der 
Hoeven 2011; Nayyar 2013b), and high inequality and faltering growth will lead 
to social unrest and to deteriorating labour market outcomes, undoing for some 
countries the gains achieved in this area (Nayyar 2017).
Domestic policies to face these challenges in Asian countries can be rein-
forced or compromised by international developments. If, as UNCTAD’s Trade 
and Development Report (2017) strongly advocates, a global social contract on 
global growth and employment creation could be achieved (van der Hoeven 2012), 
then economic and social developments in Asia would certainly progress faster 
than they would without such a global social contract. But whether such a global 
social contract will emerge is not at all a given in the current international political 
constellation.
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6. Conclusions
This chapter reviewed how economic development and labour markets have inter-
acted in Asian countries since the publication of Myrdal’s Asian Drama in 1968. It 
found that Myrdal was correct in rejecting the Western approach to, and the defi n-
ition of, employment by emphasizing the role of ‘informal’ employment, but that he 
underestimated the effects of the Lewisian development process. A classification of 
Asian countries by growth regimes and labour market regimes showed that in fast-
growing countries with a good labour market regime, initial conditions played a 
certain role, but less than Myrdal had predicted. Myrdal’s concept of cumulative 
causation explains development in Asian countries better: all fast-growing countries 
with a good labour market regime have pursued a developmental state and applied a 
host of interventionist policies in agriculture, industry, and macroeconomics, as well 
as in social policies and in the treatment of women in the labour market. Successful 
countries are also characterized by initial low-income inequality and targeted redis-
tribution of factors of production. For some countries, though, growing inequality, 
together with other development challenges (demographics, migration, technology, 
the future of work, and social policies) may, if not attended to, become a problem in 
the future. Furthermore, domestic policies to face these challenges may be reinforced 
or compromised by international developments that are difficult to predict.
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Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama (1968) was arguably the first systematic analysis of 
the role of institutions in Asia’s development. Myrdal described his magisterial 
work as an ‘institutional approach’ that aimed to explain why conventional eco-
nomic analysis was providing inappropriate policy advice. Economic policies that 
worked in advanced countries were failing in Asia, Myrdal argued, because of 
Asian behavioural norms.1 Conventional economics assumed that people would 
respond flexibly and rationally to market incentives, but social, institutional, and 
political factors made Asians respond in different ways.
Like Myrdal, later institutional economists such as North (1990) or Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012) began to explain the poor performance of some developing 
countries by comparing their market-supporting institutions and informal norms 
with advanced countries. But like Myrdal, they ignored the Asian countries that 
performed remarkably well with unorthodox institutions, and they did not ask 
why similar unorthodox institutions failed to work in other Asian countries. The 
new institutional analysis failed to explain these variations because, first, it focused 
only on an analysis of institutions, both formal and informal, ignoring how char-
acteristics of organizations and the distribution of power between them affected 
the operation of institutions and the persistence or otherwise of particular behav-
ioural patterns. Second, they also downplayed the critical role of institutions in 
responding to market failures. Later developmental state theorists did focus on 
institutions that addressed market failures, in particular, industrial policy institu-
tions. But they, too, ignored the role of power in explaining the effectiveness of 
these institutions. The ‘political settlements framework’ looks at the interdepend-
ence of institutions and organizations, and how the distribution of power across 
organizations affects the effectiveness of institutions and the persistence of 
particular types of informal behaviour. This framework can explain the diversity 
of Asian experiences better and can help to formulate more effective policy.
1 Myrdal’s work takes in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, with occasional references to South Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. However, his in-depth 
analysis is largely based on India and to a lesser extent Pakistan, with references to other countries 
supporting the main lines of argument.
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One of Myrdal’s most influential observations was that states in South Asia 
were ‘soft’ and could not enforce social discipline. Political leaders tolerated social 
indiscipline and inefficiency on the grounds that this was part of ‘democratic 
planning’ while engaging in corruption themselves. Myrdal argued that this 
regressive collective behaviour was the product of attitudes, cultures, and insti-
tutions. He was describing something important, but it was an incomplete 
observation. The soft states were only ‘soft’ in some areas. They were very hard in 
others, for instance in repressing communists or secessionists. The weak imple-
mentation of some institutions and policies is more likely to have been due to the 
interests of powerful organizations in specific countries and sectors rather than a 
general feature of their cultures and attitudes. The ‘political settlement’ describes 
the distribution of power across different types of organizations. The distribution 
of organizational power can vary greatly across countries and sectors, and over 
time, and can help to explain significant differences in institutional outcomes and 
behavioural patterns.
The relationship between institutions and political settlements can be explored 
through the lens of industrial policy institutions, which played an important role 
in many Asian countries. Success with industrialization depended not just on 
the country’s initial conditions, but also on the implementation of transformative 
industrial policy institutions. Successful industrial policy in Taiwan and South 
Korea in the 1950s and 1960s involved the allocation of resources to new firms and 
sectors as conditional policy rents. The aim was to accelerate technology adoption 
and learning-by-doing to raise productivity and achieve competitiveness in new 
sectors. The critical condition for success, as developmental state theorists later 
pointed out, was that industrial policy agencies could effectively discipline the 
recipients of policy rents. This capability allowed mistakes to be corrected and 
ensured that productivity growth was rapid. In China in the 1980s, the industrial 
policy was different but the enforcement of conditions ensuring productivity 
growth was again effective, achieving dramatic outcomes.
At the other end of the spectrum were countries in South Asia in the 1960s 
where the beneficiaries of industrial policy rents were much more difficult to 
 discipline. Powerfully connected business houses, and groups linked to them, 
captured policy rents and could not be disciplined. Not surprisingly, these coun-
tries achieved less significant industrial outcomes. Southeast Asian countries 
were somewhere in between and achieved moderate success. However, the 1980s 
saw the beginning of a different type of industrialization in South Asia, led by 
sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals in India and garments and textiles 
in Bangladesh. Institutions and policies successfully supported capability devel-
opment in these sectors because policy rents were now delivered in ways that 
could not be unproductively captured, even in these political settlements.
Developmental state institutions worked in North East Asia and China not 
because these countries already had market-supporting behavioural norms, nor 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Mushtaq H. Khan 323
because they were less corrupt or otherwise better at following market rules. If the 
appropriate rights, norms, and behaviour already existed, social transformations 
would not be required (Khan 2004, 2007). Transformational policies are required 
precisely because pre-existing rights and institutions have to change and new 
capabilities developed. They inevitably disrupt pre-existing rights and require the 
creation of many rents as important market failures are targeted. Transformational 
institutions are successful when they are effective in changing rights and behav-
iour to achieve more productive societies. For this to happen the enforcement of 
these institutions has to be aligned with the interests of the powerful.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines Myrdal’s contribution 
to institutional analysis and how modern institutional analysis has built on his 
analysis. Section 3 sets out an alternative institutional analysis based on political 
settlements, and the implications for the analysis of the effectiveness of institutions. 
Section 4 draws on the experiences of Asian countries to explore how develop-
mental policies and institutions worked across political settlements and how appro-
priately designed transformative institutions can work even in apparently adverse 
political settlements. Section 5 concludes by discussing incremental versus radical 
strategies for reforming governance and institutions. While Myrdal advocated 
radical change, he recognized, with some pessimism, that the incremental approach 
was the one that most countries would adopt. However, a deeper evaluation of the 
experiences of the last fifty years suggests that the incremental approach can have 
less pessimistic prospects than Myrdal thought, particularly if it takes into 
account the interdependencies between organizational power and institutions.
2. Myrdal and Institutional Analysis
Myrdal posed a question that continues to motivate institutional analysis: why do 
people not respond to incentives in the same way everywhere (Myrdal  1968: 
16–24)? Myrdal rightly criticized economists who assume that responses to eco-
nomic incentives will be the same everywhere. This was not the case, he argued, 
because behavioural norms may prevent individuals from responding rationally 
to economic incentives. He called these patterns of behaviour ‘institutions’, and in 
India, Myrdal’s main case study, the regressive institutions he identified included 
the caste system, the taboo on cow slaughter, dysfunctional pre-capitalist struc-
tures of land rights, and the management of firms based on caste, family, and 
ethnic allegiances. What Myrdal describes as institutions include what we would 
today call formal institutions like property rights or laws against cow slaughter, as 
well as informal institutions like caste, that are either self-enforced or enforced by 
informal extra-legal processes (North 1990).
Myrdal’s argument was that formal and informal institutions reinforce each 
other and are therefore difficult to change. Their persistence can prevent the 
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emergence of the behavioural patterns necessary for a modern market economy, 
including efficiency, diligence, flexibility, enterprise, and even honesty. He con-
cluded that regressive behavioural regularities needed to change, but this was 
only likely if compulsion was used to change these attitudes. But the ‘soft’ South 
Asian states were unable or unwilling to impose any social discipline on citizens 
(Myrdal 1968: 60–3). His response was to propose a big push to change institu-
tions and attitudes because ‘[i]t is often not more difficult, but easier, to cause a 
big change rapidly than a small change gradually’ (Myrdal 1968: 115). But he did 
not make clear where he thought such a push would come from.
Figure 13.1 summarizes the links in Myrdal’s analysis. The parallels with the 
later institutional economics of North and his followers are obvious. The argu-
ment begins with formal institutions and informal behavioural norms. In Asia 
these were often regressive, with roots going back to pre-colonial and colonial 
periods, which Myrdal loosely describes as ‘feudal’. These pre-existing institutions 
include dysfunctional property rights over land, hierarchical caste systems, or 
other social attitudes that were inimical to the effective operation of a capitalist 
market economy. Individuals and firms could not respond flexibly to price signals 
or market opportunities in such a context. To deal with the economic underper-
formance that followed, states found it necessary to operate a raft of discretionary 
top-down controls like licensing economic activities, providing subsidies, protect-
ing markets, and so on. The result was the resolution of some problems but the 
creation of new inefficiencies, since these interventions too could not be properly 
policed or enforced. We would today describe this as rent creation and corruption. 
Anticipating subsequent debates over rents, rent-seeking, and governance, Myrdal 
REGRESSIVE INSTITUTIONS
Dysfunctional formal rules and
informal behavioural norms
INEFFICIENT ORGANIZATIONS
Behavioural traits constrain efficiency:
Inflexibility, indiscipline, low responsiveness to
incentives, rule-violation behaviour, dishonesty
FAILED POLICIES
Discretionary policies to correct market
failures induce further corruption and
rule violations: regressive norms
reinforced
Figure 13.1 Myrdal’s institutional analysis.
Source: Author’s illustration based on Myrdal (1968: 901–35).
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argued that these interventions created ‘extraordinarily high profits’ (rents) for 
privileged companies in the private sector (Myrdal 1968: 926). Given the low 
social discipline, the interventions induced further rule violations and regressive 
behaviour, completing the loop in Figure 13.1 (Myrdal 1968: 901–35).
Myrdal’s analysis anticipated modern institutional analysis whose logical 
structure is quite similar. It also anticipated the literature on how corrections to 
market failures can lead to government failures (Bhagwati 1982, 1983; Krueger 
1990). Myrdal sometimes argues that regressive institutions persisted because 
powerful interests benefitted from them, but at other times he argues that they 
reflected the values and cultures of these societies. In the early part of his work, it 
appears that regressive institutions are protected by powerful interests. But later 
Myrdal argues that gradual changes were possible in Europe because reforms 
were aligned with the values of Western civilization, while in South Asia, regressive 
social behaviour, stratification, and attitudes were sanctioned by old cultures and 
popular religion, and so gradual reform was more likely to be overturned (Myrdal 
1968: 2114–15).
The distinction between the two positions is important for Myrdal’s justifica-
tion of radical change. If regressive behaviour is embedded in rigid mental  models 
of large numbers of people, there may be no alternative to radical cultural revolu-
tions to break down these ways of thinking. But if the resistance comes from the 
powerful, attempts at big changes are likely to be violently resisted and incremen-
tal reform strategies may in any case work better. For instance, the resistance of 
different elites may be better dealt with using sequential reforms, or by working in 
alignment with the interests of some of the powerful to achieve greater productiv-
ity and welfare gradually.
The interests of the powerful and the evolution of cultures can clearly interact. 
Powerful groups can be expected to invest in cultures that support their interests, 
but these can also become widely shared and provide affirmation and identity to 
many other groups. A wide range of groups can then use cultural and identity 
symbols in their own mobilizations. It may therefore appear that culture has an 
independent existence because it does not mechanically reflect the interests of 
particular groups. Nevertheless, culture persists because a variety of groups invest 
in its reproduction and it is therefore important to assess the dominant direction 
of causality over time. Myrdal’s earlier argument that regressive institutions and 
attitudes are protected by configurations of interests is more in line with my own 
thinking and with the evidence discussed in section 4. If on the other hand, cul-
tures and norms persist entirely independently because of mental models, we are 
in a thicker soup. Much later, Douglass North came to a similar impasse when he 
was trying to explain the persistence of dysfunctional institutions. North resisted 
explanations based on the distribution of power, and so he had to fall back on 
mental models to explain institutional stagnation by a process of exclusion (North 
1995). The problem is that this can easily descend into a genetic explanation 
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because we then have to explain why some population groups fail to update or 
reject their dysfunctional mental models in the light of evidence. Fortunately, 
North abandoned this line of argument before it drove him in that direction.
This is not to say that values, cultures, or religions never have independent 
effects on the evolution of institutions and organizations. Cultures and norms can 
influence how different groups across society identify themselves and the narra-
tives they use to mobilize their supporters in conflicts with other groups. As a 
result, the evolution of organizational power and institutions can be affected by 
culture and history. Myrdal’s warnings about the regressive role of culture and 
religion can hardly be ignored in the context of the backward slide towards 
 populism and identity politics in large parts of contemporary South Asia and 
beyond. Even so, the question remains as to whether progress requires substantial 
social upheavals to destroy these ideological frames or whether incremental strat-
egies can change evolutionary institutional paths. If institutions and policies can 
be designed to be effective in particular power configurations, and if they support 
the development of new productive capabilities, the distribution of power can 
gradually change and allow new groups to invest in the propagation of new cul-
tures and attitudes. We will return to these questions.
The questions Myrdal raised became the subject of a vast outpouring of research 
in institutional economics and political economy. Liberal rent-seeking analyses 
drew on the work of Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) to argue that liberaliza-
tion was required to reverse discretionary policy interventions of the type that 
Myrdal had described. This, it was argued, would reduce rent-seeking and cor-
ruption and make economies more efficient. The work of North and his associates 
(North 1981, 1990; North et al. 2007; North et al. 2009; North et al. 2013) and 
later of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) identified the formal and informal insti-
tutions that supported efficiency (essentially institutions that made market trans-
actions more efficient) and the ‘extractive’ or redistributive ones that destroyed 
value. The role of political power found a place in mainstream institutional analysis 
in the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2012).
But the emerging analysis suffered from many of the limitations of Myrdal’s 
original work. The emerging work on rents and rent-seeking ignored the rents cre-
ated by welfare-enhancing state interventions. If we recognize the possibility of 
value-enhancing rents, rent-seeking and corruption can be associated with very dif-
ferent development outcomes (Khan 2000a, 2000b, 2006). Similarly, the mainstream 
work on property rights and formal institutions ignored the fact that capitalist 
development requires the destruction of many pre-existing rights and institutions. 
Developing societies are unlikely to have well-enforced formal institutions when 
their pre-existing rights are going through huge disruptions. Using the institutions 
and governance structures of advanced countries as the benchmark for developing 
countries is therefore deeply problematic not only in Myrdal, but also in later 
authors like Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Khan 2012).
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Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000, 2012) analysis of power, and their argument 
that inclusive political institutions empower market-supporting groups, is also 
based on an inappropriate generalization. Advanced countries are advanced 
because they have many productive organizations that can benefit from market 
institutions. Market-restricting monopolies benefit small groups but hurt the 
majority. Inclusive political institutions in such a context can plausibly empower 
the productive majority to resist monopolists. The problem of power is more 
complex in developing countries where the majority may not necessarily support 
market institutions because they do not yet have the productive capabilities to 
benefit from them. Instead, large groups can be mobilized with populist or iden-
tity politics to demand value-reducing rents or to block the productive restruc-
turing of property rights. In these contexts, inclusive political institutions do not 
necessarily empower market-supporting groups. This is not an argument against 
inclusive politics, because restricting rent-seeking opportunities in these contexts 
may sometimes trigger violence and more regressive results. The challenge is to 
devise incremental institutional changes that can nudge developing societies 
towards better evolutionary paths.
3.  Political Settlements and Institutional Evolution
Given these limitations, it is not surprising that Myrdal and the new institutional 
economists who followed could not provide convincing explanations for differ-
ences in performance across developing countries. The high-growth countries in 
Asia did not have the cultures and values of Western capitalist societies, they did 
not have well-enforced formal institutions during their transitions, and they 
did not have very inclusive political institutions. And yet they achieved dramatic 
capitalist transitions. Moreover, from the 1980s, there were significant growth 
accelerations in South Asia as well, without the massive disruptions in cultures 
and attitudes that Myrdal thought would be required.
The ‘political settlements’ framework addresses this challenge and provides a 
different analysis of institutions. It builds on three analytical propositions. First, 
the effectiveness of any institution depends on the responses of the organizations 
affected by that institution. The horizontal activity of organizations in punishing 
or isolating rule-violators is at least as important in ensuring adherence as the 
occasional vertical enforcement by the state. Second, as any institution implies 
different costs and benefits across organizations, some organizations may support 
the institution while others resist it. The overall adherence to, or enforcement of, 
an institution will therefore depend on the distribution of power across different 
types of organizations (the political settlement). Finally, apart from market- 
supporting institutions (like property rights) a range of other institutions is required 
to address market failures and maintain political stability. During periods of crisis 
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or rapid transformations, institutions are also involved in organizing changes in 
rights and creating new capabilities. The operation of ‘transformative’ institutions 
can be decisive, particularly in these contexts. The political settlements frame-
work uses these propositions to provide an alternative analysis of institutional 
performance and policy (Khan 2010, 2018).
The role of organizations in enforcing institutions was highlighted in the work 
of Greif (2006). He used a game-theoretic approach to describe how institutions 
can endogenously emerge in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Institutions for 
Greif were simply the equilibrium behaviour of organizations. The formal specifi-
cation of an institution was therefore less important than the actual behaviour of 
organizations in adhering to particular rules and enforcing them on each other. 
An implication of this approach, though Greif did not put it like that, is that if 
equilibrium behaviour diverged from the description of a formal rule, it would 
appear that the formal rule was being distorted or modified by the behaviour of 
organizations. His models did not consider the distribution of power across 
organizations, but in games with multiple equilibria with different distributions 
of benefits, powerful organizations can be expected to hold out in distributive 
conflicts until the equilibrium behaviour of other organizations adjusts to support 
the institution desired by the more powerful (Knight 1992). This takes us to our 
second proposition. The behavioural regularities that emerge will depend not just 
on particular punishment strategies, but also on the relative holding power of the 
organizations involved.
Marxist historians of capitalist transitions in Europe have also identified the 
importance of distributions of power for understanding the emergence and 
effectiveness of institutions (Brenner 1976, 1985; Wood 2002). The puzzle they 
addressed was that the first transition to capitalism was in England rather than in 
more commercialized or more culturally sophisticated parts of Europe. The 
Italian city states, the Baltic states, or the Netherlands were more commercialized 
centres of long-distance trade. The Renaissance was centred in continental Europe. 
England’s advantage could not have been its more advanced culture or its market 
institutions. Rather, these theorists argued, the first capitalist transformation in 
England was the outcome of a fortuitous balance of power between peasants, 
lords, and monarchs that allowed lords to enclose the commons, yet prevented 
them from reducing the peasantry to serfdom as in Eastern Europe and Russia. 
The Enclosures gradually privatized common village lands over several centuries, 
but allowed richer peasants to become capitalist tenant farmers by leasing land 
from enclosing landlords. This created a landless proletariat and capitalist farmers, 
but also new inequalities which, far from being aligned with ‘Western values’, 
were strongly resisted by the Church (Tawney 1938). Nevertheless, the emergent 
agrarian capitalism drove innovation and productivity growth. Intense competi-
tion between capitalist farmers who had to raise productivity to pay rising rents 
to landlords led both to the development of technology and the imposition of 
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discipline on workers who adhered to new rules because being landless they had 
no exit options.
The configuration of power was therefore critical for the English transformation, 
rather than a hard state or specific cultures and values, though cultural and other 
factors may have played some role. Similar institutions did not emerge in much of 
Europe till military competition with Britain persuaded Bismarck, Napoleon, 
and other state leaders to organize political coalitions to push through institutional 
transformations from above that achieved capitalist transitions. Similar state-led 
transitions began in Asia with the Meiji revolution in Japan in the nineteenth 
century, which foreshadowed transitions in Taiwan and South Korea in the 
twentieth. In each case, the transition was driven by different types of state and 
non-state organizations but, in all cases, a specific distribution of organizational 
power enabled outcomes that led to the emergence of new institutions and more 
dynamic societies. These institutional changes were mostly gradual rather than 
revolutionary breaks with pre-existing cultures and norms, though the latter 
changed over time as production systems and power configurations changed.
In every case, there was resistance from losers, but the losers were typically 
not the small groups of privileged monopolists, as in Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
analysis. The resistance to the Enclosures in Britain came from peasants. Far from 
inclusive institutions assisting the majority, the dispossessed peasants could not 
block these changes because parliament was not inclusive enough. Representation 
was restricted to property owners. Nor did parliament play a role in ensuring that 
peasants were rapidly or fairly compensated. They were not compensated at all. 
Parliament therefore played no direct role in the institutional transformation. The 
transition was successful because landlords could expropriate common lands 
without much peasant resistance, but they could not expropriate the peasant’s 
own land because peasants had sufficient collective power at the village level. This 
fine balance of power ensured a capitalist transformation of agriculture that 
eventually led to an improvement in welfare across classes. The configuration of 
organizational power and political institutions mattered, but in more complex 
ways than Acemoglu and Robinson suggest.
Finally, a large heterodox literature has discussed the role of institutions in 
addressing market failures and transforming rights and capabilities during social 
transformations. The diversity of outcomes can be examined through the lens of 
rents and the management of rents (Stiglitz  1996; Khan  2000a,  2000b,  2004). 
Rents can be defined in a number of ways, but they usually refer to incremental 
incomes associated with specific institutions. Some institutional changes, like 
the creation of artificial monopolies, create rents that are socially damaging. But 
welfare-enhancing interventions that create or reallocate property rights or 
address market failures also create incremental incomes somewhere. What types 
of rents are created and how they are allocated and managed can serve as a use-
ful lens for assessing the rent-creating institutions. Dynamic societies have 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
330 Asian Transformations
institutions that allow growth-enhancing transformations of rights and the creation 
and management of rents that drive learning, innovation, and political stability. 
Less dynamic societies mismanage rents, allowing some groups to capture assets 
and rents without delivering results, or they create rents that are directly unpro-
ductive, like monopoly rents or conflict-inducing redistributive rents.
Since all institutional changes create new incomes, they inevitably create rents. 
Not surprisingly, the emergence of institutions is usually driven by rent-seeking 
and they create incentives for further rent-seeking. Outcomes depend on the 
institutions regulating rent-seeking and the distribution of power across relevant 
organizations. Rent-seeking can result in the creation of socially useful institu-
tions, distortions in the implementation of useful institutions, or the creation of 
damaging institutions (Khan 2000b). Rent-seeking is just as ubiquitous in advanced 
countries but the adherence to a rule of law means that rent-seeking processes 
here are generally rule-following and part of ‘normal’ politics. However, legality 
does not ensure good social outcomes, and the converse is also true. Both legal 
rent-seeking (like lobbying) and illegal variants (like bribing and patron–client 
politics) can be associated with socially damaging, less damaging, or beneficial 
institutional outcomes.
In developing countries, powerful organizations typically do not support a 
rule of law. This is because even organizations that are not predatory are often 
not productive enough to survive against more productive competitors else-
where without informal rents. And because they are few in number, they can 
also transact with each other using informal contract enforcement, without a 
rule of law. Adherence to a rule of law by the powerful is therefore unlikely in 
these contexts and rent-seeking, too, is likely to be illegal or extra-legal, often 
taking the form of corruption. Politics is therefore likely to have a rule-violating 
character. Low tax revenues also mean that promises to spend the budget in 
rule-following ways are unlikely to attract powerful organizations to support 
particular parties. These characteristics of developing-country rent-seeking can 
explain why patronage and political corruption are typically part of their ‘nor-
mal’ politics (Khan 2005).
Given the nature of rent-seeking in these countries, it is not surprising that 
developing countries, including successful ones, typically suffer from high levels 
of corruption. South Korea in the 1960s or China in the 1980s had significant 
levels of corruption and yet achieved rapid development. Myrdal’s analysis of 
corruption and later mainstream analysis does not address this challenge. The 
variations in the outcomes of corruption become explicable once we recognize 
that the real differences between countries are in the types of rents created by 
organizations and how they are managed by other organizations. Where the condi-
tions of allocating and withdrawing rents support productivity growth, desirable 
results can be achieved despite rent-seeking. Corruption declines over time in 
these countries as productive capabilities develop and the growth in the number of 
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productive organizations creates growing organizational support for formalization 
and rule-following behaviour (Khan 2005, 2006).
The management of industrial and technology policies allows us to examine 
the significance of the distribution of power for the management of rents. 
Developing-country firms typically have low initial capabilities. Myrdal recog-
nized the critical importance of learning-by-doing, a process later analysed by 
Amsden (1989) and others. Developing countries do not have to invent new 
technologies; they can just learn how to use existing ones (Myrdal 1968: 691–6). 
However, market failures may prevent investments in learning-by-doing, a 
problem Myrdal did not adequately recognize. Amsden (1989) argued that 
learning needed to be supported by targeting conditional rents to emerging 
business, but the latter also had to be disciplined, and rents sometimes withdrawn 
to ensure that these were not wasted.
Evans (1995) later contributed the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ to explain 
why intervention by strong East Asian states achieved productivity growth rather 
than rent extraction. These states had the power to extract resources from business, 
but they used their power to raise productivity instead. Evans argued that this 
happened because government agencies were embedded in dense business–
government networks that allowed the knowledge and interests of the business 
sector to be incorporated into policy.
While developmental state theorists provided a deeper analysis of institutions 
and rents and went beyond the focus on market institutions, their analysis was 
still largely a purely institutional one. They ignored the configurations of power 
that enabled some institutions to work in specific contexts but not others. The 
rent-granting and rent-withdrawal institutions that Amsden and others identified 
in East Asia existed in similar forms in South Asia where they achieved far less 
impressive results. South Asian states had sufficient autonomy to destroy or con-
strain many good businesses, but they did not discipline the bad ones. Similarly, 
dense networks between business and government in South Asia and sometimes 
in Southeast Asia resulted in crony capitalism rather than efficiency-enhancing 
information sharing. The differences between these cases cannot be understood 
by looking at institutional structure alone, we need to understand how specific con-
figurations of organizational power made similar institutions operate differently.
Figure 13.2 summarizes our distinction between a ‘pure institutional analysis’, 
which focuses on the incentives created by formal and informal institutions that 
may result in particular outcomes, and the political settlements extension, which 
looks in addition at how the specific distribution of power across organizations 
affects the actual adherence to and enforcement of these institutions. Note that 
the introduction of particular institutions and policies on the left-hand side is not 
entirely predetermined by existing power structures. Otherwise, societies would 
be completely trapped by the interests of those who are already powerful. There is 
always some policy space for the introduction of new institutions and policies 
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that innovative political leaderships or organizations can exploit, but their imple-
mentation and final effects do depend on the reaction of a broader range of 
organizations.
The distribution of power across organizations is the ‘political settlement’ at 
the top right-hand corner of Figure  13.2. This describes the holding power of 
organizations affected by a particular institution. The country and sector-specific 
configurations of organizational power can only be inferred from a reading of 
history, which is why institutional analysis cannot be generalized from particular 
cases or derived from first principles. Holding power is not just based on the eco-
nomic power of organizations but also on their organizational power to hold out 
in conflicts while inflicting costs on others. Ignoring the power and interests of 
organizations is one reason why pure institutional analysis remains deficient, 
both the mainstream variants focusing on market institutions and heterodox 
variants looking at transformative institutions. Every institution or policy has dis-
tributive implications, and organizations can be expected to support or resist 
their implementation. If institutions create rents or seek to manage rents in ways 
that are against the interests of powerful organizations, the latter will resist by 
trying to change the institution or to informally modify its implementation using 
corruption or informal violations. Fully effective adherence is a boundary case. 
Note that informal modifications here have little to do with norms and every-
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Figure 13.2 Political settlements and institutional outcomes.
Source: Author’s illustration based on Khan (2010, 2018).
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distribution of power. Actual economic outcomes depend on how particular 
institutions or policies are implemented, not just their theoretical effects. Figure 13.2 
also shows that the political settlement is itself affected by economic outcomes 
which change the distribution of power over time. It is this evolutionary dynamic 
that a historical analysis of institutions must attempt to capture.
Depending on how the outcomes of particular policies and institutions affect 
the development of organizations, the relative power of organizations will evolve 
in particular ways. Radical change from this perspective is only necessary if the 
existing political settlement allows no incremental improvements in outcomes. 
The radical change in question would involve political mobilizations and the 
creation of new organizations that sought to directly change the political settle-
ment at the top right-hand corner of Figure 13.2. The danger is that mobilizations 
on this scale can just as well trigger counter-mobilizations of even more regres-
sive coalitions, while incrementalism may actually result in more sustainable pro-
gressive changes in the political settlement over time.
4. Comparative Institutional Experiences
The analytical links described in Figure 13.2 can help to make sense of compari-
sons between North East Asian and South Asian experiences in the 1960s, the 
period that Myrdal looked at. They can also help us to understand institutional 
evolution since that time. South Korea began its industrial take-off shortly after 
Park Chung Hee took power in a military coup in 1961. By then South Korea had 
already carried out substantial land reforms as the Japanese occupation had force-
fully dispossessed the most powerful elements of the Korean yangban landed 
elite and converted much of their land to Japanese ownership. With the departure 
of the Japanese, land reform based on the redistribution of Japanese land and the 
compulsory purchase of land from the remaining landlords was relatively easy to 
achieve. These reforms led to a significant equalization of landholdings and a dra-
matic reduction in the number of tenants as they became smallholders. However, 
it did not create a class of yeoman tenants on the English pattern who could drive 
an agrarian capitalist revolution from below. The global conditions were not right 
for smallholding agriculture to make much of an impact on South Korea’s economic 
progress. At best, the land reform created political stability in the countryside in 
the face of the communist threat from the North, expanded the domestic market 
somewhat, and perhaps created a greater demand for education in the country-
side (Kohli 1994; Putzel 2000).
The real impetus to South Korean modernization came with its industrial 
push in the 1960s. A critical feature of the new institutional structure was the 
provision of significant rents to the chaebol (the large family-owned conglomer-
ates of South Korea), to enable them to engage in learning-by-doing to improve 
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their organizational and technical capabilities (Amsden 1989; Khan 2000b). The 
institutions supporting their learning also compelled the chaebol to rapidly acquire 
international competitiveness by withdrawing support if they failed to perform. 
The credibility of the withdrawal threat created compulsions for rapid productivity 
growth and ensured that infants did not require permanent support. Myrdal’s fear 
that unproductive rent capture would compound the problems that any interven-
tions tried to solve did not materialize in South Korea.
Why did South Korea not fall into this trap? Pakistan provides a good com-
parison with South Korea because it attempted a similar mix of import substitu-
tion and export promotion, and provided rents to large holding companies using 
similar instruments (Khan 1999). Indeed, in the early years, South Korean planners 
came to Pakistan to learn about planning strategies. While there were many differ-
ences between the two countries, the decisive difference was that large Pakistani 
companies were connected to powerful and dense networks within the bureau-
cracy, army, and political parties, and could use their help to successfully retain 
rents even when their failure to become competitive had become obvious.
The organization of patronage networks in Pakistan was fragmented, but each 
network was powerful enough to resist disciplining by others or by state agencies. 
In the late 1960s, the media openly reported how ‘twenty-two families’ had cap-
tured public resources, but the military regime was unable to impose discipline 
on its inefficient clients. There was much corruption in this process, as Myrdal 
recognized, but it was more than just a problem of corruption. The value-reducing 
rent capture by powerful networks hurt the legitimacy of the ostensibly powerful 
military government. It tried unsuccessfully to rein in its clients, including revealing 
their names and the money they owed, but it failed. The regime was eventually 
brought down in 1971 as a result of popular mobilizations against cronyistic elites. 
The failure was deeper than knowledge, values, or interests. The top leadership 
had strong incentives to limit rent capture by uncompetitive business groups but 
they failed to overcome their resistance. The nature of the failure suggests that a 
different policy design, perhaps supporting smaller, less-connected capitalists, or 
rewarding investors after they had achieved some results rather than giving all the 
rents upfront, may have worked better in this political settlement. Indeed, we find 
that other strategies of supporting learning worked much better in a number of 
sectors in South Asia in the 1980s.
We know as a result of later revelations by the chaebol that the allocation of 
industrial policy rents in South Korea in the 1960s involved much corruption. 
But, here, corruption did not featherbed inefficiency. The chaebol receiving support 
knew they had an opportunity to become competitive, but they also knew that the 
option of capturing the rents while remaining uncompetitive was not feasible. This 
was because the state agencies monitoring them were more powerful than the 
networks that individual businesses could mobilize. The agencies figured out that 
their formal and informal payoffs would be higher if they reallocated rents to 
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chaebol that could grow and generate additional profits rather than inefficient 
ones that could not. Corruption still happened, but here it was of a profit-sharing 
type. The chaebol needed the support of the state, and they were willing to treat 
the political leadership as informal business partners who could claim a share of 
profits as ‘dividends’. The logic was simple, and both sides soon worked out that 
profit-sharing corruption was not only not contrary to productivity growth, 
given the distribution of power, it created incentives and compulsions to achieve 
productivity growth. The rent allocation rules could not be distorted because 
critical agencies had the interest and the power to prevent it (Khan 1998, 2000b).
Where did this capacity come from? It is hard to argue that contemporary 
South Korea had a culture with attitudes of rationality and discipline that were 
significantly superior to South Asia. True, it had a more developed industrial 
history as a result of Japanese colonialism, but this cannot explain why inefficient 
firms were not allowed to capture rents. The capacity to withdraw rents and 
discipline the chaebol is more plausibly explained by a specific political settlement. 
The historical roots of this can be traced back at least to the impact of Japanese 
colonialism. The latter was brutal, but it did not create a fragmented and competi-
tive set of political organizations in its colonies, as the divide-and-rule strategies 
of British colonialism created in South Asia and elsewhere. The post-war South 
Korean political settlement was marked by an absence of powerful competitive 
networks within the state and bureaucracy, so individual chaebol could not collude 
and share rents with parts of the network to prevent themselves being disciplined 
by other parts.
When the South Korean state began its industrialization drive, its leaders did 
not have pre-conceived ideas about how to make rent allocation achieve dynamic 
results. Rather, trial and error revealed that making support to a chaebol condi-
tional on the achievement of export targets resulted in rapid productivity growth 
because the rule could be enforced. The chaebol put in lots of effort to raise 
 productivity, knowing that the alternative would be disastrous for them. Once the 
enforceability of these rules became known, the system evolved in a particular 
direction, with more ambitious learning strategies emerging. In contexts where 
state support could be combined with rules that compelled companies to achieve 
productivity growth, similar types of corrupt but ‘efficient’ profit sharing emerged 
in a number of Asian countries, including China in the 1980s.
Trial and error revealed a very different political settlement to South Asian 
state leaders. Leaders in Pakistan and India were soon aware that industrial policy 
rents were being unproductively captured and though this was not in their inter-
est they failed to discipline their clients. While individual bureaucrats and politi-
cians benefitted, the higher-level leaderships lost out in terms of overall revenue 
and legitimacy. Individual businesses constructed alliances with powerful 
 political and bureaucratic networks that undermined any possibility of disciplin-
ing them. The failure to govern rents was ultimately not due to flawed mental 
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models but rather a configuration of power that made it impossible to impose 
discipline on these firms.
In India, Myrdal argued that productivity growth was not even an explicit goal 
of import protection, the latter was justified simply by the need to conserve 
foreign exchange (Myrdal 1968: 1158). This is not true. Using protection as a rent 
allocation instrument to develop domestic productive capabilities was a demand 
of the nationalist movement, and it was supported by emerging Indian capital in 
the Bombay Plan of 1944. Moreover, the failings of the industrial licensing system 
were of great concern to the Indian state (Chakravarty 1987). However, when state 
leaders discovered that efficiency could not be achieved, they would occasionally 
justify their policies by saying this was not even their intention.
We know from the report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee 
(Dutt 1969) that Indian policymakers were painfully aware that businesses they 
supported were not meeting their licence conditions and instead using their 
licences to behave like monopolies. The Dutt Committee recommended sanctions 
on business houses that failed to comply with licence conditions, but this was not 
implemented. As in Pakistan, the problem was clearly neither ignorance nor the 
interests of state leaders. Rather, the peak agencies that wanted to achieve 
 productivity growth were weak relative to the powerful networks below them 
who saw greater benefit in capturing rents without delivering results and using 
the rents to sustain their power through patronage networks. The distribution of 
power was the real source of this prisoner’s dilemma outcome, while the ability of 
political leaderships in developmental states to discipline free riders allowed the 
pie to increase for everybody. Institutions and institutional outcomes reflected 
the political settlement rather than values or norms.
We turn now to Myrdal’s analysis of the soft state. It is true that planning agen-
cies in South Asia could not discipline businesses protected by political entrepre-
neurs from the intermediate and upper classes and their clientelist networks. But 
other state agencies were able to discipline subaltern classes or regional separatist 
movements. In these conflicts, states in India and Pakistan were ready to use 
overwhelming force to ‘discipline’ segments of their societies. The enforcement 
problem was therefore limited to specific sectors and institutions rather than 
being a general malaise of social indiscipline. The specific instruments that were 
used, particularly for promoting industrial development, had governance and 
disciplining requirements for specific organizations that could not be adequately 
enforced. The implication is that other institutions and instruments allocating rents 
to a different set of organizations may have achieved better development results.
This insight can help to explain the significant growth accelerations in a few 
sectors in India and Bangladesh in the 1980s with relatively minor institutional 
and policy innovations. The previous industrial policy had achieved output growth 
in many sectors, but productivity growth was low because of poor disciplining. As 
a result, competitiveness was typically not achieved in most sectors (Acharya 
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et al. 2003: table 2.2; Virmani 2004: table 1; Bosworth et al. 2007: table 3). The 
growing economic openness from the 1980s helped imports of capital and 
machinery, which supported productivity growth. But the achievement of com-
petitiveness also required policies that assisted learning and capability development. 
What is interesting is that relatively minor institutional and policy innovations 
created the compulsions for productivity growth that were previously missing.
The new policy and institutional innovations in a few sectors were successful 
because rents were delivered to organizations that did not have the power to 
protect them unconditionally. Conditions could be credibly enforced that would 
hurt the firms if they failed to deliver results. An important feature in several of 
these take-offs was that investors were induced to first invest their own resources 
in learning, with policy promising sufficient ex post rents to give a high return on 
their risky investments if they succeeded.
I have discussed these examples at greater length elsewhere; they included 
automobiles and pharmaceuticals in India and garments and textiles in Bangladesh, 
sectors that drove growth accelerations in these countries from the 1980s onwards 
(Khan  2011,  2013a,  2013c). The cases are different, but we can summarize the 
Bangladeshi garments and Indian automobiles cases to illustrate their common 
features. In these two cases ex post rewards were created for a foreign partner to 
transfer capabilities to domestic firms. In a third sector, Indian pharmaceuticals, 
the story was slightly different. Here ex post rents were created for domestic 
firms if they succeeded in developing manufacturing capabilities by backward 
engineering based on the application of the Indian Patent Act of 1970. But all 
these sectors were similar in rewarding successful capability development ex post 
as a way of encouraging prior private investments and being successful in the 
implementation of these rules.
In the Bangladesh garments sector, the critical instrument was an agreement in 
1979 between a Bangladeshi company, Desh, and a South Korean company, 
Daewoo, backed by the Bangladeshi state. The context was the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement of 1974, which created potential ex post rents for least-developed 
countries like Bangladesh if they could achieve sufficient quality and competitive-
ness to sell garments in the quota-protected US market. The protection created 
quota rents in the US market, and the agreement was to pass on the potential 
quota rents to Daewoo as its reward for transferring export capability to Desh 
(Khan 2013b). The rule essentially transferred a percentage of future sales revenue 
to Daewoo, and this was sufficiently rewarding for it to invest in capability transfer. 
What made the rule easy to enforce was that unless Desh acquired the capability 
to export, no one would make any money. No ex ante rents were allocated to 
powerful businesses in Bangladesh, so there was no possibility of capturing these 
rents. The rule for transferring quota rents to Daewoo was also credible because 
the Bangladeshi state could prevent a relatively small firm from violating a contract 
that the President saw as vital for the country.
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This combination of credible ex post rents for Daewoo and compulsions for 
investors to recover their investments resulted in dramatic capability development. 
Desh became a competitive firm within months of sending an army of super-
visors to South Korea to learn factory and supply chain organization. As the 
organizational design that it adapted was appropriate to Bangladeshi conditions 
and could be easily imitated, thousands of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs entered the 
garments industry. The explosive growth of the sector created millions of jobs and 
within two decades Bangladesh had become the second biggest garment producer 
after China, though still far below China in absolute terms.
In the Indian automobile industry, the government signed a joint venture 
agreement in 1982 between Suzuki, a Japanese company, and Maruti, a public 
sector Indian company, allowing Suzuki to sell in the highly protected Indian 
market if it could produce an Indian car with sixty per cent domestic content 
within five years. Given that Indian tier one and two producers already had basic 
technical capabilities, the incentive of capturing significant tariff rents ex post was 
sufficient for Suzuki to invest in developing the capabilities of its Indian suppliers. 
Here, too, the mechanisms of rent allocation were credible to the parties, as was 
the enforceability of the conditions.
Rents could not be captured by Indian components producers because no ex 
ante rents were transferred to them. A failure to achieve international standards 
with Suzuki’s help would simply be a lost opportunity for future profits. Suzuki 
knew that the strong opposition to its operations from domestic automobile and 
machine tools producers meant that a failure to achieve the domestic content 
conditions would result in exclusion from the Indian market. There was no 
question of the capacity of the Indian state to enforce this condition. As Suzuki 
was investing first, it had strong compulsions to succeed as that was the only way 
to capture the ex post tariff rents. Once again capability development was rapid 
and successful, and similar deals with other foreign companies followed. By the 
1990s, India’s auto components industry had become globally competitive. By the 
turn of the century, the sequential upgrading of auto components producers 
enabled India to produce its own branded cars. It became one of the few global 
car producers that could produce globally competitive national brands.
In both these cases incremental institutional and policy changes turned out to 
be enforceable from the perspective of specific developmental goals, given the 
distribution of power across the organizations involved, including relevant gov-
ernance agencies. This is potentially a promising escape from the bind of weak 
enforcement, because it exploits the observation that in most states, enforcement 
failure does not extend to all dimensions. Economic development would be more 
rapid, and strategies of inclusion more effective, if these opportunities were more 
thoroughly exploited. The importance of the appropriate design of policies and 
institutions across different political settlements is insufficiently understood, 
which is why Bangladesh and India have not been able to replicate their own suc-
cesses in many other sectors.
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Looking at South Korean or Taiwanese industrial policy as paradigmatic has 
been very damaging for follower countries. These North East Asian states 
inherited political settlements from Japanese colonial times that were character-
ized by the absence of powerful factional political organizations. These states had 
the capacity to enforce conditions on firms receiving rents because the latter 
could not construct coalitions with powerful factions to protect their rents for a 
price. As politicians and bureaucrats discovered their enforcement capacity, 
sequential improvements in policy design followed. These countries did not have 
the cultural norms of the West, but the gradual productive transformation of their 
societies through the development of capabilities and competitiveness created a 
very similar impetus for investments in education, health, and culture. This took 
them in the direction of modern societies, including a transition from learning to 
innovation societies. With the transition to innovation increasing in pace over the 
last two decades, the dominance of institutions supporting catching up has been 
gradually superseded by institutions supporting innovation. While the achieve-
ments of these ‘developmental states’ have been truly impressive, the institutions 
and policies that they used to achieve development are not replicable in other 
states, even in Asia, where the political settlements are substantially different.
South Asia inherited a very different political settlement. Both democratic and 
authoritarian governments in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh discovered their 
enforcement capabilities were limited when they faced powerful political and 
bureaucratic factions organized by the ‘intermediate classes’. Myrdal described a 
moment in the history of these countries when they were using policy instruments 
that were seriously distorted in their implementation. Subsequent developments 
in the 1980s and beyond show that substantial growth could be achieved with 
policies and institutions allocating rents in other ways, even though these have 
not been developed to their full extent. Nevertheless, the long-run pace of devel-
opment in South Asia is likely to be slower and more uneven than in North East 
Asia. South Asian states do not have the political and institutional capacity to 
support development across a broad range of sectors and regions all at once, as 
these strategies typically require disciplining a broad range of policy rents. 
Moreover, the poor results of bureaucratic management and the involvement of 
politicians and bureaucrats in value-reducing variants of corruption have had 
negative effects on morale. The very best graduates no longer find a career in the 
civil service sufficiently rewarding in most parts of South Asia, and this has had 
negative cumulative effects on bureaucratic capacity.
Southeast Asia has been somewhere in between in terms of the complexity of 
their internal power structures, and therefore in the constraints on enforcement 
set by their political settlements. Over the longer term their success has been 
somewhere in between South and North East Asia. From the perspective of the 
political settlements framework, it is not surprising that we find a great diversity 
of economic strategies and institutions that have worked and failed across these 
countries (Khan 2000b, 2007). Southeast Asian countries, too, have come a long 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
340 Asian Transformations
way in the half-century since Myrdal wrote his Asian Drama, and some now face 
new challenges of progressing from learning to innovation societies while dealing 
with emerging challenges of populist politics.
5.  Incremental versus Radical Reform  
and Prospects for the Future
On one critical question, the jury is still out. Myrdal posited that incremental 
changes were not only more painful than radical or revolutionary changes in the 
long run; incremental strategies were also more likely to fail. The case against 
incrementalism that Myrdal posited still affects many variants of modern institutional 
analysis. Acemoglu and Robinson are arguably in the same tradition in ruling out 
the sustainability of growth without a big shift towards inclusive political and 
economic institutions. For Myrdal, incrementalism was an excuse for unproductive 
elites to keep tolerating indiscipline and regressive practices (1968: 1909–10). 
However, neither Myrdal nor Acemoglu and Robinson have a convincing 
explanation of where the big changes will come from. Even if leaderships emerged 
in these countries with very different beliefs and a willingness to unleash 
 discipline on society, or even if the critical junctures that Acemoglu and 
Robinson identify as the prelude for big changes came around (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012: 110–23), there is no guarantee that the radical reform strategies 
that may follow would be sustained over time.
If we are right in arguing that the distribution of power in society is relevant 
for institutional outcomes, attempts by political movements to enforce radical 
changes on the powerful could unleash substantial counter-mobilizations, violence, 
and very high ‘transition costs’ (Khan 1995, 2012). Nor is it clear that incremental 
strategies are more likely to fail if they can be appropriately constructed. What is 
clear is that many of the formal institutional and policy strategies that Myrdal 
looked at did indeed fail in India because their requirements of enforcement and 
adherence were unrealistic. But a leadership that was developmental could have 
followed an incremental strategy that took into account issues of enforcement to 
identify institutions and policies that were more likely to be effective for achieving 
development in that social context.
The elephant in the room for making these comparisons is China, a country 
that Myrdal did not include in his original study and one that Acemoglu and 
Robinson write off as unlikely to succeed given its ‘non-inclusive’ institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 428–46). In fact, China is not only the most dra-
matic developmental transformation in human history, it also went through mas-
sive upheavals and revolutionary changes in the organization of its society. These 
radical changes could have contributed to its success in two quite different ways: 
the upheavals could have destroyed pre-existing regressive cultures and attitudes 
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in Myrdal’s sense, or they could have helped to create a disciplined organization, 
the Communist Party, with a new power structure that was effectively a new 
political settlement. The distinction is important. The cultures and attitudes that 
the communist revolution tried to root out were precisely the individualistic 
profit-seeking attitudes and property rights that were revived after 1979 during 
the growth transformation. One could argue that the upheaval helped to reboot 
pre-existing norms, to make them more appropriate for modern capitalism, but 
surely a less costly route could have been tried. Tens of millions of lives were lost 
or disrupted in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and yet 
many aspects of pre-revolutionary culture survived.
A more compelling case for the potentially positive effects of revolutionary dis-
ruption is that it may have enabled the construction of a relatively disciplined and 
inclusive political organization, the Communist Party, with the political power to 
allocate resources and discipline their use on a scale not possible in other 
developing countries. The Communist Party gradually came to include within it 
almost all of the politically active Chinese population, and it developed formal 
mechanisms for reaching compromises and enforcing agreements on collective 
rent allocation decisions. Decades of conflict and organizational activity were 
necessary to create this political structure but once it had emerged, the enforcement 
of collective decisions about resource and rent allocation was much more 
effective relative to other developing countries. The political settlement that the 
Chinese Communist Party represents may not be a permanently sustainable one, 
nor may it be the most appropriate one for enforcing the new types of rights and 
contracts that will be required as China moves from a learning to an innovation 
society. But it was very effective in organizing the post-1979 economic miracle 
based on adopting and adapting existing technologies and attracting significant 
foreign investments.
While the end results of the revolution were clearly positive, regardless of how 
we explain it, the policy implications are not clear. If the construction of a 
 disciplined and inclusive political organization is the element that explains 
China’s subsequent institutional success, this is by no means assured as an out-
come of an upheaval. Upheavals can destroy pre-existing institutions and organiza-
tions without necessarily leading to the emergence of a disciplined and inclusive 
organization. Massive upheavals are more likely to create unmitigated chaos for 
long periods. The answer to Myrdal’s social discipline and soft state problem may 
be to look much more seriously for incremental answers that take us in the direc-
tion of more organized and disciplined societies. I find very promising the 
 examples of successful sectoral development in Myrdal’s ‘soft states’ in the 1980s 
and beyond. These provide rich but all-too-rare examples of strategies that may 
work to accelerate the social transformation of countries in progressive and inclu-
sive directions. If incremental strategies can be sustained across sectors and 
regions (and that is admittedly a big if), these strategies could gradually result in 
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the multiplication of successful sectors and organizations, which may eventually 
want a better formal enforcement of social rules in general.
The growth and empowerment of powerful productive organizations that will 
eventually demand  the enforcement of rules in their own interest is the only sure 
way of eventually creating an effective demand for a transition to a rule-following 
society. As against this, regressive interests and organizations in these societies 
can also be expected to mount their own rent-seeking and influencing activities. 
We can expect them to try and distort institutions in ways that can be described 
as social indiscipline, corruption, regressive social norms, and impunity. The pace 
of, and prospects for, development are likely to depend on the contest between 
these contending forces.
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Gunnar Myrdal is justly remembered for his expanded vision of development that 
accounted for institutions. However, he tended to see nationalism in Asia, fuelled 
by ignorant and superstitious religiosity, as a principal block to development. In 
contrast, he viewed European nationalism favourably in relation to development, 
declaring that ‘in Europe, nationalism despite its association with romanticism, 
remained secular and rational at its core’ (Myrdal 1968: 2112). I aim to show that 
there is a more complex dialectical relationship between nationalism and eco-
nomic development than Myrdal imagined, not only in post-Second World War 
Asia, but also globally.
Nationalism reveals a common underlying structure of a self–other relationship, 
which may be expressed variously in different countries and at different times. 
The nation-state’s goal has been to strengthen the nation. Economic development 
is an important dimension and means of achieving this goal, but equally the 
demand for the integration of the nation frequently based upon the exclusivism 
of the self–other binary has periodically raised its head. Meanwhile, popular or 
alternative views of the nation have also occasionally reshaped development 
policies and goals. While many Asian nations have successfully used nationalism 
to achieve high levels of growth and development, this same nationalism has also 
generated forms of exclusivism and competitiveness that may not easily permit 
addressing contemporary global problems such as environmental crises.
The analysis in this chapter develops a chronological framework that attends to 
regional distinctiveness. It begins by assessing the legacy of European nationalism 
in Asia as the twinned ideology of development and exclusion. This legacy entailed 
national homogenization—often proceeding from a religious base overlain by 
racial, ethnic, and linguistic expressions of ‘othering’—that contributed to national 
integration and global economic competitiveness. The global spread of this model 
eventuated in the two World Wars of the twentieth century. In its aftermath, the 
UN model of national development, which promoted an inclusive, civic nationalism, 
tended to prevail in many parts of the world for the next few decades.
Next, the chapter considers the role of historical factors in shaping the devel-
opment outcomes of the post-war period, particularly probing the different 
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 legacies of state capacities between Japanese and European imperialism in Asia. 
While the cruelties of Japanese colonialism have led to its denunciation, the 
institutions and programmes they established were far better suited to modern 
development in the Japanese colonies than those of the Europeans. During the 
Cold War, many of the ex-Japanese colonies and puppet states in the Asian Pacific 
littoral came under the US security umbrella. The high rates of growth in Korea 
and Taiwan were achieved by a combination of adapting Japanese colonial institu-
tions and the top-down model of nationalism with the security and economic 
 opportunities afforded by the United States. By the late 1970s, a counterforce of 
grass-roots nationalism forced through more participatory modes of political and 
economic governance.
Turning to the populous nation-states of China and India, the chapter explores 
their distance from US hegemony and experiments with more socialistic forms of 
development. These alternative forms were enabled by the powerful nationalist 
movements, and particularly revolutionary nationalism in China, premised upon 
a more equitable contract with the population than the older imperialist order. In 
both countries, by the last decades of the century, the pattern of national develop-
ment and the ideals of redistributive justice began to change as a result of eco-
nomic and political failures and the rise of new classes demanding change and 
even expressing separatist sentiments.
In Southeast Asia, the relationship is examined for the 1970s to 1990s period, 
when a Japan-centred regional economy emerged. Developments in the 1990s 
culminated in the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, leading in turn to political 
crises in several countries. The region came out from this downturn with new 
ideas for cementing interdependence within it. The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) has emerged as a significant economic region and even 
while nationalist competition within it continues, it represents a major force 
 integrating the national economies. Finally, the nationalism–development rela-
tionship is explored for the twenty-first century, in which time there appears to be an 
emergent co-relation between neo-liberal globalization and exclusivist nationalism.
2. The Legacy of European Nationalism
Since the publication of Asian Drama, the study of nationalism may well have 
emerged as one of the most extensive areas of inquiry across the interpretive social 
sciences and humanities. The rose-tinted view of European nationalism prevalent 
during Myrdal’s time has been stripped to reveal nationalism’s twin faces: a devel-
opmental approach towards citizens of the majority group coupled with the 
practical denial of rights to minorities and a periodically hostile, competitive, and 
warring approach to nations outside its claimed territories. Minorities frequently 
serve as the hinge group between the outside and inside of the nation, or as the 
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‘internal other’ of this nationalism. This dualism of nationalism—the mother of 
all identity politics—is built upon a self–other distinction and emerges as the 
deep structure of nationalism that has been apparent over the last 300 years.
Nationalism in Europe was closely linked to imperialism, thus expressing this 
dualism well into the twentieth century. As Eric Hobsbawm (1990: 102) pointed 
out, imperial expansion was justified by a nationalism, one that was more racist 
than rational. Arendt (1948: 152–3) observed that imperialists appeared as the 
best nationalists because they claimed to stand above the reality of national 
 divisiveness and represent the glory of the nation. Whether in Europe, America, 
Asia, or Africa, nationalism has periodically expressed itself in both inclusive 
ways and in more hateful, warlike ways.
Moreover, contrary to Myrdal’s narrative of Europe, religion has turned out to 
be an extremely significant factor in the history of nationalism. The self–other 
form in which the communal self is represented by the state, whether in reality or 
aspirationally, arose out of the wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The confessional communities of Reformation Europe—Calvinist, 
Lutheran, Anglican, Catholic—were the historical antecedents of nation-states, 
where church, state, and subjects became rolled into one as the ‘chosen community’ 
antagonistic towards non-believers, whether in the vicinity or beyond the contin-
ent. The sovereign nation emerged in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
only after the confessional polity and the accompanying disciplinary revolution 
enabled the successful formations to become competitive in global capitalism. 
The states created a relatively homogenized political formation with a common 
language, national culture, and education system equipped to function in an 
industrial society and gain competitive control of global resources. While the 
national community retained the self–other identity form of confessional com-
munities, I have argued that the nation-state translated the holy compact into 
what has been called the ‘congruence of state and culture’ defining the nation.1
Religion remained an important force until well into the twentieth century, but 
its role was transformed. More than working as an obstacle to development, con-
fessional religion often became the basis of national exclusivism, even when it was 
not always so recognized. Carl Schmitt, the German philosopher who joined the 
Nazis, recognized this clearly:
All significant concepts of modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development—in which they were 
transferred to the theory of the state, whereby for example, the omnipotent 
God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic 
structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration 
of these concepts. (Schmitt 1985)
1 For the congruence of state and culture see Gellner (1983). For ‘confessional nationalism’, see 
Duara (2015).
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Schmitt’s notion of the ‘confrontation of friend and enemy’ in the modern 
nation-state is ultimately at a metaphysical level—one between faiths. Note that 
Schmitt’s religious model for the modern state came not from Christian universal-
ism but from the confessional faiths of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Myrdal did not quite grasp the three-way relationship between development, 
nationalism, and religion that European history itself had demonstrated. Religion 
as ‘superstition’ has not played a significant role as an obstacle to economic devel-
opment in Asia, even in the medium term. Rather, religion, which in many parts 
of Asia—East, Southeast, and South Asia—had not been exclusivist, came to be 
seen by elites as creating the basis of national homogenization and cohesiveness. 
State Shinto in Meiji Japan, Hindutva in India, and Islamism in many Muslim-
majority countries often represented nationalist elite efforts to suppress local 
religious orientations and practices and transfer their devotions to what I call 
‘confessional nationalism’. As in the earlier history of Europe, these sentiments 
were often expressed more as political loyalties and passions rather than as 
 religious practices. The relevant point here is that religious ideas and sentiments 
work in a different way in relation to nationalism and development. They  typically 
operate as the basis of exclusivist nationalism, but this can be used for national 
exclusivism as much as for economic expansion. While religions in the mod-
ern world can by no means be so reduced, it has also become an instrument of 
nationalism.
Writing before Myrdal, Polanyi noted a basic relationship between the inclusive/
exclusive polarity and the fluctuations of the global economy. The alternation 
between capitalist expansion and a closing off of the national economy based on 
‘the principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature 
as well as productive organizations, relying on the varying support of those most 
immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market’ was central to the 
modern history of nation-states (Polanyi 1957: 132). To be sure, the closing off 
was not always protective of all and nationalist exclusivity is not always related to 
economic protectiveness. The two are more complexly related. But there does 
appear to be a broad relationship that makes clear that nationalism—in its different 
forms—will recur with fluctuations in global capitalism into the foreseeable future.
Scholars of nationalism often present a difference between two types of 
nationalism: an ethnic nationalism (built on race, religion, language, etc.) versus a 
‘civic nationalism’ in which citizenship rights are equally granted to all citizens, 
regardless of race, ethnicity, language, religion, or culture. In the European 
context, German nationalism is often condemned as ethnic/racist, whereas 
Anglo-French nationalism is seen to be civic and inclusive. This is likely the 
model that Myrdal had in mind when conducting the comparison between 
Europe and South Asia. Moreover, it may have represented the dominant model 
during the first few decades after the Second World War, when the UN effectively 
embedded this model in its vision of the family of nations. The notion of 
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development was also sanctioned by the UN’s mandate to eradicate poverty and 
promote higher standards of living and well-being across all nations (United 
Nations n.d.). Yet in the decades since the 1980s, a narrower ethnic-cultural, if 
not racist, vision of the nation, aided by global capitalist volatility, has reasserted 
itself, which can be seen in the American support for Donald Trump today. This 
represents, of course, only the most recent expression of the deeply embedded 
self–other form of the nation.
3. Post-war Asian Nationalisms
Most international studies of economic development typically take the nation-state 
as the stable basis of their analysis. When comparing the economic achievements 
or failures of nations, analysts refer to the state’s aggregate indices and policies 
towards, say, capital formation, foreign debt, currency controls, or balance of 
trade (Bergeron 2004). While indispensable, these analyses can miss how changes 
in socio-political forces transform development strategies and vice versa. National 
development may be more accurately seen as a moving target—or the site of 
struggle—responding to both global forces and to nationalism as an  imaginary 
constituted as much by identity factors as the changing configuration of interests 
and power. Given that the raison d’être of economic development is the nation, 
economic strategy and policy is as much about social and political imperatives of 
the nation-state as it is about development.
I attend to the historical and institutional factors that shape what we might call 
the ‘national imaginary’ or ‘nation-scapes’. How do histories, institutions, and 
expectations shape the configuration of the national interests and its power struc-
ture at different moments? How might the national imaginary affect the profile of 
resource allocation, redistribution, stratification, and, not least, the environment? 
The imaginary can be integrative or contentious, leading even to separatist forces. 
It has periodically restructured the goals and strategy of the nation-state with 
regard to development. To take the most evident expressions of how imaginaries 
have reshaped society and the world, consider the difference between Maoist and 
contemporary China or, for that matter, between Nehru’s and contemporary 
India. While the broad goals of national development may remain, the frontiers 
of community inclusion, the class configuration, and possibilities of nationalism 
have changed dramatically.
Nationalism, and economic nationalism in particular, has informed most 
Asian nation-states since the Second World War. While patrimonial tendencies—
the tendency of leaders to treat national resources as their patrimony—have 
 periodically been parasitic on economic strategy, by and large the pursuit of 
national advantage has been the primary thrust of Asian nation-states. Import-
substitution industrialization or export-oriented strategies have sometimes been 
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sequential, but they often have been subtly combined, especially in East Asian 
nations, from the 1960s. Economic nationalism in the era of post-Cold War 
 globalization continues to prevail, although with considerably different approaches 
as Asian nations have come to accept global integration and seek to make their 
domestic firms more competitive in the global market.
The UN-sanctioned civic model of nationalism and stabilization of economic 
flows under the Bretton Woods regime of monetary exchange produced a breathing 
space for many emergent nation-states in the post-war period to cultivate their 
national models of development and progress. Between 1950 and 1980, the role of 
developing economies in the world economy and trade shrank greatly compared 
with the past century and a half, and also with their later growing involvement 
after 1980. As late as 1970, their share in world trade was under 20 per cent, but 
had risen to more than 40 per cent by 2010, and included trade in services 
(Nayyar 2013: 97). Moreover, as most of these erstwhile colonies had been multi-
ethnic, nationalist leaders developed policies principally of civic nationalism to 
accommodate minorities.
Indeed, decolonizing nations were created with the commitment to create a 
new and more just world order. A series of anti-imperialist and non-alignment 
conferences led by Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno of Indonesia, and, later, Zhou 
Enlai, most notably during the Asian–African Conference of Bandung in 1955, 
reiterated this commitment. They developed the principles of Panchasheela—a 
doctrine of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs—a kind of Westphalian 
doctrine for postcolonial nations. To be sure, territorial conflicts between these 
newly created states, as well as other geopolitical pressures of the Cold War, led to 
the dissipation of the movement by the early 1960s. Nonetheless, the strong anti-
imperialist and anti-capitalist sentiments upon which many of these nationalist 
movements were cultivated continued to have an enduring influence in the larger 
nations of Asia.
4. Colonial Legacies in Asia
The region of Asia that concerns us can be divided into two parts, those in South 
and Southeast Asia that fell under European, chiefly British but also Dutch and 
French empires, and those that came under Japanese control. Those that were 
colonized or controlled by Japan before the Second World War had an entirely 
different experience of development and nationalism than those in the old 
European empires. Although Japanese colonialism is abhorred by many Korean 
and Chinese because of historical crimes, the memories of which have been kept 
alive, Japanese investment in the development of its colonies in Korea, Taiwan, 
and the puppet state of Manchukuo (which was more populous than Japan) was far 
greater than in the British and French colonies of Asia. For example, 50 per cent 
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of Korean and Taiwan school children were receiving elementary education by 1940, 
compared to 2 per cent in Vietnam at the time, while literacy in India at the time 
of independence was 12 per cent (Nayaka and Nurullah 1974; Cumings 1999).2
Generally speaking, East Asia should be historically distinguished from much 
of the rest of the continent because of the strong influence of German models of 
statist nationalism associated with early nineteenth-century theorists like 
Friedrich List. The main conduit of this model was of course Japan itself, but the 
fascist dirigiste influence on the Kuomintang (KMT) in the 1930s was also signifi-
cant. Here it is crucial to note that the impact of statism and mobilization on the 
Chinese Communist Party derived, of course, from Soviet communism, but strong 
mobilizational apparatuses were developed all over East Asia during the inter-war 
period. The Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo developed a Leninist-like mobi-
lizational apparatus called the Concordia Society, as well as other controlled mass 
organizations capable of bringing vaccination, electricity, and heavy-handed sur-
veillance to the most remote villages of Manchuria in a way that was unknown 
and unseen in European colonies (Duara 2003).
The question of how and why Japanese imperialism turned out to be so different 
is a larger question that cannot be addressed in depth here, but it has a bearing on 
our analysis. Japan was a latecomer to the new industrial and imperialist powers 
at the turn of the twentieth century, including the Germans, Russians, Italians, 
and Americans, who sought to challenge the global supremacy of Britain and 
France. These powers discovered nationalism to be a powerful means to mobilize 
resources, integrate the lower classes, and discipline the population for competi-
tion, often with the promise of imperial glory and rewards. For instance, calls 
to maximize production, rein in consumption, and ban strikes during the First 
World War were associated to national loyalty in Europe (Arendt  1948 [1973]; 
Giddens 1987: 234–9; Hobsbawm 1990: 132).
Japan, operating outside the Eurasian theatre of this war, was one of the war’s 
great beneficiaries, seizing German territories and expanding its footprint in East 
Asia. At the same time, it also noted the necessity of total preparedness for future 
wars. Upon observing insufficient civilian support for the war among Europeans, 
it was the first to develop administered mass organizations. A second feature of 
nationalism among latecomer imperial powers was the recognition, especially 
among the Japanese, of the necessity to extend some of the formal features of 
nationalism to their colonies and puppets—the idea of the ‘regional bloc’ or the 
‘yen bloc’ in the case of Japan. This strategy may be seen in the German New 
Order, the US Monroe Doctrine, the Soviet Union and later the Soviet bloc, the 
Sterling Zone, and others.
2 Cumings maintains that 70 per cent of children were getting primary education in Taiwan and 
Korea, whereas Kohli cites the figure for Korea at 50 per cent (Kohli 2004: 39).
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In part because of its own humiliation as an inferior Asiatic race, as well as the 
rise of nationalism in the colonies at the end of the First World War, Japan also 
sought to match the idea of the regional bloc with the paradoxically anti-(Western) 
imperialist ideology of pan-Asianism. Encouraged partly by Woodrow Wilson’s 
doctrine of national self-determination and the Soviet revolution, the aftermath 
of the First World War saw the momentum of popular nationalism in East Asia 
rise to its greatest heights with the 1 May 1919 movement in Korea and the 4 May 
1919 movement in China. Responding to this nationalism, Japanese empire 
builders actively re-conceptualized their imperial strategy with ideas of regional 
co-operation under their dominance. This train of ideas and policies eventuated 
in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of the Pacific War. The Japanese 
often kept or set up the national form of the occupied states and claimed to mod-
ernize and develop them. However, ideology and policies should not be seen 
simply as a cloak for imperialist nationalism. Rather, the conditions of war and 
internal conflicts exacerbated the tension in the Japanese imperialist structures 
between a commitment to develop the colonies and puppet states and a confes-
sionalist Shinto nationalist tendency to impose their domination.
The impact of Japanese nationalist imperialism left its most important legacy, 
of course, upon its earlier colonies and puppet states of Korea, Taiwan, and 
Manchukuo, the last of which was perhaps the most developed state in Asia 
outside Japan. This legacy included a relatively autonomous and interventionist 
bureaucratic state drawing on native Confucian statecraft and Prussian–German 
statism (Staatswissenschaften), involving state direction of the economy, total 
surveillance, a disciplined workforce, high levels of mass education, involvement 
in the regional political economy, and, not least, an ideology of national essence.
According to Korean economist Sub Park, the yearly mean growth rate of gross 
domestic production in Korea was 3 per cent between 1915 and 1940, while 
Indian growth between 1900 and 1946 was under 1 per cent annually (Park 2003: 5). 
The accumulated per capita British investment in India and Japanese investment 
in Korea were US$8 and US$38, respectively, in 1938 (Park 2003). By 1936, heavy 
industry accounted for 28 per cent of total industrial production in Korea, with 
half a million workers, a number that tripled by 1945 (Cumings 1999: 76).
Taiwan is justly famous among the export-driven industrializing economies of 
its time. The success of its export expansion was dependent on low-cost labour 
and the import of production goods at close to world prices. Both were made 
possible by active government intervention (Chou  1985). Note, however, that 
after the ‘takeoff ’ of the 1960s, the ratio of imports and exports to gross domestic 
product (GDP) was 38 per cent in 1975; in fact, colonial Taiwan had already 
achieved this figure in 1937.3
3 It was 39 per cent, with imports at 16 per cent and exports at 23 per cent (Cumings 1999: 78–9).
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Sanctioning, if not sanctifying, the Meiji Japanese model of development and 
expansion was the nationalist ideology of kokutai. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Meiji state had developed and disseminated the idea of a unique Yamato 
race with a common ancestry and divine origins in Amaterasu, organized by a 
nationwide system of Shinto shrines reaching into every community and school 
(Hardacre 1989: 32–3, 43–55). Even apart from colonial dominance, the spread of 
Japanese (and Germanic) ideas into the rest of East Asia led to efforts to mimic 
these ideals from the early twentieth century. Chinese nationalists sought to 
derive the nation from the ancestry of the mythic Yellow Emperor (also pursued 
by the KMT and revived in today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC)), and Korean 
nationalists sought to raise the mythic Tangun to the same status (Schmid 2002).
In contrast to the Japanese colonial developmental state, which reinforced the 
top-down confessionalist model, the European colonial legacy in South and 
Southeast Asia reflected a weak capacity for penetration and development. 
However, and particularly in the British Empire, its legacy was reflected in the 
creation of the representative political institutions discussed below. East Asian 
nationalism was channelled through corporatist social surveillance structures 
such as the (updated) Chinese imperial system of baojia, in which an ascending 
hierarchical agglomeration of decimal family units was responsible for all mem-
bers under them. The massively expanded role of the baojia system in colonial 
Taiwan was as much responsible for the development of the communities as was 
their surveillance. So, too, in Manchukuo, where together with the police they 
also attended to vaccination, hygiene, and marketing, as well as political sur-
veillance projects. Little wonder that post-war South Korea was taken over by 
 authoritarian and military leaders with deep connections to the Japanese colonial 
establishment. Park Chung-hee, who came to power in a military coup to rule 
as  president (1963–1979) during the takeoff years, was a career officer in the 
Manchukuo Imperial Army and a great admirer of Meiji Japan and the Bushido 
cult (Eckert  2016: 1–2). The Chinese Communist Party’s Leninist cell units 
embedded within communities were also like confessional units in which people 
converted and were reborn into a communist faith (fanshen) with the goal of 
purifying the nation (and, more remotely, the world).
5. The Cold War Framework
The ascendance of US power over the former Japanese-occupied territories of 
maritime East and Southeast Asia during the Cold War, including Japan itself, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and other countries, played a significant role in the rise of the 
Asian tigers. Several of these countries—especially Japan and the  colonies—were 
devastated by war but they possessed high levels of education, strong traditions of 
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state activism, and a disciplined workforce. Significantly, the post-war British 
colonial state in Hong Kong and Malaya also became much more active in building 
infrastructure, public education, housing, and health services. The United States 
evolved a pattern of relationships with these militarily, and often economically, 
dependent allies. Development aid, military protection, and favourable access to 
American markets were exchanged for firm anti-communist, frequently dictatorial, 
authoritarian, and monarchical regimes loyal to American interests. As Japan re-
built its economy and the US dollar weakened in the 1970s, Japan came to play an 
important intermediary role in the regional economy of East and Southeast Asia.
Atul Kohli has argued that Asian economies performed better than those in 
Latin America through the post-Second World War period because they pursued 
national capitalist models of development rather than the more foreign-dependent 
capitalist models of the latter. The economically successful states in Asia created 
conditions to support profitability for private domestic investors by various 
means, including exercising considerable autonomy from foreign capital and 
power, fostering high domestic saving rates, limiting foreign debt, and channel-
ling foreign investment to manufacture for exports (Kohli 2009). We will explore 
here how these national structures and strategies emerged and developed—quite 
differently and with different consequences—in Asia.
In the two big countries, China and India, the powerful nationalist and national-
ist-socialist movements allowed them to limit foreign economic involvement and 
experiment with different modes of development until the 1990s. But what was 
the process whereby national models came to dominate in countries like South 
Korea and Taiwan, where the United States exercised considerable power com-
parable to that in Latin America? Were not nationalist ideals, aspirations, and 
ambitions in these countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, as well as Pakistan, subordinated 
to regimes that supported the interests of the United States during the Cold War?
Perhaps the most critical factor in this problematic is the nature of US–Cold 
War concerns in Asia. East and Southeast Asia did not see much of a ‘cold’ war; 
rather, there were many bloody hot wars, only most notably in Korea and 
Vietnam. Communist insurgencies and counter-insurgencies spread across the 
region well into the 1970s until after the United States–China rapprochement. 
The security concerns of the United States, which encountered several  communist 
powers on this eastern front, created important conditions for the relative 
autonomy of the littoral nation-states in its Asian bloc. Between 1946 and 1975, 
economic and military aid to South Korea and Taiwan was US$69 billion and 
US$42 billion, respectively. US-sponsored land reforms defused tensions and 
created stronger domestic markets. It also used aid to steer these countries away 
from import-substitution policies to the export strategy based on US domestic 
and military demand in Asia. To be sure, the United States spent even greater 
amounts—US$115 billion between 1954 and 1975—in South Vietnam, so it is 
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clear that other factors were at work in the success of South Korea and Taiwan 
(Gray  2014: 42). The colonial legacy of strong institutions, educated populace, 
and strategically minded state leadership arguably made the difference in these 
two countries.
US Cold War allies in Asia emerged as highly authoritarian, if not dictatorial, 
states backed by the US military and its security imperatives. Where possible, 
monarchies were supported in East and Southeast Asia (and, especially, in the 
Middle East). Even when they were constitutional monarchies, they represented 
the symbolic centre of anti-communist nationalism. While the US–Thai military 
alliance hunted the communists, the cult of the Thai monarch, King Bhumibol, 
became closely identified with agricultural development and compassion without 
significant rural reforms (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005).
In South Korea and Taiwan, the national interests of this leadership were 
 generated less by national movements than by the historical factors and the cor-
poratist structure of the colonial society they inherited. Both Park Chung-hee 
and Chiang Kai-shek were deeply nationalist, but their power during the post-war 
period was not based on an autonomous national movement. To the contrary, 
they sought to create and mobilize a national movement to support their political 
and economic strategies. To secure power during his lifetime, Park Chung-hee 
promulgated the Yushin (Restoration, as in Meiji Restoration) Constitution 
granting him lifetime presidency.
The New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong, 1971–1979) and the 
militarization of modern society served as the apparatuses for Park’s anti-communist 
national mobilization. The New Community Movement was launched as a rural 
development project but turned into a movement of ‘spiritual discipline’ affecting 
all aspects of life. It emphasized egalitarianism and produced ‘enthusiastic  warriors 
of industrialization’. It worked through core cells and did not expend many funds; 
it also neglected the growing numbers of urban workers. In some ways, this 
top-down mobilization, which began to be seen as oppressive after the first few 
enthusiastic years, ironically fostered the subsequent minjung movement that was 
directed sharply against military rule (Han 2004).
The role of nationalism in Korean development may be assessed, interestingly, 
through the optic of popular views of Park Chung-hee that have poured out in 
the political climate of the late 1990s. The divisive consequences of this history 
can still be seen in the recent political career of his daughter, the recently 
ousted President Park Geun-hye, and chaebols closely associated with the family. 
Conservative forces regard him as among the greatest national heroes for the 
radical modernization and strengthening of the nation while reviving national 
culture and identity, and leading an austere and corruption-free life. They justify 
his service to, admiration of, and re-opening of ties with Japan and deny his role 
in hunting down Korean independence fighters in Manchukuo. The ‘progressive’ 
critique, including those of the unifiers with the North and other leftists and 
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 liberals, depicts him as a dyed-in-the-wool would-be Japanese fascist, a brutal 
dictator, and a corrupt leader who fostered the business and political cabal that 
would rule South Korea (a phenomenon that analysts of the Korean miracle dub 
the state’s ‘embedded autonomy’) (Moon 2009: 7–9).
The role of nationalism in Taiwan under the KMT government of Chiang 
 Kai-shek, which underwent an economic miracle similar to that of South Korea 
in the 1960s and 1970s, resembled the Korean pattern in important respects, but 
was distinctive in others. The KMT imposed martial law in China soon after its 
arrival, and the February 1947 massacre took perhaps 30,000 Taiwanese lives. It 
set up a brutal dictatorship that was most draconian during the White Terror 
(baise kongbu) of the first two decades. This institutional terrorization was accom-
panied by the effort of the mainland ruling emigrants, who represented about 
15  per cent of the population, to nationalize or Sinicize the local population 
who, they claimed, had become slavish under 50 years of Japanese rule (Harrison 
2006: 103–8).
Chiang revived the nationalist–fascist–Confucian–Christian ideological con-
coction called the New Life Movement. This was essentially a highly surveilled 
code of conduct and behaviour. In the mainland it had included items such as 
accounting for the proportion of foreign product in one’s clothing and consump-
tion, as well as punishments—sometimes draconian—for keeping long hair or 
wearing short skirts. In Taiwan it was imposed through schools, media, family, 
and military. Additionally, Taiwanese were instructed and expected to speak only 
in Mandarin (a foreign language to most of them, who spoke the regional lan-
guages of South China). Chiang declared that the New Life Movement was meant 
to ‘thoroughly militarize the life of the people of the entire nation. It is to make 
them nourish courage and alertness, a capacity to endure hardship, and especially 
a habit and instinct for unified behavior. It is to make them willing to sacrifice for 
the nation at all times’ (cited by Harrison 2006: 102). In both Taiwan and South 
Korea, the communist ‘other’ without and within the nation also enabled the 
repression and disciplining of the population in their strategy of development.
By the time these states achieved their development goals in the 1970s, 
 especially at the end of the Vietnam War and after the Sino–US rapprochement, 
there was a slackening of political control. Efforts were made in Taiwan to recon-
cile the native population with the regime. Over the next few decades, the 
Taiwanese opposition developed into a full-fledged anti-KMT and ‘Taiwan inde-
pendence’ movement which now rules the island state through the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP).
The waning of Cold War pressures led more generally to popular movements 
reflecting disaffection with repression and inequality among the Cold War Asian 
allies of the United States. The South Korean student movements protesting the 
Gwangju massacre of 1980 led to the minjung movement of the later 1980s. The 
protests against Marcos emerged almost simultaneously in the Philippines; foment 
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in Taiwan resulted in the electoral defeat of the KMT in 1996; subsequently in 
1998, the Suharto regime was toppled in Indonesia. Opposition continues to fes-
ter in Thailand, although here the long political continuity of the monarchy has 
tended to diffuse the opposition. All of these movements expressed themselves as 
national movements embodying the will of the ordinary people and seeking 
genuine or grass-roots democracy. In Taiwan, it is also expressed as a guarded 
separatism, whereas in South Korea there is a deep underlying stratum of desire 
to seek reunification with the North.
6. Nationalism in China and India
If the developmental capacities of postcolonial societies were shaped considerably 
by their colonial legacies, China remains an outlier with respect to colonialism. 
To be sure, the foreign settlements in the treaty ports of China and the impact 
of  Japanese state-building activities in Manchuria, Tianjin, and later in several 
Japanese-occupied regions did have an impact, but a powerful Chinese nationalism 
was neither enabled nor hampered by existing colonial structures. The Japanese 
occupation and the course of the Pacific War provided the opportunity for 
the  Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to emerge as revolutionary nationalists. 
Chinese communism was premised on the idea that Leninism was the most 
 powerful way to establish a strong, equitable, and wealthy nation; this was also the 
case in Vietnam. Ho Chi-Minh stated: ‘I loved and admired Lenin because he was 
a great patriot who liberated his compatriots’ (Ho Chi-Minh 2004: 30). China’s 
break with other communist nations such as the Soviet Union and Vietnam was 
shaped as much by issues of national territory, honour, and interests as by any 
ideological factor. The most empowering factor enabling the CCP to follow its 
own agenda was the revolutionary nationalism that it had awakened, particularly 
in rural China, and that it managed to secure and contain through land redistri-
bution and the mobilization and control apparatuses of the CCP.
India, under the Indian National Congress, shared with China the command 
over a vast national movement that also enabled it to develop its own pathways. 
However, mass mobilization in the Indian context was relatively superficial and 
did not penetrate deeply enough to alter the lives of the masses. Nor was the state 
structure in British India or the first decades of independent India capable of 
mobilization and development. Critical to the differences between East and South 
Asia is the elimination of traditional landed-class control in the East. In Japan, the 
Meiji Restoration was effectively a revolution that eliminated historical control of 
the landed classes by means of state-led mobilization. In South Korea and Taiwan, 
it was the legacy of Japanese colonial mobilization, together with the US Occupation, 
which supervised major land reform. In older European colonies, large landed 
classes and interests retained local control well into the twentieth century.
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Regardless of the depth or strength of national mobilization, the enormous 
national movements in China and India reinforced their conviction to remain 
non-aligned, or at least not subordinate themselves to the emerging superpowers. 
To some extent this was also true of Indonesia under Sukarno. This nationalism 
predisposed these states to hold oppositional stances towards free-market ideolo-
gies, albeit with different degrees of hostility in the different societies. It is notable 
that even the Republic of China in Taiwan advocated strong state controls until 
the 1960s, when it came more directly under the influence of the United States as 
its protective superpower. Despite the weakness of the non-aligned movement, its 
most important outcome may have been that the two largest players in Asia—
China and India—managed to maintain their non-aligned status, especially after 
China pulled away from the Soviet bloc from the late 1950s.
The nationalist and nationalist–socialist movements in the two societies 
allowed them to experiment with different modes of development until the 1990s. 
In China, both the CCP and KMT, as observed earlier, were deeply influenced by 
Germanic ideas of state science (whether via Japan, the Soviet Union, or directly). 
In addition, during the revolution, the CCP developed a formidable Leninist 
organizational structure with arguably the widest and deepest penetration of any 
political structure in the world. Contrary to Marx’s dismal view of the peasants as 
a ‘sack of potatoes’, Mao turned the theory on its head and led a powerful peasant 
revolution. During the revolution, and particularly during the anti-Japanese war 
of resistance, it was by no means a merely top-down structure, but actively 
 mobilized the hearts and minds of very large segments of the population through 
rituals of deep identity conversion embodied in the community stagings of 
 re-birth and ‘speak bitterness’ campaigns.
In a brilliant analysis, Apter and Saich (1994) discuss how, through a process 
they call ‘exegetical bonding’, during the revolution Mao fashioned a nested 
 hierarchy of three narratives, disseminated through pedagogical and political 
practices, which validated the role of the communists and Mao himself. The mas-
ter narrative is a tale of loss of the nation to imperialists following the Opium 
Wars and loss of livelihood, particularly of peasants. The second narrative repre-
sents the struggle for Sun Yat-sen’s inheritance between Mao and Chiang. The 
third is about inner-party struggles, of renegades and adventurists overcome by 
Mao. To the extent that there is any Marxism in these narratives, it is about for-
ging the correct or true path to gain national liberation and social justice (Apter 
and Saich 1994: 14–15).
To be sure, the CCP closely supervised these ritual events and did not allow 
them to stray too far from the script. Moreover, as the CCP settled into power 
after 1949, and especially during and after the Great Leap Forward disaster of 
1958–1959, these rituals of self-formation came to be seen as routinized and 
‘ritualized’—in the modern sense—and even more as acts of propaganda and 
surveillance. Disenchantment came to a head during the Cultural Revolution of 
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1966–1976. After the death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four, these 
 campaigns moderated considerably, but they have not entirely disappeared.
A second dimension of Chinese communist nationalism refers to the broader 
revolutionary strategy of the party. In the Second United Front between the 
CCP and KMT, a very weak coalition forged during the anti-Japanese resistance 
between 1937 and 1945, Mao crafted an enormously influential text called On 
New Democracy. The task ahead of the CCP was national resistance and, to that 
end, only traitors and collaborators with the Japanese army were targeted for 
elimination. Rich peasants and even patriotic landlords were spared, as were 
national capitalists. Over the next 30 years, to simplify drastically, policy alternated 
between radicalism and a more moderate approach towards people who would be 
regarded as ‘class enemies’ during periods of radicalism, such as during the land 
revolution (1946–1949), the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. 
But even during these last two major campaigns, the nation’s greatness was fore-
most in the minds of the leaders. The Great Leap Forward urged the people to 
overtake Britain and France’s iron and steel production within fifteen years. 
During the Cultural Revolution, class enemies, domestic and foreign, were often 
merged because China was the only true revolutionary power in the world, 
 barring Enver Hoxha’s Albania. The enemies of the revolution were automatically 
the enemies of China.
As is well known, China’s development during the Maoist period was credit-
able compared to other developing countries, particularly in basic education 
and healthcare. GDP also grew 6 per cent between 1953 and 1978 (Zhang and 
Kanbur 2005: 192; Hirst 2015). It is interesting to note that Deng Xiaoping did 
not think that the reforms he unleashed in 1979 would end socialism. He felt 
that capitalist society could not eliminate the fundamental problems of extrac-
tion of super-profits, exploitation, and plundering. Deng was responding to the 
social and  economic problems of revolutionary nationalism that stressed non-
material incentives to increase production in rural and urban society. In the 
process, however, the national imaginary began to change from a civic union 
of  nationalities (minzu tuanjie) to an extraterritorial conception of the Han 
nation, particularly to engage overseas Chinese investments during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Meanwhile, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy in the coastal 
regions—significantly fuelled by these investments—over the hinterland, con-
tributed to dissatisfaction and separatist nationalisms in ethnic regions of Tibet, 
Xinjiang, and Mongolia.
It is not clear how prepared Deng was to drive a Faustian bargain with neo-
liberal capitalism for the sake of uplifting the nation (Xiaoping  1984: 175). As 
capitalism—led by the state—advanced in leaps and bounds in China and the 
socialist-nation ideals were increasingly eroded, an ideological and moral vacuum 
has emerged in which the party-state has installed a raw nationalism. Indeed, it 
would appear that Xi Jinping has now thrown overboard Deng’s dictum, ‘tao 
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guang yang hui’ (to hide one’s advantage and improve on the disadvantage), and 
gone on to assert China’s ‘rightful place’ among the world’s nations.
If the legacy of Japanese colonialism was a developmental state (and continued 
political hatred by many ex-colonials), the legacy of British imperialism in South 
and Southeast Asia was represented by Britain-inspired political institutions and 
the weak developmental capacity of the state. Civil society in India fostered a 
nationalism that has probably had the longest history of any modern nationalism 
in Asia. Dadabhai Naoroji, the second president of the Indian National Congress 
in 1886, was also the author of the Drain Theory, which documented the drain of 
wealth perpetrated by the British in India and the negative economic impact of 
British policies. The Indian National Congress was centrally concerned with 
 economic issues, agitating for reduced taxes and greater state expenditure; it 
launched the Swadeshi movement in 1905—simultaneously with the Chinese 
economic boycott of American goods—urging Indians to buy Indian-made cloth 
over British cloth. Under Gandhi, the idea of economic boycott grew into a vast 
non-co-operation movement that eventually fuelled Indian independence.
The history of Indian colonialism and a ‘negotiated’ nationalism ensured that 
despite the impoverished condition of the nation, democracy would remain the 
only viable means of sustaining the fledgling nation. Economically, Indian nation-
alism was a fertile ground for developing ideas and plans for independent India. 
Between Gandhian ideas of restoring the traditional village economy with its uto-
pian ideals of self-governance, and Stalinist notions of total state control of  the 
economy and society, were many hybrid ideas championed by Gandhian socialists 
of various stripes, including Ram Manohar Lohia and Jawaharlal Nehru himself.
Nehru’s ideas were implemented during the first decades of the Republic 
through the Five-Year Plans of the Planning Commission, which he chaired. 
Other South Asian countries also developed national plans that stressed self-
sufficiency, national markets, growth, and reduction of poverty and inequality. 
To  be sure, these plans were not anti-market, but rather pro-national market 
(Ludden 2005). The Nehruvian model of a mixed economy and a secular, demo-
cratic (bottom-up) political system remained a powerful imaginary of the nation 
that also became deeply entrenched as different interests and path dependencies 
became fixed into it.
As a democracy, the political leaders of India cannot simply be focused on 
growth and development, but have to respond more directly to a multitude of 
constituencies, redistribution, welfare, and territorial tensions with neighbouring 
countries. Moreover, India inherited a weak state structure compared to East 
Asian states. A study of the colonial state’s effort to prepare for the Japanese 
invasion in 1942 revealed how utterly incapable it was of expanding its fighting 
forces, raising finances, controlling prices, or rationing food (Kamtekar  2002: 
187–221). This administrative structure was inherited by the Republic of India 
without major structural change.
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Given the weak administrative capacity and its greater penetration by social 
interests compared to other East Asian states, national policies in India had to 
evolve through negotiation and consensus building. It stabilized its territorial 
unity through the creation of linguistic states and military build-up in Kashmir 
and the northeast. There have been several turning points in Indian economic 
policy that have a relationship to the nature of nationalism in India. During the 
late 1940s and 1950s, the policies of import-substitution and national planning 
that prevailed represented perhaps a midway path—the outcome of a political 
stalemate—between socialist influence and big business interests in the Indian 
National Congress (Mukherji 2009: 84). While the socialists split, creating their 
own Socialist Party in 1948, Nehru steadily increased the proportion of government 
investment in relation to private investment, although the latter continued to 
have a legitimate role in the economy.
During the Indira Gandhi years, Indian non-alignment was compromised as the 
nation-state was forced to ask for US food aid and financial assistance. In return, 
India had to liberalize its trade policy and devalue its currency. In 1969, policy 
veered in the other direction as the government nationalized a massive quantum 
of private sector assets, including the banking sector. Foreign  multinationals also 
saw their power and autonomy reduced and departed the country during the 
1970s. Such a confused zigzag of economic policy reflected weak economic devel-
opment, popular unrest, and, not least, inner-party conflict, which culminated in 
the populist policies of the Emergency Period (1975–1977) (Kaviraj 1986). This 
variety of populism not only decimated the inner organization of the old Congress 
party—which may have been imploding anyway—but the highly undemocratic 
measures and failures also catalysed changes in the national imaginary.
By the late 1970s, the growing middle classes were coming into their own and 
their rise was accompanied by an explosion of the media and civil society. Urban 
protest and anger against government corruption and mis-governance—also 
expressed in Bombay cinema of the time—in addition to weak economic devel-
opment, laid the foundations of a changing national imaginary that was in favour 
of alternative models of development. At the same time there was, in some regions 
and communities, a tearing at the national consensus as regional and communal 
movements began to assert themselves. Counter-national movements appeared 
during the 1980s in the Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir, the last of which has yet to 
be resolved (Rajagopal 2011; Roy 2015).
Finally, the liberalization measures of 1991 sealed the transformation of the 
Nehruvian national self-image, although hard reforms would still take a long time, 
given the nature of Indian national politics. Indeed, it took the dire threat of a 
fiscal crisis—in addition to the political tragedy of the death of the prime minister—
for national leaders and policymakers to accept this change (Mukherji 2009: 90). 
More than ten years before, Deng Xiaoping and the reformists in the party 
had effected similar systemic changes with positive economic consequences and 
equally powerful consequences for its imaginary of a socialist nation.
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7. The Asian Financial Crisis and the Question  
of National Autonomy
Just as in China and India, popular dissatisfaction with existing strategies of 
development and changing ideas of redistributive justice during the postcolonial 
decades in Southeast Asia forced changes in the policies and strategies of 
the  regimes. Indeed, it led to regime change in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
and Indonesia. In Southeast Asia, domestically driven tensions and opposition 
 combined with geopolitical changes particularly after the United States–China 
rapprochement, the end of the Vietnam War, and the winding down of the 
Cold War in the mid-1970s. From this period, several of these nations, including 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia—came to be integrated in the regional econ-
omy centred in Japan, together with the earlier generation of the newly industri-
alized countries of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Japan was not only 
a source of inspiration: Japanese investment created production systems in the 
region during the 1980s, and the availability of cheap credit in Japan since then 
also fuelled speculative investments.
While some of these nation-states, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, 
had relatively weak state capacities and poor governance structures, they sought 
to follow the Japanese path of development. This, as we have seen, was a form of East 
Asian neo-mercantilism involving close, co-operative relationships between the state 
and business on the one hand, and the planned nature of economic development on 
the other. The weak version of the East Asian model in Southeast Asia, while suc-
cessful in some areas, however, tended to exacerbate the undemocratic characteris-
tics of the regimes, which sometimes led them to unleash ethnic nationalism.
The ‘race riots’ of 1969 in Malaysia between Malays (bumiputera) and the large 
Chinese (and Indian) minority represents the most evident change in economic 
development policies resulting from competing nationalisms. In the major 
countries of Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese community were typically 
entrepreneurial and often wealthy, but represented what Fred Riggs called ‘pariah 
entrepreneurs’ (quoted in Baker and Phongpaichit  2005: 153) due to their low 
status in the ideology of national purity, and were the frequent object of rent-
seeking bureaucrats and military. (Part of the community was also identified with 
communism, which did not help their situation.) After the 1969 riots, the Malay 
state sought to redistribute economic power to the Malay population by increasing 
its control of key economic sectors, nationalizing many foreign enterprises and 
targeting 30 per cent bumiputera ownership of economic enterprises and employ-
ment (Chapter 20, this volume).
In Indonesia, the slaughter of communists organized by Suharto and the 
 military in 1965 overlapped considerably with a massacre of the Chinese community 
(alleged to be communist), and the ethnic violence reappeared in 1998 when the 
Suharto regime fell. The situation remains uneasy with the rise of Islamism. The 
Thai monarchy, however, was the most agile in transitioning to a post-Cold War 
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regime. Soon after the military suppressed the student and rural unrest in the 
mid-1970s, the Thai royalty was the first to host Deng Xiaoping in his post-1978 
tour of Southeast Asia. The principally Chinese Thai merchant classes were 
appeased and the leftists were isolated (Wongsurawat n.d.).
The years after the end of the global Cold War brought the Washington 
Consensus to the region. The United States and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) persuaded these erstwhile Cold War partners through their membership 
in APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) to privatize, deregulate, and 
liberalize their trade regimes and capital markets. The loosening of national con-
trols led to a wave of private capital inflows into Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines; the total value increased from US$48 billion to 
US$93 billion between 1994 and 1996. In 1997, the figure declined precipitously 
to minus US$12 billion (Financial Times, 16 February 1998: 21, cited by Beeson 
1998: 357–74; see also Higgott 1998).
What came to be called the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 was triggered 
by currency devaluation in China and Japan, which made these other Asian econ-
omies uncompetitive at both ends of the value chain. The Chinese  devaluation of 
the yuan in relation to the US dollar in 1994 led to a 50 per cent decline in its 
value on top of the introduction of a 17 per cent VAT rebate for exports (Higgott 
1998: 335). The depreciation of the Japanese yen to the US dollar in 1995 (by 40 
per cent) and the weakening of Japanese consumer markets caused the steep and 
unsustainable appreciation of these Asian currencies, which were all pegged to 
the dollar (Corsettia et al. 1999: 355). Although the crisis began in Thailand, it 
quickly spread to neighbouring countries, revealing the close relationships between 
these economies. Riots broke out in several countries, including South Korea and 
Thailand. Certain weaker economies such as Suharto’s military technocratic regime, 
which could not manage the volatility, collapsed.
One may legitimately inquire, despite the comparatively developed national 
autonomy in Asia compared to Latin America, whether this autonomy was 
 sufficient. While some Southeast Asian countries may have expressed poor gov-
ernance, it was ultimately the dependence on the United States–Japan-centred 
regional economy and the pressures they faced for liberalization that underlay the 
crisis. Paul Krugman observed in 1998:
Why hasn’t China been nearly as badly hit as its neighbors? Because it has been 
able to cut, not raise, interest rates in this crisis, despite maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate; and the reason it is able to do that is that it has an inconvertible 
currency, a.k.a. exchange controls. Those controls are often evaded, and they are 
the source of lots of corruption, but they still give China a degree of policy 
 leeway that the rest of Asia desperately wishes it had.
(Krugman 1998, quoted by Corsettia et al. 1999: 364)
The political consequences of the crisis in the context of regional development 
is  worth noting. The US allies in the region had formed into ASEAN in 1967, 
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 initially as a security organization. Subsequently, as these economies ‘took off ’, 
their economic relationships with each other grew greatly and increasingly, as 
noted, under a Japan-centred regional economy. While economic and cultural 
nationalism continued to shape these countries, by the 1990s they had developed 
sufficient confidence to announce a distinctive identity—although it was more 
ideology than identity—of ‘Asian values’, particularly in those societies influenced 
by Confucian values. This ideological bubble, however, burst soon after the financial 
crisis. Nonetheless, as the crisis revealed, these economies had become highly 
interdependent.
The economic integration of East, South, and Southeast Asia, which had 
increased steadily under imperialist-dominated trade, declined precipitously 
at  the end of the Second World War (Petri  2005: 11–14). Intraregional trade 
began to pick up in the 1980s, but it was the shock of the common crisis that 
seems to have awakened the states to the reality of regional networks and focused 
their attention on co-operation. Ten years on from the crisis, what the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) calls ‘integrating Asia’, including ASEAN, China, 
Japan, South Korea, India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, conducted over 50 per cent 
of its trade with itself in comparison to trade with the outside world, compared 
with only 33 per cent in the 1980s. In 2016, the Asian interregional trade share 
of world trade rose to 57.3 per cent. Six major indicators of interdependence 
tracked for the sixteen Asian economies have increased markedly in the ten years 
since the financial crisis (ADB 2008: 70, 97–8; see also ADB 2017). Financial 
integration has been weaker, but several of these countries have entered into 
bilateral swap agreements since the Asian financial crisis. The ADB reported in 
2017 that twenty years after the financial crisis, wide-ranging reforms and safety 
net systems against the impact of externals had been developed, ‘as seen by 
Asia’s relative resilience to and rapid recovery from the 2008/09 global financial 
crisis’ (ADB 2017: 8).
In the twenty-first century, ASEAN has sought to create a framework to 
enmesh the major powers in regional affairs through commercial diplomacy 
(e.g., free-trade agreements), thereby avoiding dependence on a single great 
power. In recent years, the admirable balance it had achieved has tended to be 
overcome by the increasing dependence on Chinese economic development and 
fear of  political intervention.
8. Nationalism and Development in the  
Twenty-first Century
The end of the Cold War and the onset of the neo-liberal era of the Washington 
Consensus has created a different scenario for Asian nations. The impact of global 
capitalism was felt most severely during the Asian financial crisis by the frontline 
nations of East and Southeast Asia. While, as we have seen, these nations have 
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succeeded in creating some protections and escaped the global financial crisis 
of  2008–2009 less damaged than others, the economic, political, and cultural 
impacts of globalization have generated a changed pattern of both state and 
 popular nationalism.
Many of the economically powerful Asian nations, including Japan, South 
Korea, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and India have accepted 
the premise of international economic integration and their businesses have 
gained considerably from this integration. This has changed the nature of state 
economic nationalism, but they have by no means rejected it. Instead of blatant 
moves like expelling multinationals or raising protective tariffs, these states have 
taken on new roles in supporting national and domestic firms to compete suc-
cessfully in the global economy. In this context, state intervention has tended to 
favour private domestic corporations, often at the expense of public investment 
and services (D’Costa 2012: 14, 28).
Saskia Sassen has written about restructuring of the contemporary state as a 
consequence of globalization: ‘The encounter of a global actor—firm or market—
with one or another instantiation of the national state can be thought of as a new 
frontier zone. It is not merely a dividing line between the national economy and 
the global economy. It is a zone of politico-economic interactions that produce 
new institutional forms and alter some old ones’ (Sassen 1999: 151). The Chinese 
state expresses this changed structure aptly since the 1990s. The special eco-
nomic zones and decentralized formats governing regional and international 
relationships can be found, most famously, in the Hong Kong–South China 
relationship, the Yellow Sea zone, and the Taiwan–Fujian–Shanghai interactions.4 
Provincial government economic activism plays a particularly important role, for 
instance, in southwest Yunnan–Southeast Asia ties, and more recently in the Belt 
Road Initiative.
While this has led to high growth rates in the GDP of Asian economies, 
especially for China and India, the population has also been exposed to the 
volatility of global capitalism. Partially in response to these changes, the role of 
popular nationalism in Asia, as elsewhere, has changed. Over the previous fifty 
years, the nation-state’s project to mobilize its citizens for development, sacrifice, 
and repression had, with notable exceptions, led to its shaping the identities of 
the people through the educational and other apparatuses, state and non-state. 
In the current era, this nationalism has tended to become a reactive—and 
often reactionary—movement in a populist version of Polanyi’s defensive or 
protective phase.
In the absence of an alternative vision to socialism, the PRC state has emphasized 
the raw goals of restoring national power and glory and reached back to its imperial 
history. The decades of state-led nationalism, first directed against US imperialism 
4 See, for example, Hook (2001); see also Chen (2000).
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and subsequently against Japanese war crimes, led in the twenty-first century to 
mass nationalism that often slipped out of state control. Internet nationalism is of 
course the latest phase of a series of events over the last twenty years, including 
demonstrations against the Belgrade bombings and the numerous protests 
regarding territorial conflicts with Japanese and other neighbouring countries. 
Similarly, popular nationalisms have forced the hand of the Vietnamese govern-
ment, generated conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia, between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, among many others. Islamic nationalism in Indonesia 
and to a lesser extent in Malaysia, regional Muslim uprisings in Southern Thailand 
and the Philippines, and Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar have also stoked 
 violence in the ASEAN region just as it has begun to gain some traction as an 
economic formation (Vu 2013).
In India, the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has seen both state activ-
ism in the global and national economic sphere as well as the intensification of 
Hindutva communalism. A recent expression of the relationship between the two 
reported in the New York Times is revealing. In the 2017 elections in Gujarat, the 
New York Times reported that many supporters of Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi, who had been a long-time chief minister of Gujarat with a strong following 
among the business community in particular, were poorly affected by recent eco-
nomic measures, such as the demonetization of the economy:
Kailash Dhoot, a textile exporter, said that Mr. Modi’s recent policies had 
wounded his business but that Mr. Modi’s party was still his first choice.
When asked why, Mr. Dhoot was quick, and curt, with an answer. ‘Hindutva,’ he 
said. And he closed his mouth firmly, signaling the discussion was over.
(Gettleman and Kumar 2018)
The legacy of confessional nationalism has produced loyalty, if not identity, with 
the state, which was mobilized for economic advancement and political integra-
tion. The particular example cited from the New York Times above reveals that the 
two need not be completely aligned, but can also function as supplementary or 
substitutive. In other words, the state in India deploys both goals—exclusivist 
integration and economic development—to substitute one for the other when 
needed. While this relationship certainly pre-existed contemporary polities, the 
scapegoating function is very relevant to contemporary states, democratic and 
non-democratic, in both the developing and developed world.
9. Conclusion
Since the Second World War, nationalism in Asia has revealed many visages—
revolutionary, top-down, anti-communist, participatory, civic, ethnic, religious, 
and more. The immediate post-war decades saw a largely inclusive civic model 
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across much of the globe, permitting the new nation-states to develop their 
domestic capabilities and resources without strong ethnocentric biases (but not 
excluding anti-communism). The prevalence of the post-war inclusive model had 
much to do with the geopolitical circumstances of the victory of the Allied 
Forces in the Second World War, but it was also enabled by strong anti-imperialist 
national movements across much of the colonial and semi-colonial world. As 
movements, these were fertile and rich sources of ideas and practices, includ-
ing co-operatives and rural re-constructionist practices across Asia. They were 
also movements for the reduction of inequalities, inequities, and social justice. 
Nationalism as a grass-roots movement is important because it urges us to view 
the costs of efficient modernization on people and the environment. In East Asia, 
the reckoning—in the places where it has come, like South Korea and Taiwan—is 
being made after a certain level of development has been attained. In the more 
democratic countries, the processes are merged and development is slow, but we 
also have to contend with the thought that without grass-roots national movements, 
development may not happen.
Each dominant mode has also transmuted over time, reflecting changes in 
domestic and international forces. In turn, changes in the political and national 
imaginaries have affected economic policies and distributive outcomes, and vice 
versa. We saw decisive transformations in the Cold War littoral where non-inclusive 
rapid growth was replaced by greater participation and more redistributive models. 
In China and India, the inadequacies of development strategies also led to political 
upheavals, which led the state to economic policies that were more capital-friendly. 
In Southeast Asia, the reliance on US military power and Japanese investments 
broke down during the Asian financial crisis, leading to changes in leadership, 
and more importantly, the emergence of a regionally integrated, transnational 
economy. ASEAN became a significant player able not only to absorb global eco-
nomic shocks, but also to enmesh global powers within a framework of its own 
making, at least until the recent activities of the PRC.
More recently, the dialectic between national political movements and economic 
development has taken a more sinister turn, baring the self–other binary that 
underlies the nation-form. The ascendance of neo-liberal capitalism globally has 
been accompanied by the rise of chauvinistic, populist nationalism. The connec-
tion between nationalism and development appears to have come full cycle 
from  over a century ago, although, of course, there are important differences. 
Nationalism is at work today to protect against real or perceived predation as well 
as to integrate the nation for competitive advantage.
The challenges ahead, particularly with the environmental crisis, will require 
nations to cultivate new ways of addressing problems of poverty and inequality in 
combination with sustainable development. While economic globalization has 
made the world more interdependent than ever, nationalism makes it very 
 difficult to translate interdependence into co-operation. Relatedly, among the 
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impediments to planetary sustainability are contemporary models and conceptions 
of prosperity  among competitive nation-states, which tend to perceive develop-
ment and sustainability as a zero-sum game.5 The forces of civil society and 
 transnational agencies and institutions committed to sustainable development 
will be needed to shift the will of nation-states to respond to this crisis.
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1. Introduction
Myrdal did not cover China in his monumental book, Asian Drama. When he 
published the book in 1968, China was approaching the twenty-year anniversary 
of the victory of the socialist revolution, led by Mao Zedong, in 1949. Its publica-
tion also came ten years after the launch of the failed ultra-leftist Great Leap 
Forward;1 and ten years before the beginning of Reform and Opening Up, 
launched by Deng Xiaoping,2 in 1978. In 1968, China was in the middle of the 
chaotic Cultural Revolution, which was launched by Mao Zedong himself in 1966 
and did not end until his death in 1976.3
Unlike other Asian countries studied in Asian Drama, China had a strong 
rather than a soft state. China had also carried out, since 1953, a big push for its 
industrialization drive, recommended by Myrdal in Asian Drama to Asian coun-
tries for changing their miserable underdeveloped status. China, starting in the 
1 The Great Leap Forward aimed for China to overtake the United Kingdom in ten years and to 
catch up with the United States in fifteen years. It set ambitious industrialization targets, for example, 
doubling the steel output from 5.35 million ton in 1957 to 10.7 million ton in 1958. The program 
boosted industrial output like a balloon but soon failed, as shown in Figure 15.1a. However, the efforts 
to industrialize China persisted. The Great Leap Forward also made parallel dramatic changes in the 
rural area, for example, the adoption of People’s Commune as the basic farming system. After the 
socialist revolution, the Chinese government first confiscated landlords’ land and distributed the land 
to poor farmers in 1949–1952 and consolidated the private farms into agricultural collectivizes step by 
step afterwards. The first attempt was the Mutual Aid team of 3 to 5 households in 1953, then pro-
gressed to the Primary Agricultural Cooperative of 20 to 30 households in 1954–1955, to Advanced 
Agricultural Cooperatives of around 200 households in 1956–1957, and peaked at the People’s 
Commune of an average farm size of 5,000 households. After the failure of the People’s Commune, the 
farm system changed to the Production Team system of 20 to 30 households in 1962. The system 
remained until the introduction of individual-based farming, the Household Responsibility System, 
in 1978, when the Reform and Opening Up began.
2 Deng Xiaoping, born in 1904, was one of the first generation revolutionary leaders. He became 
general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 1956, purged in 1966 at the beginning of 
Cultural Revolution, restored in 1973 by Chairman Mao, purged again in 1976 by the leftist Gang 
of Four, Chairman Mao’s heirs, when Mao died. He returned to power again in 1978 after the Gang of 
Four was overthrown.
3 Mao’s ostensible reason for the Cultural Revolution was to prevent China from falling back onto 
the capitalist road. However, one of the true reasons behind his motivation was to regain his political 
dominance in China after stepping aside from the first line of policymaking in 1962, due to the set-
back of the Great Leap Forward and People’s Commune in 1958–1961, which led to the Great Famine 
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first Five-Year Plan in 1953, adopted a state-led planned economic system to 
 pursue a heavy industry-oriented development strategy for the purpose of quickly 
building up a comprehensive system of modern capital-intensive industries. 
With the big push of the Stalinist planning model as well as Chinese bureaucrats’ 
 mobilization and implementation capability, China was quickly transformed from 
an agrarian economy in 1952 to an economy dominated by industry, as shown in 
Figure 15.1a, with the capability to test nuclear bombs in 1964 and launch a satel-
lite in 1970.
Nevertheless, when Asian Drama was published, China was still trapped eco-
nomically in a dire situation worse than most other countries analysed in the book. 
Measured in current US dollars, China’s per capita GDP in 1968 was US$91.5, 
compared to US$98.8 in India, US$65 in Indonesia, US$323.4 in Malaysia, 
US$146.9 in Pakistan, US$224.6 in Philippines, and US$150.2 in Sri Lanka.4
Real change in China did not occur for another ten years until the Reform and 
Opening Up began in 1978. In that year, 70.5 per cent of the labour force was 
employed in the primary sector and 82 per cent of China’s population was living 
in rural areas, as shown in Figures 16.1b and 16.1c. Moreover, 84 per cent of its 
population was living below the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day. 
China’s per capita GDP was US$156, about 25 per cent below India’s US$204 and 
less than one third of the average of US$490 in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Like other poor countries, China was also an inward-looking economy with trade 
consisting of merely 9.7 per cent to its GDP. Myrdal did not have the opportunity 
to spend another ten years doing the research on China and publish a sequel 
to Asian Drama in 1978. If he had done, he, like many economists at that time, 
would most likely have painted a pessimistic outlook for China, similar to his 
outlook for other Asian countries in his 1968 book, even though China had 
implemented many of his proposed programmes, such as big-push industrializa-
tion and land reform, for three decades.
From the above humble starting point, Deng Xiaoping and other veterans ini-
tiated at the end of 1978 the Reform and Opening Up programmes to transit the 
Chinese economic system from a planning economy to a market economy. Deng 
and his associates were purged during the Cultural Revolution and did not return 
to power until the death of Mao and the downfall of Mao’s hand-picked ultra-left 
successors, the Gang of Four, in 1976.
China is celebrating the fortieth anniversary of Reform and Opening Up this 
year. In the past forty years, predictions of the coming collapse of the Chinese 
economy surged repeatedly in the world’s news media and international forums. 
However, to the surprise of almost every China observer and economist around 
the world, China achieved a sustained growth miracle. Instead of collapse, 
4 The data for per capita GDP used in this chapter are all taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators).
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Figure 15.1 Compositions of GDP, employment, and population.
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from National Statistical Bureau, Compilation of New China 
Statistical Data, 1949–2013; National Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Abstract 2018.
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stagnation, and frequent crises—as in many transition economies in East Europe, 
the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Latin America at the same period of 
time—the average annual growth rate of GDP reached 9.5 per cent in the period 
1978–2017. This performance was far exceeding the expectation of Deng Xiaoping 
himself. When he initiated Reform and Opening Up, the target was to quadruple 
the Chinese economy in twenty years. The GDP growth rate required for that 
was 7.2 per cent per year for twenty years. I was a graduate student at Peking 
University at that time. None of my classmates, including myself, and my profes-
sors, including those visiting professors from the West, thought the above growth 
target was possible to achieve.
In addition, China’s trade growth was also unprecedented. The average annual 
growth rate of trade volume, measured in US dollars, reached 14.8 per cent in 
1978–2017. With such an extraordinary growth performance, China overtook 
Japan to be the second largest economy measured by market exchange rate in 
the world in 2009, overtook Germany to be the world’s largest exporter in 2010, 
overtook the US to be the world’s largest trading country in 2013, and in 2014, 
China’s GDP, measured by purchasing power parity, exceeded the US to become 
the world’s largest economy. China’s per capita GDP reached US$8,640 and trade 
consisted of 31.1 per cent of GDP in 2017. During this period of time about 800 
million people were lifted above the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day, 
contributing to more than 70 per cent of poverty reduction in the world. Moreover, 
not only was China the only emerging market economy to avoid a systemic financial 
and economic crisis in the past forty years, it also helped the Asian economies 
to quickly pull out of the 1997/1998 financial crisis by not devaluing Chinese cur-
rency and maintaining dynamic growth and helped the world economy avoid a 
downward spiral in the 2008 global crisis by using fiscal stimulus to achieve quick 
recovery, and contributing more than 30 per cent of global growth annually.
In this chapter, I discuss six related questions: why was China’s growth 
 performance poor before 1987? Why was it possible for China to achieve such an 
outstanding performance after the transition in 1978? Why was China able to 
avoid collapse and stagnation as was occurring in other transition economies? 
What were the prices China paid for its success? What are the prospects for 
China’s growth in the coming decades? What lessons can we draw from China’s 
development experiences in view of the Asian Drama?
2. Why was China Trapped in Poverty before 1978?
Rapid, sustained increase in per capita income is a modern phenomenon. Studies 
by economic historians, such as Angus Maddison (2001), show that average 
annual per capita income growth in the West was only 0.05 per cent before the 
eighteenth century, jumping to about 1 per cent in the nineteenth century, and 
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reaching about 2 per cent in the twentieth century. That means that per capita 
income in Europe took 1,400 years to double before the eighteenth century, about 
seventy years in the nineteenth century, and thirty-five years thereafter. Before 
the coming of modern times in 1700 ad, the gap of per capita GDP in China and 
India, compared with that of West European countries, was only about 50 per cent 
and due to their enormous population size, China and India together contributed 
about 50 per cent of global GDP (Lin and Rosenblatt 2012).
A continuous stream of technological innovation is the basis for continuous 
improvement of productivity and income and thus sustained growth in any econ-
omy. The dramatic surge in growth in modern times is a result of a paradigm shift 
in technological innovation. Before the industrial revolution in the latter half 
of the eighteenth century, technological innovations were generated mostly by 
the experiences of craftsmen and farmers in their daily production. After the 
industrial revolution, experience-based innovation was increasingly replaced by 
 experimentation and, later, by science-based experiments conducted in scientific 
laboratories (Lin 1995; Landes 1998). This paradigm shift accelerated the rate of 
technological innovation, marking the coming of modern economic growth and 
contributing to the dramatic acceleration of income growth in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Kuznets 1966).
The industrial revolution not only accelerated the rate of technological 
 innovation, but also transformed industrial, economic, and social structures, as 
the historical materialism articulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848) 
in Manifesto of the Communist Party. Before the eighteenth century, every econ-
omy was agrarian; 85 per cent or more of the labour force worked in agriculture, 
mostly in self-sufficient production for the family. The acceleration of growth was 
accompanied by the movement of labour from agriculture to manufacturing and 
services. The manufacturing sector gradually moved from very labour-intensive 
industries at the beginning to more capital-intensive heavy and high-tech indus-
tries. Finally, the service sector came to dominate the economy. Accompanying 
the change in industrial structure was an increase in the scale of production, 
required capital and skill, market scope, and risks. In order to exploit the poten-
tial unleashed by new technology and industry and to reduce transaction costs 
and share risks, it requires innovations as well as improvements in an economy’s 
hard infrastructure, such as power, road networks, and port facilities, and its 
soft infrastructure, including rules and values, the legal framework, financial 
institutions, and the education system (Lewis 1954; Kuznets 1966; North 1981; 
Lin 2011, 2012b).
A developing country like China, which started its modernization drive in 
1949 after the victory of the socialist revolution, potentially has latecomer advan-
tages in its pursuit of technological innovation and structural transformation. In 
advanced, high-income countries, technological innovation and industrial upgrad-
ing require costly and risky investments in research and development, because 
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their technologies and industries are located at the global frontier. Moreover, the 
institutional innovation required for realizing the potential of new technology 
and industry often proceeds in a costly trial-and-error, path-dependent, evolu-
tionary process (Fei and Ranis  1997). By contrast, a latecomer country in the 
catching-up process can borrow technology, industry, and institutions from the 
advanced countries at low risk and costs. So, if a developing country knows how 
and introduces necessary conditions to tap the latecomer advantage in technol-
ogy, industry, and social and economic institutions, it can grow at an annual rate 
several times that of high-income countries for decades before closing its income 
gap with those advanced countries (Lin 2009; Vu 2013).5
In pre-modern times, China was the largest economy and among the most 
advanced, powerful countries in the world (Maddison 2007). Mao Zedong, Zhou 
Enlai, and many other Chinese social and political elites joined the socialist 
revolution for the purpose of realizing the dream of China’s rejuvenation. The 
lack of industrialization—especially the lack of large-scale, capital-intensive, 
 technologically advanced, heavy industries that were the foundation for high 
labour productivity, and thus high income, and the basis for the production of 
military machineries, and thus military strength—was perceived as the root cause 
of China’s backwardness. It was natural and seemingly intuitive for the social and 
political elites in China to prioritize the development of large, heavy, advanced 
industries when they started the process of nation building after the success of the 
socialist revolution. In the nineteenth century, the political leaders of France, 
Germany, the United States, and other Western countries pursued effectively the 
same strategy, motivated by the contrast between Britain’s rising industrial power 
and the backwardness of their own industry (Gerschenkron 1962; Chang 2003).
Starting in 1953, China adopted a series of ambitious Five-Year Plans to accel-
erate the building of modern advanced industries, with the goal of overtaking 
Britain in ten years and catching up to the United States in fifteen years. Because 
those advanced industries were not only protected by patents, but their access 
to knowhow was also prohibited by advanced countries due to their national 
 security consideration, China needed to ‘reinvent the wheel’ when it wanted to 
build up those advanced industries. Such a strategy effectively gave up the late-
comer’s advantage in technology innovation and industrial upgrading.
5 The concept of latecomer advantages is related but has a subtle difference to the advantages of 
backwardness made popular by Gerschenkron (1962). The latecomer advantages refer to a country at 
a lower development stage that can learn from the existing technology, industry, and institution of a 
country at a higher development stage to reduce the cost and risk of innovation in its development 
process. The advantage of backwardness refers to a country at a lower development stage that has a 
lower opportunity cost than an advanced country in adopting the newest technology, as the former 
can adopt directly the newest technology when it first enters a new industry while the latter is already 
in the advanced industry and will have to replace the equipment that embodied the old technology 
with new equipment using the newest technology as and when the newest technology becomes avail-
able (Lin 2016).
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Moreover, China was a lower-income agrarian economy at that time. In 1953, 
83.1 per cent of its labour force was employed in the primary sector, and its per 
capita income (measured in purchasing power parity terms) was only 4.8 per cent 
of that of the US (Maddison  2001). Given China’s employment structure and 
income level, the country did not possess a comparative advantage in the modern 
advanced industries of high-income countries, whether latent or overt, and Chinese 
firms in those industries were not viable in an open, competitive market.
To achieve its strategic goal, the Chinese government needed to protect the 
priority industries by giving firms in those sectors a monopoly in product markets 
and subsidizing them through various price distortions, including suppressed 
interest rates, an overvalued exchange rate, and lower prices for other inputs, 
including wages for labour. The price distortions created shortages and the 
government was obliged to use administrative measures to mobilize and allocate 
resources directly to the non-viable firms in priority industries (Lin 2009; Lin 
and Li 2009).
These interventions, as shown in Figure  15.1c, enabled China to quickly 
transform the production structure from an agrarian economy to an industrial-
ized economy with the ability to test nuclear bombs in the 1960s and launch 
satellites in the 1970s. However, the modern capital-intensive industries gener-
ated only a few employment opportunities, resulting in little change in China’s 
employment and population structure from its agrarian past before the end of 
the 1970s, as shown in Figures 16.1b and 1c. The costs of such a development 
strategy were not only the voluntary giving up of the latecomer’s advantage but 
also the inefficiency arising from the misallocation of resources, the distorted 
incentives, and the repression of labour-intensive sectors in which China held a 
comparative advantage. As a result, economic efficiency was low and growth 
before 1978 was driven mainly by an increase in inputs. Despite a very respect-
able average annual GDP growth rate of 6.1 per cent in the period 1952 to 1978 
and the establishment of large modern industries, China’s household consump-
tion grew by only 2.3 per cent a year, in sharp contrast to the 7.9 per cent aver-
age growth after 1978.
3. Why could China have an Extraordinary Performance  
after the Transition in 1978?
As discussed in the previous section, a sustained growth relies on continuous 
technology innovation in the existing industries and constant upgrading to new, 
higher value-added industries. A developing country has the latecomer advantage 
in technological innovation and industrial upgrading and can potentially grow 
faster than advanced countries. In the post-Second World War period, thirteen of 
the world’s 200+ economies found the way to tap into the potential and achieved 
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average annual growth of at least 7 per cent for twenty-five years or more. After 
the economic transition started in 1978, China became one of the thirteen.
The Commission on Growth and Development, headed by Nobel Laureate 
Michael Spence, finds that these thirteen economies have five common features: 
openness, macroeconomic stability, high rates of saving and investment, a market 
system, and committed, credible, and capable government (Commission on 
Growth and Development 2008: 22). Spence suggests that the above five features 
are the ingredients for a recipe but that they alone are not a recipe for successful 
development (Spence 2016). In fact, there is a recipe for success. The recipe is 
to follow a country’s comparative advantages to develop its industries and to 
upgrade its industries according to the changes in comparative advantages in the 
country’s development process (Lin 2009, 2013).
Lin and Monga (2012) show that the first three features are the result of follow-
ing the economy’s comparative advantages in developing industries at each stage 
of its development and the last two features are the institutional preconditions 
for the economy to follow its comparative advantages in developing industries. 
If a country develops its industries according to its comparative advantages, it will 
produce whatever the country can produce at low cost and export the goods. 
Otherwise, the country will import from other countries. The country will be an 
open economy with trade consisting of a larger share of its GDP than a country 
adopting a comparative advantage-defying import-substitution strategy. The 
country will be competitive in domestic and international markets with fewer 
homegrown crises and better ability to mitigate external shocks due to the gov-
ernment’s sound fiscal position than a country adopting an inefficient comparative 
advantage-defying development strategy. Therefore, a country will have a good 
record of macro stability. The return to investment will be high in industries that 
are consistent with a country’s comparative advantages, resulting in a high saving 
and high investment in the country. For the entrepreneurs to make investments 
according to a country’s comparative advantages spontaneously, requires a price 
system that can reflect the relative scarcities of each production factor. Such a 
price system will exist only in a competitive market, which is the fourth feature 
among the five features of the thirteen successful economies. The economic 
development is a process of structural changes, which will require a committed, 
proactive, capable state to help overcome the inevitable externality and co-
ordination issues for a dynamic transformation.
After the transition from a planning economy to a market economy, initiated 
by Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978, China switched its development strategy. 
The government liberalized the entry of private enterprises, joint ventures, and 
foreign direct investment to labour-intensive industries, in which China had com-
parative advantages but were repressed before the transition. With liberalization 
of entry into the new sectors, in addition to providing incentives for investment, the 
Chinese government recognized the need to help private firms overcome all kinds 
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of inherent hurdles in the transition process: The overall business environment 
was poor,6 the nationwide infrastructure in China was bad,7 and the nation’s 
investment environment was inhospitable.8 The Chinese government mobilized 
its limited resources and capability to build up special economic zones and indus-
trial parks (Zeng 2010, 2011). Within the zones and parks, the infrastructure 
and business environment were made very attractive. The labour costs were low 
because of the large amount of surplus labour in rural areas when China started 
the transition. But China lacked the knowledge about how to turn that surplus 
labour to its advantage by producing labour-intensive goods of acceptable quality 
for the international market. And international buyers were not confident that 
Chinese firms would be able to deliver the goods in a timely manner. To overcome 
those difficulties, the Chinese governments at all levels and in all regions proactively 
approached prospective foreign investors, especially those manufacturers in devel-
oping Asia that were about to upgrade their  operations in the value chain and 
relocate their labour-intensive processing to other low-wage economies because 
of rising wages in their own economies. China provided tax holidays to incentivize 
foreign manufacturers to make investments in the special economic zones and 
industrial parks (Graham and Wada 2001; Wei and Liu 2001).
In addition, when the transition started in 1978, the official exchange rate was 
overvalued. To facilitate the trade, the government adopted initially a dual-track 
exchange rate system, allowing the market-determined exchange rate to operate 
parallel with the overvalued official exchange rate, and the dual-track system 
converged to a managed floating system in 1994 (2012a). The government also 
used innovatively the countercyclical fiscal policies in the 1997/1998 East Asian 
financial crisis and 2008 global financial crisis to improve infrastructure, espe-
cially the inter-regional infrastructure, such as highways and high-speed railroads, 
which contributed to the rapid integration of domestic markets and linkage to 
the global markets.9
6 In 2013, after more than three decades of market-oriented reform, China still ranked 91 in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business survey (http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings).
7 I still remember vividly the experience of my travel by car from Guangzhou, the capital city of 
Guangdong province, to Shenzhen, the newly established special economic zone, for the first time in 
1984. The car had to cross rivers by ferry three times and it took me more than twelve hours to travel 
the distance of 300 km. The infrastructure at that time in China was worse than any of the African 
countries to where I travelled extensively as the Chief Economist of the World Bank in 2008–2012.
8 In the World Bank’s Investing Across Borders 2010, China’s investment environment was ranked 
the worst among the eighty-seven economies covered in the study. See http://iab.worldbank.org/~/
media/FPDKM/IAB/Documents/IAB-report.pdf.
9 In 1997, China only had 4800 km of highway, compared to 86,000 km in the US, although the 
territory size in both countries is about the same. The length of highway in China expanded to 25,100 
km in 2003 after the investments supported by countercyclical fiscal expansion in the East Asian 
financial crisis, and to over 136,000 km now after the investments supported by the fiscal expansion in 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, China had more than 22,000 km of high-speed rail by 2016, 
contributing to more than 65 per cent of the high-speed rails in the world (NBS 2018).
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With the pragmatic transition approach, accession to WTO in 2001, the 
favourable exchange rate policy, and infrastructure improvement, China devel-
oped labour-intensive light manufacturing and quickly became the world’s factory, 
thereby tapping into the potential of latecomer advantage in the process of indus-
trial upgrading. While in 1978 primary and processed primary goods accounted for 
more than 75 per cent of China’s exports, by now the share of  manufactured goods 
had increased to more than 95 per cent. Moreover, China’s  manufactured exports 
upgraded from simple toys, textiles, and other cheap products in the 1980s and 
1990s to high-value and technologically sophisticated machinery and informa-
tion and communication technology products in the 2000s. The exploitation of the 
latecomer’s advantage has allowed China to emerge as the world’s workshop and 
to achieve extraordinary economic growth by reducing the costs of innovation, 
industrial upgrading, and social and economic transformation.
4. Why did other Transition Economies not  
Perform Equally Well?
After the Second World War, all other socialist countries and most developing 
countries, including those studied in Asian Drama, adopted a development strat-
egy similar to that of China. The strategy was influenced by the elites’ intuitive 
perception of modernization in the developing countries, the Soviet Union’s 
experience of rapid industrialization before the Second World War and the 
prevailing structuralist development thinking at that time (Lin  2012b,  2012c). 
Most developing countries shed colonial or pseudo-colonial shackles and gained 
 political independence after the Second World War. They started in earnest the 
modernization drives under the leadership of their revolutionary national fathers, 
in a manner similar to China before transition in the late 1970s. Compared with 
developed countries, these newly independent developing countries had extremely 
low per capita income, high birth and death rates, low average educational attain-
ment, and very little infrastructure—and were heavily specialized in the production 
and export of primary commodities while importing most manufactured goods 
before their modernization drive. The development of modern, advanced indus-
tries to control the commanding heights was perceived as the only way to achieve 
rapid economic take-off, become an advanced country, and avoid exploitation by 
Western industrial powers (Prebisch 1950).
It became a fad after the 1950s for developing countries in both the socialist 
and non-socialist camps to adopt a capital-intensive, large-scale, heavy industry-
oriented development strategy (Lal and Mynt  1996). But the capital-intensive 
modern industries on their priority lists could not develop spontaneously by 
market in their countries, retrospectively, due to those industries’ defiance of 
comparative advantages and the resulting lack of viability for firms in those priority 
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industries in the open, competitive market (Lin  2009,  2011). Nevertheless, the 
perception at that time was the inherent structural rigidities in the economy 
causing the market failures for developing modern industries.10 The structuralist 
thinking at that time thus advised a developing country to adopt an import-
substitution strategy to develop the modern capital-intensive industries by direct 
state intervention to overcome market failures with institutional arrangements 
similar to what were adopted in China’s planning system, including market monop-
oly, price distortions, and direct allocation of financial and other inputs.11 This 
strategy made it possible to establish some modern industries and achieve invest-
ment-led growth for one or two decades in the 1950s to the 1970s. Nevertheless, the 
distortions led to pervasive soft budget constraints, rent-seeking, and misalloca-
tion of resources. Economic efficiency was unavoidably low. Stagnation and fre-
quent social and economic crises began to beset most socialist and non-socialist 
developing countries by the 1970s and 1980s. Structuralism was replaced by neo-
liberalism after the 1970s (Lin 2012b, 2012c). As encapsulated in the neo-liberal 
Washington Consensus, liberalization from excessive state intervention became a 
fad in the 1980s and 1990s.
From the perspective of new structural economics, which advocates the use of 
the neoclassical approach to study the determinants and impacts of structure and 
structural change in the process of economic development, the industrial struc-
ture in an economy at a given time is endogenous to the comparative advantages 
determined by the economy’s endowment structure at that time. The state’s inter-
ventions and distortions before the transition were second-best institutional 
arrangements endogenous to the needs of providing protections and subsidies to 
non-viable firms in the priority sectors. But the Washington Consensus reforms, 
advocated by the academic and policy communities in the 1980s, did not realize 
the root causes and endogeneity of those interventions. As a result, policymakers 
and academics recommended that socialist and other developing countries adopt 
a big bang approach to eliminate immediately all distortions and interventions 
by implementing simultaneously programmes of privatization, marketization, 
liberalization, and fiscal stabilization with the aim of quickly establishing a well-
functioning market to achieve efficient, first-best outcomes.
But if those distortions were eliminated immediately, many non-viable firms 
in the priority sectors would collapse, causing a contraction of GDP, a surge in 
10 From the new structural economics perspective, the reason why those capital-intensive indus-
tries could not develop spontaneously in a low-income agrarian country was not because of market 
failures due to structural rigidity but the lack of comparative advantages and non-viability of firms in 
those capital-intensive industries in an open, competitive market (Lin 2011).
11 There are different explanations for the pervasive distortions in developing countries. Grossman 
and Helpman (1996), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997: 260–304), and Acemoglu et al. (2005) propose 
that these distortions were caused by the capture of government by powerful vested interests. Lin 
(2009, 2003) and Lin and Li (2009) propose that the distortions were a result of conflicts between the 
comparative advantages of the economies and the priority industries that political elites, influenced by 
the dominant social thinking of the time, targeted for the modernization of their nations.
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unemployment, and acute social disorders. Moreover, some of those advanced 
industries were the backbones to national defence. To avoid the dreadful social 
consequence and/or for the needs of national defence, many governments 
 continued to subsidize the non-viable firms in those advanced, capital-intensive, 
large-scale industries through other, disguised, less efficient subsidies and protec-
tions even after the privatization (Lin and Tan 1999). Transition and developing 
countries thus had even poorer growth performance and stability in the 1980s 
and 1990s than in the 1960s and 1970s (Easterly 2001, Lin 2014).
During the transition process, China adopted a pragmatic, gradual, dual-track 
approach. The government first improved incentives and productivity by allowing 
farmers in agricultural collectives to adopt the family farm-based household 
responsibility system. The farmers became residual claimants and were allowed to 
sell at the market freely after delivering the obligatory quota to the state at fixed 
prices (Lin 1992). At the same time, the government introduced a profit retention 
system to the state-owned enterprises, giving workers the right to a partial share 
of productivity improvements. The government also liberalized the entry of private 
enterprises, joint ventures, and foreign direct investment in labour-intensive sec-
tors, in which China had comparative advantages but that were repressed before 
the transition. In addition, as discussed in the previous section, the government 
also proactively facilitated the growth of the new industries by setting up enclaves 
such as special economic zones and export processing zones to overcome the 
bottleneck of hard and soft infrastructure in their growth.
This transition strategy allowed China to maintain stability by avoiding the 
collapse of old priority industries and to achieve dynamic growth by  simultaneously 
turning its comparative advantages into competitive advantages. The quick accu-
mulation of capital and upgrading of comparative advantages also allowed China 
to tap into the potential of latecomer’s advantages in the industrial upgrading 
process. In addition, dynamic growth in the newly liberalized sectors created the 
conditions for reforming the old priority sectors. The quick accumulation of capital 
gradually turned those capital-intensive industries from China’s comparative 
disadvantages to comparative advantages. Firms in those sectors became  viable in 
the open, competitive market, and as a result, protections and subsidies became 
unnecessary for their survival. The government could eliminate the remaining 
protections and subsidies as they became redundant. Through this gradual, 
dual-track approach, China achieved ‘reform without losers’ (Naughton 1995; 
Lau et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2003; Lin 2012a) and moved gradually but steadily to a 
well-functioning market economy.
The similar gradual, dual-track approach also worked in a few other socialist 
economies—such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in Asia, and in Poland, 
Slovenia in East Europe and Belarus and Uzbekistan in the Former Soviet Union. 
In these small groups of transition countries, they all avoided mass privatization 
of their large-scale state-owned enterprises and instead of encountering economic 
collapse, they maintained stability and growth in the transition process (Lin 2014).
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5. What Price did China Pay for its Success?
Although the economic performance during the transition in the last four dec-
ades was extraordinary, China paid a very high price for its success. In addition 
to  environmental degradation and food safety issues, which draw much public 
complaint and are the results of rapid industrialization and a lack of appropriate 
regulations, the main issue during the transition is widespread corruption and 
the worsening of income disparities. Before 1978, China had a rather disciplined 
and clean bureaucratic system and an equalitarian society. According to the 
Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, China 
ranked number 79 among all the 176 countries or territories in 2016; and based 
on the estimates of the National Bureau of Statistics and various scholars’ research, 
China’s GINI coefficient exceeded 0.45, higher than the international warning 
level, after 2000 (Li and Sicular  2014). These problems were related to China’s 
pragmatic, dual-track transition strategy.
As already mentioned, the Chinese government adopted a pragmatic, dual-
track approach in the transition. The government, one the one-hand, provides 
transitory protection and subsidies to the non-viable state-owned enterprises in the 
old, capital-intensive sectors so as to maintain stability, and on the other hand, 
liberalizes and facilitates the entry to the new, labour-intensive sectors which are 
consistent with China’s comparative advantages so as to achieve dynamic growth. 
One of the most important costs for the old capital-intensive sectors was the cost 
of capital. Before the transition in 1978, the government used fiscal appropriation 
to pay for investments and cover working capital; the SOEs did not have to bear 
any cost for capital. After the transition, the fiscal appropriation was replaced 
by bank loans. The Chinese government set up four large state banks and a stock 
market to meet the capital needs of large enterprises. To subsidize the SOEs, the 
interest rates and capital costs were artificially repressed.
When the transition started, almost all firms in China were state-owned. With 
the dual-track transition, private-owned firms grew dynamically and some of 
them became large enough to get access to bank loans or list in the equity market. 
As interest rates and capital costs are artificially repressed, whoever could borrow 
from the banks or list in the stock market are therefore subsidized. These  subsidies 
were paid for by the low returns to savings in the banks or in the stock market 
made by individual households, farms and micro, small and medium-sized firms 
in industries and services. Those people providing the funds are poorer than the 
owners of the large firms they financed. The subsidization of the  operation of rich 
people’s firms by poorer people was one reason for increasing income disparities. 
Moreover, access to bank loans and the equity market generates rents for the recipi-
ents, leading to the bribery and corruption of the officials who control the access.
Similarly, before 1979 natural resources mining was operated free of conces-
sion fees by large-scale state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their outputs were 
provided to other state-owned enterprises at very low prices. After 1983, the 
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government allowed private firms to enter the mining sectors and liberalized 
 controls over output prices in 1993. Concession fees and output taxes are kept 
low as a measure to compensate for state-owned mining enterprises’ social policy 
burden of employing redundant workers and covering the pension of retired 
workers (Lin et al. 1998; Lin and Tan 1999). For new private mining companies, 
they do not have those social policy burdens. Acquiring a concession promises 
them overnight enrichment and becomes a source of income inequality and 
corruption. In addition, banking and other large-scale service industries, such as 
power and telecommunications, are operated by state-owned monopoly enter-
prises. These monopoly rents were also sources of inequality and corruption.
It is noteworthy that in general the marginal propensity to consume decreases 
with income. Therefore, if wealth is disproportionately concentrated in the higher 
income group, the nation’s consumption-to-GDP ratio will be lower and the 
savings ratio will be higher. The concentration of wealth in the large firms has a 
similar effect. A consequence of the widening of income disparities is relatively 
high household savings and extraordinarily high corporate savings in China as 
shown in Figure 15.2 (Lin 2013).
For coping with the corruption issue, the Chinese government under President 
Xi Jinping, after taking office in 2013, launched a wide-ranging, persistent anti-
graft campaign. However, the root of widespread corruption is found in the rents 
arising from the distortions embodied in the dual-track transition for the pur-
pose of protecting and subsidizing large-scale SOEs in capital-intensive industries 
defying China’s comparative advantage. In the 1980s and 1990s, China was a poor 












Figure 15.2 China’s corporate, household, and government savings as percentage 
of GDP.
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from National Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 
(1998–2009).
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capital becomes relatively abundant and comparative advantages in China evolve 
accordingly. Many capital-intensive industries turn from defying China’s com-
parative advantages to becoming consistent with China’s comparative advantages. 
As a result firms in those industries become viable and should be competitive and 
profitable in domestic and global markets as long as they have good management. 
The nature of subsidies and protections to the recipient firms changes from a 
necessity for survival to a pure rent. It is imperative and the time to eliminate all 
remaining distortions and protections so as to complete the transition to a well-
functioning market economy and to uproot the cause for corruption and income 
disparity. Indeed, this is exactly the intention of the comprehensive reform agenda 
adopted in 2013 by the third plenary session of the 18th party congress of the 
Communist Party of China. The government sets up a national committee for 
deepening reform, headed by President Xi Jinping himself, for the purpose of 
completing the transition to a well-functioning market economy. Hundreds of 
reforms have been introduced. The implementations take time. However, the 
direction of the transition is clear and the government’s determination for mov-
ing China in that direction is strong.
6. Can China Maintain Dynamic Growth and become  
a High-Income Country in the Years Ahead?
The question that arises is, if China removes all remaining distortions and com-
pletes this transition to a well-functioning market economy, how long can it 
maintain dynamic economic growth and realize its dream of becoming a high-
income country? This question is hotly debated in China and closely followed 
globally. The reason for the question is that China’s annual growth rate dropped 
continuously from 10.6 per cent in 2010 to 6.7 per cent in 2016. A growth of 
6.7 per cent was the lowest that China has ever reached since 1990 and it was 
the first time that China experienced six concessive years of deceleration after the 
transition started in 1978.
To answer the question as to whether, after more than thirty years of 
 extraordinary growth, China can maintain dynamic economic growth in the 
coming years, one needs to answer two further related questions. The first, how 
large is China’s growth potential? And the second, what were the reasons for the 
persistent deceleration of China’s growth after 2010?
Pritchett and Summers (2014) project that China’s growth rate will decrease to 
a range of 2.3 per cent to 5.5 per cent in the next twenty years. Eichengreen et al. 
(2012) suggest that, based on international experiences of rapid-growing catch-
up economies after reaching US$17,000, measured in purchasing power parity and 
the 2005 constant dollar, a level of which China will reach soon, China’s growth 
rate will slow down to around 6 per cent. From the analysis of this chapter, the 
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potential for rapid economic growth depends on the size of the latecomer advan-
tage that China still enjoys. To measure the size of the remaining latecomer 
advantage, in my view, one should compare China’s per capita GDP with the 
per capita GDP in advanced countries, such as the US. This is because per capita 
GDP is a proxy for a country’s average labour productivity and average labour 
 productivity is a measure of the average level of technology and valued-added of 
industries in a country.
According to the data for 2008, which was the last published by Maddison,12 
the per capita GDP in China, measured at purchasing power parity, in 2008 was 
21 per cent of the United States’ figure in the same year. This proportion was simi-
lar to that for Japan in 1951, Singapore in 1967, Taiwan China in 1975, and South 
Korea in 1977. All stood at 21 per cent of the US figure in their relevant years.
In the twenty years from 1951 to 1971, Japan grew at an average annual rate 
of 9.2 per cent. From 1967 to 1987, Singapore grew at 8.6 per cent. From 1975 to 
1995, Taiwan China grew at 8.3 per cent. From 1977 to 1997, South Korea grew at 
7.6 per cent. These four East Asian economies were among the thirteen  economies 
referred to in section 2 as having tapped into the growth potential from the late-
comer advantage and as having enjoyed high growth rates of 7 per cent or more 
continuously for twenty-five or more years. Just as these economies were able to 
utilize the technology gap and exploit the latecomer advantage to grow for twenty 
years at 7.6 per cent to 9.2 per cent per year, so too potentially China can grow for 
twenty years at 8 per cent per year from 2008. Ten years have passed since 2008. 
Another ten years of potential growth at 8 per cent per year remain.
If China has the potential to grow at 8 per cent, why has the growth rate 
declined persistently down to below 8 per cent since 2010 and reached 6.7 per 
cent in 2016? The potential growth rate reflects the possibilities for technological 
innovation and industrial upgrading judged from supply side. The realization 
of this potential growth rate depends as well on demand-side conditions. From 
a demand-side point of view, growth has three components: net exports, invest-
ment, and consumption. High-income countries have not yet recovered from 
the global financial crisis of 2008: in these countries per capita GDP is stagnant, 
there is a large debt overhang, which they need to reduce, and consumption has 
increased very slowly. The stagnation of the US, western European countries and 
Japan has depressed international trade with a major impact on Chinese exports 
as China is a major global supplier of consumption goods. From 1979 to 2015, 
China’s annual average export growth was about 16 per cent. It was −2.8 per cent 
in 2015 and −7.7 per cent in 2016. The poor export performance was one of the 
reasons for a deceleration in China’s growth.13
12 The Maddison-Project (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 
version).
13 China’s growth bounced back to 6.9 per cent in 2017. The main reason was the export growth 
recovered from −7.7 per cent in 2016 to 7.9 per cent in 2017.
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The second reason was that China, like most countries, adopted countercyclical 
fiscal expansion to support investment and growth after the 2008 global crisis. 
These projects were completed but the global economy has not fully recovered 
from the aftermath of the crisis. As such, incentives for private investment remain 
low. Without a new round of stimulus programmes, investment growth rates 
will drop.
The above two factors affect all countries: growth has decelerated not just in 
China but also, and often more sharply, in other BRIC countries and many other 
countries. Fortunately, China maintains a high employment rate, and its house-
hold income has continued to grow rapidly at about 8 per cent per year, with 
consumption growing at a similar rate. This is the reason why China was able to 
maintain a growth rate higher than other BRIC and emerging market economies.
Looking forward, high-income countries are very likely to have a secular 
stagnation (Summers 2014), similar to that of Japan after 1991 due to the lack of 
structural reforms. These economies are likely to grow at less than their normal 
growth rate of 3 per cent to 3.5 per cent per year. The external demand is likely to 
remain sluggish.
How much China can turn the 8 per cent growth potential to actual growth in 
the coming years depends largely on domestic demand, including investment and 
consumption. There is a popular view that China needs to switch its unstainable 
investment-led growth model to a consumption-led growth model. This is not the 
right prescription for China or any country. Consumption is a desirable goal of 
development but its growth can be sustainable only with an increasing house-
hold income. The latter requires continuous improvement of labour productivity 
through technological innovation and industrial upgrading, both of which rely 
on investment. In fact, as shown in Figure  15.3, due to rapid income growth 
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Figure 15.3 Components of GDP growth.
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from National Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Abstract 
2018.
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of growth in China since the transition started in 1978. Except for a few years 
with investment surges as a result of events such as the entry to WTO in 2001 and 
the countercyclical fiscal stimulus in 2009, consumption contributed more to 
China’s growth than investment did.
The key for assessing how much China’s growth potential can be realized in the 
coming years depends on whether China has good investment opportunities 
in the face of the existence of excess capacity in many industries as a result of 
lingering global crisis, and whether China has sufficient resources to support the 
investment. Although there is excess capacity in many industries, such as steel 
and cement due to slack demands, as an upper-middle-income country China 
has very considerable room for investment in upgrading the industries to 
higher value-added industries, urbanization and intra-urban infrastructure, and 
 environmentally friendly green technologies. Such investments will increase effi-
ciency and environmental sustainability while taking the latecomer advantages. 
China also has plenty of resources for investments. Its fiscal position is very sound. 
In 2015 national, provincial, and local governments’ combined debt was less than 
60 per cent of GDP, among the lowest in the world. Private savings are around 
50 per cent of GDP, one of the highest in the world. China also has more than 
US$3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves. With good investment opportunities 
and abundant funding, China will maintain a reasonable rate of investment growth, 
create jobs, and increase household income and consumption. With these condi-
tions and depending on reforms to eliminate remaining distortions from the dual-
track transition, there is no reason why China cannot reach its annual growth 
target of 6.5 per cent or more before 2020 and 6 per cent in the following decade. 
If China does reach these targets, it is very likely that around 2025, Chinese per 
capita GDP will reach the threshold of US$12,700, making China a high-income 
country (Lin et al. 2016).
7. Final Remarks
There are three additional questions to answer before I conclude the chapter:
1) Why did China start the Reform and Opening Up programme in 1978 to 
transit from the planning economy to a market economy?
2) Why did China not follow the popular, seemingly more logical, neo-liberal 
shock therapy of privatization, marketization, and stabilization encapsu-
lated in the Washington Consensus and instead adopt a gradual, dual-track 
transition, which was regarded as the worst possible transition strategy, 
although retrospectively this approach is the best?
3) What lessons can we draw from China’s experiences in the past half-century 
for other developing countries?
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For the first question, I think it is because when Deng Xiaoping came back to 
power by purging Mao’s hand-picked successors, the Gang of Four, in a palace 
revolt, he needed to justify his actions in order to gain the support of the people 
and consolidate his power. After almost thirty years of socialist revolution, 
Chinese people still lived in poverty. The need to shift from the ultra-left policy to 
improve people’s living was good justification for his action to purge the Gang of 
Four (Lin 2012a).
Then why did Deng adopt a gradual, piecemeal transition approach? There 
is no theory at that time to support this approach. On the contrary, a gradual, 
piecemeal transition approach was considered the worst possible transition strategy 
as the prevailing theory at that time suggested that such an approach would make 
the economy worse than a planning economy (Murphy et al. 1992). The accepted 
wisdom in the 1980s/1990s was that the correct way to transit from a planning 
economy to a well-functioning market economy was to implement the Washington 
Consensus of privatization, marketization, and stabilization  simultaneously in 
shock therapy (Summers 1994). In the Marshall Lectures (Lin 2009), I argue: First, 
pragmatism has been a virtue in Confucianism, probably sharpened by the need 
for survival in a land with high population pressure and frequent natural disas-
ters. Second, Deng himself was one of the first-generation political leaders who 
started the socialist revolution and introduced a planned economy to China. In 
an authoritarian regime the power of a leader is not delineated by his/her formal, 
official position but based mainly on the personal trust and prestige that a leader 
receives from his people.14 If a leader is to renounce policies that he or she pur-
sued in the past, he may lose his/her prestige in people’s minds.15 Therefore, it was 
rational for Deng to adopt a tinkering strategy to reform and open up the system 
instead of a comprehensive overhaul or a complete replacement of the system. 
Vietnam and Lao also adopted a gradual, dual-track reform approach. In both 
countries, like in China, the first-generation revolutionaries, who had brought 
socialism and planned economies to their countries, initiated the transition. In 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries, their leaders were all sec-
ond or even third or fourth generation leadership when they adopted the shock 
therapy to transit from the planning system. They were not accountable for the 
14 In his final years, Deng’s only formal title was an honorary chairman of China’s Bridge Society. 
He was, however, the de facto supreme leader until his death. Similarly, Mao Zedong was regarded as 
the ultimate leader by members of the Chinese Community Party for more than ten years before he 
was elected chairman in the party congress in 1945 due to his extraordinary wisdom and strategy in 
the revolution against the Nationalist Party and the fight against Japanese invasion.
15 As argued in the previous note, in China a leader’s prestige is accumulated through the merits 
of their contributions to the people and the nation during their career, and people’s trust in their 
wisdom to provide good guidance for the nation’s future. If a political leader openly admits that 
they made a mistake in a major policy in the past, their prestige and authority will be hurt. This was 
the main reason Chairman Mao stepped aside from the central stage of power in 1962 after admitting 
his mistakes in the Great Leap Forward and the motivation for him to launch the Cultural 
Revolution to regain power.
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introduction of the planning system and could replace the old system with a new 
one in a wholesale way.
Finally, what can we learn from China’s experience? When China started the 
transition in 1978, pessimism about China’s future prevailed and, even up to 
recent years, the coming collapse of Chinese economy was a repeated theme in 
the economic profession. Myrdal did not review China’s situation in his Asian 
Drama, if he did he would have most likely been pessimistic. In fact, post-Second 
World War, the economic profession’s view about East Asia’s future was gloomy. 
The irony is that China, East Asian economies, and Mauritius were all considered 
basket cases by the economic professions but beat the odds to be the most successful 
newly industrialized economies. Moreover, the developing countries, which fol-
lowed the right development approach based on the prevailing theories advocated 
by the economic profession, all performed poorly. The dominant development 
thinking was structuralism when development economics became a sub-discipline 
of modern economics post-Second World War. The import-substitution strategy, 
which advocated structuralism, was adopted widely in Latin America, Africa, 
and South Asia in the 1950s to 1960s. Their economies performed poorly. Their 
income gap with advanced countries widened instead of narrowed. After the 1970s, 
neo-liberalism replaced structuralism as the dominant thinking in the economic 
profession. The transition approach based on neo-liberalism was the Washington 
Consensus, which advocated the use of shock therapy to establish a well-functioning 
market economy by the simultaneous implementation of marketization, privatiza-
tion, and stabilization. East Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as many 
developing countries in the 1980s to 1990s, followed this approach, resulting in 
‘lost decades’ with a lower average growth rate and a higher frequency of crises 
than before the transition. On the contrary, the few economies that performed 
well in development, for example the East Asian economies’ export-oriented 
strategy in the 1950s/1960s, and the successful transition economies like China’s 
gradual, piecemeal dual-track approach, were considered the wrong approaches 
by the mainstream economic professions.
Why was the economic profession’s perception of developing countries, in gen-
eral, pessimistic? Why did the developing countries, in general, fail by following 
the guidance from mainstream ideas to formulate their development and transition 
policies, and the few successful economies’ development and transition  policies, 
in general, considered wrong? The reasons are likely because the economic pro-
fessions always use high-income countries as their reference to see what the 
developing countries do not have and cannot do well. Developing countries do 
not have advanced industries and their market institutions do not perform well, 
compared to advanced countries. Based on the above observations, the main-
stream theories in their policy recommendations advise developing countries to 
own what the advanced countries have and to do what the advanced countries are 
doing. The intentions are good but the results are disappointing.
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Using the high-income countries, especially an ideal high-income country, 
as a reference, a developing country must be inefficient, beset with traditional, 
low-productivity industries, and backward or distorted institutions. However, 
these seemingly inefficient industries and institutions are either endogenous 
to  its stage of development, for example, the traditional agriculture and the 
related agrarian institutions, or the legacy of previous policy interventions, for 
example, the inefficient SOEs and related government interventions. Without 
understanding the roots of the endogeneity in industries and institutions 
and the appropriate theories to guide the change of endogenous phenomena, 
economists often become pessimistic about developing countries. Myrdal’s out-
look about Asian countries is an example. The repeated prediction, for the past 
forty years, by economic professions about the coming collapse of the Chinese 
economy is another example. Pessimism arises because structural backward-
ness and distortions not only cause the market to be inefficient and the govern-
ment to be ineffective, especially compared to the ideal case, but are also rigid 
and hard to eliminate.
The mainstream theories fail to guide successful development and transition 
because, in general, those theories neglect the endogeneity of the backwardness 
and distortions present in the developing and transition countries. To have suc-
cessful development and transition in developing countries, it is essential for the 
economic professions to change the reference from the developed countries to 
the developing countries themselves. From the experiences of China and East 
Asian economies in the last half-century, a successful development in a country 
should start with what a country has and what the country can do well. What a 
country has, refers to the country’s endowments, such as an abundant supply of 
labour force, at a given time and what the country can do well is the comparative 
advantage based on its endowments. The state’s development and transition pol-
icy is to mobilize the limited resources under the state’s command, proactively 
and pragmatically for the purpose of removing bottlenecks in the hard and soft 
infrastructure, in order to facilitate the country’s comparative advantages so 
that they become the country’s competitive advantages in the domestic and 
international market. This is exactly what the new structural economics, which 
I  advocate as the third edition of development economics, intends to achieve 
(Lin 2011, 2012b, 2012c; Lin and Monga 2017). If the state in a developing coun-
try can play such a facilitation role in its catch-up and or transition process, the 
country can be competitive and grow dynamically even though it is beset with a 
backward or distorted structure and turn from a low-income country to an 
industrialized high-income country within one or two generations. As Keynes 
(1935) said, ‘it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or 
evil’. The Chinese experiences in the past half-century suggest, as long as the 
ideas for development and transition are right, every developing country can be 
optimistic about its future.
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1. Myrdal and India
My first encounter with Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama was a year after its 
 publication. I joined Delhi University’s St. Stephen’s College as an undergraduate 
in 1969. One of our professors, Kalyanjit Roy Choudhury, a voracious reader, told 
us with excitement about this mammoth publication. Soon the book became a 
fashion statement for students on our campus. To be seen crossing the college 
yard with one of the volumes of the book raised one’s stature. To be seen talking 
about it raised it even more. It was a case of good competition, which helped 
enhance the level of erudition of my generation of students.
The publication of this three-volume magnum opus, focused on South Asia, 
predominantly India, and more tangentially on several Southeast Asian nations, 
marked a turning point for all those engaged in the study of economic history, 
political economy, and development. Treating the region as focus, Myrdal ranged 
over economics, history, and politics. What Myrdal was attempting, admittedly 
in an inchoate way, was an early precursor of both new institutional economics 
and behavioural economics, by insisting that to understand the performance of 
 economies, we have to view economics as a discipline embedded in sociology, 
 psychology, and politics.
Because Myrdal was charting such a new course, Asian Drama was both 
 pioneering and flawed, as we now know with the hindsight of contemporary 
research. We can see these twin traits in his analysis of India’s economy. In look-
ing at India’s sluggish growth and the vast numbers living in extreme poverty, 
Myrdal often allowed his pessimism to show through. As he wrote,
If in a country like India the government were really determined to change the 
prevailing attitudes and institutions, and had the courage to take the necessary 
steps and accept the consequences, then these would include the effective aboli-
tion of caste, prescribed by the constitution, [. . .] land reform and tenancy legis-
lation, [. . .] the eradication of corruption at all levels [. . .] and so on.
(Myrdal 1968: 368)1
1 All page references to Asian Drama are to the widely used 1972 version edited by Seth King and 
published by Allen Lane.
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One senses in this a pessimism that stems from frustration with a newly independ-
ent nation he wishes would succeed. The remark, however, suggests an inadequate 
understanding of the complexity of interaction between economics and politics and 
the troublesome idea of the endogeneity of institutions. His questioning ‘If [. . .] 
the government were really determined’ and suggestion that the ‘abolition of caste’ 
and ‘eradication of corruption’ are matters of choice by the government reveals a 
rather simplistic view of government as an exogenous institution.
It is not clear that governments have within their wherewithal the ability to 
control many of the social ills like discrimination and corruption. The persistence 
of these ills is not necessarily evidence of political leaders condoning them, even 
though it often is. We have to use more sophisticated analysis to separate out the 
cases where the corruption is being condoned or even encouraged, and where it is 
being haplessly suffered because its mitigation is beyond the leader’s reach or any 
individual’s reach for that matter. Many of our worst social ills are collective traps.
While Myrdal deserves credit for venturing out to some of these, rather treach-
erous, multidisciplinary terrains so early, the social sciences at that time did not 
have the tools and theoretical constructs to do justice to such interdisciplinary 
trespassing. As a consequence, we can now share the concern that Myrdal had for 
the theatre of Asia and at the same time bring some of the more contemporary, 
multidisciplinary social science methods to bear on the project. That is what 
I attempt to do in this chapter.
India is today a changed country from what it was half a century ago. It still has 
huge challenges but the country has long since broken with the ‘Hindu rate of 
growth’, and its population below the poverty line has fallen steadily since the late 
1960s, and sharply over the last decade. One way of celebrating Asian Drama is to 
take stock of what India has done since the time of its publication in 1968 and 
peer into the future and at the challenges that lie ahead, and that is what I propose 
to do in this chapter.
2. Politics First
From the vantage point of hindsight, it seems quite remarkable that India did 
what no other newly independent developing country did. It invested in politics 
first—establishing democracy, free speech, independent media, and equal rights 
for all citizens. At one level all progressive leaders around the world tried this. 
Following the end of the Second World War, as nations broke from the yoke of 
imperialism and became independent, we had not just Jawaharlal Nehru in India, 
but Sukarno in Indonesia, Jinnah in Pakistan, Nkrumah in Ghana, Nyerere in 
Tanzania, and several other leaders trying to put their nation on an even keel 
politically, and build political institutions to promote inclusive economic devel-
opment. But in most cases it did not last. Coups, chaotic responses, and the lust 
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for power caused democracy to collapse in one nation after another, bringing in 
military rule and conflict. A map of democracy around the world in 1985 would 
show a bleak landscape in virtually all developing and emerging nations. India 
was the exception.
While a large part of the credit for this does go to the early political leaders—
Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, and Ambedkar, and to progressive writers and intellec-
tuals like Rabindranath Tagore, Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy, and Sarojini Naidu—as 
in all matters of history, luck also plays a role. And India had it in ample measure. 
In any case, the upshot was that in terms of political design and structure, with 
regular elections, a progressive constitution, secularism, free media, and an 
empowered supreme court, India resembled an advanced nation, and in this 
respect had very few peers in the developing world.2
India’s downside turned out to be its economy. With growth sluggish, large 
swathes of population living in poverty, and widespread illiteracy, the country 
trudged along for decades, while several other nations, like South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong, starting from roughly the same level of economic 
prosperity in the 1950s, took off in spectacular ways. Some would argue that this 
sluggishness was in part caused by India’s democracy and progressive politics, and 
that, if there were a dictator, he or she would have pulled the economy out of 
the vicious circle. I shall comment on this later. But whether or not this causal 
 explanation from politics to economics has any merit, two facts do stand out: 
early India’s remarkable political achievements and the persistent economic stag-
nation for at least three decades after its independence.
Two caveats to the above claim ought to be made. First, the description should 
not convey the impression of nothing happening during these first decades. 
Despite the overall growth remaining subdued at around 3.5 per cent per annum, 
much was happening beneath that. Taking a page out of the Soviet model, India 
tried to institute five-year planning, with an effort to set up heavy industries, 
large-scale steel production, and building dams to generate electricity on a large 
scale. Second, somewhere in the mid-1960s, India had a successful ‘green revo-
lution’ and broke out of the trap of low agricultural productivity and frequent 
famines. Though this was most visible in Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar 
Pradesh, its benefits were felt across the nation.
The second caveat is that the slow growth of the early years should not be taken 
as an indicator of the nation’s independence not having an impact on the econ-
omy. Independence was good for India. Sivasubramonian’s (2000) comprehensive 
statistical study shows that annual growth, from being negligible during the first 
fifty years of the twentieth century, moved up to somewhere between 3 and 3.5 
per cent in the decades immediately after the country’s independence in 1947. 
2 For discussion, see Sen (2004, 2005) and Basu (2009). For one of the most authoritative studies of 
the interface between politics and economics in India, see Bardhan (1998).
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Nayyar (2006) identifies 1951 and 1980 as the two turning points in India’s growth 
in the twentieth century. I will have occasion to dispute his second turning point 
but that will come later.
There would be a short interruption in democracy in 1975, when the Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, declared an emergency and took dictatorial control over 
the nation. For those who believe dictatorship helps economic growth, the emer-
gency seemed like a godsend because, in 1975/76, India’s GDP growth rate hit 9 per 
cent, an unimaginable figure at that time (and, it is also believed, the trains ran on 
time). However, if these hardliners studied the growth trend thereafter, they would 
be deflated. Growth declined and, by 1979/80, it had plummeted to –5.2 per cent, the 
worst year in India’s history from 1947 to now.3 In fact, after that year, India has not 
had a single year of negative GDP growth, though it grazed past it in the early 1990s.
Luckily, the emergency lasted just under two years and, unlike most dictator-
ships, it was brought to an end by an election, called by Indira Gandhi herself, in 
1977, when she was roundly defeated. It remains a mystery why she behaved so 
differently from other dictators—namely, calling an election and then not rigging it. 
One theory, to which I subscribe, is that she was troubled by the fact of having 
destroyed her father’s legacy of establishing a vibrant democracy in India and 
wanted the legitimacy of an election and was prepared to lose.4 The other hypoth-
esis is hubris, namely, that she was confident that, though the opposition and 
much of the media cried foul, she would win and then she would consolidate her 
power. In any case, fortunately for all supporters of democracy, she was defeated.
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in the 1980s, India’s policies began to 
change. I would argue that, unlike her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, she did not have 
an innate economic ideology. While she had strong political convictions, on 
matters of economics, she had few deep convictions. When it came to economic 
policy, her career can be broken into two parts—the first when she was her father’s 
daughter, driven largely by Nehru’s ideology, and the second when she was her 
sons’ mother, steered largely by her sons’ convictions.
In her early years as leader, Indira Gandhi was largely her father’s daughter and 
she did what Nehru would have done. Nehru’s own ideology was broadly Fabian 
socialist, with an instinctive internationalism. As he wrote to Amiya Chakravarty 
in a letter dated 29 November 1935, ‘I have far more in common with English and 
other non-Indian socialists than I have with non-socialists in India’. And later, 
when he was prime minister, he had joked with the US Ambassador to India, 
John Kenneth Galbraith, that, to understand India, Galbraith ought to realize that 
3 As this topic has been so much in the news since the demonetization of 8 November 2016, 
I should point out that the only other time demonetization was tried in independent India was in 1978, 
when Morarji Desai was prime minister. This was before the year when growth plummeted in a way 
not seen since India’s independence.
4 This is the view taken by Pranab Mukherjee, who was close to Indira Gandhi and would later 
become president of India. (I know this from my personal conversation with Mr Mukherjee).
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Nehru was ‘the last Englishman to be ruling over India’. His socialist instinct—the 
belief that there should be vastly greater equality of income and wealth—was 
genuine. Commenting on what differentiates Western and Indian political thinking, 
Myrdal had written, ‘Another fact is South Asia’s commitment to egalitarianism, 
which is an integral part of their ideology of planning’ (Myrdal 1968: 120). Despite 
this, Nehru balked at the centralization of power that he saw in China and the 
Soviet Union.
Questions remain about whether these two instincts are compatible. In the 
end, the form of socialism India followed is best described as state capitalism. A 
few large public sector firms and banks were established; there were lots of private 
firms and enterprises, with some polarization between the very large and very 
small (with a missing middle); the state tried to command and direct from the 
top; and, finally, all this was wrapped up in a profuse rhetoric of socialism. It is 
interesting to note that Myrdal (1968) himself had toiled to make sense of India’s 
‘socialism’ and observed how this involved a certain amount of ‘verbal jugglery’. 
The evidence for this comes from the fact of enormous income and wealth 
 inequality that prevails in India (see, for instance, Bardhan 2007). Some observers 
of India’s political economy have argued that, despite this rhetoric, in practice, 
India drifted to ‘neo-liberalism’ (Kohli 2012).
This is an important observation. India never practised socialism in the sense 
of having a centralized ownership of the means of production in the hands of the 
state, though using the term socialism had become mandatory in all government 
documents and declarations pertaining to the economy, well into the 1990s. What 
India meant by the term socialism (and pursued that, too, without much success) 
was a kind of welfare state, in which there would be support for the poor in terms 
of healthcare, education, and basic food. But even this was more often present in 
writings emerging from the government than in actual action. In terms of the 
government owning the means of production, India was nowhere near a social-
ist state: India had roughly 14 per cent of GDP coming from state-owned enter-
prises, whereas for China this was 40 per cent. These data are not easy to compute 
and there is indeed a big margin for error (see Basu 2009) but the large difference 
is significant.
In her early years, Indira Gandhi pursued a policy similar to that of Nehru, the 
nationalization of banks in 1969 being the most aggressive move along those 
lines. By the time she returned to power in the 1980s, three years after her 
electoral defeat in 1977, her strategy had shifted, this time under the influence of, 
primarily, her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, and later under the influence of Rajiv 
Gandhi, which would have large implications for India’s economic trajectory, the 
story of the next section.
Indira Gandhi also had deep influences on India’s politics and the nature of the 
state. Even leaving aside the emergency, she had centralized power, often in her 
own hands, much more than Nehru. As Kothari (1977) argued, this in turn 
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tended to take away power and initiative from the grass-roots level, and resulted 
in a centralization of power that Nehru had resisted. According to Kothari (though 
there is scope to contest his view), this had a negative effect on economic growth.
Similar issues arise in evaluating India’s democracy. Thanks to the adoption of 
the principle of ‘one person, one vote’, independent India established representa-
tive government right from the start, but questions remain about how ‘responsive’ 
India’s ‘representative’ state is. In a compelling essay, Mehta (2012) examines these 
questions. Echoing Myrdal’s view that distant histories can have deep influences 
on the nature of contemporary politics and institutions, Mehta points to the social 
inequalities that go far back into Indian history, having legacy effects on the 
nature of democracy.
One of the most major historical sources of social inequality in India is its caste 
system. While in itself caste is a deplorable inheritance and, at least in speech, 
most founding political leaders of India spoke out against it, it has been argued by 
some that the castes have played a role in nurturing India’s democracy by provid-
ing focal points of coalition and political mobilization for disadvantaged groups 
(see Varshney 2013). What complicates the story is that many of these caste iden-
tities are local and regional, which has thwarted mobilization across the nation—
an outcome that has both its plusses and minuses.
It must also be recorded that the nature of India’s politics has changed much 
since the mid-1970s. The domination of a few big parties and in particular the 
Congress has diminished vastly. Regional parties have sprung up all over the 
nation and India has seen the rise of coalition politics also on the national stage, 
as parties have had to reach out to others to make sure they have the majority 
necessary to form a government. This has put a new set of brakes and challenges 
on policy experimentation, and, at the same time, brought a certain agility to 
politics, as all parties that matter have had to master the art of accommodation 
and compromise.
One major shift in the trajectory of India’s political economy is the arrival of 
‘coalition politics’ in the late eighties. Though there was a short period of coalition 
governance immediately after the emergency, the paradigmatic shift to coalition 
politics began in 1989. This did create new strains. As Nayyar (1998) argued, 
there was an ‘absence of consensus’ rarely seen earlier. But this also created a kind 
of stability whereby the nation learned not to destabilize economic policy every 
time there was a shift in power at the nation’s helm. Indeed, despite all these 
 caveats, despite the two-year retreat from 1975 to 1977 caused by the emergency, 
and despite its complicated and many-splendoured manifestation, democratic 
stability is a remarkable achievement for India. While research and activism must 
persist in analysing and correcting the weaknesses of India’s democracy, it needs 
to be appreciated that this, like good infrastructure, is an institutional and political 
investment for stable economic policy that modern India has inherited and it 
would be folly to damage it just when the nation has reached a stage to take 
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advantage of and build on it to power its economy, promote development, and 
even step up the GDP growth rate.
While this is not the central concern of this chapter, the political story that 
I have laid out in this section is of considerable relevance. There is a small but 
undeniable build-up of opinion in India that is questioning the value of India’s early 
commitment to cultural and political openness, secularism, and commitment to 
freedom of speech, for the media and also for individuals—from university cam-
puses to the street-corner coffee house. It is regrettable that there are now forces that 
would like to reverse this. I believe that democracy, cultural openness, and secular-
ism are traits that make for a better society and also more growth, at least of a 
sustainable kind. Whether or not India’s early investment in this kind of politics was 
the right choice at that time (I believe it was but am aware that this is not beyond 
contestation), to squander this social and political capital just as the economy is 
taking off would be a mistake of enormous proportions, akin to making early invest-
ment in large ports, roadways, and railways, and then deciding not to use them.
3. India’s Economic Trajectory Since Independence
In a project commemorating Myrdal’s Asian Drama there should be no need to 
remind the reader that economic growth does not occur solely because of good 
economics, but is due to many other factors that lie beyond economics (see 
Chapters 3 and 13, this volume). Growth is the outcome of various factors, from 
the nature of institutions, the prevalent social norms, and the positioning of the 
nation in the global polity, to the nature of economic policy. Some of the drivers 
of growth are beyond the control of any individual or organization. But there are 
also drivers that can be controlled by citizens and government. The purpose of 
economic analysis is to identify these.
What marks India’s economic history since the nation’s independence is the 
relative lack of drama, compared to other Asian countries. Barring the growth 
spike in 1975, mentioned above, India chugged along at a steady rate, of around 
3.5 per cent per annum, for the first three decades. Given that population was 
initially growing at over 2 per cent per annum, this meant a growth of barely 
1 per cent for per capita income. Table 16.1 summarizes the essential numbers. 
Annual GDP growth rate, averaged over decades, shows India growing at 
3.91 per cent, 3.68 per cent, and 3.09 per cent over the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
respectively. In decadal terms, the big break was in the 1980s, when the growth 
breached the 5 per cent mark for the first time.
I believe this initial sluggishness was, in part, a consequence of the nature of 
Indian politics. Democracy with a vibrant media and regular elections makes 
governments wary of policy experiments, because the politicians are likely to be 
out of office if the policies backfire. So what Park Chung Hi could do in South 
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Korea, or Mao Zedong could in China, or Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore was not 
feasible for leaders in India’s democratic setting.5
All this is well reflected in the anecdotes of history and comparative statistics. 
In the 1950s, South Korea and India were almost equally poor and, in fact, most 
advanced nations treated South Korea as the basket case that would need support 
and aid to prevent major suffering but there was not much hope of a growth surge, 
whereas India was treated as ready to take off. However, Park Chung Hi took 
commanding control of the economy, took some daring policy decisions, some of 
which backfired massively and had to be retracted (see Krueger 1998). However, 
and maybe because of this policy agility, the economy stumbled a few times but 
also grew at a remarkable clip. South Koreans are now a little more than seven-
teen times as rich as Indians, in per capita income terms, which shows what a 
combination of good policies and institutions can do.
Turning to China, in contrast to India, we find it, all the way up to 1976, 
 experiencing fluctuations in growth that would have been unimaginable, and also 
intolerable, in India. The broad picture of India’s growth, captured in Table 16.1 
reflects this relative tranquillity, which is in sharp contrast to China. In 1961, 
following the Great Leap Forward and the famine it unleashed—arguably the 
biggest famine in world history—China had a negative growth of 27 per cent. 
That is, more than a quarter of its GDP disappeared.
The Cultural Revolution would again result in a drop in growth much greater 
than India ever saw. On the other hand, China had several years of double digit 
growth during the 1960s and 1970s. Until the arrival of Deng Xiaoping, the most 
notable feature of China’s economy was not how high or how low growth was, but 
the fluctuations in growth. This would change in the early 1980s, when China would 
move to a sustained high-growth path over a thirty-year period. When the Latin 
American crisis of 1982 happened, caused by the huge international debt build-up, it 
5 Lest this misleads the reader, I should add that just as China, Singapore, and South Korea are 
examples of authoritarian control and high-growth coinciding, there are many more examples of 
nations with totalitarian control at the helm and low growth and devastated economies.
Table 16.1 India’s growth and investment rates






1951–61 3.91 11.82 –
1961–71 3.68 14.71 9.03
1971–81 3.09 17.86 12.96
1981–91 5.38 21.04 17.32
1991–2001 5.71 24.14 24.27
2001–11 7.68 32.44 31.42
2011–18 6.61 35.78 31.17
Source: Economic Survey 2017–2018, Government of India, 2018.
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had a negligible effect on China, which was by then on a fairly steady 10 per cent per 
annum growth path. China’s growth is gradually slowing down now, currently 
just below 7 per cent per annum, but that is probably a reflection of the economy’s 
maturity. It is beginning to look like a proper upper-middle-income nation.
For India, in contrast to China—barring relatively small dips in 1957–1958 and 
1965–1966, and a very occasional 8 per cent growth and one year of 9 per cent 
growth (in 1975–1976)—the trajectory remained quite uneventful for the first 
three decades after Independence. Growth picked up through the 1980s as a 
changed Indira Gandhi tried to free up markets and ease controls, which were 
beginning to smother the country’s growth. But by the end of the 1980s, more 
than anything else, it was fiscal laxity that helped India grow faster and also set 
the stage for the big crisis of 1990–1991, when the first Gulf War precipitated a 
massive slowdown and a balance of payments crisis for India.
This is where there is scope for some debate on whether the growth pick-up 
that India saw in the early 1980s can be described as a turning point, as Nayyar 
(2006) called it. Rodrik and Subramaniam (2004b) take a similar view, pointing 
to an ‘attitudinal shift’ in the government in the 1980s. At one level, this is a 
semantic controversy. It is indeed true that while in a pure comparison of numbers 
in terms of decadal growth, as captured in Table 16.1, where the broad direction 
of India’s growth is upward, there is indeed a sharp rise in growth between the 
1970s and 1980s.
There were some important policy drivers behind the growth pick-up, includ-
ing Indira Gandhi’s small steps towards liberalization, but there was, at least from 
the mid-1980s, also some short-termism, in terms of fiscal fuelling, which contrib-
uted to the growth but also to the economic crisis of 1990–1991. The  proximate 
cause of the crisis was the first Gulf War, which put a sudden stop to the inflow of 
foreign exchange to India. At that time, the main inflow of foreign exchange was 
from remittances sent by Indian workers in the Gulf countries. The Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait and the subsequent crisis put a virtual halt to this. One reason why 
this spun into an even bigger crisis than need have been the case was the growing 
fiscal burden of the previous years.
The crisis of the 1990s enabled India to do what China had been able to do in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and South Korea in the 1970s—experiment with policy shifts 
and reforms, and the rewards were visible. The economic reforms of 1991–1993 
in India have been analysed extensively (see Nayyar  1996; Ahluwalia  2002; 
Mohan 2002). They caused many changes, most notably in India’s international 
sector, best captured by India’s foreign exchange reserves, which increased expo-
nentially after 1993. There was also the removal of India’s notorious licensing 
system, which drew attention to the larger subject of the costs of doing business, 
which in India were (and still are) very high. I shall return to this later.
In India, since foreign exchange reserves used to be so low, it had become 
standard wisdom that people and corporations should not be allowed to take for-
eign exchange out of the country. What this wisdom missed out on was the fact 
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that if you do not allow people to take their foreign currency out of the country, 
they will not bring their foreign currency into the country in the first place. 
Hence, it is likely that one reason India had so little foreign reserve is that there 
were such severe restrictions on taking foreign money out of the country. This 
was changed during the reforms of 1991–1993 and the results were visible within 
three or four years.
Of course, at the time of such a policy shift there is a risk of crisis, because 
once the restrictions to take foreign exchange out are lifted, the first instinct of 
people will be to take their foreign reserves out and this can cause a sudden bal-
ance of payments crisis. India reached out to the IMF for support at the time of 
the reforms, to ensure that there would be a backup in the event of a sudden cur-
rency haemorrhage. Once that immediate risk of crisis was overcome, the benefits 
were visible. The country’s foreign exchange reserves began to rise exponentially 
from the mid-1990s and the level that used to hold steady roughly at US$5 billion 
now stands at over US$400 billion.
The nation’s growth rate also picked up from 1994, and hovered between 
annual rates of 6–8 per cent, with a small drop in and after 1997, almost certainly 
caused by the East Asian crisis. The growth rate picked up once again in 2003 and 
from 2005 it was at a level of over 9 per cent for three consecutive years, for the 
first time drawing comparisons with China’s.
Such major shifts have many precursors and I would be remiss not to mention 
some less dramatic but important changes that began in the late 1960s and played 
an important role in preparing the ground for India’s later high growth. I do believe 
that the early political investments of Nehru that I have already referred to played an 
important role in the long-run strength of the Indian economy. Turning to economic 
policy, the most important story was that of savings and investment. On these 
dimensions India today resembles East Asian economies, with savings and invest-
ment rates somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent. But this was not always the case.
What arguably gave a boost to savings and investment was the controversial 
move to nationalize all banks in 1969. This may have had other negative effects 
but one consequence of this was a sharp rise in the number of bank branches in 
relatively remote rural areas (a consequence of a directive from the government 
to the banks). This made it easier for people to save money, and through the 1970s 
there was an unprecedented rise in India’s savings rate (Basu and Maertens 2008). 
A comprehensive study by Athukorala and Sen (2004) confirmed that the ‘spread 
of banking facilities’ played a positive role in India in promoting savings. What 
India saw subsequently was a most unusual growth pattern for a developing 
country. It was not the manufacturing sector that led India’s growth but the ser-
vices sector (Murthy 2005; Nayyar 2012; Basu 2015). Over the next fifteen years 
India topped the chart of nations in terms of service sector growth and this was 
primarily because of the information technology sector, in which the country 
excelled, but there is more to the story.
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The growth story of India’s services sector is an outlier. It has been argued 
that the services sector growth tends to occur in two waves, one which takes an 
economy from the low- to middle-income category, and a second one which 
occurs in middle-income economies, giving them a further boost (Eichengreen 
and Gupta 2009). The first consists of various informal sectors growing rapidly, 
whereas the second gets its boost from more sophisticated sectors, such as infor-
mation technology and finance, triggering the overall service sector growth. It is 
this second-stage services sector growth that happened in India, rather early and 
with a vigour rarely seen anywhere else. As Nayyar’s (2012) estimation shows, 
between 1980 and 2009 India’s service sector growth was so large that it picked up 
85 per cent of the decline in share of agriculture. That the share of agriculture will 
decline in the process of development is normal. What this statistic shows is both 
the remarkably good performance of India’s service sector and the remarkably 
poor performance of India’s manufacturing sector.
The factors that drove India’s success in the service sector are several and make 
for interesting economic analysis. First, there was an early policy shift that was 
rooted in politics but had an unintended, beneficial effect. This had to do with the 
computing sector. Following a spat with IBM in 1977, India asked the company to 
leave the country. This caused big disruptions to the computing sector in India, 
but it also became an inadvertent application of the infant industry argument, 
whereby India was forced to make its own innovations and advances in this sector 
(Murthy 2005). This prepared the initial ground and then, when the economic 
reform of 1991–1993 happened, India’s information technology sector was ready 
for take-off. As has been emphasized by Murthy (2004), the reforms were  critically 
important because they cut down government bureaucracy and enabled speed in 
a sector that depends on that.
I have argued in Basu (2015) that two of India’s big stumbling blocks, a cum-
bersome bureaucracy and poor infrastructure, explain a significant part of both 
its success in the services sector and stagnation in the manufacturing sector. 
The manufacturing sector, which needs to transport its products over roads and 
use the nation’s ports to ship goods out for global sales, and has to negotiate the 
bureaucracy to pay taxes and get permits, was naturally stunted. The services sec-
tor, and in particular IT products, on the other hand, was initially largely tax 
exempted and so did not have to interact much with the bureaucracy. Further, its 
outputs did not, for the most part, have to be carted across roads or negotiate 
ports since they could be digitally sent to the user. Hence, this sector could bypass 
the nation’s two big stumbling blocks.
Another interesting connection, which fits so well with the kinds of concern 
that Gunnar Myrdal had, is between democracy and service sector growth. 
Eichengreen and Gupta (2009) argue that the second wave of service sector 
growth has a connection with democracy, with more vibrant democracies having 
an advantage. They create an ethos of openness and connectivity that are crucial 
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to this sector. One obvious factor is Internet connectivity. Many nations with 
severe top-down state control place restrictions on digital connectivity to thwart 
dissent and the amassing of popular opinion. Fortunately, India had the advan-
tage of a democratic system, and it is arguable that this played a significant role in 
the success of its service sector.
This pattern of growth, coupled with India’s over-production of engineers 
through from the 1960s to the 1980s, had a political fallout. As Silicon Valley took 
off in the USA and there was a growing need of expertise there, India became the 
main partner of the USA in this segment of the economy. This caused a warming 
of relations between the USA and India, which had hit rock bottom at the time of 
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 when Indira Gandhi refused to toe Nixon’s 
line. This political development has been of great help to both the United States 
and India, with FDI flowing in both directions between the two countries and 
greater geopolitical co-operation between them. With Indians getting more than 
50 per cent of the H1B visas, which is the category meant for professionals, that 
the USA issues, these links have continued to grow.
All these drivers had fallen into place by the early years of this millennium and, 
by 2003, India seemed to have moved another step up the growth ladder. In 
2003–2004, India’s GDP grew by 8 per cent and then from 2005 to 2008 it grew at 
over 9 per cent for three consecutive years. It is likely that India has moved up to a 
higher growth path, even though there have been some trying years subsequently. 
Immediately after 2008, the great global recession had its effect on India. After 
2010, some major corruption scandals rocked the entire economy and in 2016 an 
ill-conceived demonetization put the brakes on the economy. It is, however, argu-
able that India is now on a higher growth path overall, despite these occasional 
interruptions.
To complete the picture of how India has developed overall, it is important to 
look at other indicators of progress—literacy, poverty, inequality, and health. The 
story here has been less encouraging. For a nation committed to equality and 
socialism, India did surprisingly poorly on these important indicators. Literacy 
is a striking example. In higher education, India did remarkably well for a devel-
oping economy (though it has, of late, been losing rank).6 We could see this from 
the large presence of Indians in international gatherings of science, engineering, 
and other areas of higher learning and research. Yet, in terms of basic literacy, it 
trailed behind much poorer nations. In 1961, India’s adult literacy was 28 per 
cent and life expectancy at birth was 28 years. These improved slowly till 1991 
when the figures were, respectively, 52 per cent and 58 years. Thereafter there 
was some pick-up and latest available numbers (for 2011) are literacy 74 per cent 
and life expectancy 67 years.
6 See Agarwal (2009); Patra et al. (2017).
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Given that it is easier to make progress on a low base, the performance was 
very disappointing up to 1991. It is also worth noting that there is a great deal of 
variance across the country, with two states—Kerala and Mizoram—having over 
90 per cent adult literacy, whereas in several states it is barely above 60 per cent. 
These figures hide large gender differences in most parts of India. There is only 
one state where female literacy is over 90 per cent. This is Kerala. At the other 
end, there are states with abysmally low female literacy, such as Rajasthan (52.7 
per cent) and Bihar (53.3 per cent).
The above numbers are symptomatic of other social indicators, like poverty, 
health, and malnutrition. India’s poverty rates, using the simple headcount ratio, 
have also been declining. In 1977 there were 60 per cent and 87 per cent of the 
population living on less than US$1.90 and US$3.20 dollars a day, respectively. 
There was a sharp fall after 2009, but with over 20 per cent of the population liv-
ing on less than US$1.90 and 60 per cent living on US$3.20, there is still a great 
distance to go.
Finally, a comment on inequality. The numbers here are dismaying and reveal 
what was discussed earlier in this chapter, namely, that socialism in India was 
mainly a rhetorical exercise. The measurement of inequality is, of course, a vexing 
problem, the classic work being that of Sen (1977).7 The Gini coefficient of income 
or consumption inequality is high but there are other measures, based on wealth 
and the tracking of the difference between the super-rich and the median person, 
which shows very high and worsening inequality (Bardhan 2007; Mishra 2012), 
which is likely to have negative spillovers in the long-run, and maybe not that 
long. The numbers on poverty quoted above, in a nation that now has several 
individuals listed among the world’s wealthiest individuals, tell us that India does 
have work to do in reversing some of these inequality trends.
4. Contemporary Challenges
While India’s growth picked up in the last few decades, and especially since 2005, 
as just discussed, India still faces formidable challenges—of deep-seated poverty, 
endemic corruption, growing inequality, and other anxieties of early growth. 
How should the nation deal with these hurdles? How should India turn the march 
of technology that is happening around the world, and creating turmoil in so 
many places, to its advantage? How should it attend to the disquiet of the disen-
franchised class, a necessary concomitant of high inequality? The aim in this sec-
tion is not to be even-handed but to comment on four special areas, where India 
has work to do and on which I have comments on offer.
7 For an excellent short summary of the numbers and also the challenge of measurement in the 
context of India, see Mishra (2012).
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4.1 Bureaucratic Costs
In India, the cost of transactions with the bureaucracy is too high. This curbs 
enterprise and handicaps small businesses, which cannot afford to operate large 
legal departments to deal with government sanctions and permits. India’s disad-
vantage in this is caught well by the World Bank’s Doing Business indicator. 
Among the 190 countries studied by the World Bank, India currently has a rank 
of 100 in terms of the ‘ease of doing business’, where rank 1 indicates an economy 
with the least bureaucratic inefficiency.
A snapshot of how India performs in comparison with a group of Asian 
 economies in terms of select indicators is dismaying. Consider, for instance, the 
number of days it takes to get the basic permits to start a small enterprise. In 
Singapore it is 3 days, in South Korea 4, in Bangladesh 20, and in India 30. An 
enterprise pondering whether to start a new business venture will surely consider 
how difficult it would be to close and exit, should the business fail. For this rea-
son, one of the ten indicators that make up the overall ease of doing business is 
the time it takes to resolve insolvency and close down a firm. The data on this are 
quite remarkable. Resolving insolvency in Singapore takes 9 months, in Malaysia 
1 year, in South Korea 1.5 years, and in India 4 years and 3 months. The story is 
similar for the time required to enforce a contract and the time needed to obtain 
export clearance and customs clearance for imports. In the light of all this, it is 
not hard to understand why India’s manufacturing sector has failed to take off.
In moving on I should make three warnings. First, in reality there are thou-
sands of dimensions to measuring a business environment. The aim must not be 
to target the World Bank’s indicators and work specifically on them. Yet there is a 
tendency in contemporary India to do just that, because the Doing Business 
ranking has suddenly become a visible and much talked about indicator. That can 
move a nation up the World Bank’s chart and yet miss the substantive improve-
ments the indicators are supposed to approximate. Second, it is important to 
remember that ease of doing business is not the same as overall welfare. It would 
be foolhardy to concentrate on ease of doing business to the exclusion of other 
measures of a nation’s welfare. One important dimension of human life is how 
difficult or easy it is for ordinary people to interact with the government. How 
easy is it to get a driving licence, to pay one’s electricity bills, or to file an income 
tax return? Doing Business measures the ease of business groups’ interaction with 
the state, but there is also a need for a measure that captures ordinary people’s 
ease of interaction with the state. Such a ‘living life’ index would capture an 
important dimension of economic life alongside what is measured by the Doing 
Business index.
Finally, the need to eliminate unnecessary hurdles must not be equated with a 
call for doing away with regulation. No modern economy can run well or enhance 
the well-being of its overall population if it is left entirely to the dictates of profit 
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making. We need regulation to direct the economy, and we certainly need laws 
and controls to curb environmental damage. We cannot allow enterprises to 
choke our rivers and lakes with plastic and chemicals on grounds of free-market 
efficiency. But what has happened in India is a stacking-up of old and new rules, 
many of which serve no purpose other than to slow down decision-making and 
fuel corruption as people are forced to cajole and bribe those in authority to get 
the necessary permissions.
4.2 Corruption Control
The above topic naturally leads us to the problem of endemic corruption, which 
was a major concern of Myrdal. However, his emphasis was on the determination 
of leaders as a potential remedy. While this may be of some importance, it may 
not address the crux of the problem. At the same time, it would not be right to 
treat corruption as inevitable, as some take it to be. Corruption can be curbed and 
vastly diminished. But to do this needs analysis and careful reasoning, as much as 
determination and grit on the part of leaders. The world has had leaders who 
were deeply troubled by corruption and determined to end it in their nation, 
and were themselves incorruptible, and yet failed. To understand this, we need to 
dissect the problem carefully.
First, many observers make the mistake, looking at the corruption all around 
them, of treating corruption as an inherent part of society. There are some pas-
sages in Kautilya’s Arthashasthra that have nurtured this belief. Consider this: 
‘Just as it is impossible not to taste honey or the poison on the tip of the tongue, 
so it is impossible for a Government servant not to eat up at least a part of the King’s 
revenue.’ This beautiful imagery, characteristic of Kautilya, expresses a rather 
pessimistic view, and nurtures a sense of helplessness in the face of corruption.
Fortunately, there is enough evidence now that corruption can be controlled. 
There are developed countries in the world that had a high level of corruption 
in the early nineteenth century. In Myrdal’s own country, Sweden, there was the 
ubiquitous institution of the ‘sportler’, which was something between a tip and 
a bribe, given to a bureaucrat to get some ‘job’ done. It is gone now. Today, the 
Scandinavian and Nordic nations are among the least corrupt countries in the 
world. There are examples of economies where corruption has gone down over an 
even shorter period—a couple of decades. Singapore and Hong Kong are good 
examples. According to Transparency International’s data, Singapore has less 
corruption than the UK and USA; Hong Kong less than the USA.8
Much of the challenge of corruption control arises from unrealistic assump-
tions about the behaviour of the agents of the state. Once we recognize that they are 
8 See https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table.
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human, with their own motivations and aims, we can attempt to draft appropriate 
laws. This is essentially a problem of mechanism design. I shall stay away from 
such micro issues here; I have discussed these at some length elsewhere, in the 
context of controlling bribery (Basu 2015, 2018). I want instead to address here 
one widespread challenge that arises in countries where corruption is endemic, 
such as Brazil, India, and China. To put the problem in perspective, it may be 
pointed out that these three countries have ranks of 96 (Brazil), 81 (India), and 77 
(China) in terms of the perceived level of corruption among the 180 countries 
analysed by Transparency International, the least corrupt country (which hap-
pens to be New Zealand) having a rank of 1 and the most corrupt (Somalia) a 
rank of 180.
The problem I am referring to occurs when a leader has a surfeit of options 
when it comes to deciding where to start cleaning up corruption. Consider a 
nation where corruption is endemic. This can be because there is a natural self-
reinforcing element to corruption: If lots of people are corrupt, it seems fine 
for you to be corrupt. And this logic can lead to a corruption trap (World 
Bank  2015). There is also the problem of nations with a complex history of 
law-making, such as India,9 where there has been such a build-up of layers of law 
and custom that it is now virtually impossible to avoid violating the law. Debroy’s 
(2000) estimate is that, between central government and the (29) state governments, 
India has over 30,000 laws, a disproportionate number gathering dust. Therein 
lies the problem.
Consider a leader in some such nation who is genuinely keen to put an end to 
corruption. With corruption everywhere, the leader faces a choice of where to 
start. She can pick anybody and find him guilty of some violation of the law. Now, 
every political leader knows that if she wishes to survive politically it is best to 
arrest not friends but those in the opposition. But once she begins to go after her 
enemies it becomes clear that the anti-corruption policy itself is a handy instru-
ment to silence the opposition and to go after a press that is critical of her policies. 
In other words, what begins as an anti-corruption policy becomes an instrument 
of disciplining the opposition and the media. This is the danger that is faced by Xi 
Jinping, by Narendra Modi, by Michel Temer. It is an important reason why cor-
ruption persists and why the persistence of corruption is not necessarily a sign of 
the leader not being serious about removing corruption but simply a manifestation 
of a political-economic trap in which nations tend to get caught. And India is 
no exception.
One way for a leader, serious about crime control, to handle this is to set up 
some broad parameters and hand over corruption control to an autonomous 
authority, with the explicit commitment that, once this authority begins to func-
tion, it would have full autonomy, in the way a nation’s supreme court is supposed 
9 For an elegant commentary on this history, see Roy and Swamy (2016).
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to have. In Asia, Indonesia is the only country that has had some experience of 
this kind of institution, though even it has run into problems recently.
4.3 Norms and Institutions
Turing to broader issues, the challenge of mitigating corruption entails thinking 
of the state as an endogenous institution consisting of individuals with their own 
objectives and motivations, as assumed in the literature on new institutional 
economics, of which Myrdal’s work was clearly a precursor (see Evans 1995; Stiglitz 
2017; Basu 2018). Such a perspective opens up new ways of thinking about the 
law and how to control corruption.10 I want to discuss one that relates to social 
norms and, more generally, sociology.11
In controlling corruption, the design of incentives with which economists have 
been concerned matters, but the social and political setting is as important. This 
is often missed by neoclassical economists, who treat social and cultural variables 
as exogenous and redundant for the economy. In reality, we can try to eliminate 
or modify cultural traits that have harmful consequences on the economy and 
encourage the ones that aid efficiency and progress. And even though it is true 
that, at this stage, we do not fully understand what causes norms to change, the 
recognition that they do change and can potentially respond to policy is  important 
and can help set up a useful research agenda. Second, even when our norms and 
culture are fixed, knowing how they intertwine with economic variables  enables 
us to think of new policy interventions and assess more accurately the costs and 
benefits of interventions.
As illustration, consider the problem of teacher absenteeism in government-
run schools. A multi-country study in which researchers made surprise visits to 
government-run primary schools shows that in terms of teacher truancy, India 
is second only to Uganda (Kremer et al. 2004)—and by a short head. At any time, 
25 per cent of teachers are found missing from government-run schools in India. 
What should be done? In answering this, economists have typically looked to 
economic variables. This can indeed be useful. Analysts have rightly stressed the 
role of incentives and sanctions—both carrots and sticks—in creating greater 
work discipline among the teachers. However, I believe that much of the problem 
is rooted in culture and social norms. Economists assume that, once we cite cul-
ture, we are planning to do a disappearing act in a welter of words and vague 
 generalities. That is not true. There is now an increasing body of knowledge that 
is beginning to give shape and structure to these topics. For one, we know that 
our behaviour is affected by echo chamber effects within groups and by notions of 
10 See Basu (2011), Abbink et al. (2014), Berlin et al. (2017), and Mishra (2017).
11 For an innovative scheme of corruption control, which does not involve the government but 
entails self-enforcing contracts among private sector firms and corporations, see Dixit (2015).
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social stigma. It is otherwise hard to explain why, though teachers are paid the 
same salary and subjected to the same rules of economic incentives and punish-
ments across the nation, teacher truancy in Jharkhand is about three times as 
high as that in Maharashtra, as the Kremer et al. (2004) study shows. Our behav-
iour is often guided not by monetary considerations but by notions of dignity, 
stigma, and self-respect.
In reality, unlike in the neoclassical model, people, including those indulging 
in corruption, are aware of the moral dimensions of corruption. However, when 
corruption is widespread, it may seem a more tolerable form of behaviour. It can 
then be like an equilibrium-selection norm. As is pointed out in World Bank 
(2015: 60), through much of history and in many contemporary societies, corrup-
tion is ‘a shared belief that using public office to benefit oneself and one’s family 
and friends is widespread, expected and tolerated. In other words, corruption can 
be a social norm.’
An interesting study by Abbink et al. (2014) checks this out by artificially cre-
ating the social norm in a laboratory setting, and measuring people’s behavioural 
response.12 The study found that the probability of offering a bribe doubles when 
the subject is paired with a more corrupt partner rather than a more honest part-
ner. The social setting influences individual behaviour. The moral quality of 
leadership in society can make a difference. And there is now a large body of 
 literature which outlines social and institutional interventions that can be as 
powerful as economic incentives in changing some of these adverse behaviour 
patterns in society.
4.4 Technology and Labour
Turning finally to the challenge of technology and labour, for India this is as yet a 
problem in its early stages, but it may come to be the dominant problem in the 
medium to long term. Worldwide and in high- and upper-middle-income coun-
tries the problem is acute. Thanks to the rise of two kinds of technology—the 
‘labour-saving’ kind, which is leading to machines and robots replacing labour, 
and the ‘labour-linking’ kind, which is allowing workers in low-wage nations to 
do some of the work for rich economies without having to leave their shores—
there is a clear trend of wage shares falling and inequality rising.
The problem is affecting India (Kotwal  2017). Since the reforms to India’s 
economy during 1991–1993, growth has been higher but job creation has 
lagged behind growth quite significantly (Ghose 2016; Nayyar 2017). During 
the real-high-growth period for India, 2005–2008, for instance, when GDP 
12 See also Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) and Banerjee (2016).
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was growing at roughly 9.5 per cent per annum, annual job creation was barely 
2 per cent. I believe that this will become an inevitable problem once India 
becomes a high-income or even an upper-middle-income economy, since it is 
a global problem. However, there is no reason why India should not be able to 
take advantage of labour-linking technologies and create more jobs for now. 
However, to continue to be competitive in this dimension, India will have to 
build skills and continue to improve and modernize its education system. As 
Ghose’s (2016) recent study shows, not only is India’s labour force very poorly 
educated, the distribution of education is also abysmal. This will cause a large 
problem because the demand for unskilled work is bound to go down. Mechanical 
work will soon not need labour because machines will out-compete labour, but 
when it comes to creative work and research, human skills will continue to be 
critical, at least in the foreseeable future. This is what takes us back to what was 
stressed above—the importance of education, especially the development of 
creative skills.
To absorb labour, it is also important to grow and nurture both the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors. India’s services sector, the engine of India’s good per-
formance, is virtually on autopilot now. Attention needs to be directed to the 
other sectors, which also happen to be more labour-intensive. For this, work is 
needed in two areas that have already been mentioned: namely, creating better 
infrastructure and cutting down bureaucracy.13 There will be a challenge later 
when wages rise and India becomes part of the global story. My belief is that India 
will need radical reforms such as some form of profit sharing across the popula-
tion. But that is not a problem special to India, and so it is of no direct concern in 
this chapter.
5. The Next Twenty-five Years
Peering into the distant future is not easy for any discipline. In the case of eco-
nomics, its intertwining with politics and sociology makes forecasting even more 
hazardous. With that caveat in mind, here is some speculation about what the 
next twenty-five years may hold in store for India.
It has been a remarkable half-century since when Myrdal’s seminal work drew 
global attention to this newly-independent nation. All the portents are that India 
will continue to grow rapidly and will take on the mantle of a growth leader in the 
world.14 At this moment, this sounds overly optimistic since, politically and 
socially, India is going through a bleak patch. The reason for my optimism is that 
13 There have been some, more specific, exciting new ideas, such as the development of coastal 
economic zones, that have been discussed in recent times (see Singh 2018).
14 See discussion in Basu (2015). See also Rodrik and Subramaniam (2004a).
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I expect this to pass. A run of 9 per cent annual growth, which began in 2005 but 
has slackened off since then, maintained over a twenty-year period is not a pipe 
dream. If the country can get back onto such a growth path five years from now, it 
will be a transformed nation by 2043. But there are risks and one would be remiss 
not to point to them.
First, agriculture as a share of value-added in GDP has, over the last fifty years, 
become quite small but it is still a vital sector that employs around half of the 
nation’s labour force. Even a small decline in its production can cause food infla-
tion, large welfare losses among the poor, and even political instability. Therefore, 
agriculture as a sector will continue to need nurture.
Second, as pointed out above, while technology will eventually create a global 
challenge that will affect India, for some time still to come India can take advan-
tage of its cheap labour and boost its manufacturing sector. But to nurture this 
sector, more investment is needed in infrastructure, the reduction of bureaucratic 
costs, and also good macroeconomic policy, because a wrong exchange rate pol-
icy, or another move like demonetization, can blight the nation’s prospects.
Third, we have the challenge of inequality. As Ghatak (2017) documents, India 
has a growing inequality problem, and unless it invests in health and education 
and also taxes to curtail dynastic intergenerational transfers more effectively, it 
may have growth but at the cost of true development. This will be a problem for 
India for some time to come. While the growth story has been exemplary, various 
indicators show that growth has not been distributed well across society (see 
Subramanian  2016). This shows up clearly if we compare two countries that 
have had similar growth, Vietnam and India. In terms of child malnutrition, for 
 example, India has performed markedly less well than Vietnam (Ray 2008), show-
ing that the spoils of growth may not have been shared well; and, further, as 
Vietnam’s experience shows this is not inevitable.
India has all these challenges but with its early investment in the political insti-
tutions of democracy, secularism, and openness, as well as in good universities 
and institutes of higher learning, India has the potential to be in the frontline of 
the world economy within the next quarter-century.
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Two powerful, vicious circles drove Gunnar Myrdal’s pessimism about the 
 development prospects of South and Southeast Asia. The first was the pervasive 
poor governance that he termed the ‘soft state’, usually controlled by corrupt, 
rent-seeking elites who were uninterested in economic policies that might bring 
widespread gains in welfare. The second was the debilitating nutritional status of 
most of the rural population, too poor and unproductive to even put enough food 
on the tables for their families, thus reducing their productivity even further. 
These downward spirals, visible in many countries in the early-to-mid-1960s 
when Myrdal was researching and framing Asian Drama, were especially 
‘ dramatic’ in Indonesia. No one at the time seemed to doubt his judgement that 
the country was the showcase example for development pessimism. This chapter 
tries to explain why that pessimism turned out to be unfounded.
When the First Five-Year Plan of the Suharto government (REPELITA I) 
(1969–1974) was drafted, the economic team was aware of Myrdal’s pessimism 
about development prospects in South Asia broadly, and his especially harsh 
judgement about the prospects for Indonesia. The Plan anticipated growth in per 
capita incomes of about 3 per cent per year, and this was widely viewed as opti-
mistic. But the subsequent half-century proved that far more was possible. Per 
capita economic growth of nearly 5 per cent per year was sustained over more 
than three decades, pulling tens of millions of Indonesians above the nutrition-
based poverty line. The trauma of the Asian financial crisis in 1998 hit Indonesia 
hard, both economically and politically. But it recovered from this as well, in the 
context of a surprisingly smooth transition from military dictatorship to wide-
spread participatory democracy. Much of the story of the democratic era is neces-
sarily about politics and governance, and this chapter focuses on these and the 
accompanying economic trade-offs.
Three themes run through this chapter, interconnected yet discrete enough to 
merit their own headings: (1) the story of economic growth and its accompanying 
structural transformation of what was a largely rural economy in 1968; (2) the 
record on poverty alleviation that was mostly a result of that economic growth, 
but which was enhanced by a conscious policy of connecting poor households to 
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the growing economy; and (3) the political transformation that began well before 
the 1998 fall of the Suharto regime, and which continues to this day.
The main message from this is succinct but powerful—Indonesia’s poor have 
been very closely connected to economic growth in the country, benefitting 
differentially when the economy was growing rapidly, and suffering dispropor-
tionately when the economy is not growing, or suffers a major crisis, as in 1998. 
Of all the countries discussed by Myrdal, Indonesia’s record from the late 1960s 
to the mid-1990s was one of the most ‘pro-poor’, and from the late 1990s to the 
mid-2000s one of the most traumatic. But once again the country recovered from 
chaos to build a successful economy with a rising middle class and aspirations of 
regional leadership.
The chapter closes with a review of the economic record of the various 
 democratically elected presidents since 1999, and a prognosis of likely progress 
for the next quarter-century. Indonesia will celebrate the centenary of its inde-
pendence in 2045.
2. Understanding Indonesia’s Pathway out of Poverty
Myrdal was fully aware of the historical significance of the structural 
 transformation in Western societies as the route out of poverty for agrarian 
 populations, although he apparently did not think the process was relevant to the 
Asian societies he was observing in the mid-1960s.1 The structural  transformation 
of poor, agrarian economies into rich, industrial- and service-based economies 
located largely in urban areas is arguably the only sustainable pathway out of pov-
erty. Surplus labour from agricultural households migrates to more productive 
off-farm employment, generating a process of economic growth. Productivity 
growth in the agricultural sector is also needed as a way to feed workers in the 
cities and keep labour productivity in agriculture from falling too far behind 
labour productivity in urban areas. A large gap in incomes between the two sec-
tors creates severe political tensions, and we will see these play out in Indonesia 
after 1998.
2.1 The Dynamics of Structural Transformation
Two variables drive the structural transformation story: the share of agriculture 
in gross domestic product (GDP) (AgGDPshr) and the equivalent share of the 
agricultural labour force in total employment (AgEMPshr). The difference 
1 The term ‘structural transformation’ does not appear in the 35-page index to the three-volume set 
of Asian Drama (Myrdal 1968).
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between these two shares measures the gap in labour productivity between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (AgGAPshr). AgEMPshr is nearly 
always larger than AgGDPshr, and thus labour productivity in agriculture is lower 
than in non-agriculture (Timmer and Akkus 2008); Timmer 2015; see Table 17.1.
Figure  17.1 shows these three basic variables for Indonesia during 1880 to 
2016. The common pattern of structural transformation is readily apparent—both 
sectoral employment and contribution to GDP decline smoothly after the eco-
nomic chaos of the Great Depression and the Second World War. The gap between 
these two variables also tends to decline (absolutely; by definition it tends to be 
negative), but remains negative. Even most advanced countries did not reach par-
ity between rural and urban incomes until late in their development. The United 
States, for example, reached parity around about 1980 (Gardner 2002).
Labour productivity in agriculture has two components: the physical yield of 
commodities on the land at the disposal of the farm household, and the value 











7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5
AgGDPshr AgEMPshr AgGAPshr
Figure 17.1 Long-run patterns of structural transformation in Indonesia, 1880–2016.
Note: The data used in this figure for measuring structural transformation include four variables, of 
which the first three are:
 (1) AgEMPshr: percentage share of agricultural employment in total employment;
 (2) AgGDPshr: percentage share of agricultural GDP in total GDP; and
 (3) AgGAPshr: percentage share of agricultural employment in total state employment minus the 
percentage share of agricultural GDP in total GDP (AgGDPshr–AgEMPshr).
Values for the third variable are typically negative because the share of the labour force working in 
agriculture is nearly always larger than the contribution of those workers to GDP. This definition makes 
Figure 17.1 easy to interpret.
The fourth variable is the logarithm of per capita GDP for each decade (lnGDPpc) (see Table 17.4 
for source and details). The decadal data used in Figure 17.1 are presented in Table 17.1.
Source: Author’s illustration based on updated data from Timmer (2017) and Bolt et al. (2018).
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 productivity, and farm incomes, can be raised by policies affecting output prices, 
as well as by investments that raise physical yields of crops and livestock. Of 
course, markets also affect agricultural commodity prices and significantly influ-
ence the cost of policy choices to alter them. For tradable commodities it is much 
easier for policy to affect the domestic market price than the farm yield. High rice 
prices help close the gap between rapidly rising urban incomes and lagging 
rural incomes. They also encourage domestic rice self-sufficiency, which has 
been the politically articulated approach to poverty reduction and food security 
in Indonesia since the mid-1970s.
2.2 Initial Conditions: Where does the Path Begin?
Booth (2016) makes a powerful argument that the initial conditions for much of 
modern Indonesia’s economic development were laid down by Dutch colonial 
policies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Certainly Myrdal, when 
writing Asian Drama, was acutely aware of the differential impact of British, 
French, and Dutch colonial legacies on the development paths of their former 
colonies, and the Dutch come out rather badly in his assessment. But does that 
matter fifty years on? Are the relevant ‘initial conditions’ the reality that Myrdal 
was observing in the mid-1960s, which was quite grim, or does the story need to 
start much earlier?
As Booth emphasizes, there is no neat answer to this question. The title of her 
book indicates that her preference is to start with the colonial legacy.2 A short 
2 The full title is Economic Change in Modern Indonesia: Colonial and Post-Colonial Comparisons.
Table 17.1 Decadal data used in Figure 17.1
 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940  
AgGDPshr 44.1 42.5 41.4 40.4 36.7 33.1 32  
AgEMPshr 76.3 76.3 76.4 76.5 76.8 77.1 75  
AgGAPshr −32.2 −33.8 −35.5 −36.1 −40.1 −44.0 −43  
GDPpc 1,147 1,134 1,267 1,392 1,551 1,876 1,944  
lnGDPpc 7.045 7.034 7.144 7.238 7.347 7.537 7.573  
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016
AgGDPshr 35.5 31.0 27.8 21.4 18.5 15.7 13.9 13.5
AgEMPshr 72.2 69.9 64.7 56.4 55.9 45.3 39.1 31.8
AgGAPshr −36.7 −38.9 −36.9 −35.0 −37.4 −29.6 −25.2 −18.3
GDPpc 1,410 1,776 2,074 3,283 4,414 5,664 8,425 10,911
lnGDPpc 7.251 7.482 7.637 8.097 8.393 8.642 9.039 9.298
Source: Author’s illustration based on updated data from Timmer (2017) and Bolt et al. (2018).
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chapter does not have that luxury, but Figure 17.1 does provide useful historical 
perspective. Indonesia suffered greatly from the Depression and Second World 
War—the level of per capita GDP was still depressed (by 10 per cent) in 1950 
compared with 1920. Compounding the problem, Indonesia missed much of the 
growth spurt experienced in other parts of Asia between 1950 and 1970—per 
capita GDP was only 15 per cent higher in Indonesia after those two decades (and 
almost all of that growth came between 1967 and 1970, after the fall of Sukarno), 
whereas Japan had per capita GDP that was more than 400 per cent higher.
The basic starting point for this chapter is the mid-1960s, when Myrdal was 
writing and when much of the development profession was forming its first 
impressions of Indonesia. Based on his review of the Dutch colonial and Sukarno 
era economic record, he is unrelenting in his pessimism for Indonesia’s future 
economic prospects:3
It was in their refusal to permit any significant advance toward responsible gov-
ernment that the Dutch, together with the French, stood out in comparison with 
the British as the guardians of a reactionary imperialism . . . Holland’s stubborn 
refusal to accede to the moderate demands of indigenous nationalists, as well as 
its practice of reserving even the less elevated positions in the colonial adminis-
tration to Dutch and Eurasian residents, drove the forces of nationalism into 
conspiratorial channels and militant agitation. (p. 164)
Without collective cabinet responsibility for major policy directives, govern-
ment proved grossly ineffective and unstable. There were six cabinets between 
1945 and 1948, seven between 1949 and 1957 . . . Corruption, graft and fraud on 
a colossal scale were conspicuous features of public life. (p. 367)
Furthermore, it has been suggested that Indonesian ‘national income per head 
in the middle of the fifties was below the 1939 level, . . . probably below the 1929 
level and may even be below the level of 1919’, [citing Benjamin Higgins] and 
the evidence shows a sharp decline since 1957. As things look at the beginning 
of 1966, there seems to be little prospect of rapid economic growth in Indonesia.
(p. 489)
The next 50 years played out quite differently.
3. The Evolution of the Indonesian Economy
Indonesia is the original home of the dual economy. Boeke’s experience during 
the Dutch colonial administration of Java led him to identify two types of eco-
nomic agents—‘rational’ and ‘traditional’—with almost entirely separate spheres 
of economic activity (Boeke 1946). Lewis (1954) built his Nobel Prize-winning 
3 The quotes are from volume I of Asian Drama (Myrdal 1968).
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model of the dual economy with unlimited supplies of labour on the behaviour of 
such agents. Indonesia’s history has modern lessons.
3.1 The Historical Setting for Indonesia’s Growth Experience
Indonesia is an archipelago nation. The soils are mostly volcanic on Java, and 
they support intensive rice cultivation. The laterite soils on the Outer Islands are 
most productive in tree crops and natural rainforest. Indonesia’s agriculture is 
 dominated by wet- and dry-season rice cultivation and a variety of tree crops 
for export. There has been long-term experience with international trade, and 
Muslim traders established Islam peacefully by the sixteenth century.4
Under Dutch colonial rule, which started in the fifteenth century and ended 
with independence in 1945, the trade and tax regime favoured Dutch extraction 
of income, except for a brief period at the beginning of the twentieth century 
when Dutch public opinion supported a more developmental approach known 
as ‘ethical policy’. However, this policy collapsed with world prices for export 
 commodities in the 1920s, and Indonesia experienced especially poor economic 
management during the Great Depression. The Dutch forced the Netherlands 
East Indies to stay on the Gold Standard well after their regional competitors 
devalued. The colonial authorities did build a significant network of irrigation 
canals, roads, ports and shipping facilities, and railroads. There was, however, 
very little investment in the education of the local population. Only 3.5 per cent 
of the population was attending school in 1939, compared with 13.3 per cent in 
1995. The historical record suggests there was severe poverty in the mid-nine-
teenth century, which fell gradually until the 1920s. Poverty increased rapidly 
from the Great Depression until the end of the Second World War.
The Sukarno government took control after declaring independence in 1945, 
and put ‘politics in command’ after 1958. It neglected agriculture and adopted an 
‘inward looking’ development policy; the result was economic and political chaos 
by the mid-1960s. Incomes fell and the hyper-inflation in 1965–1966 had an 
impact on everyone. The post-war recovery had helped reduce poverty, but the 
poverty rate increased rapidly as inflation soared and the economy collapsed. 
Probably 70 per cent of the population was ‘absolutely poor’ by 1966. Average 
food energy intake was about 1,600 kilocalories per day. Hunger was widespread.
3.2 Pro-poor Growth in Historical Perspective
Thanks to the painstaking historical research of Pierre van der Eng (1993a, 1993b, 
2000, 2002), it is possible to construct a long-run indicator of how the poor 
4 Much of this early history is drawn from Timmer (1975).
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have  fared since 1880 (see Table 17.2). Van der Eng’s time series data for 1880 
to 1990 can be divided into five main epochs: Dutch colonial exploitation of the 
Indonesian economy (1880–1905); the ‘ethical policy’ era when efforts were made 
to improve living standards of native Indonesians (1905–1925); the tumultuous 
period during the Great Depression, Pacific War, and fight for independence 
(1925–1950); the Sukarno era (1950–1965), whose ‘guided economy’ after 1958 
created the economic turmoil that was observed by Myrdal; and President 
Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime in the 1965–1990 period, which is the main focus 
of this chapter. The original van der Eng data end in 1990 and the results reported 
here depend on that dataset.
Three sets of calculations for each epoch are shown in Table 17.2. The first 
 column shows the trend growth rate of incomes per capita (YPC), as estimated 
from a semi-logarithmic time trend for the respective time period. These growth 
rates vary widely. There was a sharp deterioration over the quarter-century of 
economic chaos from 1925 to 1950, which contrasts equally sharply with strong 
growth in both the ‘ethical policy’ era under the Dutch and, strikingly, in the 
Suharto era. Over the entire time period for which van der Eng reports, per capita 
incomes rose 0.89 per cent per year.
The second column in Table 17.2 shows the similarly estimated time trend for 
intake of food energy, as measured from food balance sheet data on kilocalories 
(KCAL) consumed per capita per day, on average for each year for 1880–1990. 
During two epochs this trend was negative, which indicates a decline in nutri-
tional status on average for the whole society and the strong likelihood of signifi-
cant increases in hunger among the poor. During such episodes, poverty was 
rising. A sharply positive trend in food energy intake, however, as during the 
 ‘ethical policy’ era and the early Suharto era, suggests that income growth was 
reaching the poor and improving their access to food. Over the entire time 
period, the trend in food energy intake was just 0.2 per cent per year.
The relationship between the variables underlying these two trends is also 
reported in Table 17.2. The third column reports the average income elasticity of 
demand for food energy (KCAL), which is estimated from the annual data for 
each epoch. Importantly, the pattern of coefficients is similar for the income elas-
ticities and the rate of change in food energy intake. The logic connecting the two 
is straightforward. Engel’s law suggests that the income elasticity of demand for 
food (of which energy is an important component for the poor) is a declining 
function of income level. When income growth includes the poor, their higher 
income elasticities for food energy raise the income elasticity observed on aver-
age. It is thus possible to infer what is happening to the poor during long-run 
periods of economic growth (or decline) by analysing these changes in food 
energy intake (Timmer 1996).
This approach works, of course, only for those societies in which the poor wish 
to increase their food energy intake when their incomes increase—that is, when 
they are still on the rising part of the Engel curve. This is the case for Indonesia. 
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Even in 2002, at least the bottom half of the income distribution had significantly 
positive Engel elasticities for food energy. This half of the population subsisted on 
less than US$2 per day (World Bank 2003a, 2003b).
Finally, Table  17.2 carries this inference process to its logical conclusion, by 
constructing a crude ‘index of pro-poor growth’. The scale is somewhat arbitrary, 
but it is based on an analytical relationship between the overall incidence of 
 poverty and the observed, average income elasticity of demand (see the deriv-
ation and proof in Timmer 2004b). The income elasticity of food energy for the 
entire period from 1880 to 1990, estimated to be 0.313, is used as the long-run 
base, scaled to 1. It is multiplied by the long-run growth rate in per capita 
incomes, 0.89 per cent per year, to generate the long-run average Index of 
 Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG) of 0.89. The income elasticity for each separate epoch is 
then scaled relative to the long-run average, and multiplied by the growth rate in 
Table 17.2 Long-run patterns of pro-poor growth in Indonesia(a)
Time period Growth rates (%) Income  
elasticity  
for KCAL
Index of pro-poor 
growth (IPPG)(b)
YPC KCAL








Depression, the Pacific War, and 




The Sukarno era, including the 








The long-run averages, 1880–1990 0.89 0.22 0.313
1.00 0.89
Notes: (a) Details of the regressions are shown in Timmer (2004b), which also provides a full 
explanation of the analytical relationship between the overall incidence of poverty and the average 
income elasticity of demand for food energy. (b) The IPPG is calculated as the product of the growth 
rate in per capita income times the ‘standardized’ income elasticity of demand for food energy 
(KCAL), where the base income elasticity is the value for the entire time period from 1880 to 1990 
(0.313). Growth rates are calculated as least squares time trends of logarithmic values of incomes per 
capita (YPC) and average daily per capita food energy intake per capita (KCAL). The ‘top’ value for the 
income elasticity of demand for food energy for each epoch is estimated as a constant elasticity value 
from a double logarithmic function. The ‘bottom’ value re-scales this estimated value, with the 
1880–1990 average of 0.313 equal to 1.000. As an example, the IPPG value of 6.56 for the Suharto era 
from 1965 to 1990 results from the OLS-estimated rate of growth in per capita income of 3.45 per cent, 
times the ‘standardized’ income elasticity of 1.901. This standardized value is computed by scaling up 
the OLS-estimated income elasticity for the period of 0.595 from the historical base income elasticity 
of 0.313. Thus 0.595/0.313 = 1.901, and 3.45 × 1.901 = 6.56.
Source: Based on Timmer (2004b).
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per capita incomes to generate the IPPG for each epoch. Note that the IPPG 
incorporates both the growth and the distributional dimensions of pro-poor growth, 
and this index is thus a country-specific version of equation 1 in ‘Concept paper 
on  operationalizing pro-poor growth’ (World Bank 2004).
As shown in Table 17.2, the IPPG has varied dramatically over time, from −2.53 
during the 1925–1950 epoch, to 4.57 during the ‘ethical policy’ era of 1905–1925. 
The index is surprisingly high during the Sukarno era, when economic policy is 
widely regarded to have been a disaster. But a combination of a modest recovery 
from the quarter-century of depression and wars, with average per capita incomes 
rising 1.5 per cent per year, and a large average income elasticity for food energy, 
suggest that what growth there was did actually reach the poor.
The strongest pro-poor growth has been from 1965 to 1990. The data analysed 
in Table 17.2 only carry the story to 1990, well before the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/98. The quarter-century from 1965 to 1990 has an IPPG of 6.56, which is 
more than seven times the long-run average and nearly half again as large as 
 during the next best epoch, from 1905 to 1925. Clearly, something quite outside 
 earlier historical experience was going on during the first two and a half decades 
of the Suharto era. What made this era so pro-poor?
3.3 The ‘New Order’ Government of Suharto:  
Why was Growth so ‘Pro-poor’?
In the early years of the Suharto government, pre-OPEC (1966–1973), there was a 
need to establish stability and consolidate political power. There was an  important 
role for the food logistics agency (Bulog) in stabilizing rice prices, and for donor 
assistance, especially the provision of food aid. Major investments were made to 
stimulate agriculture: irrigation rehabilitation, the introduction of high-yielding 
rice varieties from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), fertilizer 
imports and distribution, and the BIMAS programme of extension and farm 
credits. Because median farm size was less than 1 ha, rice intensification had 
widespread benefits, although larger farmers (those who cultivate about 1 ha of 
land) benefitted the most in the early years (Afiff and Timmer 1971).
Macroeconomic stability was achieved through a balanced budget and donor-
provided foreign borrowing, with all proceeds going to the Development Budget 
(World Bank 1968; Hill 1996). Poverty fell rapidly as the economy stabilized and 
grew 5–6 per cent per year in per capita terms, and as food production and over-
all food supplies rose sharply. Still, absolute poverty was thought to be about 60 
per cent in 1970. The first official poverty estimates, based on the 1976 National 
Socio-Economic Survey (SUSENAS), indicate a national poverty rate of about 40 
per cent (see Table 17.3).
Even for an oil exporter, coping with high oil prices (1973–1983) is not the 
luxury it might seem. There was rapid expansion of the economy as the role of 
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the state expanded, but much of this expansion was in inefficient public-sector 
investments. Accompanying the real appreciation of the rupiah was declining 
 profitability of tradable goods production, especially in agriculture (Warr 1984). 
During the mid-1970s there was a growing sense of income inequalities and 
severe poverty in rural areas, although the regional and commodity dimensions 
of the poverty masked its economic roots.
Table 17.3 shows estimates of income distribution and the share of the popula-
tion below the poverty line, using data that are from a variety of sources, includ-
ing from official Indonesian government statistical sources. These historical data 
provide comparisons of poverty and inequality from several methodological 
approaches and update the key data to 2016. Further historical data are illustrated 
at the sectoral level in Figure 17.1, which charts the structural transformation of 
the economy from 1880–2016.
Income distribution deteriorated sharply between 1976 and 1978, confirming 
the growing anxieties. The technocrats took a highly original strategic approach 
Table 17.3 Measures of inequality and poverty in Indonesia, 1932–2016
Year Gini coefficient(a)
 Share of the population below  
the poverty line(b)
 Rural Urban Total  (50 per cent of median) BPS  
poverty 
line      Indonesia People (million)
1932 0.52 0.57 0.56  26.3 16.4 –
1939 0.58 0.53 0.60  – – –
       –
1942 0.60 0.53 0.60  27.6 20.0 –
       –
1953 0.51 0.49 0.55  25.4 21.1 –
1959 0.46 0.47 0.51  23.9 22.3 –
       –
1975 0.16 0.31 0.28  9.4 12.2 –
1976 – – – – – 40.1
1980 0.13 0.27 0.24  5.4 8.0 28.6
1985 0.19 0.20 0.24  5.4 8.9 –
1987 – – – – – 17.4
1990 0.15 0.20 0.24  6.2 11.1 15.1
1993 0.16 0.27 0.31  10.2 19.1 13.7
1999 0.17 0.23 0.32  11.7 23.9 –
2005 0.16 0.19 0.34  13.3 29.8 16.0
2008 0.12 0.22 0.37  15.4 36.2 15.2
2012 – – 0.42  – – 12.0(c)
2014 – – 0.42  – – 11.0(c)
2016 – – 0.38  – – 10.5(c)
Source: Author’s illustration based on: (a) van Leeuwen and Foldvari (2016: 386, table 5);  
(b) van Leeuwen and Foldvari (2016: 391, table 6); (c) World Bank (2017: 30–1).
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to what was then diagnosed as ‘Dutch disease’, with a devaluation in November 
1978 that came as a big surprise to financial markets. After this, tradable goods 
production rapidly recovered, especially in agriculture. Poverty rates after 1978 
fell, driven by a significant recovery in the share of income garnered by the 
bottom 40 per cent of the distribution (Papanek 2004).5
By the early 1980s the oil boom was over. It became necessary to restructure 
the economy for a world of low commodity prices, which is the basic story from 
1983 to 1993. Agriculture continued to grow, and rice prices were stable (this 
 stability amounted to protection against the low prices in world markets). The 
government pursued aggressive exchange rate protection via further devaluations 
in 1983 and 1986 (Thorbecke  1995; Hill  1996). Massive investments in rural 
infrastructure from earlier oil revenues began to pay off in higher production and 
lower transactions costs for marketed goods (and improved labour mobility). 
Industrial output surged in the latter part of the period, led by labour-intensive 
manufactured exports.
The manufacturing sector contributed 29.2 per cent of the growth in GDP 
between 1987 and 1992, a radical increase from the 10 per cent contributed dur-
ing the recovery from 1967 to 1973 (Hill 1996, 2000). Large-scale and sustained 
economic deregulation led to better incentives for exports, and these were 
matched by incentives for foreign direct investment (FDI). Manufactured exports 
responded even faster than policymakers had hoped, and contributed almost half 
of all exports by 1992, up dramatically from the 3 per cent in 1980. The fortuitous 
‘push’ in FDI from Japan and the ‘pull’ from the attractive climate in Indonesia 
thus allowed manufactured exports to play a significant role in employment 
 generation by the end of the 1980s.
There was also a boom in the non-tradable economy. National income 
accounts, however, are not kept according to this distinction, hence the data are 
more impressionistic.6 Nonetheless, just as the export economy was booming in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and overall GDP was growing by nearly 7 per cent 
per year, roughly half of that growth was made up of non-tradable goods and ser-
vices. According to the Mellor model of poverty reduction (Mellor 2000, 2017), 
production of non-tradable goods and services, especially in rural areas, pro-
vides the economic link between higher incomes from both agriculture and 
5 A sharp debate, totally confidential, took place in mid-1978 between advisors concerned about 
‘Dutch disease’ and its impact on rural incomes and poverty, who argued for a significant devaluation 
of the rupiah, and the trade and industry advisors, who argued for a revaluation because of foreign 
exchange surpluses (Timmer 1994). The devaluation in November 1978 set the exchange rate at Rp 
625 per US$, instead of revaluing to what the market expected, Rp 380 per US$.
6 It is hard to define the components of the non-tradables sector—although some items are obvi-
ous, such as local services, construction, and low-quality local manufactured goods with a limited 
market appeal beyond the immediate vicinity. Even modern industrial goods produced at high cost 
behind tariff barriers are non-tradable. Obviously, poor transportation facilities lead to high market-
ing costs, meaning that many potentially tradable goods are non-tradable. Lower transactions costs 
and lower tariff barriers are among the surest ways to improve competition and market efficiency.
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manufacturing wages, and serves to pull people out of underemployment in rural 
areas—and out of poverty.
The Mellor model stresses the role of producing rural non-tradables that are 
locally consumed—processed foods, construction, trade, and small-scale manufac-
tures—as the ‘ladder’ for underemployed workers in agriculture to begin the climb 
to modern jobs at higher wages. In most poor, rural economies this non-tradable sec-
tor is demand-constrained. That is, expanding it, and the number of jobs it creates, 
does not depend on better access to capital or to management skills, but on greater 
purchasing power among local consumers. Thus Mellor emphasizes rising profit-
ability of agriculture—through higher productivity, not higher prices. Higher prices 
for agricultural output, especially food, do not contribute much to added demand 
for non-tradable goods and services because the higher food prices choke off 
demand for non-food items, except from farmers with significant surpluses to sell. 
The growing wages of workers in a rapidly expanding manufacturing export sector 
also contribute to higher demand for the output from the non-tradables sector.
This Mellor model is a three-sector version of the standard Lewis model of the 
dual economy. In Mellor’s version there are two ‘commercial’ sectors—industry 
and modern agriculture. The latter has come to use modern technology and is 
market-driven, a departure from the traditional rural economy envisioned by 
Lewis (1954). Relatively separate from the commercial sectors is the ‘non-trada-
ble’ sector, which is informal and mostly rural. The two commercial sectors are 
the ‘engines of growth’ because of their potential for rapid productivity gains. 
Connecting them to the ‘non-tradable’ sector, however, is the key to a high ‘elasticity 
of connection’ between overall economic growth and rapid poverty reduction. 
This is the sector in which most of the poor make a living (Timmer 1997, 2002). 
Unless demand from rising incomes in the commercial sectors spills over to this non-
tradables sector, the poor tend to be left out of the growth process.
The combined boom in agriculture, manufacturing, and non-tradables means 
the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s is one of the most ‘pro-poor 
growth’ episodes in modern economic history. This result is a surprise to many. 
The extensive economic restructuring that took place in the 1980s was expected 
to create widespread unemployment and lead to lower wages for unskilled labour. 
Instead, agricultural growth continued, labour-intensive exports surged, and pov-
erty continued to decline throughout the period of restructuring (Ravallion and 
Huppi 1991).7
Figure 17.1 provides an illuminating view of the structural dimensions of this 
growth. AgGDPshr declines steadily as the economy is growing fairly rapidly—
about 3.6 per cent per year per capita between 1970 and 2010. But AgEMPshr 
declines only slowly in the early stages of growth, from 1970 to 1990, and then 
7 It should be noted that the rice sector in particular was protected from the worst pressures of low 
prices in world markets, and the substantial devaluations in 1983 and 1986 provided enhanced profit-
ability for the rest of the tradable sector, with spillover effects on incomes in the non-tradable sector.
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declines quite rapidly as the rural economy is integrated into the dynamic urban 
economy via better roads, communications, and an educated rural labour force in 
search of economic opportunities. The rapidly narrowing AgGAPshr after 1990 
reflects the falling poverty rates shown in Table 17.3.
Corruption and increasing distortions in resource allocation during 1993–1998 
followed the interests of the Suharto family, especially the children (and grand-
children!). These interests distorted trade policy and public-sector investments, 
and had visible effects on competitiveness, which were partly masked by the 
inflow of FDI (Cole and Slade 1996). As the economy boomed, deregulation lost 
steam, first in the Bulog commodities, then more broadly. The performance of 
the overall economy started to suffer, although poverty levels in 1996, the last 
SUSENAS report before the crisis, dropped to their lowest levels ever. Absolute 
poverty, measured in a comparable fashion to the poverty statistics reported first 
in 1976, fell below 12 per cent.
The three decades of superb economic results were over. The Asian financial 
crisis hit in late 1997. Investors started to lose confidence in the ability of the 
Suharto government to cope, especially after the new cabinet was named in 
April 1998, packed with Suharto cronies and relatives. The crisis caused a mas-
sive depreciation of the rupiah, eventually leading to chaos in the domestic rice 
market (Schydlowsky  2000). Spiralling rice prices late in 1998 led to huge 
increases in poverty, which is estimated to have reached over 30 per cent of the 
population by late 1998, early 1999. This was a dismal period for economic 
growth and poverty reduction.
3.4 The ‘Democratic Era’ (1999–)
After Suharto’s surprise resignation in late 1998, Indonesia successfully elected 
a democratic legislature in 1999, which in turn selected a new president, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, a popular Islamic scholar and cleric who headed Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Islamic organization. Wahid attempted to 
reform the military’s role in government and was ultimately impeached by parlia-
ment for that effort and accompanying corruption scandals. He was replaced by 
his vice-president, Megawati, the daughter of Sukarno. She served for three years, 
but was defeated in the election by her former co-ordinating minister for politics 
and security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
Representative democracy brought forth a new political economy of economic 
policy. Populist voices ostensibly spoke on behalf of the poor. With two decades 
of experience, it remains to be determined whether Indonesia’s pro-poor growth 
experience under a highly centralized and politically dominant regime put down 
sustainable, even irreversible, roots, or whether the very foundations of the strat-
egy will come undone under political challenge.
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It is already clear that the transition from the autocratic rule of Suharto, an era 
of economic policy designed and administered by an insulated group of skilled 
technocrats, to a politically responsive system has been difficult for both eco-
nomic growth and its connection to the poor. There are few public institutions in 
place to protect economic policy from polemicists.
As part of a broad effort to help Indonesian development, after the fall of 
Suharto the World Bank led an effort to help the country cope with corruption in 
the national government. The main vehicle was to promote decentralization of 
political power (World Bank  2001). Domestic reform groups supported this 
agenda and responsibility for most local services devolved to kabupaten (‘county’) 
levels in 2002 in a ‘big bang’ political decentralization. Not surprisingly, this 
transfer was made without adequate funding, policy guidelines, or training of 
local officials (Alm et al. 2001).
Inevitably, perhaps, corruption at the local level has become rampant. Local 
‘trade’ policies are being used to enforce commodity taxes and trade barriers, 
especially for rice. Partly because of the resulting ‘compartmentalism’ in the 
economy, and the higher transactions costs for most economic activities caused 
by these activities, donor interest and activity have focused on improved local 
governance. The stakes are high. Ongoing research by the Social Monitoring and 
Evaluation Research Unit (SMERU) indicates that measures of the ‘quality’ of local 
governance were closely associated with the rate of poverty reduction between 
1999–2002 (Sumarto et al. 2004).
The country is clearly paying the price for decades of forgone institution 
 building, especially in the arenas of property rights and rule of law. The new 
democratic governments have found it difficult to make rapid progress in these 
arenas, although more has been accomplished than many observers credit 
(MacIntyre 2003; Ramage 2004). The government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(known universally as SBY) (2004–2014) and the current government of Joko 
Widodo (again, universally known as Jokowi) (2014–) have made significant 
strides in strengthening transparency in government and addressing corruption.
Their records on economic growth and poverty reduction are respectable but 
not outstanding relative to regional and historical performance. The data on per 
capita GDP in Table 17.4 show Indonesia’s record of economic growth per capita 
by political era since 1880. Per capita GDP in constant 2011 US dollars fell by 4.38 
per cent per year from 1996 to 1999 during the Asian financial crisis, and then 
recovered by 3.31 per cent per year from 1999 to 2005. Still, from its peak in 1996, 
before the crisis, until the previous peak in per capita incomes was restored in 
2005, incomes per capita grew just 0.6 per cent per year. It took a long time for 
democratic governments to figure out how to manage the economy.
By 2005, however, the new SBY government was able to restore investor 
confidence, both foreign and domestic, and the economy started growing rapidly 
again. Between 2005 and 2016, per capita GDP grew by 4.59 per cent per year, 
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slightly faster than during the thirty years of the Suharto regime (see Table 17.4). 
But the return to rapid economic growth was not mirrored by changes in poverty. 
Between 2010 and 2016, the poverty rate only declined from 13.3 per cent to 10.9 
per cent. Most other welfare indicators track these statistics on the poverty rate. 
This is respectable progress, but leaves Indonesia lagging other countries in its 
region and income category. Economic growth is no longer ‘pro-poor’.
4. Political Economy and Governance
The standard story to explain the political economy of the Suharto regime’s 
emphasis on agriculture (and pro-poor growth) relies on conflict between 
 traditional political forces—communist-inspired peasants and workers faced 
opposition from an authoritarian military (Simpson 2008). Buying off the peas-
ants was cheaper than repression. Rural development was seen as the least-cost 
approach to political stability. Large-scale ethnic (Chinese) businesses bought 
protection from Suharto and his military allies and received lucrative import 
and operating licences in return. When these highly protected businesses, and 
their closely associated banks, collapsed in the Asian financial crisis the entire 
regime unravelled. The vacuum of political institutions, deliberately created by 
Suharto to remove any challenge to his authority, exposed the country to years 





Notes on historical era
1880 1,147 0.36 Dutch colonial exploitation
1905 1,255 1.37 Dutch ‘ethical policy’
1925 1,648 −0.62 Depression, war, fight for 
independence
1950 1,410 1.14 Sukarno era
1966 1,690 4.47 Suharto era
1996 6,269 −4.38 Asian financial crisis
1999 5,481 3.31 Fall of Suharto; recovery to 
previous peak
2005 6,663 4.59 Democracy in command
2016 10,911   
Note: The average annual rate of economic growth from 1996, the peak year before the crisis, and its 
full recovery nine years later, in 2005, is just 0.6 per cent per year. Maddison Data Project note: ‘In 
addition to the 𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 series, we provide a measure of growth of GDP per capita that relies on a 
single cross-country price comparison, for 2011. This series is also expressed in 2011 US dollars (and 
𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 = 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐 in 2011), but its defining feature is that it tracks the growth rate of GDP per 
capita as given in country National Accounts (or their historical reconstructions). Following PWT 
[Penn World Tables], we refer to this measure of real GDP per capita as 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑁𝐴𝑝𝑐. This series is 
primarily useful for comparing growth rates of GDP per capita over time.’
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Maddison Data Project (Bolt et al. 2018).
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of political chaos and weak leadership. This standard story suggested there was 
only modest hope that the presidential election in September 2004, when 
Megawati ran against SBY, would return the country to strong leadership and 
rapid, pro-poor growth.
As with most stories based on conventional wisdom, there are substantial 
 elements of truth in this one. But it misses what distinguishes the Suharto regime 
from otherwise similar military dictatorships around the world: its focus on 
development and the effort to improve the welfare of the poor by connecting the 
rural economy to rapid economic growth. Fear of radical peasants wielding 
scythes simply does not explain this passion, or the massive budgetary resources 
devoted to it. Oil revenues helped, but the basic strategy was already laid down 
before the OPEC price shock. A more nuanced story is needed, one that includes 
the complexities of the structure of political power and the role of leadership. The 
remainder of this chapter attempts to provide some of that nuance by tracing the 
political economy of poverty through a governance lens to the problems caused 
by the massive decentralization that was the first priority of the new democratic 
government.
4.1 The Political Economy of Pro-poor Growth
Political scientists speculate on the nature of the political coalition assembled by 
Suharto to maintain and strengthen his hold on power. This coalition was held 
together by the distribution of economic resources, often in the form of lucrative 
access to such easily marketable commodities as oil or timber. Import licences for 
rice, wheat, sugar, and soybeans were equally lucrative. Bulog controlled these 
closely in the interests of the Suharto regime. Whether the pro-poor policies, and 
results, of the regime were tied to keeping these interest groups satisfied, even at 
the expense of faster economic growth in the short run, is the subject of active 
debate, especially because Bulog, despite being ‘privatized’ in 2003, established 
close ties with the husband of President Megawati and successfully lobbied for 
renewal of Bulog’s monopoly control over trade in most agricultural  commodities. 
The ability of Bulog to stall the deregulation process in the early 1990s is seen by 
some observers (including this one) as an early signal that the entire growth pro-
cess was running off the rails into corrupt and distortionary cronyism. From this 
perspective, the collapse of the formal sector during the Asian financial crisis was 
not such a surprise, as it had become increasingly dominated by these interests 
(Cole and Slade 1998; Stern 2003, 2004).
The most debated political economy aspect of the New Order government was 
the near-schizophrenia between macro and sectoral policies. What is so puzzling 
is why macroeconomic policy was left largely in the hands of very talented, but 
highly apolitical, technocrats. Persuasive arguments are made that they provided 
access to the donor community, which has been a strong, almost lavish, supporter 
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of Indonesia since the late 1960s (Simpson 2008). But another argument is simply 
that the technocrats delivered the economic growth the country desperately 
needed. In a comparison of the political economy of growth in the Philippines 
and Indonesia, Thorbecke (1995) came to the following conclusion:
. . . the most fundamental difference between the development environments in 
the two countries relates to the macroeconomic policy management and the role 
of the technocrats. In Indonesia, the latter followed a consistent, far-sighted, 
credible, and enlightened macroeconomic policy that was outward-oriented and 
provided a framework within which both economic growth and poverty 
 alleviation could occur . . . the key policy instrument that the technocrats relied 
on was an appropriate exchange rate. Even at the height of the oil boom, when 
Indonesia was swimming in petro-dollars and was generating large balance-of-
payments surpluses, and when the natural inclination would have been to let the 
rupiah appreciate, instead the technocrats devalued the currency to protect the 
 traditional tradable sectors . . . and recycled large parts of these windfall profits 
back into agriculture. This policy contributed substantially to the phenomenal 
poverty alleviation process in the rural areas that characterized Indonesia in the 
seventies and eighties. (Thorbecke 1995: 34–5)
The technocrats had no political base of their own. They depended entirely on 
their patron, Suharto, to implement their plans and policies. The president was an 
active participant in every major macroeconomic decision, especially changes in 
the exchange rate. Widjojo Nitisastro, the acknowledged dean of the technocrats, 
receives high praise for his ability to manage the economic team and to consoli-
date their advice when he explained pressing economic issues to the president. 
His close colleague, Radius Prawiro, makes the following observation:
. . . the economic team were intelligent and dynamic men with no shortage of 
self-esteem. It was Widjojo, however, who quickly became the unofficial yet 
acknowledged head of the group. Widjojo was an expert in both demographics 
and economics. He was a brilliant strategist and a person of vision with a long-
term focus. He was an excellent listener and without resorting to  domination . . . 
Widjojo was able to guide a team comprising many of Indonesia’s most capable 
and influential economists . . . He kept meetings moving without imposing rigid 
procedures or formality. Widjojo was a natural leader. Throughout his career, he 
deliberately kept a low profile and yet if there is anyone who deserves the title of 
‘architect’ of Indonesia’s economic development, it is Widjojo. (Prawiro 1998: 83)
Despite the control of the economic team over macroeconomic policy, with the 
president’s equally clear support and blessing, Suharto used trade policy to pro-
tect special interests in his circle and even beyond, sometimes with no more 
apparent rationale than a nationalist interest to develop a modern industrial 
capacity. The role of good economic governance and political commitment to 
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poverty reduction is a key lesson here, but the paradox is why the autocratic 
Suharto regime provided both ingredients for so long, and why the new demo-
cratic governments have not.
Part of Suharto’s commitment to the rural economy seems to have come from 
the highly visible politics, and power, of food security. The drive for higher agri-
cultural productivity—a key ingredient in pro-poor growth in the circumstances 
Indonesia faced during this period—was fuelled in part by the desire for house-
holds, and the country, to have more reliable supplies of rice than were available 
from world markets. When the world rice market quite literally disappeared for 
several months during the world food crisis in 1973, Indonesia’s dependence on 
imported rice to stabilize domestic prices highlighted its vulnerability to external 
markets beyond its control—the opposite of food security in the minds of most 
Indonesians—and showed how important it was to increase rice production 
(Timmer  2000). A ratcheting up of policy attention to agriculture and budget 
support for rural infrastructure followed the traumatic loss of control of rice 
prices in 1972–1973.
From this perspective, the political economy of pro-poor growth since the 
tumultuous events surrounding the Asian financial crisis seems quite perverse, 
especially policies with respect to the rice economy which are intended to generate 
that growth. There is, however, a rationale that explains the new political economy. 
Behind the Suharto regime’s commitment to pro-poor growth were two important 
constituencies: one that backed economic growth itself; and the other that 
expressed concern for the poor. The growth coalition was made up of the mod-
ernizing elements of the military, the business elite not already comfortably pro-
tected by anti-growth protectionist measures, and most of the rural sector, which 
was near starvation in the mid-1960s.
The voices for the poor included many of this same coalition, but for somewhat 
different reasons. The military was concerned about rural unrest. It did not have 
the coercive resources to suppress it by force alone. The Jakarta political elite, led 
by Suharto, increasingly staked its credibility on political stability. Both the urban 
and rural poor could pose a threat to that, as the 1974 Malari riots demonstrated.8 
Increasingly, the donor community stressed the importance of poverty reduction. 
The World Bank made a major commitment in the late-1980s to the analytical 
work that surfaced in its 1990 report on poverty (World Bank 1990).
The fortuitous intersection of the growth and poverty coalitions thus offered 
the Suharto regime a political opportunity to do well by doing good. In the context 
of powerful opportunities to stimulate rapid growth in rural areas through high-
payoff investments in rehabilitating irrigation systems and rural infrastructure 
8 A major grievance of the student rioters was the loss of control over rice prices in the previous 
year, and the continuing high prices.
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and the importation of new rice technologies, a cumulative process started that 
built both rapid growth and poverty reduction into the basic dynamics of the 
Indonesian economy. But the process started in the agricultural sector.
This cumulative process appeared to have ended in the early 1980s, as prices 
for agricultural commodities collapsed in world markets, oil prices declined, and 
the whole growth process seemed threatened. Fortuitously, again, but under the 
determined guidance of the technocrats, and with the full support of the presi-
dent, the economy was restructured to make it more open to foreign trade and 
investment, just as Japan and Korea came looking for opportunities to invest in 
labour-intensive manufacturing facilities. Only with the economic and political 
collapse in 1998 did this source of pro-poor growth disappear (and with it the 
patron of the technocrats). In its place, a new populist-driven strategy of poverty 
alleviation has emerged.
The political appeal of the new democratic strategy for dealing with poverty—
direct fiscal and food transfers to the poor—is obvious. In principle, these trans-
fers have an immediate and visible impact on the recipients, and the political 
‘pitch’ for the programmes makes it sound as though the government is actively 
committed to poverty reduction. Although democracy has probably increased the 
size and influence of the political coalition concerned about poverty, it has greatly 
undermined the coalition supporting economic growth as the main mechanism 
for dealing with it.
In the political rhetoric since 2003, poverty reduction is no longer linked to eco-
nomic growth. Instead, the agency distributing subsidized rice to the poor, Bulog, 
has built an ‘anti-poverty’ political coalition similar to the one that long supported 
food stamps in the US Congress. Support in the USA came from conservative 
rural legislators eager to have additional markets for the food that is produced in 
surplus by their farm constituents and from urban liberals who have in their con-
stituency many poor people who use food stamps as a major source of income.9
Similarly, Bulog is the agency that procures rice domestically with budget sup-
port from parliament, and distributes this rice to the poor at low prices that are, 
again, subsidized by the budget. Bulog has mobilized political support from two 
constituencies concerned with poverty: first, for its rice procurement programme, 
on the grounds that it helps rice farmers; and second, for its implementation of 
the ‘special market operations’ (OPK) programme that delivers subsidized rice to 
the poor. As Mink (2004) of the World Bank observed, no parliamentarians have 
been willing to take on both dimensions of the rice programme simultaneously. 
As a result, the huge budget subsidies that accrue to Bulog to run these pro-
grammes, and the corruption that accompanies them, go unchallenged.10
9 Political polarization in the USA now threatens this long-standing coalition between rural farm 
interests and interests determined to help the urban poor.
10 The most complete historical analysis of the Indonesian experience with direct food deliveries to 
the poor (originally OPK, but then called RASTRA, and now about to disappear in favour of cash 
transfers for most recipients) is offered by Timmer et al. (2018).
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Rebuilding the economic growth coalition in support of the poor is proving 
difficult. It depends on the underlying conditions of economic governance— 
political stability, rule of law, control of corruption, and so on—that moved in the 
wrong direction for several years after democratic governments were elected. 
Probably the best that can be done in the short run is to minimize policy damage 
to the interests of the poor while trying to improve the effectiveness of the 
 programmes transferring resources directly to the poor.11
4.2 Trends in Governance at the National Level
A focus on the quality of governance at the national level is an essential compo-
nent of any effort to understand, in political economy terms, the historical and 
emerging patterns of support for pro-poor growth. The poor themselves seldom 
have a voice in the strategies that influence the growth process, and they rely on 
government officials to act on their behalf. In addition to its ‘voice’ on behalf of 
the poor, governance is now seen as a major factor in the growth process itself. 
First, such dimensions as government effectiveness and regulatory quality influence 
growth directly. Second, dimensions such as rule of law and control of corruption 
influence growth indirectly and in the longer run.
Understanding the quantitative significance of this influence is difficult because 
the components of governance are hard to measure. Still, measures of voice and 
accountability improved between 1996 and 2002, and this improvement sig-
nalled the switch to reasonably representative democratic government. There 
have been steep declines, however, in political stability, regulatory quality, and 
control of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2003). This deterioration has immediate 
ramifications for the pace of economic growth, as it affects investment in a dir-
ect manner. FDI was negative between 1998 and 2004. A concern is that such 
poor governance affects the extent to which economic growth actually reaches 
the poor. That is, governance itself might be a decisive factor influencing both 
dimensions of pro-poor growth performance.12 There is accumulating evidence 
of this connection at the regional level. Indonesia conducted a massive decen-
tralization of many governmental functions in 2001. Research has attempted to 
judge the quality of local governance and its impact on poverty reduction between 
1999 and 2002.
11 Early in 2018, the Jokowi government announced significant changes in how the ‘rice for the 
poor’ programme would be administered. Most urban poor now receive pre-paid debit cards that can 
be used to buy essentials in local markets. Direct deliveries are still used in many areas of the Outer 
Islands where food markets are not well developed.
12 The analytical effort to measure the components of governance at the national level was 
 sponsored by the World Bank but never officially adopted. Its directors objected to the often-critical 
characterization of their own countries.
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4.3 The Role of Governance at the Regional Level
The experiment with decentralization of government services to the kabupaten 
level presents challenges and opportunities. The challenges are obvious enough, 
and have stimulated important efforts by the government of Indonesia and its 
major donors to provide legal guidelines and financial incentives to make the new 
structure work. The opportunities are equally obvious. Design and implementa-
tion of many basic services in health, education, and business regulation are now 
closer to the people and far more transparent. Whether they become more 
responsive is the key challenge to democracy.
One opportunity for researchers that stems from the decentralization is the 
introduction of a great deal of variance into local government activities, which 
had been precluded by the strong centralization of power during the Suharto 
regime. With variance comes an opportunity to analyse what works and what 
does not. Obviously, it is too early to see many systematic effects, but researchers 
at SMERU have examined initial data to determine if rough measures of the 
quality of local governance matter for poverty reduction (Sumarto et al. 2004). 
Perhaps the most interesting result comes from a survey of eighty-seven cities 
and kabupatens for which a research team was able to construct an index of 
bureaucratic culture at this level. There were four levels: ‘disruptive, less conducive, 
conducive, and very conducive’ in fostering the local business environment. 
None of the districts had a disruptive climate, and twelve were ‘less conducive’, 
sixty-one were ‘conducive’, and fourteen were ‘very conducive’ (Sumarto et al. 
2004: 28).
Using kabupaten-level reports from the SUSENAS reports for 1999 and 2002, 
the researchers then compared the mean level of poverty reduction for each of 
these categories of local bureaucratic culture. The overall mean level of poverty 
reduction for all eighty-seven cities and districts was 7.8 per cent between the two 
years, but it was only 3.4 per cent in the ‘less conducive’ environments, 7.0 per cent 
in  the ‘conducive’ environments, and 15.1 per cent in the ‘very conducive’ 
environments. Local ‘good governance’, at least as measured by this index of 
bureaucratic culture with respect to business climate, is associated with an imme-
diate impact on poverty reduction.
5. Looking Forward to 2045: Optimism or Pessimism?
Much of this chapter has been spent looking backward, trying to understand the 
historical, and positive, reversal in the fortunes of Indonesia’s poor after 1967, 
and the challenges the poor have faced in the transition from the authoritarian 
Suharto regime to real democracy. The issue here is to look forward: can the poor 
place their hope in economic growth guided by democratic governments, or will 
they need to seek redress through other venues?
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First, a brief restatement of the results of the economic and political history of 
the past fifty years is in order. The declining role of agriculture in the economy 
and employment is the clearest lesson, especially because Indonesia has used 
investments in the rural economy and policies to increase financial incentives 
for the sector as a way to connect poor households to rapid economic growth. 
A significantly reduced agricultural sector, in relative terms vis-à-vis labour force 
and GDP contributions, removes a number of policy instruments to help the 
rural poor (see Figure  17.1 for a graphical depiction of the declining share of 
 agriculture in both employment and GDP).
These historical lessons are interesting, but the most important reason for 
spending the time and energy to understand the, often paradoxical, record is to 
offer useful insights into the future. In particular, how do democratic govern-
ments move forward on an agenda of pro-poor growth?
Press reports out of Indonesia were not encouraging after the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997/8 and Suharto’s decision to resign in mid-1998. The country had 
been through a historic drought. Only imports of six million metric tonnes of rice 
in 1997/8—20 per cent of consumption—kept per capita supplies at their trend 
level. The Asian financial crisis swept Indonesia in its fullest fury. The dominant 
political regime, which had spent thirty years building a support structure to 
ensure its continued survival, collapsed. When that structure collapsed, it seemed 
that there was nothing. But in fact the Suharto government had left a legacy of 
political involvement on the part of the entire population. Every five years, elec-
tions were held for members of parliament, who subsequently elected the presi-
dent. No serious doubts existed about the ultimate outcome of these elections, but 
they were taken very seriously by the government. Jakarta routinely voted against 
the government, as did Aceh in Northern Sumatra. High-level officials in the gov-
ernment were tasked to ask ‘why?’ What was the government doing wrong? The 
end result was a population that was used to voting, and counting on their votes 
being heard. When Suharto stepped down in mid-1998, general elections were 
called to elect a new parliament. It was empowered to name a new president.
The question remains: how does a society cope with three such massive shocks 
in the span of just a year? If 1966, in the famous words of President Sukarno, was 
‘the year of living dangerously’, what was 1998? The quiet answer, in retrospect, is 
‘the year of transformation to a freer and fairer society’. This is not the stuff of 
headlines. The headline grabbers are the Bali and Marriott bombings, judicial 
ineptitude and outright corruption, human rights abuses by the military, and 
continuing games played by Jakarta’s political elite (McBeth 2003). Little noticed 
is the steady progress that is being made. If occasional jabs at foreign companies 
by local courts still roil investors, the clear competence of the new constitutional 
court is unreported. The petty (and not so petty) corruption of newly empowered 
local governments makes news and is troublesome. But the open competition to 
create good business environments at the local level will probably have more 
long-term impact (Ramage 2004).
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Amid the gloom and doom, the historical resilience and successes of 
Indonesian society need to be appreciated. From a long-run perspective, the 
Indonesian experience with pro-poor growth provides genuine hope that desper-
ately poor societies can escape from the worst manifestations of poverty in a 
generation, provided appropriate policies are followed. Much of East and 
Southeast Asia provide evidence for the reality of this hope. This is a direct 
challenge to Myrdal’s pessimism. This is also a critically important message for 
the Indonesia of the future, unsure as it is over what path to follow under demo-
cratic governments. In its broadest outlines, that path is clear. The three-tiered 
strategy of growth-oriented macroeconomic policy, linked to product and factor 
markets through progressively lower transactions costs, which in turn are linked 
to poor households whose capabilities are being increased by public investments 
in human capital, is a general model accessible to all countries, including the 
future Indonesia (Timmer 2004a).
Investments in infrastructure and human capital are at the heart of the public-
sector dimensions of this model, and the Jokowi government clearly recognizes 
this (The Economist 2018). The pace of investments in infrastructure to lower 
transactions costs and in human capital to improve the capabilities of the poor 
depends on the country’s ability to generate public revenues and incentives for 
private participation (World Bank 2017). A fairer and more effective form of pub-
lic taxation is essential if the new government is to make these investments. The 
design of these pro-poor mechanisms of public finance is urgent, because foreign 
resources, from donors and foreign consumers of petroleum, are becoming less 
available, although FDI could increase substantially with the right policies in 
place. There is no escaping the hard fact that these resources dictate not only the 
pace of economic growth but also the extent to which that growth reaches the 
poor. With the right pro-poor growth model in place, continued foreign  assistance 
and private investment could have a very high payoff in both dimensions.
Indonesia’s success from 1967 to 1997 did not just happen as the accident of 
market forces. It was planned, nurtured, and largely financed by a government 
intent on rapidly reducing poverty. Although Myrdal was pessimistic in the late 
1960s that such a ‘developmental state’ could emerge in Indonesia, he likely would 
have agreed that the authoritarian Suharto government did what was necessary 
for economic success and rapid poverty reduction. Democratic governments with 
similar commitment can do the same in the future.
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When Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations was 
published in 1968, Vietnam was in the middle of a devastating war. The United 
States (US) had escalated her military involvement drastically during the previous 
years as Asian Drama was written, and whatever data were available for socio-
economic analysis were extremely poor. Importantly, Asian Drama contains a 
series of pointed observations on the nature and wide-ranging consequences of 
French colonial domination from the early 1860s to 1954 and the associated 
severe exploitation of the country. Moreover, US action in Vietnam is character-
ized as ‘awkward’, ‘. . . in the name of democracy the Vietnamese should be pre-
vented from following their own will’ (Myrdal 1968: 399).
Accordingly, while little could be done in the mid-1960s to forecast future 
political and socio-economic developments in Vietnam in any meaningful way, it 
does in retrospect strike the reader’s eye that Myrdal observed: ‘The Vietnamese 
were by far the most numerous and most cultured of the Indo-Chinese people 
and it was from them, with their age-long tradition of opposition to Chinese 
invaders, that early resistance to French rule emerged’ (1968: 170). Determination, 
unity, and willingness to experiment and recognize failure within the country’s 
leadership came to play a critical role in Vietnam’s subsequent economic history 
and development process. Asian Drama also highlights that:
The French intransigently discouraged even moderate nationalists, and then 
wreaked terrible vengeance on the innocent and guilty alike when violent 
 agitation and conspiratorial activity became the customary mode of political 
expression . . . The predictable consequences of this stern policy of repression was 
to leave the underground Communist Party in the forefront of the Vietnamese 
struggle for independence. (Myrdal 1968: 171)
Struggle was certainly to continue as the Vietnamese went on to resist the world’s 
largest military power; and the Vietnamese Dragon initially took a very costly 
path to post-war reconstruction and development after peace from 1976 where 
much went wrong. At the same time, few would now dispute that Vietnam did 
eventually rise from the ashes in a most respectable manner. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita rose from US$231 in 1985 to US$2,171 in 2016.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Finn Tarp 451
This chapter aims to provide an up-to-date country study, which sets out an 
analytical narrative of the Vietnamese development experience over the past five 
decades. The story begins with historical background in section 2, and then 
moves on to the war period until 1975, the subsequent decade guided by the 
Second and Third Five-Year Plans (1976–1980 and 1981–1985), and a summary 
of initial conditions in place in 1986. Moving on from history, section 3 outlines 
the process of economic growth, structural transformation, and rural change 
from 1986 onwards; while sections 4 and 5 discuss, respectively, the phased tran-
sition from planning to markets, and key themes associated with economic open-
ness. Section 6 reviews what was achieved in human development; and section 7 
concludes, relating back to Asian Drama and reflecting on future prospects and 
challenges for this dynamic Southeast Asian economy with an unusual history.
The overall narrative is linked together by an effort to identify turning points 
in economic strategies, policies, and performance, situated in the wider context 
of polity and society, with focus on the role of history, policymaking, state 
interventions, and socio-economic performance. The essential insight—or devel-
opment lesson—is that gradualism and prudence in managing the process of 
economic change in a centralized yet responsive political system—whether 




Myrdal notes that the social structure of the Vietnamese society traditionally 
based on land ownership remained essentially unchanged under French rule. 
Overall, some 82 per cent of the economically active population derived their 
livelihood from traditional, exceedingly low-productivity, village-based subsist-
ence agriculture in the mid-1950s, and only 8 per cent of the population was 
urban in 1950 (see Myrdal 1968: 427, 467, 494). The level of human development 
was extraordinarily low, landlessness extreme, and the Vietnamese were generally 
excluded from more modern sectors of the economy. Colonial rule also brought 
French-style institutions to support an exploitative production system. While the 
French imported cheap raw materials from Vietnam they exported tariff-protected 
industrial products the other way. It is no surprise that ‘from this type of colonial 
domination the emergence of a substantial Westernized upper class was hardly to 
be expected’ (Myrdal 1968: 170).
During the Second World War, where Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese, 
the Viet Minh was founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1941 as a nationalist independ-
ence movement. It quickly established itself as the only organized movement 
opposing the Japanese, and after the end of the Second World War it started ‘a 
radical land reform by distributing land to the tenants in the part of the country 
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they had gotten control of in their fight against the French’ (Myrdal 1968: 1316). 
As Viet Minh was trying to respond to the underlying land conflicts, negotiations 
with the French failed, and a decade-long war known as the First Indochina 
(or French) War (1945–1954) followed. It ended with French defeat at Dien Bien 
Phu and the Geneva conference in 1954 that divided the country into North and 
South Vietnam.
In the North, Viet Minh took over the civil administration in early October 
1954 and Ho Chi Minh became President of North Vietnam, established as a 
socialist state led by the Vietnam Workers’ Party that changed its name to the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) at the Fourth Party Congress in 1976, and 
with Hanoi as capital. In the non-communist South, Ngo Dinh Diem assumed 
control based in Saigon. Yet, Viet Minh cadres remained active and fought the 
Diem government with support from the North. Myrdal notes that ‘. . . many 
tenants who had obtained land free under the Viet Minh, lost it again or had to 
pay rent and even back rent or compensation’, and he goes on to point out that 
‘this contributed to the rebellion against the Saigon government that started in 
1956 and it is one of the powerful undertones to the present conflict’ (1968: 1316). 
The conflict just referred to was the Second Indochina War (1954–1975), also 
known as the American War or the Vietnam War. It forms a crucial part of world 
history in the twentieth century and ended with US defeat and withdrawal. Viet 
Cong captured Saigon on 30 April 1975, and after national elections on 2 July 
1976, reunification of North and South Vietnam took place. The Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam was formed under the leadership of the CPV, and the CPV remains 
firmly in control and, since 1988, is the only legal political party in Vietnam.
The 1954–1975 war brought gigantic destruction on top of French colonial 
exploitation, and the human and economic costs of the conflict went very deep. 
Production and the vast majority of the labour force had been squarely focused 
on the wartime effort; and human casualties and injuries were immense (see 
Rummel  1998; Obermeyer et al.  2008). Out-migration of more than 1 million 
people, who fled after reunification, and the imprisonment of large numbers of 
former associates of the government of South Vietnam in re-education camps, 
formed a ruthless part of the initial post-war state of affairs. The professional and 
entrepreneurial classes in the South were decimated and private ownership was 
abolished.
2.2 Post-reunification, 1976–1985
The task of unifying a fractured economy and people in what was in 1975 one of 
the poorest countries in the world can only be characterized as daunting. The 
prevailing ideology at the time led to the adoption of a heavily centralized, 
socialist-inspired command-type approach to economic policy and management 
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for the whole of Vietnam, with very ambitious goals. While the command-type 
model was already established in the North and had indeed worked well under 
wartime conditions, it marked a radical as well as risky change in economic 
organization in the South; especially when recalling earlier land conflicts. The 
way forward, including an emphasis on restoring infrastructure, building heavy 
industry, and promoting state ownership and entrepreneurship, was to be mapped 
out in five-year development plans; and in spite of the difficulties faced, ambitions 
were high and self-confidence pronounced. Building a unified socialist economy 
in Vietnam was to be achieved in a mere two decades! And the Fourth National 
Congress was united in the vision adopted. Notably, while the Second Five-Year 
Plan for 1976–1980 aimed at unifying the shattered (although markedly different) 
economies of the North and South in one socialist system, no role was permitted 
for market prices, private trade, and individual entrepreneurship. The plan also 
set ambitious goals for economic development including a 13 to 14 per cent 
aggregate annual growth rate. It was soon to become evident that the model was 
not working.
There was real GDP growth in Vietnam in the early 1970s, after which growth 
first spiked from a very low level as peace set in and then went on to drop badly in 
the later years of the Second Plan. While agricultural crop production, then dom-
inated by village collectives, did not collapse outright from its already very low 
wartime level, production was extremely volatile from one year to the next. Severe 
food shortages were quickly experienced as a consequence, and in light of pent-
up needs. Food-rationing was reintroduced, and Vietnam had to rely on large 
amounts of food aid support from the World Food Programme and on financial 
and material support from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
countries (see ReliefWeb 2000).
In sum, the Vietnamese economy was plagued by serious structural constraints 
and policy failures at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. Aggregate growth 
turned negative and agricultural crop production did not recover from wartime 
lows. In any case, individual land ownership was abolished in 1980 in the whole 
country in line with the policies of the socialist transformation that had been pro-
moted in North Vietnam after the adoption of the 1959 Constitution. This course 
of action was taken even if the collectivized production sector was clearly inefficient. 
In addition, unemployment was high, and there were material and technological 
shortfalls alongside the serious deficits in food and consumer goods supply.
Far from dynamic economic progress and transformation from an extremely 
low wartime base in a context of high expectations, central planning was yielding 
stagnation, and the role of the state continued to be paramount. Heavy state-
led industrialization was prioritized in government budget allocations and in 
international collaboration (with foreign assistance flowing in from socialist 
 partners including China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe as discussed in 
section 5). Some industrial growth did take place but at a very high cost, and the 
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industrial sector was in any case too small to have any impact on overall eco-
nomic  performance and living standards in the short term where food supply was 
the overriding concern.1 The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 
added international isolation and even a Chinese attack along the northern bor-
der in early 1979 to the challenges faced.
Cognisant of the failures of the Second Five-Year Plan, the CPV adopted a 
somewhat more gradual planning approach during the next five-year period 
(1981–1985). The government presented plans for one year at a time, and policy 
nuances were introduced in response to policy experimentation at the local level 
referred to as ‘fence breaking’ by Rama (2008).2 Industrial policy started stressing 
development of small-scale industry to provide goods for domestic markets and 
export and to support heavy industry. Some room was also allowed for free enter-
prise activity; in agriculture policy started encouraging the ‘family economy’ in 
which family units instead of collectives were responsible for farming. In parallel, 
it was the stated aim to improve crop production by intensive cultivation, crop 
specialization, and employing advanced technologies.
As experimentation, learning, and policy dialogue was going on both inside 
the CPV and in the public more widely during the first half of the 1980s, short-
falls had become endemic, and the country continued to experience high poverty 
and unemployment rates. In addition to unemployment, underemployment was 
high; inflation exploded, and the current account was in persistent deficit. The 
wide-ranging nature of the crisis was manifest, and conditions were ripe for initi-
ating a response in the form of a comprehensive reform programme.
3. Economic Growth, Structural Transformation,  
and Rural Change from 1986
The Sixth National Congress of the CPV in December 1986 adopted the Doi Moi 
‘renovation’ programme that had been in the making. Doi Moi was a far-reaching 
and comprehensive set of policy moves, and in its adoption the CPV recognized 
that serious policy shortcomings and mistakes had been made and that they were 
responsible for Vietnam’s economic disappointments. A five-point action plan 
was issued, and Vo Van Kiet (later to become prime minister during the 1990s) 
delivered the Economic Report to the Congress. He highlighted that the produc-
tion of grain and food products would be the main objective of the Fourth Five-
Year Plan; that material incentives and end-product contracts would play a 
1 See McKay and Tarp (2015) for a more recent account of how this concern has influenced policy-
making in Vietnam for decades.
2 Rama (2008: 15–16) highlights that ‘Fence breaking experiments in agriculture mainly involved 
allocating land to farmers and directly contracting with them at prices above those set by the plan’, and 
that these experiments involved fairly high-level local leaders, who had in common that they were 
seen as ‘ “bullet proof ”, given their track records during the wars’. See also Thanh (2011).
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prominent role; and that the export of agricultural products would be emphasized 
as would FDI (see Thayer 1987: 15–16). All in all, a set of quite remarkable policy 
initiatives, designed to promote the establishment of a socialist-oriented market 
economy, not so dissimilar to what was happening in other socialist economies at 
the time. The party leadership had, in the formulation of Rama (2008: 18), first 
tolerated, then embraced, and finally scaled up ‘fence breaking’. A multitude of 
practical measures and steps was subsequently taken in the rural sector including 
prominently the liberalization of the price of rice, the phasing out of agricultural 
co-operatives, and the redistribution of agricultural land to peasants (while keep-
ing in place restrictions on the use of the land for rice production) (see Markussen 
et al. 2011). Concerted programmes for development of agricultural technology 
and inputs were also initiated. Of particular note, the land reform initiative was 
implemented in a remarkably egalitarian manner that came to serve Vietnam well 
in the coming decades (see Ravallion and van de Walle 2008).3
Economic growth reacted quickly to the Doi Moi reforms and has remained 
high, and also relatively stable, ever since. Very significant progress in the level of 
real GDP per capita was achieved over the years. Inflation got under control, and 
savings and investment increased considerably.4 While investment was driven 
initially by state investment, domestic credit to the private sector was expanded 
fast as well. Moreover, even if private consumption as a share of GDP soon started 
falling to a level around 60 per cent, absolute increases in household consump-
tion were impressive. Agricultural output also responded soon after Doi Moi. 
Crop production expanded quickly, and growth has remained positive. Importantly, 
the politically sensitive food deficit started declining quite significantly, alongside 
the substantial drop in undernourishment of the Vietnamese population. A major 
reason behind this progress lies in the phenomenal progress in rice production. 
In a short span of years, Vietnam turned herself into a major producer and 
exporter of rice and other agricultural products, from having depended heavily 
on significant amounts of food imports.
Looking at sector shares of value-added and total employment (see Tarp 2018), 
it becomes immediately clear that Vietnam is a case of successful structural trans-
formation. Workers have over the past three decades gradually migrated to urban 
areas and have been employed there. In contrast to the strict traditional Lewis 
(1954) dual-sector model, agriculture was by no means ignored in Doi Moi. In 
fact, agriculture was very much at the core and was actively supported by state 
co-ordinated support measures. Consequently, and importantly for the process of 
3 More recently, attention has shifted to the efficiency costs associated with operating the large 
number of plots that individual households were allocated, and consolidation of fragmented plots is 
presently a priority on the policy agenda. See Khai et al. (2013) for background on farmers’ access to 
land and land transactions.
4 For a study on rural household savings, social capital, and network effects, see Newman et al. 
(2014); on formal and informal credit, see Barslund and Tarp (2008).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
456 Asian Transformations
structural transformation, agriculture has grown substantially in absolute terms.5 
In sum, the general economic transformation story that emerges from Vietnam 
includes a combination of labour moving out of agriculture to be absorbed in 
expanding higher value-added industry and services sectors. This implies that 
structural change contributed to aggregate growth over and above the impact 
from high levels of investment and technical change.6 At the same time, signifi-
cant changes took place in rural organization and life (see Tarp 2017).7
The CPV National Congresses have, from 1991 onwards, maintained a strong 
focus on the continued shift towards a more market-oriented rural economy and 
an enhanced role of the private sector, while at the same time stressing state 
 control and co-ordination as fundamental characteristics of the Vietnamese 
economy and society. Goals and strategies continue to be articulated in five-year 
plans, which play an important role in resource allocation. As regards macroeco-
nomic and rural sector policies, they have in general been focused on very ambi-
tious investment and infrastructure development programmes (across the whole 
economy), and countercyclical measures have on many occasions been taken. 
Vietnam managed the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and 2007–2008 financial 
crisis and its aftermaths much better than other countries. This was achieved 
through a combination of substantial fiscal stimulus and keeping in place controls 
of capital movements.8 In spite of the occasional instability, macroeconomic 
management has over the years been solid. Growth versus inflation aims has 
been balanced while responding to severe external shocks (in particular the global 
financial  crises) and generally holding to the objectives of growth and poverty 
reduction.
4. From Planning to Markets: Increasing  
SOE Autonomy and Fostering Entrepreneurship
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were central to the pre-Doi Moi reconstruction 
and industrialization drives in North Vietnam, and from 1975, in the whole of 
5 The Vietnamese structural transformation process may therefore be said to be better captured by 
the Ranis and Fei (1961) two-sector model formulation than Lewis’s (1954) original formulation.
6 McCaig and Pavcnik (2013) conclude that structural change accounted for a third of the growth 
in aggregate labour productivity. Abbott et al. (2017) argue that a significant part of growth originated 
from technological change that benefitted agriculture as well. For the importance of industry switch-
ing firms for productivity change, see Newman et al. (2013); for industry agglomeration, see Howard 
et al. (2016).
7 For detailed panel data studies on the development of the rural sector in Vietnam since 2002, see 
also UNU-WIDER (2018). A recent book is Tarp (2017) on structural transformation, and two recent 
papers are Markussen et al. (2017) on happiness, and Newman et al. (2015a) on property rights; but 
there are many more studies such as Markussen and Tarp (2014) on political connections and invest-
ment in land. Also, detailed bi-annual research reports are available from 2006 on the characteristics 
of the Vietnamese rural economy (see Ayala-cantu et al. 2017).
8 See Abbott and Tarp (2012) and Thurlow et al. (2011) for detailed studies.
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Vietnam. Heavy industry was prioritized in government budget allocations 
within the planned economy framework; market prices had no role to play; pri-
vate trade was not recognized; and the role of the SOEs was restricted to imple-
menting plans and achieving production targets decided on and passed down 
from central levels. No company law existed, and all industrial and service firms 
were in principle to be brought under state ownership and management. This cre-
ated obvious disruptions in the South, where drastic nationalization efforts were 
taken after reunification;9 but in spite of the fact that none of the industry targets 
set for the 1976–1980 Five-Year Plan were met,10 state ownership was pushed for-
ward, and in 1986 SOEs accounted for 40 per cent of GDP (Frank 2013: 2). SOEs 
were given more flexibility in decision-making and planning in the 1981–1985 plan 
and from 1986 Doi Moi included a series of further important steps to gradually 
give the SOEs autonomy. Detailed targets were reduced to broader socio-economic 
guidelines; price controls for consumer goods were abolished; and industrial 
production was to focus on food, consumer goods, and exports. At the same time 
government subsidies were significantly reduced. This forced SOEs to become 
more self-reliant. It also brought out in the open their lack of efficiency and that 
many were loss-making entities. From the early 1990s this led to the  liquidation 
of many SOEs across the economy. The total number of SOEs fell drastically (see 
Ngu  2002: 7; Thanh  2011: 5). In contrast, the number of private small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) started growing.11
The somewhat tentative changes during the 1990s were to accelerate drastically 
after the Enterprise Law was enacted in 1999 (National Assembly 1999). It made 
it easier for private enterprises to enter and operate. Nguyen et al. (2016, 2014) 
document the industry sector changes in detail, including both the continued 
drop in SOE numbers and that the number of private sector firms (including both 
industrial and service sector firms) shot up to over 200,000 by 2006. Other telling 
data is that the number of micro firms with fewer than ten employees increased 
their employment share from 22.4 per cent in 2002 to 44.7 per cent a decade later. 
Manufacturing accounted for more than 80 per cent of industrial activity, and 
annual industrial sector growth was generally around 15 per cent with far lower 
growth rates in SOEs in the first decade of the 2000s. Service sector developments 
were quite similar, and in 2005 over half of Vietnam’s enterprises were in services, 
with the highest percentage being in wholesale and retail commerce. The vast 
majority of very small and small enterprises were in services, with wholesale 
and  retail trade having three-quarters of the enterprises with fewer than five 
9 Ngu (2002) reports that by early 1978 a total of 1,500 private enterprises in the South, with 
70 per cent of privately employed workers, had been converted into 650 SOEs.
10 For example, Ngu (2002: 4) notes target achievement rates of 32 per cent, 21 per cent, and 24 per 
cent for cement, steel, and chemical fertilizers, respectively.
11 Further comments on the foreign-invested companies, which were allowed entry after the 1987 
Law on Foreign Investment, and which form a critically important part of the changed enterprise 
landscape in Vietnam, are made in section 5.
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employees (see UNDP 2005: 10). An impressive part of the services sector devel-
opment has been the very rapid expansion of the tourism sub-sector, which in 
2015 accounted for 13.9 per cent of GDP, more than 11 per cent of total employ-
ment, and 5.6 per cent of exports (Voice of Vietnam Online 2016).
Over the past decade, the above developments have been intensified through a 
vast number of further legal and economic policy steps. One highlight is the 2005 
Enterprise Law that unified the legal foundation for all enterprise types (i.e., 
SOEs, FDIs, and private firms) to create a level playing field for their operations. 
The shift away from a completely state-dominated economy to one where the 
 private sector and foreign invested firms tower was very distinct.12 Moreover, the 
developments over the last couple of years where available statistics are less 
 systematic, confirm that these trends continue (see Nhân Dân 2018). For example, 
the government has announced further ambitious SOE divestment and restruc-
turing plans for the period until 2020; meanwhile, the number of private SMEs 
continued to grow with around 100,000 new firms in 2016 (see Vietnam Briefing 
2017).13 In conclusion, and looking ahead, it merits stressing that while labour 
value-added in agriculture and services has generally been on an upward trend, 
this is not the case for industry. Although the rapid expansion and greater absorp-
tion of labour in industry is clearly welcome,14 this point has attracted consider-
able attention in the domestic policy debate in Vietnam, and we shall revert to 
this topic in section 7.
5. Openness: Aid, Trade, and FDI
Turning to the role of foreign aid in the Vietnam development experience, it 
 merits recalling that North Vietnam received significant financial and technical 
support from the USSR and China before reunification, and that from 1954 
onwards South Vietnam became heavily dependent on foreign aid from the 
US, in particular. After reunification, foreign aid continued to flow in, though 
amounts are not known in detail. Cima (1987: 150–1) estimates that the Soviet 
Union, China, and Eastern Europe provided foreign assistance during the Second 
12 Eckardt et al. (2018) stress that foreign companies include major global players such as Samsung, 
Intel, and LG, and that they are primarily active in export-oriented, labour-intensive manufacturing.
13 For detailed panel data studies on the development of the SME non-state manufacturing sector 
in Vietnam since 2005, see UNU-WIDER (2018). The two most recent papers are Calza et al. (2019) 
on drivers of productivity in SMEs and Sharma and Tarp (2018) on managerial personality; but there 
are many more studies of interest, such as Hansen et al. (2009) on whether government support mat-
ters, Rand and Tarp (2011) on gender as well as corruption issues in Vietnamese SMEs, and Howard 
et al. (2016) on industry agglomeration. Detailed bi-annual research reports are also available on the 
characteristics of the Vietnamese business environment (see Brandt et al. 2016).
14 Eckardt et al. (2018) note that manufacturing added an estimated 1.5 million new manufacturing 
jobs in Vietnam between 2014 and 2016 alone.
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Five-Year Plan from 1976–1980 worth US$3–4 billion, whereas Western aid 
amounted to roughly US$1–1.5 billion.15 Cima paints the following picture:
In the late 1970s, Vietnam relied heavily on economic assistance from both 
Western and Soviet-bloc donors to finance major development projects. 
[However, following Vietnam’s membership of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon) and the associated] closer ties with the Soviet Union, its 
incursion into Cambodia in December 1978, and its border fighting with China 
in early 1979, aid from China and from Western countries and multilateral 
organizations dropped . . . Aid from China, reportedly close to US$300 million in 
1977 and 1978, dropped to zero in 1979 . . . Following Vietnam’s occupation of 
Cambodia, only Sweden continued to provide any significant amount of eco-
nomic help. Some multilateral assistance, such as that for development of the 
Mekong River, was made available by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, however. Western and multilateral 
 assistance, therefore, did not stop entirely, although the yearly average of about 
US$100 million through 1986 provided only a fraction of the country’s hard-
currency needs. (1987: 176)
Vietnam was clearly in a vulnerable situation and becoming very dependent on 
the USSR. Moreover, frictions were frequent. Cima states:
. . . in the early 1980s, announcement of the Third Five-Year Plan was delayed 
until the Fifth National Party Congress of March 1982 while Vietnam waited for 
the Soviet Union to confirm its aid commitments; and that Vietnam in the mid-
1980s suffered first reduction, and then elimination of Soviet price subsidies for 
purchases of Soviet oil. (1987: 166)
This provides a telling insight into the massive difficulties in macroeconomic 
management in those early years after reunification, though remittances from 
overseas Vietnamese played a moderating role at the household level.
One of the institutional decisions of the Sixth National Congress in 1986 was 
to establish a Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, and 
Vietnam clearly aimed at stimulating foreign aid inflows as part of the Doi Moi 
renovation effort. The response came forth once Vietnam had withdrawn from 
Cambodia in the late 1980s and the world had witnessed the downfall of the 
former USSR.16 Aid flows doubled and rose more than five-fold during the  decade 
from 1993 and Japan quickly established itself as the leading donor, with the 
15 To compare: the total Vietnamese government budget amounted to US$2.5 billion in 1976 
while investments amounting to US$7.5 billion were planned for the 1981–1985 Five-Year Plan 
(Cima 1987: 150). This suggests that an amount equivalent to two-thirds of the investment programme 
came from abroad.
16 Hansen and Tarp (2004) provide an overview of aid flows and management from 1993 on which 
this paragraph draws.
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World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in important second and third 
place. Countries in the European Union added important amounts that have 
 nevertheless all but disappeared in most recent years as Vietnam has achieved 
lower-middle-income status. Specifically, Vietnam’s dependence on foreign aid 
has been falling quite steadily since the turn of the millennium where aid 
accounted for some 5 per cent of GDP to now 1.5 to 2 per cent.17 Importantly, 
Trinh (2014) concludes that foreign aid had a significantly positive role in pro-
moting economic growth in Vietnam from 1993 to 2012; a result that is in line 
with the positive assessment results from the general literature over the past dec-
ade (e.g., see Arndt et al. 2016). So the drop in the aid/GDP ratio is both a result 
of aid phasing out from some donors (the nominator) and of substantial GDP 
growth (the denominator).
In parallel with the domestic reforms in agriculture, industry, and services, 
Vietnam began in 1986 an extraordinary process of opening up its economy to 
regional and global economic forces; and as discussed by Tarp et al. (2003), both 
the quantity and composition of international trade have changed dramatically. A 
first, and critical, monetary policy step was the unification of the various official 
exchange rates in 1989, where the dong was devalued significantly to approach 
the market parallel rate. By 1992, the parallel premium had fallen to less than 
1 per cent (see Dodsworth et al. 1996: box 1), and significant measures had been 
taken to change the mono-bank system into a commercial banking system (see 
Kovsted et al. 2005). Subsequently, Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 as relations with the US normalized, and is also a 
member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The key economic 
and trade programme for ASEAN is the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and 
AFTA’s core instrument is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff. By joining 
ASEAN, Vietnam therefore undertook early on international commitments in 
trade policy, which have had a profound impact as set out in what follows.18 
Other subsequent significant initiatives included the US–Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement in 2000 and Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007 as WTO 
 member number 150.
Abbott et al. (2009) and Abbott and Tarp (2012) review the host of institutional 
and policy changes involved; and it stands out that rather than being a standard 
17 Raghuram Rajan, during his term as Chief Economist of the IMF, presented an early version of 
Arvind Subramanian and his own much cited paper on what the cross-country evidence really has to 
say about aid’s impact on growth (Rajan and Subramanian 2008). The Vietnam context could hardly 
have been more at odds with the thesis presented and the empirical evidence has since been refuted 
(see Arndt et al. 2010).
18 Focus in what follows is on major overall trends. For analytical papers on the impact of glo-
balization crises, lessons from trade agreements, technology transfers, productivity spillovers, 
enterprise behaviour, and income growth related to international trade and foreign investment, 
see, for example, Tarp et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2009), Abbott and Tarp (2012), and Newman 
et al. (2015b, 2017, 2018); and on firm-level technology and competitiveness, see Central Institute 
for Economic Management et al. (2015).
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case of export-led growth, Vietnam saw more limited declines in investment than 
in export and import around the 1997–1998 and 2008–2009 global crises. There 
is, therefore, much to suggest that solid investment and macroeconomic manage-
ment and trade policy, combined with an impressive record on sticking to the 
programme of building up the necessary institutional framework to benefit from 
continued international integration, including a strong and focused co-ordinating 
role by the state, had a lot to do with the success achieved.19 Moreover, Vietnam 
has stayed on track since accession to the WTO, and presently has sixteen 
bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements; in 2018 Vietnam became one 
of the eleven signatories of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the successor of the TPP after the US withdrew 
(see Eckardt et al.  2018). A particularly significant element of the opening-up 
process has been the effective promotion of development zones. They have 
included industrial zones, economic zones, export-processing zones, and high-
tech zones, and firms that have been willing to invest have benefitted from prefer-
ential governmental policies, modern infrastructure, and access to utility services 
(for details, see Ernst & Young 2013). UNIDO (2015: 88) reports that in 2015 
there were 313 economic zones in Vietnam; and that 40 per cent of Vietnam’s 
total exports originate from the economic zones.
A first and quite impressive impact of the changes in international monetary 
and trade policy is the consistent increase in the openness of the Vietnamese 
economy as measured by the foreign trade (export plus import) share of GDP. It 
increased from a mere 20 per cent in 1986 to more than an impressive 180 per 
cent in 2016. While the trade balance during a significant part of the 1986–2016 
period was in deficit, it has since 2011 been in surplus, suggesting that the long-
term growth strategy has indeed paid off. Vietnam’s main exports are rice, coffee, 
textiles, and machinery. Textiles and machinery, in particular, have become more 
important export commodities in the 2010s. Oil discoveries were made in the 
early 1980s in offshore fields, and crude oil exports peaked in 2004. However, 
since then the production has decreased, and Vietnam is currently a net importer 
of oil products (World Energy Council  2018). While impressive success in the 
production and export of agricultural export goods was experienced early on 
after 1986, declines have been experienced in value terms in more recent years. 
However, this fall has been more than compensated by manufacturing exports. 
Main imports are, as could be expected, machinery, chemicals, metals, and oil 
products, and manufacturing success from 2007–2008 onwards is clearly visible 
19 It is striking that many in the international community, including in particular the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), argued for a strategy that emphasized stability over growth and faster SOE 
reform (see IMF 2010), and did not seem to grasp what it actually took to steer the reform process 
safely and successfully through difficult times. The World Bank was much more receptive, and, as 
Rama (2008) explains, built up its concessional lending programme to the point where the lending to 
Vietnam from the International Development Association was second only to that of India.
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from the trade balance by goods categories. Despite the global economic crisis, 
Vietnam maintained focus on investment and expansion and certainly managed 
to reap the economic benefits in global manufacturing markets after WTO mem-
bership became a reality.
Finally, Doi Moi, including domestic reforms, trade opening, and accession to 
the WTO increased the credibility of Vietnam among international investors, and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) increased very significantly from 1989 onwards 
and has been high ever since. From 2005, the IMF balance-of-payments statistics 
also registers outflows of Vietnamese investments abroad. Doanh (2002) analyses 
the difference between registered and implemented capital, and adds that the 
decline in the case of Vietnam should also be related to domestic investment 
 climate factors.20 In any case, the total registered FDI capital has reached a very 
significant level, reported to amount in 2017 to a record high of almost US$36 
billion. Among the nineteen industries and sectors that attracted FDI capital in 
2017, the manufacturing–processing industry remained on top with almost 
45 per cent (see Viet Nam News 2017). Accordingly, the relative size of FDI to 
investment by the state and non-state sectors has changed drastically over the years, 
underlining that FDI is a key source of investment funding in addition to the 
derived agglomeration, technology transfer, and productivity impacts that FDI is 
associated with. Moreover, the gradually shifting balance between state and non-
state investment is fully in line with the discussion about the move from planning 
to markets in section 4.
6. Human Development
While Vietnam’s growth record is impressive, many observers would argue that it 
is surpassed by achievements in terms of human development. The poverty rate 
was 58 per cent in 1993, and though poverty has not been eliminated it has fallen 
significantly: in 2016, it was less than 6 per cent for Vietnam as a whole, with the 
rural rate being 7.5 per cent and the urban rate being 2.0 per cent. Remaining 
poverty is particularly associated with poverty among the ethnic minorities in 
North and Central Vietnam that account for about 10 per cent of the population.21 
Inequality measured by the Gini coefficient for consumption rose moderately 
from 33.4 per cent in 1993 to 39.3 per cent in 2010. It then fell to 35.6 per cent 
after which it has risen again to 37.6 per cent. While it does appear that  inequality 
has risen, this is an encouraging performance, and arguably reflects that the 
20 Hansen et al. (2003) provide regional context and further data on the distribution of the FDI 
received.
21 Glewwe et al. (2004) provide 628 pages of excellent background and analysis on poverty in Vietnam 
during the 1990s based on the 1993 and 1998 rounds of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 
(VHLSS). See Tarp (2017) for more recent panel data analysis and further information on the ethnic 
minorities, and the World Bank (2012) overview with the telling title Well Begun, Not Yet Done.
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majority of Vietnamese have had their share of growth benefits.22 However, it 
should be highlighted that the Gini measures relative inequality and, therefore, 
hides changes in absolute differences in income and consumption.
McKay and Tarp (2017: 213) document that in the Vietnam Access to 
Resources Household Survey (VARHS) rural panel, overall living conditions have 
in general improved according to three measures of welfare: (i) food consump-
tion, (ii) household income, and (iii) household ownership of assets. However, 
there are exceptions such as the province of Lao Cai, and the data also document 
that even in provinces where average living conditions improved, the situation 
deteriorated for a sizeable minority of households. Migration of some household 
members seems to have a positive impact on the remaining household members; 
yet belonging to a non-Kinh23 minority is significantly associated with smaller 
increases in food consumption and income. In sum, what has been achieved in 
Vietnam in terms of growth and poverty reduction is impressive, but important 
challenges remain.
Turning to other dimensions of human development, life expectancy at birth 
was more than seventy-six years in 2016 and infant mortality 17.3 per 1,000 
births. Access to basic services (electricity, drinking water, sanitation) has 
expanded rapidly, reflecting substantial public investment in these social goods. 
Though child malnutrition has continued to fall, stunting nevertheless is around a 
relatively high 25 per cent and the share of underweight children below five years 
of age is 14 per cent, indicating that more remains to be done. Finally, tertiary 
school enrolment is now at almost 30 per cent, reflecting the progress achieved 
since the mid-1990s where only 2–3 per cent entered tertiary education.
7. Conclusions and Reflections
This study took as its starting point what Myrdal (1968) had to say about Vietnam 
in the context of the Asian Drama. It was clear that little detailed information and 
data were available at the time in the middle of the war. However, Myrdal was 
right in pointing to the decisive nature of the Vietnamese people, and subsequent 
developments have demonstrated that amply. Vietnam emerged victorious in the 
war and the CPV went on to take a dogged and, in retrospect, very costly position 
on economic policy and management from 1976. At the same time, when the 
approach taken did not produce the hoped-for results, the CPV pursued Doi Moi 
22 Jensen and Tarp (2005) analysed spatial inequality following trade liberalization in a Computable 
General Equilibrium model relying on data on all of the 5,999 households surveyed in the VHLSS and 
a 2000 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Vietnam. They concluded that the government should be 
proactive in combining trade liberalization measures with a pro-poor fiscal response to avoid increas-
ing poverty and inequality. This is exactly what the government has done. See Thurlow et al. (2011) for 
an illustration.
23 The majority of the Vietnamese population are of Kinh background.
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in an equally persistent manner; and it has certainly paid off. Vietnam has come a 
long way indeed since the Doi Moi reform process was initiated in 1986, and the 
past more than three decades have witnessed one of the best performances in the 
world in terms of both economic growth and poverty reduction. People’s living 
standards have improved significantly, and the country’s socio-economic achieve-
ments are impressive from a human development perspective. Wide-ranging 
institutional reform has been introduced, including a greater reliance on market 
forces in the allocation of resources and the determination of prices. The shift 
from an economy completely dominated by the state and co-operative sectors to 
one where the private sector and foreign investment play key and dynamic roles 
should also be highlighted. Significant strides have been made to further the 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, without giving up 
strategic leadership and influence by the state.
In sum, the key line of argument in this chapter was that gradualism and 
 prudence in managing the process of economic change in a centralized yet 
responsive political system, combined with embedded history, have shaped 
socio-economic outcomes in a significant way. The chapter was structured to first 
set out the historical context and background, moving on to outlining the struc-
tural reforms undertaken and explaining how they have played themselves out 
and impacted on socio-economic and human development in the Vietnamese 
historical and political setting. This setting has throughout been characterized by 
a strong focus on egalitarianism, and this has clearly influenced both the nature 
and content of policy formulation. As was clear, much went wrong in the early 
years after 1975, but the willingness to learn from mistakes and ability to absorb 
lessons from experimentation paved the way for an important course correction 
from 1986 onwards. The importance of history was highlighted already by 
Myrdal, and the political system as it has evolved has so far kept in place the 
 necessary checks and balances on individual power.24
Vietnam, over many years, depended heavily on the USSR and the Comecon 
members, and only after a reluctant start in the 1980s did the international 
 community start engaging more broadly. Large-scale investment programmes 
were pursued during the 1990s, and the international community assumed 
responsibility for supporting a wide variety of social and economic reform initia-
tives. Importantly, the determination of Vietnam to maintain ‘ownership’ of the 
reform process has been evident and absolutely fundamental to the success 
achieved (see Hansen and Tarp  2004). The reforms were truly generated by 
Vietnam herself in an impressive manner where search for workable and mutually 
24 Vietnam has no principal ruler and is officially led by the President, the Prime Minister, the Party 
Secretary General, and the Chair of the National Assembly. Whether the CPV decision of  nominating 
Nguyen Phu Trong to simultaneously assume the posts of Party Secretary General and State President 
following the untimely passing of Vietnam’s President Tran Dai Quang on 21 September 2018, will 
change existing practice in any fundamental way is unclear.
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agreed solutions with a minimum of losers was central, at a time when so many 
other countries were giving in to heavy-handed pressure from the Bretton Woods 
institutions and others (Tarp  1993). In contrast, in Vietnam the international 
community had to adopt patient dialogue, bargaining, and technical advice to 
find effective ways of securing the attention of the Vietnamese authorities and 
people. Much can be learnt from this experience for international relations and 
for foreign aid more generally at a conflict-prone moment in world history.
In the midst of the success achieved it is equally important not to lose track of 
the fact that Vietnam remains a lower-middle-income country according to the 
World Bank classification, with GDP per capita considerably lower than in some 
other Southeast Asian countries. How the country can rapidly and sustainably 
continue to transform itself and its economy to a wealthier and modern high-
income society is a critical policy challenge. While future success cannot be taken 
for granted, it would fortunately seem as if there is a lot of awareness about this in 
Vietnam. Caution is justified for many reasons.
First, Vietnam has, as documented in detail by Hoai et al. (2019) in their SAM-
based analysis, stressed that it is time for the country to make focused efforts tar-
geted at transforming the economic growth model towards a more sustainable 
one which does not rely to such a large extent on expanding capital and labour 
inputs.25 Technological upgrading has so far played a relatively modest role in 
Vietnam’s success, though by no means has it been completely absent. 
Nonetheless, the advantages of low labour costs have started to run out of steam 
and more technological upgrading will be required across the board. This has 
already been touched upon in section 4 in relation to industry sector  performance, 
where it was noted that labour value-added in industry has not been on a consistent 
upward trend. This reflects that much of the employment created is in quite basic 
functions that do not add greatly to the value-added per worker. While the trend 
may have turned from 2010 onwards, efforts need to be scaled up in combination 
with continued export engagement. External demand extension can, in addition 
to generating foreign exchange, also help strengthen internal economic integra-
tion and technological upgrading further (e.g., see Newman et al. 2015b, 2017), 
and productivity dynamism will no doubt be needed to sustain growth in the future. 
So, it is time to pursue a proactive policy approach to avoid being caught in what 
is sometimes referred to as a ‘middle-income trap’. Vietnam can, in many ways, be 
said to have by now harvested the relatively easy ‘low-hanging fruits’,26 achieved 
by a strong focus on an expansionist (domestic and foreign)  investment-driven 
model of growth coupled with recovery from a very repressed level. Furthermore, 
25 The SAM dataset is available in Hoai et al. (2016).
26 As shown by Arndt et al. (2012) in their comparative path analysis of Vietnam and Mozambique, 
a specific dimension of this is that Vietnam has benefitted greatly from inherent economic multi-
plier-effects due to a more tightly linked-up economy than Mozambique, as demonstrated in their 
respective SAMs. Vietnam has, so to speak, got more ‘bang for the buck’ in terms of poverty reduction 
for the exact same policies.
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what stands out is that this process has been guided by a strong co-ordinating 
state. Nonetheless, it is time to look ahead—development policy challenges never 
go away; they simply change in nature, because of past failures and/or successes. 
One specific future dimension of this will surely be how Vietnam will handle 
(or not) issues associated with the increasing digitalization of the global economy 
and the availability of labour-saving technology.
Second, significant differences in the level of sector labour value-added 
 continue to prevail. This reflects that Vietnam has by no means arrived at the 
‘modernization’ point where labour is optimally allocated across sectors. 
Moreover, existing differences contribute to visible disparities in income and 
living standards in spite of the efforts of the government to redistribute towards 
poorer groups of people. In spite of recent progress, the ethnic minorities are far 
from included on an equal basis and gender equity also leaves much to be 
desired. In addition to gender- and group-based policy initiatives, this implies 
that  productivity in agriculture will have to increase a lot more. This will have 
to involve both further investment and technology-driven productivity increases 
in agriculture and relocation of workers to other non-farming-based activities. 
While much can be achieved in improving processing of agricultural products, 
significant shifts of people towards dynamic urban centres will also have to be 
factored in. How to manage the inherent equity issues in such a process and 
ensuring no one is, in UN-SDG terminology, ‘left behind’, will no doubt remain a 
challenge. The same goes for the need for forward-looking urban and spatial 
planning, which leads us to the next point, climate change.
Third, Vietnam is typically expected to be susceptible to climate change for a 
number of reasons. They include the following: (i) much of Vietnam’s population 
depends on agriculture; (ii) the position of Vietnam at the end of the Red and 
Mekong Rivers exposes the country to inland flooding; and (iii) the long, low-
lying coastline is vulnerable to cyclones. The combination of rising sea levels 
and cyclones is likely to be particularly challenging: it could lead to displacement 
of large numbers of rural people and undermine valuable transport, energy, and 
urban infrastructure and impact on longer-term development. At the same time, 
Arndt et al. (2015) conclude that the negative impacts on agriculture are mod-
est until 2050. Instead, larger costs are caused by rising sea levels and cyclone 
strikes that undermine urban infrastructure and capital. The insight is that 
costs are more limited for agriculture, which is a shrinking sector in relative 
terms in relation to both people and output, while present spatial patterns of 
urban areas are highly vulnerable, especially in scenarios that go beyond 2050. 
The implication is that there is a window of opportunity to act, at least with 
standard rates of  depreciation of the existing capital stock. However, the win-
dow is quickly narrowing and spatial planning shifting focus towards higher-lying 
areas of the country is going to be an essential requirement to adapt effectively 
to climate change.
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Fourth, Rama (2008) pointed out a decade ago that the task of managing the 
Vietnamese economy and society has become a much more complex set-up as a 
result of the changes associated with Vietnam’s transformation following Doi Moi. 
This includes obviously the radically increased openness of the domestic econ-
omy to the world economy, which makes it increasingly important to be able to 
adapt policies and courses of action to changing circumstances outside Vietnam’s 
control. It also means that the number of domestic stakeholders with conflicting 
interests has become much larger; and this inherently makes the consensus-seeking 
(growth-focused) approach adopted in the past harder to maintain and pursue 
successfully. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the existing state and party apparatus 
depends critically on what will happen to the by now widespread corruption.27 It 
is therefore clear that ‘new feedback mechanisms from society to state’ (Rama 
2008: 48) will be needed in the coming years. One development of note in this 
regard is the increasing role of the National Assembly,28 but there are many other 
issues looming here. Overall, none of these challenges referred to here have 
become less important over the past ten years; and Vietnam continues to be 
ranked relatively low in indices such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
and the Transparency International corruptions perceptions index (see World 
Bank 2018c), trying to capture voice, accountability, and control of corruption.
Finally, while caution is required for the above reasons, there is also a lot of 
reason for optimism as regards the future of development in Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese people are not prone to rest on their laurels (see Rama 2008; Eckardt 
et al. 2018), as history has taught us over and over again. The economy is increas-
ingly being focused on forward-looking manufacturing, information technology, 
high-tech industries, and agriculture, and Vietnam will for years to come be able 
to harvest a demographic dividend with a relatively young and growing labour 
force. Eckardt et al. (2018) note that half the Vietnamese population is below 
35 years of age and stress that Vietnam has invested heavily in education. They 
also argue that ‘Vietnam’s efforts to promote access to primary education and to 
ensure its quality through minimum quality standards have paid off ’ and note 
Vietnam’s ranking as 8 in the latest 2015 OECD Programme for International 
Student Assessment (see OECD 2018).
27 See Rand and Tarp (2012, 2016) for one dimension hereof.
28 This includes the series of leadership changes introduced at the Tenth CPV Congress in 2006 
(see Koh 2008), including that the Eighth Five-Year Plan had to be approved by the National Assembly 
before being implemented. Moreover, ‘. . . if the use of laws and rules to regulate government and state 
affairs was a dominant theme of political reform in the past two decades, the trend was now seen in 
the running of party affairs . . . Another outcome is allowing different opinions on alternatives to be 
articulated, while retaining the power to accept or reject them within the Central Committee and the 
Political Bureau. It would be reasonable to say that these changes constitute political reforms designed 
to democratize the Party through raising the status of the Central Committee, especially in respecting 
the collective’s decision on personnel decisions, and in reducing the roles of powerful individuals in 
making such decisions’ (Koh 2008: 671–2).
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Whether one agrees with the exact ranking or not,29 this does bode well for the 
future when taking account of what will be required to do well in the global 
 economic environment where global technological and IT advance will be a 
determining factor for economic and social progress. At the same time, Vietnam 
will as a sine qua non have to continue the process of institutional reform across 
the board to turn this potential into reality in the coming decades. This is so in 
general for the economy as a whole and in particular for the higher education and 
vocational training systems. Vietnam continues to lack workers with the  necessary 
technical and soft skills, illustrated by the fact that, despite the improvement of 
language proficiency of Vietnamese students over the years, a major breakthrough 
is yet to materialize. If this does not change it will soon emerge as a key bottleneck 
for continued economic development and become a major stumbling block in the 
context of global technological and IT advance.
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1. The fast growth of the developing countries, which used a lot of 
import protection and other forms of dirigisme ‘had a lot of mystery 
for me [and for all of us] who advocate hands-off markets’
(Easterly 2002, emphasis added).
2. ‘[A] nation that opens its economy and keeps government’s role to 
a minimum invariably experiences more rapid economic growth and 
rising incomes’
(Louis Uchitelle (2002), reporting on the consensus among 
business executives and government leaders at the World Economic 
Forum meeting in 2002).
3. ‘The most important thing in life is to have a goal, and the 
 determination to achieve it’
(in English and Chinese, on plaque in entrance to Industrial 
Development Bureau, Taipei; reported in Weiss and Thurbon 2004).
1. Introduction
When historians look back on the second half of the twentieth century they will 
likely see the economic renaissance of East Asia as one of the seminal events. 
Starting with Japan in the 1950s, it rolled on to Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s; later (but less so) to Southeast Asia; and 
into China in the 1990s. It represents the first major challenge to the global hier-
archy of military, economic, and cultural power created by the British Empire and 
its European counterparts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and led by the 
United States since the Second World War. It has begun to restore the region to the 
forefront of world development, which it earlier occupied for more than a thousand 
years before being eclipsed in the new Western-centric world order (Arrighi 2007).
Our focus is on the world order of Northeast Asia, created by Japan in the late 
nine teenth and early twentieth centuries and then integrated into the emerging 
American empire after the Second World War. Myrdal’s (1968) Asian Drama said 
little about Northeast Asia, focused as it was on South Asia and secondarily on 
Southeast Asia.
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2. Exceptional Economic Performance in Northeast Asia
Today the Northeast Asian countries remain among a small set of non-Western 
economies to have escaped the typical structural constraints on developing coun-
tries. But instead of ‘developing countries’ or ‘emerging economies’ we should 
speak of ‘peripheries’ in the core–periphery structure of the world economy. The 
core emits impulses; the periphery receives impulses and supplies the core with 
inputs that sustain the core’s technological, economic, financial, and military 
dominance—including supplies of skilled people (Fischer 2015).
The Northeast Asian countries remain among a still smaller set of non-Western 
countries which have developed mostly indigenously-owned firms across a broad 
range of major global industries, able to act as first-tier suppliers to (Western or 
Japanese) multinational companies (MNCs) and even compete head-to-head 
with them. The range includes chemicals, petrochemicals, electronics, steel, ship-
building, cars, and car parts, and more recently, biotech, advanced semi-conductors, 
artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and space exploration. This achievement 
reflects their development of an indigenous capacity for technological innovation-
on-the-world-frontier. Yet they are located some 9,000 kilometres across the Pacific 
from the world’s biggest and most innovative market, while next-door Mexico has 
languished.
Just how exceptional is the economic performance of Northeast Asia is clear 
from the answer to the question: how many non-Western countries have reached 
the general level of prosperity of Western Europe and North America in the past 
two centuries? Fewer than ten. The small number of catch-ups makes the point that 
the main long-term growth pattern in the world economy has been: ‘divergence, 
big time’ (Pritchett 1997). A World Bank (2013) study confirms this conclusion. It 
identified 101 countries in 1960 as ‘middle-income’ and found that, of those, only 
thirteen reached ‘high income’ almost five decades later, by 2008.
Table 19.1 (panel A) shows, for 1970 and 2010, the average income of several East 
Asian countries as a percentage of US average income, plus Indonesia, India, and 
Brazil. Taiwan and Korea, together with China, stand out for the magnitude of their 
catch-up. Most of the rest of the world looks more like Indonesia, India, and Brazil.
Taiwan held the world record for the number of years of continuous 6 per cent 
or more growth until 2010, at 32 years (1962 to 1994). Korea came second, at 
29 years (1962 to 1991). China broke Taiwan’s record in 2010; by then it had grown 
continuously at more than 6 per cent for 33 years, if its growth statistics can be 
trusted (Pritchett and Summers 2014).
Investment rates underpinning these growth performances are shown in 
Table 19.1 (panel B). By way of comparison, the UK figure for 1990 was 19 per cent 
and the US figure was 17 per cent.
We have to keep in mind that most of the non-Western countries that ‘made it’ 
into developed country status have small populations (future China aside). 
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The rarity of income and production catch-up on the scale of Northeast Asia, and 
the relatively small ‘demographic mass’ involved, suggests that the world economy 
contains a segmentation analogous to a ‘glass ceiling’ or ‘middle-income trap’. The 
idea is at odds with mainstream or neoclassical development theory, which pre-
sumes the world economy is an open-ended system with no overall structure of a 
core–periphery kind, analogous to a marathon race in which the position of each 
runner is a function of internal fitness.
The next section discusses the causes proposed by analysts writing in the main-
stream tradition, often called neo-liberalism. Their interpretation—emphasizing 
market liberalization in Northeast Asia—has been the most influential in the more 
general debate about economic development, including in the World Bank. I sug-
gest that its influence stems less from the power of confirming evidence than 
the power of sheer simplicity (Occam’s Razor) plus fit with a pro-Western-capital 
ideological story.
3. Northeast Asia’s Rise in the Neo-liberal Paradigm
By the 1980s, when Northeast Asia’s rise began to attract sustained attention from 
Western policy analysts, most economists and the Western-controlled multilat-
eral development organizations (including the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
OECD and its Development Centre) viewed their subject through the lens of 
neo-liberalism—the newly resurgent economic faith in the West, including in 
development economics.
Table 19.1 Comparison of income and investment in Asian countries
Panel A: Country average income as % of US real average income, 1970 and 2010
 Japan Taiwan S. Korea Malaysia Indonesia China India Brazil
1970 50 20 10 15 5 5 5 15
2010 70 80 70 45 20 25 10 30
Panel B: Gross capital formation/GDP, selected entities, %
1970 1990 2012 1980–2014
China 33 36 47 40
East Asia & Pacific minus China 23 32 30 28
LICs & MICs minus East Asia 22 22 25 23
Note: Panel A: Penn World tables 9.0, based on 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) numbers, 
rounded to nearest ventile. Panel B: LICs = low-income countries, MICs = middle-income countries.
Source: Panel A: Author’s update from Cherif and Hasanov (2015). Panel B: World Development 
Indicators, 22 December 2015.
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Neo-liberal philosophy says that ‘the market’ is the best institution for both 
economic growth and liberty. Even where unambiguous ‘market failures’ are 
identified, they are generally best left untreated, because the societal costs of 
correcting them through ‘state intervention’ are likely to be higher than the 
societal gains. The optimum degree of openness to the international economy is 
close to maximum openness, because global integration raises competitive pres-
sure on all domestic producers and thereby makes national economies more flex-
ible and channels resources to their most efficient uses. The idea that governments 
should curb competition in the interests of helping some firms and industries 
reap  economies of scale, and curb global integration in the interests of national 
social cohesion and national employment, has little value in this way of seeing 
(Wade 1992a, 2017a, 2017b).
The World Bank’s (1993) book, The East Asian Miracle, is a relatively sophisti-
cated case in point. It examined the causes of success in eight ‘high-performing 
Asian economies’: Japan, the three first-generation newly industrialized  economies 
of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and three second-generation Southeast 
Asian economies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, plus Hong Kong. The 
book argues that the states made important contributions to the fast growth of 
these countries by ensuring ‘the fundamentals’: low inflation and competitive 
exchange rates; human capital; effective and secure financial systems; low price 
distortions; easy access to foreign technology; and low bias against agriculture.
In other words, the states implemented effective ‘horizontal’ policies, applied 
across all sectors. But ‘strategic’ interventions—sector-specific policies to promote 
specific industries or even specific firms—‘generally did not work’ (World Bank 
1993: 354; Wade 1996). The take-away message: ‘openness to international trade, 
based on largely neutral incentives, was the critical factor in East Asia’s rapid 
growth’ (World Bank 1993: 292, emphasis added).
This argument makes Northeast Asia powerfully confirm the neo-liberal answer 
to Adam Smith’s question: how does market capitalism generate human welfare? 
The answer is market liberalization—and in a global context, global integration, or 
moving towards ‘the world as one economic country’, having no more restrictions 
on economic flows or ownership claims across borders than US states have across 
theirs. It is an argument not just for free trade but also for free capital movement; 
conversely, it downplays the value of both national sovereignty and democracy. In 
short, the World Bank concluded that, contrary to William Easterly in epigraph 
one, East Asia’s rise was no mystery. The main causes are identified in epigraph 
two, the pro-Western-capital argument from the World Economic Forum.
4. The Rise of the Developmental State
We can give a more interesting answer by asking: what conditions enabled Myrdalian 
cumulative causation between rising state capacity, rising internal peacefulness, 
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and rising incomes. Put the other way, what conditions enabled Japan, Taiwan, 
and Korea to avoid the common fate of the periphery—the ‘weak state’, with 
a  well-entrenched ruling group fighting internal enemies, supplying narrowly 
focused public goods to favour its own supporters, and loosely  enforcing the 
rule of law? What conditions enabled them to begin with the ‘special-interest 
state’ (a well-entrenched ruling group able to maintain internal stability, tending 
to favour its own supporters in order to fortify its grip on power but also focusing 
over time on long-term national goals), and then transition towards the ‘common-
interest state’ providing broadly based public goods, thereby helping to raise 
incomes and reduce discontent (Besley and Persson 2011).
We need to keep in mind the point made by Francis Fukuyama: ‘Holding on to 
a certain structure of political power is often a life-and-death issue for leaders of 
poor countries’ (Fukuyama 2004: 49). This holding on to power often results in 
low state capacity and low commitment to national development goals, even to the 
point of the rulers creating antagonistic relations between government ministries 
in case rival groups benefit from the new economic opportunities created by a 
national development project and use their new wealth to try to replace the 
incumbents, perhaps by investing in violence (Kohli 2004).
It turns out that the answer to how Northeast Asia sustained the cumulative 
causation between rising state capacity, rising incomes, and rising internal peace-
fulness is closely related to the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and the US, and the 
resulting structure of the regional economy. The rise of Northeast Asia is far from 
a story of a small group of marathon runners forging ahead in an open race.
4.1 The ‘Luck’ of Location, Endowments, and Timing
The historian Bruce Cumings reminds us: ‘If there has been an economic miracle 
in East Asia, it has not occurred just since 1960; it would be profoundly  ahistorical 
to think that it did’ (Cumings 1984: 3). In a longer treatment we would begin with 
causes of East Asia’s economic pre-eminence up to the seventeenth century. Cutting 
short this longue duree, I begin in the late nineteenth century and the three ‘orders’ 
in East Asia at that time (Woo 2016). The first was the world of state-capitalist 
Northeast Asia, created by Japan with its late nineteenth century colonization of 
Korea and Taiwan, followed in the 1930s and first half of the 1940s by colonization 
of Manchuria and down the east coast of China. The Japanese colonial government 
treated Korea and Taiwan as offshore farms, mines, and industries, closely inte-
grated to the core. It replicated similar economic and  political institutions and 
policies as earlier in Japan—nationalistic, insular, militaristic, state-permeated, 
focused on raising productivity in agriculture, mining, and early manufactur-
ing, and committed to providing mass elementary school education. By 1940, 
somewhere between 50 to 70 per cent of Korean and Taiwan children were in 
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elementary school. All three countries were more homogeneous in terms of 
 ethnicity and religion than most other countries.
The second world order, created by Western colonialists, comprised Hong 
Kong and Southeast Asia. The colonialists transformed the economy (entrepôt 
Hong Kong apart) into commodity production for Western markets, mainly in 
the form of plantations, empowering big landlords. But outside the extractive sec-
tors, colonial governance was more passive, more accepting of incumbent landed 
elites than in Japan’s empire. By 1940 only about 2 per cent of children were in 
elementary school in the French colony of Vietnam. Also, the host societies were 
ethnically and religiously much more diverse than in Northeast Asia. The third 
world order was China, which later, in the post-Second World War decades, came 
to be seen as an enemy of the new US-shaped order in capitalist Northeast Asia.
Our interest is the Japanese–centred world of Northeast Asia, starting with 
Japan’s forced opening in the mid-nineteenth century. For some 250 years before 
the mid-nineteenth century Japanese rulers isolated the country. In 1853, 
Commodore Perry of the US navy sailed into Edo (now Tokyo) harbour with a 
fleet of warships and demanded that Japan open up to American commerce. His 
visit sent shockwaves through the country’s leaders, who feared that America 
might colonize Japan as it strove for dominance across the Pacific. News had 
already reached Japan of European states gobbling up chunks of China through 
what later came to be known as the Unequal Treaties, from 1839 to 1849, by 
which European states imposed European laws on foreigners in China and set 
tariffs on goods imported through the treaty ports. Would Japan be next? The 
Japanese government responded with wholesale reforms to create a centralized 
state and national identity as the basis for a strong military. The guiding spirit was 
expressed by a Japanese leader in the wake of Perry’s visit: ‘If we take the initia-
tive, we can dominate; if we do not, we will be dominated.’
The Meiji restoration of 1868 launched a frenzy of industrialization and 
 militarization lasting several decades, guided by the developmental mindset that 
emerged from the brutal collective choice of ‘sink or swim’. The government 
undertook a Big Push in state capacity, including fiscal, legal, and public goods. It 
sent teams of officials around the Western world to investigate ways to organize a 
modern society, such as a tax system, a post office, a railroad, an army, a state 
constitution, a parliament, a judiciary, and the like, and then implemented the 
best models at home.
Japan militarized so fast and effectively that in 1894–1895 its navy defeated 
China’s and a decade later defeated Russia’s. The latter sent a shockwave through 
Western governments, as the first time in the modern era that an Asian state had 
defeated a European state (as Russia was then considered). Japan went on to 
become the first non-Western country to catch up with the West in broad meas-
ures of production structure, military strength, and mass living conditions. At the 
same time a powerful group of chauvinist ideologues began to advocate for a new 
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pan-Asian order led by Japan, to fend off Western empires. This group paved the 
way for Japan to take Korea and Taiwan as colonies in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and later, large swathes of China.1
Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Korea reverted to the unified 
kingdom it had been for a thousand years before it became a Japanese colony—
now with a president rather than a king or emperor. Taiwan reverted to a neglected 
province of the Chinese polity, as before it became a Japanese colony in 1895.
After the war, Japan continued to be ruled by the developmental mindset 
institutionalized during the Meiji restoration and fortified in the 1930s in the 
build-up to war. A similar mindset began to be institutionalized in national elites 
of independent Korea and Taiwan, building on the developmental legacy of 
Japanese colonialism. Having emerged in Japan in response to the external threat 
of the US, it re-emerged in Japan and was created anew in Korea and Taiwan in 
response to another external threat, from close-by communist states of China, 
North Korea, and Russia. More broadly, the developmental mindset emerged from 
the combination of:
 • a lack of natural resources, above all, land and energy, which allowed the 
countries to escape ‘the natural resource curse’ (overvalued exchange rate 
hindering manufactured exports, and government based on control of  natural 
resource enclaves, ignoring the rest of the population), and on the other hand, 
abundance of people, with a high ratio of working age people to young-and-old 
dependents, and a long history of mass literacy and elementary education, 
which made them outliers for countries at their income levels;2
 • huge post-war challenges to reconstruct (as distinct from create de novo) 
physical and organizational infrastructure;
1 Following its victory in the Sino–Japan war of 1894–1895, Japan formally annexed Taiwan into 
the Japanese Empire in 1895, as the first (formal) step in implementing the Southern Expansion 
Doctrine. The annexation lasted until Japan’s Second World War defeat in 1945. Japan began creeping 
colonial rule in Korea in the 1870s and made Korea a ‘Protectorate’ in 1905 and a full-fledged colony 
in 1910. Japanese rule broke the pre-colonial Yangban’s (landed elite’s) hold on the state. Senior posi-
tions in the state were filled with Japanese bureaucrats, who applied economic development lessons 
from the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912) to Korea. They encouraged Korea-based Japanese business 
groups, similar to the zaibatsu at home, with state-financed credit, cheap electricity, and other bene-
fits. It is widely believed in Korea that Japanese colonialism heavily damaged the economy’s growth 
potential. We should qualify this belief with the fact that factories left behind at the end of the war 
fairly quickly regained pre-war levels of production, thanks to the know-how in the heads of Koreans 
who had worked as middle managers in Japanese-owned companies. Also, the pre-war experience of 
Japanese zaibatsu made it easier for President Park Chung Hee and his government to nurture Korean 
equivalents, the chaebol, in a similar relationship to the state. Other favourable long-term causes 
include ethnic homogeneity, cultural propensity to take organizational goals as one’s own personal 
goals up and down the hierarchy, and more. On organizational incentives in Korean and Indian 
bureaucracy, see Wade (1982a, 1982b, 1985, 1992b).
2 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris compiled 1961 data for seventy-four developing countries. 
Taiwan was 44th in per capita income, 12th by ‘socio-political’ development, and 4th by ‘development 
potential’ (Wade 1990b/2004: 109). The median age in Japan in 1970 was 28.8 years; Hong Kong 21.7; 
Singapore 19.7; South Korea 19.0. The UK median age was 34.2 years, same as Germany’s.
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 • the imperative of building up industry to escape low value-added activities 
and grow the exports needed to pay for industrialization and military 
imports; and
 • a perception of immanent and existential threat from nearby communist 
countries, which necessitated a strong military, US protection, and high-
speed industrialization, while at the same time allowing mass consumption 
and living conditions to improve by enough to limit domestic unrest—which 
enemy neighbours could exploit.
Early post-war Taiwan, with a population of six million, received a turbulent 
influx of between one and two million in 1949 as the Nationalist (Kuomintang) 
army and government lost the long-running civil war with the Red Army and 
Chinese Communist Party, and its leaders, officials, military, and sympathizers 
fled to Taiwan, 150 kilometres from the mainland. The incomers, under Chiang 
Kai-shek, claimed to still constitute the rightful ruling regime of China; so they 
planned merely to regroup in Taiwan for later resumption of the civil war on the 
mainland. The native Taiwanese, most of whose ancestors had come from the 
mainland two and more centuries before and had experienced fifty years of total 
separation from the mainland under Japanese rule, saw the incomers as foreign, 
and vice versa. With little need for support from the local elite, the Nationalists 
implemented a disciplined one-party state on Taiwan, applying lessons from their 
disintegration on the mainland, and discriminating economically and politically 
in favour of themselves. They constantly invoked the threat of communist invasion 
or subversion to justify authoritarian rule. The threat was real. For example, the 
Red Army bombarded Nationalist-held small islands close to the mainland in 
1954 and 1958. In short, Taiwan at this time was a ‘special-interest’ state, but 
the well-entrenched (and semi-foreign) ruling group was disciplined to provide 
broader (rather than narrower) public goods both by the external threat and by 
the US government.
The Korean War of 1950 to 1953 pitted communist North Korea backed by 
China and the Soviet Union against South Korea backed by the US and a coalition 
of allies. The numbers ‘killed and missing’ were: South Koreans—210,000 from 
the military and one million civilians; North Koreans—406,000 from the military 
and 600,000 civilians; Chinese—600,000 from the military; and American theatre 
deaths—37,000. The war ended with an armistice but no peace treaty, the peninsula 
divided into North and South. The two sides are technically still ‘at war’. From the 
end of the war till today the North Korean regime has undertaken sustained provo-
cation and terror in the South. At the time of my fieldwork in South Korea in 1979, 
every metre of beach on the country’s long coastline was raked at sunset and 
inspected at dawn in the hunt for footprints of North Korean sea-coming saboteurs.
As in Taiwan, South Korea’s rulers—following the military coup led by Park 
Chung-hee in 1961—implemented a tightly disciplined military dictatorship, 
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using the external threat as its justification. Park had been educated in a Japanese 
military academy and served in the Japanese army in Manchuria, when he 
studied the history of the Meiji Restoration and the role of the state in Japan’s 
industrialization. He was chief architect and driving force of Korea’s developmen-
tal state from 1961 until his assassination in 1979—his core belief was ‘we can do 
anything if we try’, as though all problems could be overcome by sheer willpower. 
Soon after taking power, he arrested leading businessmen and threatened them 
with jail (for ‘corruption’) unless they left for the US and returned with export 
orders; he expropriated houses of senior military (clustered in one part of Seoul), 
on grounds that their salaries could not possibly have afforded such houses, and 
handed the area to the diplomatic colony; and he closed down the golf course in 
the heart of Seoul, built as a facility for American troops and the Korean elite. 
Both governments sustained intense surveillance over their populations. In Seoul, 
some rubbish collectors and street sweepers were equipped with unobtrusive 
communications devices, which marked them out—it was said—as surveillance 
agents as they went about their work, especially in the poorer districts.
Korea and Taiwan transitioned to a democratic regime as late as the second 
half of the 1980s, well after they had passed through the demographic transition. 
Even Japan was almost a one-party state; the Liberal-Democratic party was the 
majority party in nearly every government from 1955 to the present. The  dominant 
political philosophies of these countries emphasized ‘order’ and ‘nationalism’ 
more than ‘liberty’ and ‘free enterprise’, in contrast to neo-liberal philosophy, 
despite Western media presenting them as lovers of liberty and free enterprise 
and the American way of life, the better to justify aid against communists.
4.2 The US Role in Northeast and Southeast Asia
Before the Second World War the US had little presence in Northeast Asia. It 
entered in force as part of its hegemony strategy. In East Asia and in Western 
Europe it saw severe and persisting communist state enemies. So ‘containment of 
communism’ became the top US foreign policy priority in both East Asia and 
Western Europe (Lee 2017). After several decades of close ties to Chiang and the 
Nationalists, including the Second World War alliance, the US after 1949 plunged 
into Cold War with communist China and then into hot war in Korea. The US saw 
communist China and North Korea—with communist Russia close by—as a severe 
threat to its emerging ‘Pacific sphere of influence’. But despite powerful voices in 
Washington wanting the US to help Chiang re-start the civil war on the mainland, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson prevailed in his call for ‘strategic restraint’ and a 
less aggressive policy of building ‘a great crescent’ of containment around China.
The US poured in assistance to its three Northeast Asian allies—troops, economic 
advisors, political advisors, teachers, Christian missionaries, accompanied by 
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large financial transfers. Drawing on New Dealers’ experience of trying to foster 
pro-development governments in Latin America before the war, US advisors 
helped construct centralized, top-level agencies to plan the use of very scarce 
capital and helped construct an effective civil service, police, judiciary, and educa-
tion system. During the American Occupation of Japan (1945–1952) the Japanese 
government instituted ‘the most restrictive foreign-trade and foreign exchange 
control system ever devised by a major free nation’, with American blessing 
(Hollerman  1979). The country’s renaissance was much helped by the Korean 
War, 1950–1953, because it made Japan the main source of American procure-
ments. The prime minister at the time, Shiguru Yoshida, later declared, the war 
was a ‘gift of the gods’.
The US government gave strong backing for expropriative land redistribution 
in all three countries. The land reforms helped establish political order and sup-
port for industrialization by curbing the landed classes and strengthening peasant 
support for the state—making the rural population a less fertile site for communist 
subversion. They created a small farmer agrarian structure receptive to intense state 
efforts to raise agricultural productivity as a condition for fast  industrialization 
(Dore 1965; Wade 1982a). The US government made clear that assistance would 
not be sustained indefinitely. It gave assistance in the spirit of raising the capacity 
of the state to finance and man its own bureaucracy and military, so that US 
resources and personnel could be scaled back without danger to Cold War 
containment. The periods of intense US involvement in helping to create the 
developmental state and ward off military attack were: Japan 1948–1964; Taiwan 
1950–1965; and South Korea 1945–1965.
Note that the ending of intense US involvement came as the US and allies 
geared up military efforts on behalf of South Vietnam, fearing that ‘communism’ 
might triumph in Indochina after semi-failing in Korea. Korea sent 320,000 troops 
to fight alongside South Vietnamese and American troops and received in return 
tens of billions of dollars in grants, loans, tech transfer, and preferential markets 
from the Johnson and Nixon governments.
In short, thanks to the threat of communist state expansion in a region the US 
sought to make its sphere of influence (having been attacked from the Western 
Pacific at Pearl Harbour), the US transferred huge resources to the East Asian 
three. It raised their foreign exchange reserves (allowing them to run sustained 
current account deficits), boosted their investment ratios to unusually high levels, 
and helped to discipline the use of investable funds by strengthening the commitment 
of national elites to transform the production structure towards manufacturing 
and away from agriculture and commodities, and create appropriate planning and 
implementation organizations. Also, it gave the aid and loans in a form that did 
not dilute national ownership of the industrial sector, in contrast to Latin America’s 
reliance on US firms to establish subsidiaries. And it gave Northeast Asian coun-
tries privileged access to its giant high-income market for manufactured goods.
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In the case of Taiwan, the US financial transfers averaged about US$600 
 million a year from 1951 to 1965 (2016 dollars), the biggest US aid transfers per 
capita in the world through that period. The US civilian and military aid officials 
were particularly attentive to ensuring the appropriate use of the resources they 
transferred to the Nationalist government, well aware of the history of wanton 
 corruption during the Nationalist Party’s decades of misrule on the Chinese 
 mainland before retreating to Taiwan in 1949. US resources went directly to firms 
in the fertilizer, shipping, cement, aluminium, paper, glass, sugar, chemical, 
 synthetic fibre, and pharmaceutical industries. US officials helped draw up regu-
lations for property rights, investment, export-processing zones, and the like. 
They consistently opposed the many senior people in the Nationalist government 
committed to establishing new enterprises as public rather than private enterprises. 
They put their weight behind those wanting strong state leadership of a largely 
private sector economy.
In 1959, the director of the US aid mission to Taiwan proposed an eight-point 
economic reform programme, which included unification of the exchange rate, 
liberalization of controls on foreign exchange, and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. Based on this proposal, the government launched its Nineteen-Point 
Program of Reform in early 1960, which amounted to a cautious, controlled 
sequence of promoting exports, opening the economy, replacing some imports in 
line with an industrial strategy, privatizing a few state-owned enterprises (leaving 
the commanding heights—the upstream input supplying firms—in public own-
ership, contrary to American wishes), plus creating or strengthening several 
agencies to pilot the programme. The US offered a large loan conditional on ful-
filling certain goals of the programme.
Lee (2017) sums up: ‘By the end of the official aid program in 1965, Taiwan had 
acquired a developmental state, in which the instruments of state guidance 
remained but the basis of development was private industry’. The US sponsored 
similar reforms in Japan and South Korea.
Compare US strategy in its former colony, the Philippines, where the US saw 
no existential threat.3 In response to a communist-led insurgency in parts of the 
countryside, the government and the US relied on a counter-insurgency strategy—
and did not try land reform, which would have upset the existing landlord–
government complex. The US did not provide anything close to its Northeast 
Asia level of assistance for the Philippines’ own attempt at indigenous 
 industrialization, or encourage effective state planning. It remained relaxed as aid 
resources fed into existing landlord-dominated patronage networks, as it was not 
relaxed further north.
3 The Philippines was under Spanish rule for centuries before the US took it as a colony in 1898. US 
rule lasted till 1941. The US colonial administration was much less dense than the Japanese adminis-
tration in Korea and Taiwan, and ruled through landed elites.
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The US supported the Filipino government’s emphasis on intensification of 
agricultural goods and raw materials, not industrial goods (Lee 2017; Rock 2017). 
Why? The US saw the Philippines as a periphery of the regional economy focused 
on threatened Northeast Asia. The top American priority was to industrialize 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, so as to give them the ability to stand up to their 
enemies and provide frontline defence of the US. Filipino commodities exported to 
these countries would provide cheap inputs for people and industry, and help their 
industrialization while also removing their temptation to import  commodities 
from nearby communists. So the Philippines ‘suffered’ from not having a com-
munist enemy able to threaten the survival of its pro-American state. Neither its 
own elite nor the US government pushed for a ‘production transformation’ coalition. 
The Philippines remains a periphery in the wider East Asian economy to this day.
Three broader points about the geopolitics and timing should be made. First, 
in the US and Japanese vision, Japan was to be tied to the US by economic,  political, 
and ideological means, and was itself to be the restored core of the Northeast 
Asian regional economy. Taiwan and South Korea were to be lower-cost semi-
peripheries (though this terminology was not used). All three were to receive easy 
access to the US market, and favoured for public procurement, on account of 
their security importance to the US. Encouraged by their governments’ commit-
ment to the vitality of these economies, US and Japanese firms took their first 
steps of importing cheap-labour manufactures from domestic producers or from 
their own operations there (not from next-door Mexico, in the case of US firms).
Second, timing mattered. The Big Push development efforts in Northeast Asia 
coincided with the US leading a big multilateral trade and investment liberaliza-
tion project through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
placed more pressure on developed countries to open their markets than on devel-
oping countries to open theirs. Northeast Asian firms, and branches of Western 
multinational corporations, were the ‘first movers’ to take advantage of the new 
export opportunities, using Western demand to compensate for relatively low 
domestic demand out of low incomes and small populations. In particular, they 
rode the wave of post-war mass consumption of oil-automobile-mass production 
products of the fourth great technological revolution, and then, from the 1970s, 
the wave of emerging demand for the information and telecommunication prod-
ucts of the fifth revolution. With their head start, they were well established and 
moving up value chains and down cost curves by the time producers in other 
developing countries came into the game.
The regional economy developed a pattern of integration famously known as 
the ‘flying geese’ model. As Japan grew fast by the late 1950s some firms began to 
offshore to Taiwan or Korea (or switched supply to local producers, often in joint 
ventures); as costs rose in Taiwan and Korea, the process repeated to cheaper sites in 
Southeast Asia and Indochina—and over the 1990s, China. But an often-overlooked 
qualification to the flying geese model is that whole industries generally did not 
move; the high value-added parts remained at home and the lower value-added 
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activities were offshored. Rather, Northeast Asia saw an early development of 
what would later be called ‘global value chains’ and should more accurately be 
called ‘regional value chains’. But contrary to today’s orthodoxy about GVCs, which 
suggests that integration into GVC is a better alternative to building a domestic 
integrated supplier base, these governments promoted both at the same time.
Here is an example of the flying geese mechanism. In the 1970s, Japanese 
electronics firms like Cassio, Canon, and Sharp began to offshore the assembly of 
low-end calculators to Taiwan firms in the role of ‘original equipment manufac-
turers’. The production equipment and key components (such as liquid crystal 
displays) came from Japan, and the calculators were branded as Japanese. One of 
the main Taiwanese companies was Jinbao Electronics. In 1990, after extensive 
consultation with Sharp, Jinbao decided to open its own factory in Thailand and 
sell calculators (and related items) mainly to Sharp. The key components and 
production equipment in Thailand came from Japan; the procurement and 
administration came from Taipei; the management in Thailand was Taiwanese; 
and Thailand provided the lower skilled labour force and the land. All the pro-
duction was exported. The production appeared in international trade statistics as 
Thai; the investment in Thailand appeared in international investment statistics 
as Taiwanese; Japanese firms got most of the profit; and the customers thought 
the product was Japanese (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995).
The third contextual point is that high levels of US support enabled the East 
Asian three to run sustained external payments deficits during their stage of fast 
industrialization and urbanization—financed by US assistance. Even as they used 
substantial and strategic levels of protection to foster import replacement, they 
sucked in huge volumes of imports in selected sectors. In contrast, most develop-
ing countries, lacking large-scale external assistance, could not sustain the exter-
nal payments deficits that would have been necessary for fast industrialization 
and urbanization—unless financed by loans from the multilateral development 
banks, which have carried mostly neo-liberal conditionalities since the 1980s, 
unlike US conditions in its assistance to the East Asian three.
I now turn to the role of the state and the arrangement of power in Northeast 
Asia, comparing it to the model of the neo-liberal regulatory state.
5. Characteristics of the Northeast Asian Developmental State
‘Developmental state’ was coined by Chalmers Johnson (1982) in his study of 
Japan’s rise, MITI and the Japanese Miracle.4 He used the phrase to refer to a 
‘plan-rational state’, in contrast to a ‘market-rational state’, two broad types of 
capitalism. The market-rational state concentrates on ‘horizontal’ policies to 
improve  productivity across the economy, including market regulation, transport 
4 For succinct accounts of the history of the idea see Woo-Cumings (1999) and Haggard (2018).
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infrastructure, education, as typified by the US (he said, wrongly (Wade 2017b)). 
The plan-rational state carries out these same horizontal policies but also uses 
more ‘vertical’ (sectorally selective) policies to steer the production structure 
towards state-set goals (mostly by influencing market allocations, in contrast to 
 communist states which relied on plan-allocation more than market-allocation). 
Johnson took Japan as his case study of the developmental state in action, focusing 
briefly on the decades after the country’s forced opening in the mid-nineteenth 
century and then at length on the post-war fast-growth decades.5
Since Johnson’s book on Japan, a sizeable literature has applied the idea of the 
developmental state to other cases as a way to understand relative long-run eco-
nomic performance. This literature emphasizes: (1) the ‘developmental mindset’ 
of key state actors—the normative and cognitive models with which they conceive 
and implement the idea of a state-led national development project, in contrast to 
the basic idea of neo-liberal economics that states are inherently inefficient and 
predatory as compared to markets; (2) the remaking of power relations so as to 
secure the dominance of state actors with a developmental mindset; and (3) insti-
tutions, strategies, and policies supporting the developmental mindset (Haggard 
1990; Wade 1990; Ravenhill 1993; Weiss 1998; Amsden 2001; Thurbon 2016; 
Haggard 2018; Khan 2018; Wade 2018).
5.1 The Developmental Mindset
The developmental mindset (a super-social-norm of appropriate actions), as it 
emerged in the threatening environment of Northeast Asia, included elite agree-
ment on the following:
 • high and sustained economic growth rates so as to catch up with developed 
countries ‘quickly’ (within a few decades);
 • high rates of investment to gross domestic product (GDP) so as to achieve 
rapid movement of the production structure into more productive sectors;
 • the state to co-ordinate the catch-up strategy and promote some sectors and 
functions ahead of others, whether through public enterprises or through 
steering private actors into sectors they would otherwise not enter;
 • the state to curb the growth of consumption by the urban labour force and 
farmers, so as to free up more resources for investment;
5 Myrdal’s idea of the ‘hard state’, in contrast to the ‘soft state’, is an obvious precursor. Myrdal 
defined ‘soft state’ to mean the societal ‘indiscipline’ prevalent in South Asia and by extension much of 
the developing world, as compared to the states which had emerged in Western Europe. ‘Indiscipline’ 
referred to, in his words, ‘deficiencies in legislation, . . . law observance and enforcement, widespread 
disobedience by public officials and, often, their collusion with powerful persons and groups . . . whose 
conduct they should regulate’ (Myrdal 1970: 208).
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 • the state to promote exports intensively, so that the high investment could 
be profitable despite restrained growth of consumption at home, but at the 
same time, state industrial policy must target feasible replacement of imports 
and concentrate foreign exchange on imports of capital goods, intermediate 
goods, and raw materials (not consumer goods) by means of a managed 
trade policy, not free trade and not ‘neutral incentives’ between export 
promotion and import substitution;
 • the state to invest heavily in education (people being the primary endow-
ment, not natural resources), especially engineering, including sending 
students to the West for university education and putting them under obli-
gation to return; and
 • the state to boost the take-up of Western technology, including by establishing 
public research and development (R&D) centres able to ‘domesticate’ tech-
nologies purchased or imitated from abroad or brought in by branches of 
Japanese or Western companies, and by industrial extension services to push 
‘learning in production’, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises.
Underpinning this elite consensus was recognition that investment resources 
were very scarce and had to be carefully husbanded. The elite had no commitment 
to the idea that ‘free markets’ or unstrategic integration into the world economy 
would produce a catch-up production structure over time, nor did American 
advisors push this agenda, in contrast to their later counterparts in other parts of 
the world and the World Bank.
The content of the production structure to be aimed at was influenced by 
 popular metaphors of economic development, like descending a river or flying in 
a V-shaped formation of geese. Officials in South Korea and Taiwan saw their 
economies descending the same stretch of river, or flying in the same V-formation, 
as Japan some ten to twenty years before. They could look to Japan’s past pro-
duction structure for a tangible guide to what they should be investing in 
(qualified, of course, by knowledge of current developments in technology and 
markets, especially in Japan and the USA). The neo-liberal model deliberately has 
no such compass.
Northeast Asian officials recognized, more implicitly than explicitly, that a unit 
of GDP from some sectors gives a larger boost to longer-run growth than a unit from 
other sectors. Sectors which are more closely linked to others with higher value-
added potential (in manufacturing) have a higher impact on growth than less 
connected ones. They recognized, second, that in the early stages in most sectors, 
few domestic firms have the ability to compete internationally without subsidies 
or protection, or if they do, it is as subordinate producers in low value-added 
portions of global or regional value chains, exposed to pressure from the lead 
firms (mostly Western or Japanese) ‘to run faster to stay in the same place’. In sec-
tors with high potential to boost longer-run growth, they saw that the question 
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was not whether to give state support in order to help reap economies of scale 
and  provide ‘externalities’ to other firms and sectors (beneficial but unpaid for 
 spillovers), but how.
Officials recognized, third, that import replacement in sectors vital to industrial 
transformation required high levels of imports of raw materials, capital equipment, 
and technology; and therefore fast growth of export earnings. Business people 
learnt that export performance was one of the main criteria by which government 
responded to them across the board. If their export  performance was good, 
government would help when they faced unexpected injury in whatever context. 
In all three countries, the government created an export ‘culture’, in the sense 
that exporting became a ‘focal point’ for decisions in wider government–business 
relations.
5.2 State Capacity and Bureaucracy–Business Institutions
Neo-liberal economics has a ‘good governance’ model, which emphasizes checks 
and balances between the various government ministries concerned with economic 
policy; so at central government level, authority should be horizontally decentral-
ized, without a strong co-ordinating centre. And it emphasizes arms-length 
relations between government agencies and business, to avoid the ever-present 
danger of business capturing government, given the propensity for government 
officials to behave ‘opportunistically’.
The developmental state model emphasizes the likely need to remake power 
relations so as to make them support the developmental mindset and the institu-
tions and interventions through which the state tries to accelerate production 
transformation. In Northeast Asia the land reforms were crucial in removing a 
potential blockage to industrial development in the form of a landlord–state alliance 
(as in the Philippines). Also, all three governments in the post-war decades were 
able to wield a big stick over business. Taiwan and Korea were a mix of one-party 
states and military dictatorships until the late 1980s.
In the developmental state model the state gains high ‘capacity’ in economic 
governance not only from its fiscal and legal capacity but also from its institutional 
arrangements of ‘embedded autonomy’, to use Peter Evans’ apparently oxymoronic 
phrase (Evans 1995). The state and its officials have a close working relationship 
with capitalists, plus the capacity to discipline capitalists and capital. They have 
the autonomy needed to formulate and implement a strategic vision for the 
economy’s future growth and to discipline the owners and managers of capital in 
line with that vision (not be captured by specific groups of capitalists to work in 
their own interest at cost to the larger project). They also maintain close enough 
relationships with these owners and managers of capital to get information feed-
back and corporate buy-in to the national project. In Taiwan, when there were 
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more than five firms in an industry the government required them to form an 
industry association (hence, a Taiwan Feather Exporters’ Association). The firms 
elected the officials—but the government or Kuomintang (KMT) party appointed 
the secretary.
The ‘embedded’ part of embedded autonomy did not include much input from 
labour unions, especially in South Korea and Taiwan before the late 1980s. Labour 
repression, political marginalization of the working class, was part of the model, 
to keep down labour costs, prevent consumption demand from eating into the 
cycle of investment–profits–reinvestment, and keep the state–business vision of 
future transformation on track (Kohli 2004). Also, non-governmental organizations 
were tightly constrained.
Comparing public infrastructure bureaucracies in Korea and India, my research 
found that the Korean agency gave multiple incentives, individual and collective, 
for staff to act in line with the agency’s objectives, while the Indian counterpart 
had virtually none—its incentives inclined the operational staff to threaten poor 
service so that clients would pay them under the table to receive normal service 
(Wade 1982b, 1985). The bureaucracies of Taiwan and Korea were certainly not 
‘squeaky clean’; corruption was well institutionalized in certain parts of the state, 
with the exception of the pilot agencies, the central bank, and a few others. But 
corruption functioned more as a tax or profit-sharing mechanism than as a price. 
Bidders on civil works contracts knew the conventions about how much had to be 
kicked back to officials, who, since the kick-back was much the same between 
different bids, were more inclined to allocate according to ‘merit’. In India, by 
contrast, bidders would offer different amounts of kick-back, and officials allo-
cated more in line with who offered the most.
5.3 The Policy Level
Chalmers Johnson summarized the array of instruments for influencing industry 
in Japan’s post-war decades through the 1960s:
control over all foreign exchange and imports of technology, which gave them 
[MITI officials, and US aid officials] the power to choose industries for develop-
ment; the ability to dispense preferential financing, tax breaks, and protection 
from foreign competition, which gave them the power to lower the costs of 
the chosen industries; and the authority to order the creation of cartels and 
bank-based industrial conglomerates . . . which gave them the power to supervise 
competition. (Johnson 1982: 199)
Johnson argues that bureaucratic dirigisme or administrative guidance played a 
central role in industrial structure policies into the 1970s and was even significant 
in Japan’s move into more-technology-intensive industries later on.
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The underlying rationale (which mainstream economics has long neglected) 
was to reduce the uncertainty facing investors at home—using trade protection to 
restrict competition from foreign producers; concessional finance for selected 
sectors; national procurement in favour of domestic firms; restricting competi-
tion among domestic firms, such as by government licensing of entry to particu-
lar industries; and also by taking the lead in the domestication of new technologies 
developed elsewhere.
Japan’s methods for shaping the industrial structure provided models for 
the governments of Taiwan and South Korea. They deployed a wide range of 
instruments, including directed credit, fiscal investment incentives (such as 
tax rebates on production of products currently on the country’s technology 
frontier), trade protection (combined with a tariff-rebate system so that 
 producers could get tariff-free import of inputs which went into their exports 
while they paid the tariffs on what they sold on the domestic market), and 
hard bargaining with  multinationals intending to make foreign direct invest-
ments within the national territory (such as local content requirements on a 
proposed ethylene plant or chip plant) (Wade 1990b/2004, 1991). Richard 
Luedde-Neurath (1988) documents the elaborate, and often covert, trade and 
investment controls used by the Korean government at the same time as it 
boasted to the world of its waves of market liberalization (see also Wade 1993, 
for Korea and Taiwan).
In contrast to many other governments which used broadly similar instru-
ments from time to time, the developmental states in Northeast Asia normally 
imposed performance conditions of one kind or another to accompany state 
 assistance (Wade 1990b/2004; Amsden  2001). The conditions might relate to 
closing the price and quality gap between imports and domestic substitutes 
within a fixed time, or to pushing out the technological frontiers of domestic pro-
duction (for example, tax incentives for the first few producers to make electrical 
transformers above a certain capacity).
All three governments managed their exchange rates to ensure that trade pro-
tection did not yield overvalued exchange rates. So the combination of exchange 
rate management and performance conditions meant that trade protection did 
not insulate producers from international competitive pressure. It buffered 
 producers from international competitive pressure until such time as the 
 producers succeeded in (almost) matching the price and quality of competing 
imports, or failed to do so (Wade 1990b/2004, 1993). Howard Pack is right to 
criticize the common use of ‘a generalized, blunderbuss industrial policy where 
you say, “Let’s protect an entire industry” ’, but wrong to imply that it is the only 
way to give trade protection (Pack 2012).
Whereas mainstream economics tends to see learning as happening in R&D 
entities and deployed fairly automatically in firms’ production, all three govern-
ments worked actively to accelerate learning in production by combining public 
R&D with industrial extension services, parallel to agricultural extension services, 
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to accelerate industrial upgrading at the firm level (as distinct from relying on 
‘learning by doing’). Korea and Taiwan instituted technology development pro-
grammes as US aid came to an end in the mid-1960s. For example, the Korean 
government established the Science and Technology Agency as a department of 
the Prime Minister’s Office in 1967. Its central location in the state gave it power, 
and it had freedom to hire top-level staff outside of civil service rules. Separately, 
the government established a network of government research institutes (GRIs), 
such as the Korea Institute for Science and Technology and the Korean Advanced 
Institute of Science, both in the late 1960s. They had strong links direct to 
President Park and the top levels of the military; and received ample assistance 
from the US. The GRIs took ‘localizing foreign knowledge’ as a core objective, 
meaning above all, getting this knowledge into the heads of locals, in the spirit of 
the Korean motto, ‘We never learn anything twice’.
Taiwan created the Industrial Development Bureau within the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, to operate as an industrial extension service (with a staff of 
about 150 by the early 1980s, mostly engineers). For decade after decade its 
 engineers, divided into sectoral teams, travelled the length and breadth of the 
country (their job contracts required them to be out of the office so many days 
per month), visiting factories, giving advice, listening to problems, and feeding 
back into policy discussions. See epigraph three.
The government began to institutionalize a ‘Science and Technology’ complex 
of organizations at about the same time as Korea. The two countries watched each 
other closely and sent teams to learn from each other (a Korean team spent weeks 
inside Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, making a detailed copy of the coun-
try’s duty drawback system in the early 1980s). Both countries sent large numbers 
of students to study science and engineering in the US, with inducements to 
return. The Taiwan government established a special office dedicated to organizing 
the diaspora: contacting Taiwanese working in US firms in sectors of high priority 
in Taiwan (for example, IBM), offering them expenses-paid trips back to Taiwan 
for conferences and networking, and facilitating full-time repatriation to Taiwan. 
Taiwan also established a Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG), com-
prised of the minister of science and technology, plus between seven and ten 
 foreign experts and a local secretariat. The group met for several days at a time, 
twice a year, to review investment proposals and to draw in knowledge about 
global technology developments. The Industrial Technology Research Institute 
(ITRI) by the early 1980s had a staff of some 10,000, divided into sub-institutes 
such as the Electronics Research and Service Organization (ERSO), with a staff of 
around 700. ITRI had a secretive military twin with a staff roughly twice as big.
These policies helped sectors and firms produce more, upgrade quality, and 
diversify into other product and capability domains—helped some more than 
others. Managing the inevitable tensions between the favoured and not-favoured 
was essential to their effectiveness. Beyond instruments for managing specific 
conflicts (for example, over excess capacity in industries like shipbuilding or cars), 
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the authoritarian state managed conflicts through its domination in state–capital 
relations, and its assistance to capital in dominating capital–labour relations.
6. Singapore and Hong Kong
Singapore was a British colony from 1830 to 1963 (with a brutal Japanese 
 interregnum from 1942 to 1945). It became a sovereign state as recently as 1965. 
Its development story is similar to that of the Northeast Asian three in that it had 
no significant natural resources beyond people, and location on one of the world’s 
main East–West communication routes. Starting in the 1950s, it underwent a fast 
production transformation and integration into the world economy, led by 
manufacturing. And it experienced a super-fast rise in the world income hierarchy, 
from about 15 per cent of US average income in 1965 to nearly 70 per cent by the 
mid-1990s. Like the Northeast Asian cases (minus Hong Kong), it had a develop-
mental state of strongly authoritarian character. (Regular parliamentary elections 
were held from 1959, but virtually all seats were won by the People’s Action 
Party.) The state ‘intervened’ in labour markets to keep wage levels well below 
 productivity levels. It engineered forced savings through government-controlled 
vehicles. It owned the land and ensured that a high and rising portion of the 
population lived in publicly owned housing, rented out on long leases: by the 
mid-1970s, half of the population lived in this accommodation (owned by 
the Housing and Development Board), today, 95 per cent. The state covered all 
Singapore citizens with a public health system, which today combines a very low 
percentage of GDP spent on health care and exceptionally high health indicators. 
Both housing and health tended to make people feel obliged to the state.
But the story also differs from that of the other three. Singapore had no signifi-
cant agriculture population. It relied heavily on foreign firms establishing mostly 
wholly owned operations—together with state-owned enterprises. Missing in 
action was a local capitalist class, for the governing party sought to avoid the pos-
sibility of state capture by local capitalists. Also, the authoritarian regime has 
remained resilient throughout, from the late 1950s until today. Pressure from the 
population for  political liberalization has been conspicuously lacking, in contrast 
to Taiwan and South Korea through the 1980s (Barth 2017). The state has avoided 
demands for democratization by: overseeing a high growth economy; being 
responsive to  demands for social protection; ruling loosely enough that 
Singaporeans are often able to sidestep some state constraints in everyday life; 
and maintaining a highly meritocratic and squeaky clean civil service—keeping 
public sector senior salaries closely in line with private sector equivalents, and 
inverting the normal rule of law, ‘innocent till proven guilty’, to make civil 
 servants subject to ‘guilty [of corruption] till proven innocent’.
As for Hong Kong, mainstream economists like to cite its economic success 
to affirm that any non-neoclassical explanation of Northeast Asia’s success is 
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doomed, because, according to John Williamson, Hong Kong practised ‘the most 
laissez-fare development strategy of any economy in history’ (Williamson 1999), 
and the causes of the others’ success must be similar to those of Hong Kong. The 
second part of Williamson’s argument is impure nonsense (impure in that it 
contains a grain of truth).
Hong Kong was a British colony 1842–1997. Britain took it as ‘spoils of war’ 
when the British military defeated the Chinese military and forced the economic 
opening of China in the First Opium War. Like Singapore, it developed as a service 
centre for a vast hinterland. The economy flourished on the back of entrepôt trade, 
as a base for British–India exports of opium into China and for coastal China 
trade, and for the vast emigration from the mainland to the rest of the world. By 
1900, tiny Hong Kong handled 40 per cent of giant China’s exports and 42 per cent 
of its imports (Haggard 1990: 116). In the late 1940s it ‘imported’ an entrepreneurial 
light-industrial class already formed on the mainland under Nationalist (KMT) 
auspices when Shanghai textile capitalists with their modern machinery fled from 
the prospect of communist victory in the civil war.
For the entire period to 1997 (the brutal Japanese interregnum from 1941 to 
1945 aside), it was governed largely by British businesses and senior civil servants 
in an emphatically non-democratic regime but with an independent judiciary. 
Virtually all the land belonged to the British Crown, which auctioned long-term 
leases—and kept taxes low on the proceeds; taxes were also low because the social 
security system was minimal. Functions which, in the other cases were carried 
out by state agencies, were performed in Hong Kong by well-institutionalized 
commercial and banking enterprises drawing personnel and organizational cul-
ture from Britain. But the Hong Kong state did intervene to provide a range of 
public goods for industry: it initiated the Federation of Hong Kong Industries in 
the 1950s, and established a Trade Development Council in 1967 to promote 
exports, a Productivity Council and Centre in 1967 to provide training and 
 consultancy, and an Export Credit Insurance Company in 1966 for risks not com-
mercially insurable.
Stephan Haggard summarizes similarities and differences with the others: 
‘although Hong Kong’s economic policy may constitute an anomaly [close to 
laissez faire], its political structure shows surprising parallels to the East Asian 
pattern: a highly insulated state; limited representation [especially of “labour”]; 
and a concentrated and internally cohesive economic decision-making struc-
ture’ (Haggard 1990: 115).
7. Conclusion
Northeast Asia undoubtedly benefitted from capitalism (private profit-driven 
production), and from access to the world market. To this extent the mainstream 
is correct. But several qualifications have to be made.
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First, the ethnic and religious homogeneity of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, 
and the long history of dense populations and institutionalized political order, 
helped to generate dense, hierarchical social networks through which the natural 
human tendency to free-ride on the collectivity could be checked and collective 
interests fostered. This basic cultural pattern of individualism checked by power-
ful group norms was reinforced by intense state permeation of the society, driven 
and disciplined by external threats: Japan under the threat of US colonization in 
the nineteenth century; Korea and Taiwan colonized by Japan as it created an 
empire to ward off American and European empires; and all three under 
 communist state threat after the Second World War.
Second, they came into the post-war decades with high ratios of working-age 
people to dependents, as seen by much lower median ages in 1970 than in Europe 
at that time.
Third, the post-war threat perception of national and US elites kept national 
elites relatively unified and not at each other’s throats—and kept the inevitable 
tensions between favoured and not-favoured sectors and firms, and favoured and 
non-favoured regions, within limits. On the spectrum of ‘weak state/special-
interest state/common-interest state’ these were special-interest states moving 
towards—with a lot of American help in the first decades—common-interest states.
Fourth, for the first several decades the Northeast economies relied not so 
much on ‘the world market’ as on ‘empire preference’ to the US market—and to 
US technologies, US capital, US military and civilian aid, and US public procure-
ment—thanks to their role in the US’s geopolitical strategy to contain  communism 
and show the world that ‘capitalism’ was superior to ‘communism’.
Fifth, steered by a developmental mindset, the developmental state was organ-
ized differently than the model neo-liberal state. The latter has no strong centre of 
co-ordination (because markets played by private capitalists, not states, are the 
resource co-ordinating institution), and has arms-length relations between the 
various ministries and between ministries and business. The developmental state 
has one or a few powerful centres of co-ordination and market leadership, a 
 limited role for the legislature in matters of economic, financial, and security 
policy, and well-developed mechanisms of consultation and co-ordination with 
private capitalists, in the spirit of ‘embedded autonomy’.
Sixth, these governments operated on the premise that increments of GDP 
from some sectors brought higher potential future growth than from others, and 
made intensive use of steerage policies and institutions frowned upon in the neo-
liberal playbook—such as managed trade, sectoral industrial policy (not ‘picking 
winners’ but ‘making winners’), targeted concessional credit, and capital controls. 
These instruments were intended to buffer (not insulate) producers in selected 
sectors from international competitive pressure and volatility—so profit-raising 
protection and subsidies came with performance conditions, which were 
enforced. The whole complex would have scored poorly by Washington 
Consensus criteria. For example, Taiwan’s financial system was and remains the 
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despair of visiting Western economists. That said, there is no knockout evidence 
on the effects of these ‘government interventions’. The causality is too difficult to 
disentangle ‘rigorously’.
Finally, as the governments encouraged firms to integrate into global value 
chains while simultaneously encouraging the growth of backwards and forwards 
linkages (filling up the input-output table), they undertook to develop domestic 
technological capacity, with public laboratories, high enrolments in university 
and vocational science and engineering faculties, and organized efforts to attract 
back overseas graduate students (seen as ‘brain bank’ rather than ‘brain drain’). 
Singapore, as noted, did rely more than the others on incoming Western 
 multinationals—which were left in no doubt as to who called the shots.
These points help to understand how Northeast Asian countries overcame two 
logics of power which keep most of the periphery as a periphery, and which inter-
twine like a double-helix to produce the result we know as the glass ceiling or the 
middle-income or middle-capability trap: first, the centrifugal pressures emanat-
ing from the Western core (including several mechanisms of net resource transfer 
from periphery to core); second, the drive to hold on to a certain structure of 
political power on the part of leaders of poor countries, even at cost to national 
development, in case rival groups use the wealth created by access to new oppor-
tunities to oust the incumbents.
The full-fledged East Asian developmental states were self-limiting, in the 
sense that the package of (1) elite consensus around the national development 
project, (2) bureaucracy of industrial planning, (3) array of industrial steerage 
instruments, and (4) repression of labour, came out of shared elite conviction of 
the imperative of high rates of investment to upgrade the production structure 
quickly, raise mass living conditions, inhibit domestic revolt, and support a strong 
military, coupled with knowledge that many domestic firms could not compete 
‘on a level playing field’ with firms in developed countries.
Some analysts say that, as of today, the Northeast Asian developmental state 
has eroded to the point that ‘the developmental state is dead’ (Pirie 2017). It is 
true that as the economies achieved ‘high income’ they moved in a neo-liberal 
direction, both for structural reasons and also to bolster their alliances with the 
West. Structurally, they faced the problem common to developed countries: they 
became less able to generate enough profitable investment opportunities to 
absorb domestic savings (especially given the various policies in place to restrain 
consumption). Far from a severe shortage of capital, they began to experience an 
abundance. At the same time, the general level of productivity became high enough 
for most firms not to need subsidies or protection to compete  domestically or 
abroad. The state has withdrawn from the capital–labour relation (withdrawn from 
negotiations about wages and working conditions), and relied on the ‘discipline of 
the market’—the threat of unemployment and the threat of bankruptcy—to keep 
labour under capital’s control. The state has also substantially withdrawn from the 
allocation of credit, as seen in the now ‘independent’ central banks and in the 
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large majority of lending having no link to the creation of new productive capacity. 
So, in both Taiwan and Korea the capital–labour relation and the allocation of 
capital have been marketized; the state is mostly out.
These neo-liberal trends have been all the easier because during their history as 
developmental states the state resisted moves in a social democratic direction to 
build up social protections. Today, public welfare is still underdeveloped and legal 
obstacles block collective action among the working class. Public social spending 
as a share of GDP remains far below the OECD average, and the share of the 
labour force in independent trade unions also falls far short of the OECD average. 
The governments have allowed the share of wages in national income to keep falling. 
Income inequality has steadily risen since the 1980s. The growth model relies on 
rising household debt plus foreign demand—exports—to close the demand gap, 
and both are sources of vulnerability. Both countries have become highly exposed 
to an economic crisis in China, or Chinese arm-twisting.
At the same time, the Northeast Asian states (and Singapore) are still charac-
terized by a developmental mindset driving the state to keep pushing for produc-
tion transformation. The developmental state has not so much ‘declined’ or 
‘disappeared’ in East Asia in favour of the neo-liberal state, as Iain Pirie (2017) 
claims; it has ‘evolved’ in response to changing parameters. In Christopher Dent’s 
words: ‘while the policy tools and means may have changed, developmental states 
still preside over various adaptive-cum-transformative economic projects that 
increasingly involve a partnering with transnationalized capital’ (Dent 2007: 227).
Much of the state’s market leadership takes the form of overarching ‘societal 
missions’ driven by a varying mix of economic and national security objectives. 
Over the past several decades, all the Northeast Asian (capitalist) cases have 
 experienced a dizzying number of organizational restructurings in the pursuit of 
national innovation objectives. Standing back, one can see, first, a fairly steady 
movement from state-led efforts to domesticate foreign innovations and deploy 
them in the domestic economy (lowering risks for adopters), to managing uncer-
tainties of innovating on the global techno-economic frontier. Second, one can see a 
zig-zagging path over time, often coinciding with changes of  government: from 
fairly centralized, top-down control (using methods of formulating,  legitimating, 
and implementing innovation policies drawn from the principles of the old devel-
opmental state), to more decentralized, ‘peripheral islands’ of innovation agencies 
(drawing on the approach of states like the US and UK), and back to more central 
control, drawing on an updated version of the developmental mindset (Karo 2018). 
In short, we should talk not of the death of the developmental state in Northeast 
Asia and the rise of the neo- liberal or the post-developmental state, but of the 
transformation of the developmental state from 1.0 to 2.0.
Beyond Northeast Asia, the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2007 to 2012 and 
ensuing long recession has somewhat weakened credence in the neo-liberal 
development consensus, reawakening interest in ‘respectable’ circles in industrial 
policy and the developmental state. The evidence is clear that economic 
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development that is fast enough to bring mass living conditions close to devel-
oped countries is really difficult – because of intersecting logics of the ‘special 
interest’ state and the centrifugal forces from the Western core. Catch-up requires, 
above all, that a powerful coalition within a country embraces a ‘developmental 
mindset’ and sustains an institutional process for eliciting information from the 
private sector about investment opportunities and obstacles, nudging private 
firms to upgrade and diversify, sponsoring investment initiatives in promising 
directions that the private sector would not otherwise undertake, pushing educa-
tion in engineering and science, and managing the inevitable conflicts. But the 
developmental state is not ‘all or nothing’. It can be institutionalized at the sub-
national regional level and at sector level. Even where bureaucracy-in-general is a 
swamp, equivalents to Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau and its Science 
and Technology Advisory Group (described earlier) can be established to acceler-
ate production upgrading, provided they have top-level political support. But the 
first step is to accept that the Washington Consensus policy agenda is useful enough 
as a recipe for improving the performance of a thoroughly crony capitalism, but not 
for powering upwards through the centrifugal dynamics of the middle-income trap.
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This chapter examines the development experiences of Six Southeast Asian  countries, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(hereinafter ‘Lao PDR’), and Myanmar—here collectively called ‘the Six’—fifty 
years after Gunnar Myrdal’s (1968) Asian Drama. A companion piece, (Montes 
2018), which is longer but with the same structure, presents more  elaboration on 
the data and analyses.
In Asian Drama, Myrdal took an unambiguously pessimistic view of Asian 
prospects for development on the basis of (1) obstacles to raising agricultural 
 productivity and (2) the low perceived level of capability of governments to 
intervene effectively in favour of industrial development, the latter being a handicap 
that included extensive corruption at all levels of government. For the most part, 
the record of the Six defied Myrdal’s prognosis, raising agricultural productivity 
faster than population growth and displaying sufficient state capability to direct 
change towards a respectable level of industrial development.
The Six comprise a diverse grouping of countries in terms of natural endowments, 
historical precedents, and polities. Five, all except Thailand, are former colonies. 
Three—Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia—are constitutional  monarchies. Three—
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand—are long-running market economies. 
Two—Myanmar and Lao PDR—are formally socialist economies; at the other 
end of the scale, free enterprise is deemed as the foundation of the Philippines’ 
democratic way of life (Myrdal  1968: 387). Three states—Cambodia, Malaysia 
(until May 2018), and Myanmar (until 2016)—have been de facto one-party states.
In terms of standard categories, there are two distinct groups within the Six. 
There are the three middle-income economies—Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand—and three least-developed countries (LDCs)—Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
and Myanmar—sometimes also referred to as the Socialist Three. The Socialist 
Three spent part of the post-Asian Drama period overcoming economic isolation 
and embargo, but managed to develop and expand the international dimensions 
of their economies.
A memorable contribution of Myrdal’s Asian Drama is the idea of the ‘soft state’, 
introduced in the ‘value premises chosen’ section at the start of Asian Drama. 
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He categorized Asian countries as having ‘all “soft states” ’ (Myrdal 1968: 66). For 
Myrdal, a soft state comprises two faces of a coin: (1) policies, whether or not they 
are actually decided, are poorly enforced and (2) authorities ‘are reluctant to place 
obligations on people’.
Subsequently, a discussion arose on the indispensable role of a ‘strong state’ or 
a ‘developmental state’, based on an interpretation of the record of successful East 
Asian economies (Wade 1990). According to this view, as ‘strong states’, East Asian 
states engineered state-led development. This view was an antidote to the rapid 
rise of the view—propagated by Bretton Woods staff and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) agencies in the wake of the developing country debt crises of 
the 1980s—that an interventionist state is the main obstacle to development. 
According to this view, if a society is saddled with a soft state susceptible to elite 
capture, it might as well let domestic and international market forces discipline 
both the state and the private sector.
The Six threaded the space between these two exhortations, with the exception 
of two countries. The Philippines has been dismantling state intervention since 
1984 and Myanmar has long relied on a planned economy with direct state control 
over the enterprise sector, despite efforts at reform since 1988. In between, the 
other Four, despite not being ‘strong states’, exhibit relatively better  performance 
despite widespread state interventions, governance weaknesses, and gradualist 
reform paths. These contrasts could suggest that one does not have to choose 
between corner solutions to obtain some measure of structural change.
Table 20.1 presents the broad contours of overall growth among the Six. For 
the three LDCs (Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar), per capita growth rates are 
distinctly lower in the conflict-ridden 1970–1990 period; per capita growth rates 
more than doubled in the 1990–2015 period. Starting from below the average in 
1970, by 2015 these three had caught up and exceeded the average per capita income 
of LDCs. Among the three market economies, Malaysia and Thailand achieved 
high growth in the first half of the post-Asian Drama period, until 1990, subsiding 
in the second half, while the Philippines shows an upturn from low levels in the first 
period. On per capita income comparisons, Malaysia and Thailand are clearly strong 
performers. Malaysia’s per capita income is practically double that of average 
developing country per capita income; Thailand’s per capita income is 20 per cent 
higher than average developing country per capita income. The Philippines has 
lost ground in per capita income comparisons among developing countries.
A discussion of the factors behind this overall pattern will be grouped around 
four issues:
(1) raising agriculture output and transitioning from agricultural dependence;
(2) industrial development, the state, and the private sector;
(3) openness, trade, and foreign investments; and
(4) employment, inequality, and social development.
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2. Raising Agriculture Output and  
Transitioning from Agricultural Dependence
Variations in the record among the Six uphold the view that strong progress in 
agriculture is an essential element of structural change. There were two vital dimen-
sions in this record: (1) institutional reform and (2) output increases mainly but not 
solely enabled by the dissemination of ‘high-yielding varieties’ (HYVs) of rice.
The record suggests that markets and private incentives, while having a 
 necessary role, are insufficient for the purpose of agricultural development and 
diversification. While the introduction of HYV in rice was fortuitous to the 
agricultural challenge, successful cases among the Six point to the larger role of 
institutional changes traceable to state policies and interventions.
2.1 Institutional Reforms
For the Six, these reforms concerned issues of tenancy and collectivization and 
the role of foreign, indigenous, and state-owned enterprises. Except for Thailand, 
which was never colonized, plantations for export on one hand and farming for 
local consumption on the other were the two main production modes in agricul-
ture. As independent states, the Six faced the problem of sustaining commodity 
Table 20.1 Economic growth indicators, %
 Per capita
GDP growtha
GDP growth ratea Per cent of ‘group’b 
per capita income
1970–1990 1990–2015 1970–1990 1990–2015 1970 2015
Cambodia −2.3 5.0 −1.0 7.4 78.0 119.0
Lao PDR 2.5 5.0 4.8 6.9 31.5 220.9
Myanmar 0.5 8.0 2.7 9.1 72.4 122.1
Malaysia 4.9 3.5 7.7 5.7 162.6 198.0
Philippines 1.0 2.2 3.8 4.2 94.1 59.1
Thailand 5.0 3.4 7.3 4.2 90.9 119.4
Developing 
countries
2.2 3.6 4.5 5.2   
Notes:
a Growth rates are compounded growth rates calculated from end-points based on real values.
b  Per capita incomes are based on current prices at current exchange rates; for Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
and Myanmar, the ‘group’ denominator is LDC per capita income; for Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand, the ‘group’ denominator is developing country per capita income.
Source: Author, based on data from UNCTADStat (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN), Data Center, 
folder Economic trends/National accounts/Gross domestic product/Gross domestic product: total 
and per capita, current and constant (2010 prices), annual and/Gross domestic product: total and per 
capita, growth rates, annual.
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export earnings while responding to the inequities in access to land in the rural 
areas bequeathed by colonial trade.
2.1.1 The Socialist Three
In the Cambodia Lao PDR, agrarian reform—meaning a deliberate withdrawal 
from collectivized farming, during the 1980s after the failure of initial attempts to 
secure food security through collective farms—constituted the crucial event in 
institutional reform in Lao PDR and Cambodia (van Arkadie 1995).
In 1986, Lao PDR began encouraging a return to family farms, de-emphasizing 
collectives that had generated resistance, ‘leading many to retreat into subsist-
ence’ (van Arkadie  1995: 31). With state ownership of land, Cambodian non-
plantation agriculture in principle was organized in co-operatives, but, in practice, 
the rules did not displace family farming. By 1989, private property ownership 
had replaced collective production.
In Myanmar, where all land is the property of the state, formal agrarian reform 
efforts began after 2010. About one-third of the country’s rural residents, are 
landless labourers. In early 2018, the government enacted two new laws to provide 
a legal framework that offers a path to widening land ownership: the Farmland 
Law and the Vacant, Fallow, and Virgin Land Management Law (Hiebert and 
Nguyen 2018).
2.1.2 The Market Economy Three
In the three market economies of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, argu-
ments of equity, tinged with the possibility of raising agricultural productivity by 
unleashing individual initiative, underpinned various state efforts to expand 
farmer families’ access to agricultural assets.
In Malaysia, a postcolonial disposition promoted indigenizing commodity 
processing and the resettling of landless rural households in rubber and palm oil 
estates in the 1960s. Under the Bumiputera programme, private, foreign-owned 
plantations were nationalized so that by the early 1980s, the state had gained con-
trol of the whole plantation sector (Lim 1985).
In the Philippines, tenancy-based production—and a matching social struc-
ture (‘pre-capitalist’ (see Chapter  13, this volume) or ‘feudal’ (Myrdal  1968)) 
from the Spanish colonial period—held sway in all major crops. The Philippines 
have attempted a major ‘land reform’ programme in every decade with indifferent 
results despite high ambitions (Borras 2007; also Chapter 5, this volume).
Thailand’s previous political history, including reforms in 1874 and, again, in 
the 1930s, afforded a much less skewed distribution in access to land.
Owners and financiers have to take greater responsibility in introducing new 
technology where tenancy is dominant. Large landowners control not only pro-
duction but also local labour markets. The next section explores how these kinds 
of differences in institutional resources shaped the speed and the impact of efforts 
to raise agricultural productivity.
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2.2 The Green Revolution
The propagation of HYV rice, the first of which was introduced in 1966, two years 
before Myrdal’s volume, played a significant part in raising agricultural production 
and attaining food security in the Six. HYV technology was input-intensive in 
terms of water, fertilizer, and pesticide, and induced its own pressures on institu-
tions and on state provisioning. Rural institutions and the capabilities of the 
state,  in turn, affected how increases in agricultural output were shared among 
members of society.
2.2.1 Raising Agricultural Production and Yields
There is a vast body of literature on the positive impact of the Green Revolution 
on the economies of Southeast Asia, and it suffices to touch on the highlights. The 
spread of the Green Revolution and HYVs proceeded at a strong pace in the 1970s. 
By 1976/77, HYVs accounted for 7 per cent of crop area planted in Myanmar, 
37.4 per cent in west Malaysia, 68.1 per cent in the Philippines, and 11.3 per cent 
in Thailand (Darlymple 1979: 708).
For rice, the most telling impact of HYVs was to allow two rice crops per year 
in irrigated areas. The increase in output was significant enough to turn the terms 
of trade against agriculture, greatly benefitting consumers, especially those in the 
lower-income strata who spend more on food.
For the whole of Southeast Asia between 1961 and 2010, the record shows 
that  total agricultural production grew by 3.44 per cent per year, substantially 
faster than the population (Timmer 2015: 99), a record that includes not just the 
Green Revolution in rice, but diversification in production and consumption as 
incomes rose.
Cambodia achieved rice self-sufficiency in 1995. Production targets for rice 
incorporate a surplus for export (Chhair and Ung 2016). Inadequate infrastruc-
ture to transport agricultural produce hampers further investment in  productivity 
and crop diversification. Lao PDR achieved rice self-sufficiency in 1999. However, 
with 70 per cent of the population living in rural areas, agricultural productivity 
per worker remains low (World Bank 2014: 26). These two cases argue for sus-
tained state investment in agriculture at low-income levels.
2.2.2 Impact on Society
The impact of the Green Revolution on farmers themselves depended on whether 
the ‘technology enabled their costs of production to decline more than prices 
declined’ (Evenson  2004: 548). Farmers who could use the technology were 
 positively affected; those farmers without access to the technology were negatively 
affected since they sold their produce at lower market prices.
In the literature, pre-existing inequality is seen as the main determinant of the 
distribution of gains from the Green Revolution (Ruttan 1977: 20; see also Wong 
1987, for Malaysia).
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On the consumer side, in the context of Myrdal’s warning of a reinforcing 
interaction between low agricultural productivity and low labour productivity, 
Timmer (2015: 91) finds that, compared with the rest of the world, Southeast 
Asia as a whole made substantial progress in reducing food insecurity in the two 
decades since 1990, with the region transforming a ‘large negative gap of 12.3 
per cent to a very large positive gap of 15.7 points’. The underlying process 
Timmer implicates is the rise in the productivity of agricultural labour, which, in 
the standard narrative, is a precondition for the transition from agriculture to 
industry.
2.3 Transitioning Out of Agricultural Dependence
Led by Malaysia and Thailand, the Six have managed creditable transitions in 
shifting the weight of economic activity from agriculture to industry and services 
at rates that exceeded those achieved a generation earlier by Northeast Asian 
‘tiger economies’ (Coxhead 2015: 4). All of the Six have reduced the sectoral con-
tribution of agriculture to gross domestic product (GDP); all, except Myanmar, 
see the proportion of GDP in services rise, with the Philippines showing the greatest 
increase; see Montes (2018: table 2).
The extractive industries represent a high proportion of GDP in Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, and Myanmar; for these countries, the bulk of the difference between 
the proportion of GDP in industry and the proportion in manufacturing is 
 associated with the extractive industries. These countries have the advantage of 
 relatively low population densities and thus much room to rely on this sector. 
Figure 20.1 depicts the steep shift of value-added proportions from agriculture to 
manufacturing, particularly most recently in Myanmar and Cambodia, with a 
more moderate but steady long-run reallocation for Malaysia and Thailand. 
Between 1993 and 2007, the share of manufacturing in Cambodia increased from 
12 to 25 per cent. In most countries, the growth rate of manufacturing subsided 
after the Asian financial crisis.
In the case of the Philippines, the long-term trend has been a declining share 
of agriculture with no perceptible increase in manufacturing as a proportion of 
value-added; services, especially in recent years, have absorbed labour from 
 agriculture. A portion of the Philippines’ increase in services contribution comes 
from its capturing second position to India in the international business process 
outsourcing sector.
3. Industrial Development, the State, and the Private Sector
There is a policy controversy over whether the state had any positive role in the Six’s 
industrial development. One side of the debate holds that successful Southeast 
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Asian states did not intervene significantly and that the unsuccessful ones inter-
vened too much; the other side holds that evidence of extensive intervention on 
the part of successful economies cannot be ignored. Even for those recognizing that, 
indeed, extensive state interventions occurred, one side of the argument takes the 
view that state policies did not have significant impact on industrial upgrading in 
the successful cases and that external trade, foreign investment, and macroeco-
nomic stability—the latter a distinctly Southeast Asian advantage in the 1980s but 



























































































































































































Figure 20.1 Structural change in Southeast Asia: percentage of GDP in agriculture 
and manufacturing.
Note: Three-year moving averages, except for end-points.
Source: Author, based on data from UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/
reportFolders.aspx in folder Economic trends/National accounts/Gross domestic product: GDP by 
type of expenditure, VA by kind of activity, total and shares, annual, 1970–2016.
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by being export-oriented, market conditions were  simulated (Bhagwati 1988), 
thereby enforcing market conforming behaviour on both the state and the enter-
prise sector. The opposite view is that state policies defied market signals and 
played an indispensable role in structural change.
The evidence presented here is that successful economies among the Six did 
intervene and distorted market signals—both as industrial policy and as state-
led investment. This contradicts the view detailed in the ‘East Asian miracle’ 
study by the World Bank (1993), that the successful economies relied mainly on 
 macroeconomic stability to drive structural change. Except for the Philippines, 
industrial policy regimes in the countries in all economies have persisted, albeit 
still evolving, since 1968. State-led investment played a significant role in the early 
stages. Instead of being dismantled, industrial policies expanded to benefit export 
sectors beginning in the 1980s. The rest of this section develops this narrative in 
three sub-parts: (1) a review of the actually existing policies among the Six; 
(2) the role of state-led investments; and (3) the role of the state and the large 
domestic private sector. Much of the discussion in this section will be on the three 
middle-income countries. The three LDCs can be seen as following the path of 
the successful three middle-income countries, with state-led investments in early 
stages and state-enabled efforts to penetrate export sectors in extractives and light 
manufacturing.
3.1 Actually Existing Industrial Policies in Southeast Asia
In 1968, import-substituting policies were unchallenged among the three Southeast 
Asian market economies (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), while state dom-
inance over the economy in the three LDCs (Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar) 
was inescapable in their conflict-ridden and embargo-restricted contexts.
A system of sectorally targeted exchange controls, cascading tariffs, multiple 
exchange rates, tax incentives, and subsidies lay at the heart of industrial policy 
for Southeast Asian countries. There were preferential exchange rates, import 
controls on competing final goods or intermediate inputs, tariff exemptions on 
imported equipment, tax holidays, restrictions on entry of new capacity in the 
industry, preferential interest rates, and access to credit (Montes 1993: 12–13).
3.1.1 Developing while Import-Substituting
After the racial riots of 1969, as part of its Bumiputera programme, Malaysia 
state protectionist intervention became widespread. However, these programmes 
sought also to strengthen competitiveness in key export industries, including 
palm oil. State intervention paved the way for the extensive relocation of US 
semiconductor companies to Malaysia, exploiting the country’s supply of 
 low-cost, semi-skilled female labour (Montes  1993: 15). The net effect of these 
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interventions involved an economy whose degree of price distortion did not differ 
significantly from that in the Philippines or Korea in 1975 (Salleh et al. 1992: 20).
Thailand has maintained significant import protection for selected industries. 
Among the most highly favoured sectors were textiles, automobiles, and pharma-
ceuticals. Industrial promotion benefitted capital-intensive manufactures in 
defiance of the country’s static comparative advantage as a resource-rich, labour-
abundant economy (Montes 1993: 17).
3.1.2 Contrasting Approaches to External Liberalization
The 1980s saw a decided shift towards external liberalization among the Six. 
However, there were contrasts in degree and strategy among these countries. For 
the Socialist Three, privatization and exchange rate consolidation were critical 
elements of outward reorientation. For Thailand, this meant the redeployment of 
import-substituting policies in support of export promotion. For the Philippines, 
outward reorientation involved import liberalization. In 1981, Thai industrial 
policy shifted to incorporating export promotion. Even with these reforms, 
Christensen et al. (1992) report the Thai effective protection rate for manufactur-
ing to be 52 per cent, still higher than Korea (28 per cent), Malaysia (23 per cent), 
and the Philippines (23 per cent).
The Philippines chose a different path towards an internationally competitive 
industrial sector, embarking on an ambitious trade and import liberalization pro-
gramme, starting in 1984 during a balance-of-payments crisis. The new trajectory 
aimed at eliminating the disincentives imposed by protection (Hill  2015), in a 
series of structural adjustment programmes under the aegis of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The programmes, in line with other such programmes in other debt-
distressed countries, did not afford additional financing specifically for industrial 
adjustment. State financing is analytically incompatible with a  liberalization-based 
effort, which is predicated on a private discovery of  international competitiveness.
Lao PDR introduced the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, to begin the 
transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. In a ‘step by 
step’ gradual manner, price controls were removed, the exchange rate system was 
unified, and the government’s monopoly on trade ended, with the number of state 
enterprises reduced and the establishment of private firms. With the achievement 
of peace in 1992, the reintroduction of private ventures in Cambodia began. With 
the support of international financial institutions, Cambodia and Lao PDR 
expanded their infrastructure and utilities. Lao PDR benefitted from multilateral 
programmes to develop the Mekong region and the market for hydropower to 
Thailand. Cambodia became a big player in contract production in textiles and 
clothing. Myanmar’s industrial sector was under state control throughout this 
period but in 1988 the registration of private ventures was opened. Table 20.2 
indicates that Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar doubled the contribution of 
manufacturing to GDP between 1985 and 2015, after stagnating for the previous 
twenty-five years.
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3.2 State-led Investments and State-owned Enterprises
Among the Six, rapid transitions to industry and manufacturing were enabled by 
high national investment rates. Except for Myanmar, a socialist state, private 
investment rates played a key role. However, what distinguishes the successful 
economies is the sizeable role of government investment. Before the Asian finan-
cial crisis in 1997, national investment rates exceeded 20 per cent of GDP in 
Malaysia and Thailand, with government investment at over 8 per cent (see Montes 
2018: table 3); the exception was the Philippines, where government investment 
never exceeded 3 per cent. An acceleration of investment rates after 1997 is 
evident in Cambodia and Lao PDR. With various levels of effectiveness and 
through bouts of nationalization and privatization, all of the Six deployed state-
owned enterprises (Myanmar exclusively until 1988) and none permanently 
collectivized agriculture. All of the Six engaged in a fluctuating degree of national 
economic planning.
Among the Six, the variation in the record of state enterprises mirrors the same 
range of success and disappointment in the developing world—with Myanmar’s 
experience of stasis uniformly across sectors at one end (Booth 2003; Tin 2006), 
and successful cases such as palm oil processing in Malaysia at the other (Teoh 2002). 
What deserves mention is how the private sector in successful cases such as Malaysia 
achieved productivity increases and industrial development while exploiting 
state-provided economic subsidies and protection.
3.3 The Role of the State and the Private Sector
In Southeast Asian development, it is not realistic to discuss the role of the state 
without addressing the nature of ‘the’ indigenous private sector. Large business 
conglomerates dominate the economic landscape in Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. Linked politically, including through state and military control, 
large enterprises play a leading role in basic sectors, such as in food and trade, in 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. How this configuration in most of the Six 
except for Myanmar and the Philippines has not proven an obstacle to  respectable, 
if not vigorous, rates of economic growth in Southeast Asia is a key question.
Unlike Northeast Asian states, which obliged favoured enterprises to reinvest 
‘policy rents’ (Akyüz and Gore 1996; Chapter 13, this volume), Southeast Asian 
states were ‘too soft’ to impose accountability on favoured elites for their economic 
actions. Southeast Asian growth based on delivering economic advantages to 
political ‘cronies’ has been called ‘ersatz capitalism’ (Yoshihara 1988; Jomo 2003a).
3.3.1 Relational Contracting
Among the successful economies of the Six, the nurturing of a rentier incentive 
structure through industrial policies can be seen as a dimension of their soft state 
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status. In the Six, conglomerates, led by well-connected businessmen, many with 
foreign business partners, operated in the leading and most profitable sectors of 
the economy, which for the most part were located in the region’s growing exter-
nal sector.
The domination of economic policy by a state-connected clique provided an 
infrastructure for co-ordination. Accountability on the part of privileged businesses 
consisted of political support for the regime and continued commercial success, 
including the timely servicing of subsidized financing. Myrdal (1968: 957) was 
profoundly sceptical of such a configuration. This configuration shares many fea-
tures of medieval guilds in Europe (Montes 2018), where it played a role in regu-
lation, contract enforcement, and co-ordination. In game-theoretic terms, in a 
repeated game, members enforced commercial accountability among themselves 
(Greif et al. 1994). The term ‘relational contracting’ is a shorthand for this kind of 
governance approach. The clique-based configuration has periodically spawned 
spectacular corruption episodes, such as the scandals associated with the Port 
Klang Free Zone (Juego 2015) and the 1MDB holding company in Malaysia.
3.3.2 Business Dominance by a Minority of a Minority
The dominant role of business minorities is also a common phenomenon among 
the Six. Business conglomerates are owned by a minority within a minority, with 
prominent businessmen sharing their ethnicity with many other residents who 
are not wealthy at all. The pervasiveness of Chinese minority groups highlighted 
by Myrdal (1968: 691) in business endures to this day in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, 
while constituting 30 per cent of the population (as estimated in 2001 by The 
Economist 2001: 5), Chinese-descended businessmen account for 69 per cent of 
market capitalization in large conglomerates; in the Philippines, Chinese constitute 
2 per cent of the population and control 50–60 per cent of the market capitaliza-
tion; in Thailand, the comparable numbers are 14 per cent of the population and 
81 per cent of the market capitalization.
In Thailand, Thai export promotion was built on top of the conglomerates 
from the import-substitution era, with the specific red line that foreign partici-
pation in domestic markets is effectively at the ‘consent’ of indigenous business 
(Rock 2001). Thai legislation, National Development Plans, and Board of 
Investments rulings from the 1970s to the present have ‘reserved’ the most 
lucrative domestic market for Thai business companies (Montes and Cruz 2017). 
Thai business conglomerates have enjoyed stable access to state-provided com-
mercial  advantages. In contrast, in the Philippines, Montes and Cruz (2017) 
suggest that outcomes of political contests have caused significant reallocations 
of state-provided privileges. Spending for political contests, including in the 
maintenance of a coterie, is counted as consumption in the national accounts. 
Such consumption expenditures represent forgone investment spending by busi-
ness conglomerates (Montes 1995).
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In contrast to Thailand, where large conglomerates dominated policy design, 
in non-socialist Malaysia the business sector faced a coherent state which ‘sought 
to guide industrial change through a detailed sector-by-sector strategy laid out in 
the Industrial Market Plan 1986–95’ (Felker 2001: 135).
Myanmar, whose commodity-exporting potential is enormous, is in the early 
stages of creating an indigenous business class. In Cambodia and Myanmar, the 
rapid rise of the garment export industry relies primarily on investment and loans 
from ‘Greater China’ (a term that includes the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, 
China, and the Special Administrative Region) to local businessmen, many of 
minority descent.
‘Family-style’ management of domestic conglomerates was diagnosed—
erroneously1—as the ‘Asian’ governance explanation behind the Asian financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, it bears asking whether this structure can mobilize capital and 
operations of sufficient scale to continue to play a prominent role among those 
economies of the Six seeking to escape the middle-income trap. The contrast is 
with China, where large state-sponsored corporations are becoming global players. 
In contrast to those in the Republic of Korea (Amsden 2008), these family-based 
conglomerates are not known for technological prowess and innovation.
4. Openness, Trade, and Foreign Investments
Most of the Six are renowned as successful globalizers. While it is undisputed that 
international trade and foreign investment played an indispensable role in the 
Six’s growth and economic diversification, scepticism remains about the manner 
in which these economies integrated internationally. One side2 of the debate 
holds that openness in the customary sense of low tariffs, minimum application 
of quantitative restrictions, and unrestricted foreign investment were decisive in 
Asian, including Southeast Asian, development. The alternative view3 is that 
successful economies integrated themselves internationally without dismantling 
their industrial policies or abruptly exposing their domestic enterprises to foreign 
competition. The record reviewed here argues for the second view. It is also 
 necessary to differentiate between the role of external developments (sometimes 
called ‘luck’) and the domestic policies involved in the hosting of foreign invest-
ment. Domestic hosting policies in Southeast Asia made it possible to benefit 
from foreign investment, while retaining industrial policies.
1 See Montes (2017) for the contrasts between the set of analyses that took the view that the 
 1997–1998 crisis was principally due to domestic governance failures versus those that recognized the 
role of external factors.
2 See, for example, Krueger (1992), a piece which gained attention in transition economies when it 
was published.
3 See, for example, Amsden (2008) or Wade (1990).
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4.1 Performance and Diversification in External Trade
It is proper to start by outlining the role of trade in the Six’s overall economic per-
formance. External sources of growth played an important part in the sub-region’s 
development (Phung et al. 2015: 76–7). For example, of Malaysia’s 3.8 per cent 
annual growth in output per worker in the 1980s and 1990s, 1.75 percentage 
points is from world economic growth, the rest coming from domestic invest-
ment, resource endowments, and openness.
The rapid increase in exports as a proportion of GDP in the sub-region would 
be the envy of other parts of the world. Between 1985 and 2005, Lao PDR increased 
goods exports as a proportion of GDP from 2.3 to 20.2 per cent; for Malaysia 
from 41.8 per cent in 1965 to 99.7 per cent in 2005. In the 1990s, Malaysia export 
volume was growing at 14.2 per cent, the Philippines at 15.1 per cent, and 
Thailand at 11.2 per cent. Even accepting the susceptibility of the numbers to 
commodity price cycles, at the end of the period in 2015, the trade outcomes 
among the Six fell into two groups: (1) the hyper-traders of Cambodia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand, whose goods exports-to-GDP ratios are near or exceed 50 per cent; 
and (2) the slower traders of Lao PDR, Myanmar, and the Philippines, with goods 
exports-to-GDP ratios at or below 20 per cent (see Montes (2018: table 4).
Each of the Six began their transition to more outward-looking policies in 
the 1980s. Except for the Philippines, it would be inaccurate to propose that the 
Six began practising openness in the mid-1980s through the path of import 
 liberalization. The persistence in the 1980s and beyond of—costly and inefficient—
industrial policies belies this view. In Nayyar’s (2013: 118) telling, Malaysia 
and Thailand ‘were non-conformists without being liberalizers’ whose economies 
performed well.
In the 1980s, the Six followed varied transition paths out of import-substitution 
industrialization. The Socialist Three ended state monopolies in key areas such as 
external trading, undertook a controlled opening to foreign investment, and 
relaxed price controls, with Myanmar moving more slowly than the other two. 
Among the three market economies, Malaysia and Thailand retained industrial 
policies and refined these tools to apply them to export promotion. The salubri-
ous outcomes for both investors and host countries of these projects established 
the international reputation and the standards of foreign investor hosting of 
Southeast Asia. As a sharp contrast, the Philippines, beginning in 1984, embarked 
on a classic import liberalization programme. Myanmar maintained the  dominant 
position of state enterprises even after embarking on gradual liberalization in 1988.
In Southeast Asia in the 1980s and to the present, the spectacular growth in 
exports has been strongly driven by foreign investment inflows. In the 1980s, foreign 
investors produced components in host countries which were exported to home 
countries for assembly in the final product; eventually, final product assembly 
moved into the region. Low-cost, pliant labour was the main host-country input; 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Manuel F. Montes 517
the operation required no important industrial input from the host country. The 
investment-driven trade expansion enabled the diversification of the host coun-
try’s export structure; components for electronic and electrical goods were the 
key sector. Southeast Asian trade still relies more heavily on component produc-
tion than East Asian trade (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon 2015: 147, table 7.3).
Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR are the ‘late-traders’ among the Six. Like 
Bangladesh, Cambodia seized the opportunity of the termination in 1985 of the 
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (the ‘ATC’, more 
popularly known as the ‘multi-fibre arrangement’) to build a garment exports 
industry, collaborating with the international network of clothing jobbers. Natural 
gas represents the most dynamic element of the export sectors in Myanmar and 
Lao PDR. These exports do not absorb much labour, being capital-intensive and 
highly dependent on foreign investment, but provide foreign exchange.
4.2 Policies towards Foreign Investment
There are possibly two ways to interpret the origin of Southeast Asia’s reputa-
tion as a platform for foreign investor activities. A widespread view is that ‘mar-
ket-friendly’4 government policies by host countries led to the region’s attractiveness 
to foreign investment and its success in globalization. The alternative view—for 
example, Jomo (2003b)—is that external events and decisions had greater impacts 
than domestic policy in explaining the large-scale inflows into the region.
In the mid-1980s, domestic policy on the part of Southeast Asian states cannot 
be considered the main driver of the enormous inflow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The unexpected advantage from FDI initially flowed from Japanese com-
panies seeking low-cost labour following the abrupt realignment of the world’s 
major currencies in the mid-1980s from the Plaza–Louvre agreements. In that 
decade, because of perceived instability on the part of investors, these flows did 
not land in Hong Kong,5 the least regulated economy in the region. FDI landed in 
economies populated by highly protected domestic enterprises—both state-
controlled and private. Success in exploiting FDI, instead, depended on state pol-
icies to provide these investments with a reliable location to profitably operate 
production activities for export. Earlier, Nayyar (1978: 77) found that, in location 
decisions of such export activities, political stability and labour docility are the 
most decisive factors.
4 There is no standard definition of ‘market-friendly’ policies, of course. The usage of the 
phrase  here is as a shorthand for economic liberalization and deregulation; see, for example, 
World Bank (2002).
5 Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2015: 141) point to China’s Cultural Revolution occurring at that 
time. Apropos, almost a decade earlier, Nayyar (1978: 68) quotes as typical a statement from a multi-
national executive that ‘We wanted a site where we could have the US Navy between us and Mainland 
China’.
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The key element of the domestic ‘hosting’ strategy was the expansion of special 
economic zones for foreign investors, a tool from the 1960s intended originally to 
facilitate non-traditional exports while preserving the industrial protection of 
domestic enterprises. Standard economic analysis deemed this strategy extremely 
costly in terms of domestic resource costs (Warr 1989). Whether in special zones 
or not, a contrary view is that countries do not need a liberalized economy to 
productively host FDI, but instead require affordable utilities and infrastructure 
and facilities for reducing variable costs (Montes 1997a: 178).
In non-special zones, Malaysia and Thailand eventually removed restrictions 
on 100 per cent-owned foreign ownership, but with sectoral- and market-
restricted conditions. By 1992–1993, net FDI into Malaysia as a proportion of the 
gross fixed capital formation reached 7.3 per cent (Rasiah 2001: 95).
In Thailand, since the 1959 inception of import-substitution, domestic sectoral 
groups operating in large conglomerates had been capitalizing on a triad of (1) 
government promotional/protectionist provisions; (2) financing from large indig-
enously-owned commercial banks operated meticulously along commercial lines; 
and (3) technology sourced from foreign, mainly Japanese, companies (see Rock 
2001: 268–70). After the yen revaluation, the entry of foreign investment basically 
followed the private channels established during import-substitution.
The transitions to outward orientation in Lao PDR and Cambodia began about 
a decade later in the 1990s and in Myanmar in 2016, after the lifting of the trade 
embargo by advanced economies.
In the international garment industry, the supply-side aspects of foreign 
 investment-driven trade remain a powerful force among the second-tier Southeast 
Asian countries, benefitting Cambodia and Myanmar. In an arrangement originally 
necessitated by the quota dispersion for developed country markets during the 
era of the ATC, the international garments trade became dependent on subcon-
tractors organized by the main supplier companies. The rise of garment subcon-
tracting companies facilitated rapid employment absorption of rural labour. In 
Cambodia, 91 per cent of industrial establishments in 2011 were micro-firms 
employing fewer than five workers (Chhair and Ung 2016), mainly in the gar-
ment business. In Myanmar, the garment sector grew rapidly even in the midst of 
the international embargo in the 2000s (Myint et al. 2015).
4.3 Balance-of-Payments Financing and  
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998
Fragile balance-of-payments conditions and periodic commodity price slumps, 
including the almost simultaneous payments crisis episodes in the mid-1980s, are 
part of the Six’s growth record. Montes (2018: table 5) summarizes the patterns in 
accumulated current account deficits in five of the economies through the period 
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leading up to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. These ten-year deficits are not higher 
than an annual rate of 3 per cent of GDP, but leave the economies vulnerable 
to commodity slumps. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the middle-income 
countries’ current accounts switched to surpluses. However, the region’s most 
harrowing balance-of-payments episode did not originate with a commodity 
price slump. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 came from a sudden reversal 
of flows in the capital account, sparked by the Thai baht devaluation on 2 July 1997. 
Abetted by World Bank staff in the 1990s, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
succumbed to the siren call of capital account deregulation starting in the late 1980s. 
Authorities were forced to intervene against currency  appreciation triggered by 
the unprecedented portfolio inflows to defend their built-up export competitive-
ness, a policy that further fed short-term capital inflows (Montes  1997b). The 
domestic impact was a financial sector laden with long-maturity receivables in 
property development funded by volatile, short-term, hard currency liabilities; 
thus, the seeding of a financial crisis with foreign characteristics.
The flight of portfolio funds out of the region only ended in the last quarter of 
1998 in conjunction with a series of financial crises elsewhere (Montes 2017: 131). 
These events signalled to portfolio investors that the sub-region was not such a 
bad bet, within a choice set rife with bad portfolio bets.
Rapid economic recovery in Thailand ensued in 1999, after a fall in output of 
10.2 per cent through 1997 and 1998. Malaysia, which had responded to the crisis 
with effectual capital account controls,6 lost 0.6 per cent in the same period.
5. Employment, Inequality, and Social Development
In chapter 9 of Asian Drama, Myrdal highlighted the deep economic and ethnic 
divides in business and political participation specific to each country and their 
roles in national politics and social stability. What role did economic growth and 
structural transformation play in bridging the social divides inherited from the 
colonial era in the Six? How did economic growth and structural change affect 
poverty, inequality, and social development?
The record among the Six is a mix of spectacular reductions in poverty 
 incidence during periods of rapid employment growth and little progress, if not a 
worsening, in equity. This mix can be attributed to three trends: (1) income gains 
by the richest strata outstripping income gains obtained by workers moving from 
rural sectors to industrial activities; (2) state investment in social development, 
including in education, being inadequate to increase the access of the general 
population to skills premia introduced by structural change and international 
integration; and (3) the indifference, if not hostility, of the development model to 
6 See Khor (2005) for a description of these capital controls and their impacts.
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more widespread political participation and to the strengthening of citizens’ 
rights and labour protections. These three trends are incorporated in the discus-
sion, grouped into the following three topics: (1) employment absorption and 
poverty reduction; (2) social and political (in)equity; and (3) state investments in 
social development.
5.1 Employment Absorption and Poverty Reduction
Southeast Asia has an exceptional record in employment absorption and 
employment redeployment out of agriculture. Much of the redeployed labour was 
absorbed in enterprises whose markets were overseas, including the Philippines 
where the labour redeployment was directly overseas. At the national level the 
poverty impact of the labour redeployment has been spectacular in specific 
 periods among the Six. In Malaysia, the incidence of rural poverty fell from 27.3 
per cent in 1985 to 18.6 per cent by 1993 (Government of Malaysia 1996). The 
 performance of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar as they moved rural labour 
into labour-intensive manufacturing for export follow the Malaysian pattern; see 
Montes (2018: table 6).
In terms of poverty reduction, Thailand’s performance—reflecting the greater 
progress achieved in the rural sector—outshines that of the Philippines, with 
poverty incidence that is little over half that of the Philippines’ 21 per cent, a level 
in the same vicinity as that of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar; see Montes 
(2018: table 6). Malaysia’s poverty incidence was around 5 per cent in 2005 and 
has shrunk to practically zero by 2015.
With the foreign investment influx after the yen revaluation, Malaysia’s  proportion 
of employment7 in agriculture fell from 30.4 per cent in 1985 to 20.0 per cent by 
1995, matching an increase in the proportion of employment in industry from 
23.8 to 32.3 per cent in the same period. The proportion of Thai employment in 
agriculture fell from 66.6 per cent in 1980 to 52.0 per cent in 1995, in step with an 
increase in industry’s proportion from 12.1 to 20.0 per cent by 1995. The Malaysia 
and Thai precedent became a model for mobilizing unskilled workers, particularly 
young female workers, from rural areas into industry. Cambodia built its export 
garment sector more than a decade later using this model. At present, garment 
workers, recruited principally through personal networks, constitute 80 per cent 
of the industrial labour force. Remittances to rural areas amplified8 the poverty 
impact of the new labour opportunities.
The most dynamic element in the redeployment process involved women’s work 
in light manufacturing. The pattern of redeployment mirrors the FDI-driven 
export trends in the previous section (Table 20.2). For Malaysia, the Philippines, 
7 All data cited in this paragraph are from the World Bank database.
8 See Chhair and Ung (2016: 228) in the case of Cambodia.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Manuel F. Montes 521
and Thailand, female labour force participation rates peaked around 1990 with 
the influx of foreign investment. Studies in the garment and textiles sectors have 
revealed that as firms expanded their operations and increased mechanization, 
female workers were being let go in favour of male operators.
Into the 1990s, the mobilization of women’s labour into export industries gave 
foreign companies access to Lewis’s (1954) fabled unlimited supply of unskilled 
labour, initially in Malaysia and Thailand, then in the other four. Women gained 
employment in subcontracting companies producing for multinational  corporations 
and in related informal work. Women’s employment was ‘characterized by long 
hours, job insecurity and unhealthy working conditions, as well as low pay’ 
(Çağatay and Ertürk 2004: 20), but nevertheless coveted by women facing harsher 
forms of work otherwise. Feminist research from the late 1990s indicated that, 
instead of competitive pressures driving a decline of discrimination against 
women and minorities as predicted in mainstream economics, the low cost of 
non-unionized, and therefore docile, women’s labour often played the same role 
as an undervalued exchange rate in preserving international competitiveness in 
East Asia.9
5.2 Social and Political (In)equity
The lagging progress in social and political equity in the Six can be traced to the 
economic model and the efforts of postcolonial elites in these countries to maintain 
their political dominance. The performance of the three market-oriented econ-
omies of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand is quite weak in terms of improving 
social and political equity (You 1999). Chongvilaivan (2014) suggests that rising 
inequality in Southeast Asia has been driven primarily by the extent to which 
incomes of the rich have outstripped income growth of the poor despite significant 
reductions in the poverty headcount ratio. These are reflected in the relatively 
9 See, for example, Berik et al. (2004).
Table 20.2 Ratio of female-to-male labour force participation rate: national estimates, %
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Cambodia      98.7 94.3 89.4 93.5  
Lao PDR      97.2 99.0 99.3 96.0  
Myanmar    49.5 41.5 46.1 50.6 55.2 59.8 64.3
Malaysia   49.4 53.6 56.0 53.0 58.2 57.4 60.5 67.1
Philippines 43.6 51.9 30.2 59.7 58.1 59.7 60.2 62.3 64.0 64.8
Thailand 83.6 62.8 87.2 87.1 87.0 79.4 80.5 81.3 79.6 78.4
Source: Author, based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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stagnant trends at high levels of inequality in the Gini coefficient. These patterns 
are consistent with an economic model in which the key driver is the movement 
of rural labour to low-skill, export-oriented jobs. Low labour costs were the original 
source of attraction for the relocation of production facilities to the sub-region, 
‘militating against rapid wage growth in these countries’ (Jomo 2003b: 203).
In Malaysia, intra-elite conflicts have not expanded popular political participa-
tion within the state and across the society (Weiss 2006; Juego 2015). Single-party 
control in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Myanmar over long periods has 
kept intra-elite competition out of the public eye. The Philippines is distinguished 
in relying on periodic elections, enabling sweeping shifts in power over economic 
policy but only within the elite. In Thailand, periods of military control restrained 
intra-elite conflict; in the 2000s, a rural-based movement led by Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra threatened to broaden political participation.
5.3 State Investments in Social Development
Among the Six, a profile of exceptional growth and structural change is not 
matched by a strong record of investments in the social sector and social protection. 
The mobilization of rural workers, especially women, into the industrial labour 
force had a strong impact on poverty reduction in its heyday; but this was not 
accompanied by a ratcheting up in capabilities in the labour force because of 
shortfalls in the expansion of education, health, and other social programmes. In 
this section, we shall review the extent of these programmes and illustrate how 
these now represent a binding constraint for development, even for successful 
countries among the Six.
Social programmes and protections in the Six cannot be considered generous. 
Many of the customary programmes are still to be introduced or with coverage 
only for urban populations or the employed, and their long-term sustainability is 
weak (Chongvilaivan 2014). Among the Six, Thailand, followed by the Philippines, 
has made the most progress in terms of the existence of statutory social provi-
sions at the national level. Lao PDR leads the three LDCs in introducing statutory 
protections (see Montes  2018: table 8). As in other developing countries, the 
existence of statutory national protections among the Six can fall far short of the 
extent of actual funding or its transfer component, the quality of provision, and 
equality of access by gender, social class, and urban/rural location (ILO  2015; 
Mundle 2018). For development purposes, the most critical investments are in 
health and education.
5.3.1 Health: Limited Progress towards Universal Coverage
There is progress in health provision among the Six, but increasing coverage and 
keeping out-of-pocket costs low is difficult among the three LDCs because of the 
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undeveloped health infrastructure. Malaysia and Thailand have achieved universal 
coverage for essential health problems, while the Philippines had just crossed 
80 per cent coverage in 2015 (ILO 2015). Health coverage in Cambodia and Lao 
PDR are in the range of 25 per cent of the population. Various strategies have 
been tried to increase coverage. Out-of-pocket expenditures as a proportion of 
total health expenditures tend to be high among the LDCs (Montes 2018).
5.3.2 Education: A Prospective Binding Constraint
Inadequate investment in education has implications for the long-term  sustainability 
of the export-oriented model. The quality of education in the region is low and 
the expansion of access is often at the cost of quality (Phan and Coxhead 2015). 
Trends in inequality in access to education among the Six have stayed at stagnant 
levels in most countries experiencing rapid economic growth.
In Thailand, school completion rates are not distinguished. Skills shortages 
have become quite noticeable. Further expansion of the Thai automobile sector is 
now hampered by the lack of engineers (Orihashi 2010: 228) Thailand must also 
contend with a shortage of supporting industries, inadequate organizational cap-
acity, and poor capabilities of small- and medium-scale enterprises.
The extractive industries represent a high proportion of GDP in Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, and Myanmar. With low levels of education and social services, 
 extractive industry earnings could be channelled to investments in human devel-
opment; however, very few developing countries, including the other three mem-
bers of the Six, which in earlier decades had important mining sectors, have 
managed this potential well.
6. Southeast Asian Development Narratives
Why is the development record in the Six stronger than most other developing 
countries? What did Myrdal miss in 1968? One could group the flaws in Myrdal’s 
(1968) otherwise deeply grounded and wide-ranging social analysis into three types: 
(1) unexpected events that would have been difficult to predict; (2) mistaken 
inferences drawn from observations at the time; and (3) blind spots arising from 
the underlying analytical framework. The most important unexpected event 
would be Japan’s seizure of the United States’ private sector’s global dominance in 
leading global manufacturing areas, which triggered a drastic fall in the value of 
the dollar. The resulting yen revaluation required many industries in Japan to 
seek to relocate their labour-intensive activities to Thailand and Malaysia.
Another unforeseen event would be the experimentation and institutional 
reforms by Southeast Asian states in the agricultural sector, including a retreat 
from the socialist experiment of collectivized farming, and the significant alloca-
tion of state investments in agriculture. HYV also played a strong role in boosting 
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national agricultural productivity, though the technology favoured large land-
holders. State successes through institutional reforms and investment, which 
mitigated existing inequalities in rural areas, affected agricultural performance 
via their impact on unleashing private incentives.
In the case of the mistaken inferences from observation, an important example 
could be made about the undervaluing of a possible positive role of the elite in 
development processes, perhaps from an overemphasis on obstacles from corrup-
tion and poor governance. Against social democratic benchmarks, Myrdal (1968) 
pinpointed cultural impediments and the dominance of an unprogressive elite as 
villains in the Asian drama. Gradual reform could have fallen afoul of Myrdal’s 
warning that such a pace of change could be self-defeating. Among the Six, the 
exertions of postcolonial elites to protect their supremacy have shaped economic 
policies and reforms. This has meant that except for Malaysia, with its explicit 
programme to raise the social position of Malays, and the Philippines with its 
efforts at radical economic liberalization, changes have been gradual in order not 
to jeopardize elite economic interests.
In terms of blind spots arising from Myrdal’s (1968) underlying social democratic 
framework, it cannot be denied that the rent-driven industrial policies were 
 occasions for corruption and extended inefficiency. However, there were suffi-
cient opportunities for socially productive private wealth creation in the interface 
between state intervention and the external economy during and after import-
substitution. Contrary to Myrdal’s expectations, elites in the region, even those 
without a socialist mindset, have been relatively successful in nation-building 
efforts, including through evolving, though socially costly, industrial development 
interventions.
Especially within ethnic networks, capitalist motivations appear to have been 
sufficiently strong to mobilize adequate reinvestments of state-provided rent 
surpluses without the need for heavy state supervision to substitute for market 
 discipline. In the Six, the pursuit of development and export success relied heavily 
on existing technology and foreign investment, thus making the government bur-
den lighter; the difference is that most governments dared to sustain sectoral 
industrial policy.
The ability of the societies in the Six to productively and profitably participate 
in international production networks was facilitated by the practices of relational 
contracting, reminiscent of the mercantilist period, which Myrdal considered 
unsuitable. Shortfalls in social development and technological upgrading are the 
consequences of the chosen, elite-protecting, development path. These shortfalls, 
in line with Myrdal’s earlier insights, could impose a ceiling on an otherwise 
 relatively successful development record. A second blind spot from an underlying 
social democratic framework could be the undervaluing in the Six of the 
 commercial and innovative drives of the small farmers, who responded well to 
economic incentives and to access to higher-yielding farm technologies. In rural 
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Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, the spread of modern farming techniques, 
with state assistance, was rapid, even though the process could have worsened the 
existing economic and political imbalances against small farmers.
Myrdal’s analytical framework did not imagine the resilience and adaptability 
of the rentier economy in poor countries operating within a global capitalist 
economy. A lot of international trade and investment does not take place in an 
‘arm’s length’ manner, but relies heavily on international business networks and 
their engagement with local businessmen. Myrdal also did not foresee how 
workers’ overseas remittances and business process outsourcing could extend the 
life of a rentier economy in the Philippines, even though he predicted in 1968 
either a thoroughgoing democratization based on agrarian reform or a communist 
regime in the Philippines (Myrdal 1968: 390). Myrdal expressed scepticism of the 
diffuse form of socialism in Myanmar (then Burma); in actual operation, this 
regime, which relied heavily on state-owned enterprises, survived economic iso-
lation with an extended operation of a command-and-control system but lagged 
in growth and industrial development.
In the other four, the record suggests that domestic rentiers can engage in 
 capital accumulation while interacting with global capitalist processes. The Six’s 
experience suggests that a globally friendly postcolonial elite could play a positive 
role in coherently taking advantage of opportunities in the global economy to raise 
economic growth rates. But it is not a guarantee of long-term development, espe-
cially because sustaining growth will require upgraded domestic  technological 
 capabilities which, in turn, requires building internationally capable indigenous 
enterprises and workers.
To an extent not foreseen by Myrdal, the development achievements of the Six 
have been predicated on a benign influence of the external economy—both in 
short-term events and long-term evolution.
In the short term, the three LDCs’ dependence on commodity exports signals 
continuing vulnerability to global economic cycles; with state facilitation, these 
economies have been increasing their participation in global production net-
works. In the case of the three middle-income countries, the short-term external 
vulnerability derives from their open capital accounts susceptible to highly 
volatile  private capital flows. The prospects are poor regarding concerted private 
 capital re-regulation or global institutional reforms to constrain global economic 
cycles, commodity price cycles, and private capital flow volatility. In the long term, 
climate change represents the first external binding constraint (Montes 2018).
The inadequate level of social development and provisioning constitutes the most 
binding internal constraint in the context of the Six’s reliance on  international 
trade. Capturing greater value-added from participation in  international value 
chains requires an increasingly capable labour force and private sector.
Extending the model of exporting goods does not augur well for further 
development. While there is still some room for climbing up the value chain 
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among the three LDCs, for the middle-income countries the threat is stagnation 
in the middle-income category. Growth among the Six is not distinguished by 
significant upgrading of human or technological capabilities. Southeast Asia 
does not have large international companies that participate actively in inter-
national  technological advances. The social structure—including a narrow private-
sector base—and internal politics among the Six also do not portend an ample 
change in attention to investment in social development or a ratcheting-up of 
technological capabilities. Within the constraints imposed by global rules in 
international institutions, such as the WTO, these countries, seen by many other 
countries as successful globalizers, must find a way to overcome the limits of 
their domestic social structures to continue to advance their development ambitions. 
It will not be easy.
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This chapter tells the story of the South Asian economy (excluding India) in the 
last fifty years. Soon after independence from British rule around the middle of 
the last century, the region seemed to have a better prospect than many other 
parts of the Third World. In the event, however, South Asia crawled while the 
neighbouring East and Southeast Asia galloped away. In fact, in the 1970s, soon 
after Gunnar Myrdal finished writing his Asian Drama, South Asia (including 
India) plunged into a crisis, that made future prospects look even worse than 
Myrdal had anticipated. Nonetheless, after traversing a chequered path, a large 
part of the region seems finally able to look forward to a much brighter future 
than seemed possible at the time the Asian Drama was being written. This 
chapter describes and explains this story in terms of economic strategies and 
political economy of the region—focusing on Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, and Bhutan.
It ought to be recognized at the outset that although South Asia has failed to 
keep pace with East and Southeast Asia, in absolute terms the region has made 
great strides in the last fifty years—in both economic and social spheres. South 
Asia was among the most populous parts of the world in the 1960s and excessive 
population pressure was widely deemed to be a serious obstacle to the region’s 
socio-economic progress. After fifty years, the population has more than trebled, 
and yet the spectre of population explosion is no longer as haunting as it used to be. 
This is because the region has succeeded in bringing down the rate of population 
growth considerably. From an average of over 2.5 per cent per annum, population 
growth has come down to about 1.5 per cent, the only exception being Pakistan, 
where population growth has slowed only marginally. The slowdown in popula-
tion growth was brought about by an unusually early demographic transition that 
is still ongoing in most of the region.
Slowing population growth and respectable economic growth have together 
ensured that, despite more than a trebling of the population, the region has 
 experienced an improvement in living standards that did not seem possible fifty 
years ago. Per capita income has almost trebled, life expectancy at birth has gone 
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up from less than fifty years (except in Sri Lanka) to nearly seventy years, and 
enrolment at the primary level has become near universal.1
This chapter tells the story of how this progress was achieved and what chal-
lenges lie ahead. Section 2 sets out the background to the story by looking at the 
initial conditions that Myrdal would have observed in the 1960s. Section 3 pro-
vides an overview of the economic growth and structural transformation of the 
region over the fifty years since the writing of Asian Drama. Sections 4 and 5 
then attempt an analytical narrative of the major forces—including policies 
and exogenous factors—that underlie the growth process. Next, the record of per-
formance in the spheres of poverty reduction and human development is discussed 
in section 6. Finally, section 7 offers some brief observations on the prospects of 
the region in the coming decades.
2.  Historical Context and Initial Conditions
As the countries of the region embarked on the path of economic development 
around the middle of the twentieth century, they naturally shared some common 
initial conditions, stemming from a common historical legacy, most notably 
nearly two hundred years of British colonial rule.2 Nonetheless, there were some 
important differences among the countries—stemming from cultural, geographical, 
and to some extent historical differences—that had a significant bearing on their 
subsequent trajectories of development.
Nepal and Bhutan, the two landlocked countries of the region, were 
 geographically very different from the rest. A rugged mountainous topography 
posed a serious hindrance to the development of agriculture and infrastructure, 
in particular. The same topography, however, also endowed them with a rich 
potential of hydropower, which they were to harness to great advantage in the 
years to come. In contrast, Bangladesh was a plain riverine land, whose soil fertility 
was regularly replenished by the rich alluvial deposits that came with the annual 
flooding of several mighty rivers and their numerous tributaries. Geography 
made the pursuit of traditional rice-based agriculture especially convenient, but it 
also made the development of physical infrastructure especially difficult and 
made the country susceptible to excessive flooding and devastating tidal surges. 
Pakistan had a combination of rugged mountains and plain land. The latter was 
made fertile by the rich network of modern irrigation developed under the Indus 
Valley Development Project, initiated during British rule. Sri Lanka, as an island 
economy, was geographically at the opposite pole of landlocked Nepal and Bhutan. 
1 For more on the quantitative indicators of socio-economic progress, see Osmani (2018: table A1).
2 Although Nepal and Bhutan were never colonized by India, they were not altogether immune 
from the economic and political consequences of British colonialism.
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Like Pakistan, it too had a fair mix of rugged mountains and plain land, but the 
land was naturally fertile, blessed as it was with generous rainfall from a double 
annual monsoon. Unlike agriculture in the rest of the region, however, Sri Lanka’s 
agriculture was not singularly oriented towards the production of subsistence crops 
(rice and wheat). Sri Lanka was unique in the region in having a predominance of 
plantation agriculture (mainly tea, followed by rubber and coconut), as a direct 
legacy of British colonial policy.
There were significant differences in the political sphere as well. Nepal and 
Bhutan were ancient kingdoms, ruled by powerful dynasties, which did not allow 
democratic freedom of any sort. The cost of unfreedom in the two countries was 
very different, however, owing to deep-seated religious and cultural differences. 
Nepal was a deeply caste-divided Hindu society, where the lower castes faced 
severe discrimination in all spheres of life—in some ways, more severe than even 
the worst cases of caste discrimination in India. Bhutan, in contrast, was a much 
more peaceful homogeneous Buddhist society, where the general populace was 
largely content with meagre living in material terms, and the elite faced little 
resistance in maintaining its grip on both political and economic levers. While 
both these kingdoms were internally powerful, they were externally vulnerable, 
because of their small size and landlocked nature; and they responded to this vul-
nerability by forging very close political and economic ties with India.
Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were parts of the same country when Myrdal 
was writing, had a very different political and cultural disposition. There were 
stirrings of democracy following independence from colonial rule in 1947, but 
they soon dissipated as the country came to be ruled by military dictatorship 
within a decade of independence; and by the time Myrdal began to study this 
region in the 1960s, autocracy had become firmly entrenched. However, the 
underlying discontent at the loss of democratic freedom never disappeared at the 
grassroots level, especially in Bangladesh (East Pakistan, as it was then called), for 
which military dictatorship was tantamount to forceful subjugation of their  people 
by the military junta of (West) Pakistan. Over time, the undercurrent of discontent 
was to culminate in the break-up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as 
an independent nation in 1971. But the legacy of prolonged military rule had 
already done lasting damage to the polity in both countries, especially in Pakistan, 
as military rule was repeatedly reimposed under various pretexts. Bangladesh has 
succeeded somewhat better in removing the shackles of autocracy in recent years, 
practising parliamentary democracy since 1990, albeit in a deeply flawed fashion; 
but Pakistan continues to be haunted by the recurrence of military rule every time 
the prospect of democracy appears on the horizon.
Among all the countries under review, Sri Lanka was the most advanced in 
terms of success in forging democratic institutions. The practice of limited self-
rule that the British had initiated in the 1930s had already instilled a culture of 
democratic practice even before the British left, and, by the time Myrdal was 
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writing, democracy had taken a firm hold in Sri Lanka. There was trouble ahead, 
though, as the eruption of violent conflict between the majority Buddhist 
Sinhalese community and the minority Hindu Tamils threatened to destroy the 
fabric of the society.
Apart from a more democratic polity, the initial conditions of Sri Lanka differed 
from those of the rest of the countries in several other important respects. Most 
significantly, Sri Lanka was well ahead of the rest (including India) in terms of per 
capita income. This advantage was owed almost entirely to its plantation economy, 
which had enabled Sri Lanka to gain handsomely from successive commodity 
booms both before and after political independence. Sri Lanka was also way ahead 
in terms of human development—its achievements in health and education were 
well above the levels obtaining in other countries with similar per capita income.
Despite many differences in the initial conditions noted above, the majority of 
the countries shared one common initial condition that was fundamental to their 
subsequent transformation. This commonality lay in the choice of development 
strategy. Inspired by the example of India, they adopted the then popular strategy 
of economic planning in which the state was expected to play a predominant role 
in guiding the process of economic development.
There were a couple of significant exceptions, however. While Sri Lanka did 
follow in the footsteps of India by adopting a state-led development strategy, it 
continued at the same time to sustain—and indeed strengthen—its unique welfare 
state policies, which were inherited from the terminal years of colonial times. The 
other exception was Bhutan, which had no development strategy in the conven-
tional sense. This was consistent with the de-emphasis on material prosperity that 
had become ingrained in Bhutanese culture, which received rather colourful 
expression in the royal proclamation that Bhutan would pursue the goal of gross 
national happiness (GNH) as distinct from the pursuit of gross national product 
(GNP) that is embodied in conventional development strategies.
Some quantitative indices of the initial conditions are presented below:3
(a) In terms of per capita income, the region was poorer than most developing 
regions in the world but not in comparison with the rest of Asia. Within 
the region, Sri Lanka was by far the most prosperous country and Nepal 
the poorest.
(b) There was a negligible manufacturing base in Nepal and Bangladesh, with 
GDP shares of 3.3 per cent and 5.4 per cent respectively. Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka were relatively advanced in this regard but they, too, were well below 
the East Asian and Latin American standards.
(c) Bangladesh and Pakistan were the most populous countries of the region, 
accounting for some 85 per cent of the total population of the region. 
Bhutan was by far the tiniest, with a population of about 200,000.
3 For more details, see Osmani (2018: table A2).
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(d) With more than 400 people per square kilometre, Bangladesh had an 
exceptionally high population density. For comparison, South Asia as a 
whole (including India) had a density of 128, East Asia 59 and the other 
developing regions only around 10–12.
(e) With a life expectancy of fifty-nine years and 94 per cent enrolment at the 
primary level, Sri Lanka was way ahead of the rest of the region as well as 
most other developing regions in terms of health and education. Within the 
region itself, Bhutan and Nepal lagged the furthest behind, with Pakistan 
and Bangladesh occupying a position somewhere in between.
3. Growth and Structural Transformation
Growth performance has been slightly uneven across the region (Table  21.1, 
Panel A). Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka experienced a growth acceleration 
between the two halves of the fifty-year period from 1965 to 2015. The  acceleration 
was the sharpest in Bangladesh, where the growth rate doubled from 2.7 per cent 
per annum in the first half to 5.4 per cent in the second. In comparison, the 
 acceleration in Nepal and Sri Lanka was marginal. Bhutan and Pakistan, in con-
trast, experienced a deceleration of growth. Between the two, Bhutan’s case is 
somewhat special because its initial growth rate (10.1 per cent in the 1980s) was a 
bit artificial, built as it was on a low base. The only genuine deceleration is 
observed in Pakistan, where the growth rate went down from 5.8 per cent in the 
first half of the period to 4.1 per cent in the second.4
All the countries in the region have gone through significant structural changes 
over time, as one would expect to happen in conjunction with economic growth. 
The share of agriculture in national income has declined sharply in all the coun-
tries and the share of industry increased. However, industry is a broad category 
that includes hydropower (e.g., in Bhutan and Nepal) and plantation (in Sri Lanka) 
as well as construction and manufacturing. Considering the narrower category of 
manufacturing alone, the extent of transformation in the sense of economic mod-
ernization has been relatively modest. This is true especially of Nepal and Bhutan, 
where the share of manufacturing remains well below 10 per cent in recent years. 
Even in the other three countries, the share is currently less than 20  per cent, 
whereas, for comparison, the share of manufacturing in the GDP of the East Asia 
and Pacific region during the same period was close to 30 per cent.
The growth and structural transformation of the last fifty years have been 
underpinned by a considerable increase in the rate of capital formation and 
trade orientation (Osmani 2018: table A2). Pakistan is a notable exception with 
4 The pattern of change in the growth of per capita income is very similar to that of the overall 
growth rate. However, differential success in reining in population growth did make a difference, 
especially in sharpening the contrast between Bangladesh and Pakistan.
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regard to the rate of investment, which has actually declined over the period—
from 16.2 per cent at the beginning of the period to 14.9 per cent towards the 
end, which goes a long way towards explaining why Pakistan has been unique 
in the region in facing a growth deceleration between the two halves of the 
period. As for trade orientation, Sri Lanka was by far the most trade-oriented 
country at the beginning of the period, thanks mainly to its reliance on the 
plantation sector. Over the years, Sri Lanka has increased its trade ratio 
slightly—from 46.7 per cent in the beginning to 51.1 per cent at the end. By the 
end of the period, Bhutan had turned into the most open economy of the region, 
with a trade ratio of over 100 per cent, which is a consequence of the country’s 
overwhelming dependence on India for all its hydropower exports as well as 
most of its consumer goods imports.
There has also been a significant change in the region’s dependence on foreign 
aid: all the countries are now much less dependent on foreign aid than they used 
to be. In this sense, the region has become much more self-reliant. The most 
Table 21.1 Growth performance of South Asia: 1966–2015
Panel A Growth of GDP: 1966–2015
(% per annum)
 Per capita GDP owth GDP growth Population growth
1966–1990 1991–2015 1966–1990 1991–2015 1966–1990 1991–2015
Bangladesh 0.1 3.6 2.7 5.4 2.6 1.7
Bhutan 7.1 5.0 10.1 6.6 3.0 1.6
Nepal 1.1 2.7 3.3 4.4 2.2 1.8
Pakistan 2.7 1.8 5.8 4.1 3.1 2.3
Sri Lanka 2.8 4.5 4.6 5.4 1.8 0.9
India 2.1 4.9 4.4 6.6 2.3 1.7
Panel B Growth reversal in the 1970s and subsequent  
transition (growth of GDP; % per annum)
1966–1970 1971–1980 1981–2015
Bangladesh 3.4 1.0 5.0
Bhutan n.a. n.a. 7.6
Nepal 2.6 2.1 4.5
Pakistan 7.1 4.7 4.7
Sri Lanka 5.8 4.4 5.1
India 4.6 3.1 6.3
Notes: (1) The initial figures for Bhutan relate to the decade 1981–1990, since national income data are 
not available for Bhutan prior to 1980.
(2) In this, and the next table, we include Indian data, purely for a quick comparison, but without 
any comments in the text, because the Indian experience is not in the purview of this chapter.
Source: Compiled by the author from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
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significant change in this regard has taken place in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
During the last three decades, the flow of foreign aid has gone down in Sri Lanka 
from 8.4 per cent of GDP to less than 1 per cent, and in Bangladesh it has fallen 
from almost 6 per cent to 1.3 per cent. The flow of foreign aid to Nepal and 
Bhutan—originating mostly from India, on which both countries continue to be 
highly dependent—remains high in absolute terms, but even there it has fallen 
somewhat as a percentage of GDP.
A final noteworthy feature of the structural change in the region is its heavy 
reliance on workers’ remittances. In all the countries except Bhutan, the flow of 
remittances is high and has increased sharply over the years. The magnitude of 
increase has been the most spectacular in Nepal, where remittances amounted 
to 27.5 per cent of GDP during 2011 to 2015, making it an exceptionally 
 remittance-dependent country by international standards, not just by the standards 
of the region.
The main features of growth and structural transformation of the region may 
be summarized as follows. First, all the countries except Pakistan have  experienced 
a substantial growth acceleration in the period since around 1990. Second, the 
growth acceleration has been underpinned by a rapid increase in the rates of sav-
ings and investment on the one hand and increasing trade openness on the other. 
Third, the rise in investment rates is especially remarkable in view of the fact that 
the region’s dependence on foreign aid has fallen drastically. Higher rates of 
investment have been sustained partly by internal resource mobilization, and 
largely by a sharp rise in the flow of workers’ remittances. Fourth, the structural 
transformation that has accompanied growth acceleration has been characterized 
by a sharp decline in the share of agriculture in national output, but without a 
correspondingly sharp increase in the share of manufacturing; it is services that 
have led the way. Finally, Pakistan, with stagnant investment rate and sluggish 
growth, has been an exception to the general pattern prevailing in the region.
The preceding summary makes it clear that the growth acceleration that has 
occurred since 1990 (except in Pakistan) is what one would expect from the basic 
tenets of development theory. Rise in investment rates and in the degree of trade 
openness are widely recognized to be among the major factors (though by no 
means the only ones) that propel economic growth, both on their own and 
through their interaction with each other. Both these factors have improved sig-
nificantly in the second half of the period under consideration (except in 
Pakistan), making the growth acceleration possible. At the same time, the com-
parison of these factors with those of East Asia helps explain why the region is 
lagging behind. Most of the countries of the region have failed to reach the levels 
that East Asia has achieved—in terms of both investment rates (43 per cent in 
2011–2015) and trade openness (56 per cent during 2011–2015).5
5 East Asia here refers to the region classified by the World Bank as ‘East Asia and Pacific (excluding 
high-income countries)’ and the data are taken from the World Development Indicators database.
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4.  Growth Reversal of the 1970s
Before attempting to unravel the forces behind the patterns of growth and struc-
tural transformation in South Asia, it is necessary to note that, soon after Myrdal 
wrote Asian Drama in the mid-1960s, growth prospects actually dimmed in 
South Asia (including India) before they began to improve. For most of the 1970s, 
the region faced a reversal of the growth momentum that had been generated in 
the preceding decades. For this reason, this decade has been described as the ‘dis-
mal decade’ of South Asia (Osmani 2009).6
The rate of growth declined in the 1970s from the rates achieved in 1966–1970 
in all countries for which data are available (Osmani 2018: table A1, panel B).7 It 
was only in the 1980s, and in some cases in the 1990s, that signs of transition to a 
higher growth path began to emerge. The setback that happened in the 1970s, and 
the struggles the countries had to go through to recover from this setback, explain 
in some measure why South Asia has lagged behind East and Southeast Asia in 
the last fifty years in spite of starting from roughly comparable positions. In order 
to understand the overall growth performance of the region, it is therefore neces-
sary to understand why the reversal happened in the first instance and how the 
countries attempted to climb out of it in the subsequent decades.
In explaining the growth reversal of the 1970s in South Asia (including India), 
it is common to attribute a central role to the alleged inefficiencies of a restrictive 
trade and industrial policy regime—in particular, of the import substitution strat-
egy of development that was pursued throughout the region in the 1950s and 
1960s.8 It is, of course, acknowledged that South Asia was not unique in pursuing 
the import substitution strategy and that East Asia was also pursuing a similar 
strategy around the same time and still achieved much bigger success in subse-
quent decades. The argument is rather that South Asia persisted with this strategy 
for far too long and implemented it much more rigidly than East Asia, and as a 
consequence suffered much more from the inefficiencies induced by the strategy. 
While this argument may have some validity in explaining a part of South Asia’s 
growth shortfall relative to East Asia over the long term, it is a mistake to single 
out the cumulative effect of import substitution as the primary reason for the 
growth debacle of the 1970s. A number of conjunctural factors combined with a 
6 The 1970s was of course a bad time for the global economy generally, owing mainly to the oil 
price shock and the policy responses to it. But the situation was especially bad for South Asia for 
reasons that were specific to the region, which is what justifies describing the 1970s as the dismal dec-
ade for South Asia, much more so than for any other developing region. For more on this, see Osmani 
(2009).
7 The precise period during which the growth reversal happened varied between countries, and the 
record of growth during those periods is a lot worse than the average for the entire decade of the 1970s 
shown in the table. For details of these variations, see Osmani (2009).
8 The exception was Bhutan, which did not pursue any kind of industrialization strategy to speak of 
until the 1980s.
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range of policy failures to cause that debacle, and the policy failures that occurred 
went far beyond mere persistence with import substitution.9
The overwhelming importance of conjunctural factors is obvious in 
Bangladesh, which emerged as an independent nation in December 1971 after a 
prolonged war of liberation. The problem of physical devastation caused by the 
war was compounded by the disappearance of almost the entire entrepreneurial 
class, which came predominantly from West Pakistan. In the process, a large 
number of modern industries became ownerless, leaving the government with 
the choice of either nationalizing them or auctioning them off to private entrepre-
neurs. In the event, the first option was chosen, partly because of the absence of a 
strong indigenous entrepreneurial class, and partly in deference to the socialist 
ideal of the leadership of the newly independent country. At the same time, unre-
lenting balance of payments crises forced the government to adopt various 
restrictive measures including high tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, 
and import licensing, resulting in high and variable incentives for import substi-
tution. It is thus fair to say that the restrictive trade and industrial policies of this 
decade were more a consequence than a cause of the economic meltdown, which 
was due primarily to exogenous factors.
In Pakistan, too, the poor performance of the economy in the dismal decade 
must be attributed mainly to factors other than the trade regime. To begin with, 
half of the country’s export market suddenly disappeared with the cessation of 
East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh in December 1971. At the same time, 
agricultural output was severely disrupted by a series of floods and pest attacks. 
The effects of these shocks were compounded by the radical programme of eco-
nomic reform adopted by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He came to power 
in December 1971 with an avowedly socialist agenda of land reform and nation-
alization of industries. In the event, the implementation of land reform fell far 
short of its aim, but the disruption caused by government rhetoric and the piece-
meal nature of its implementation created enough uncertainty to dampen the 
growth of investment in agriculture. The nationalization programme proved to be 
especially damaging. It had a severely dampening effect on private investment—
the driving force behind Pakistan’s growth in the preceding decades (Burki 1980). 
By 1974/75, total investment in large-scale manufacturing had dwindled to just 
one-third of the level of 1969/70. The precipitous decline of manufacturing in the 
dismal decade was but the inevitable consequence of this slump in investment. 
It is thus reasonable to argue that the slump of the 1970s owed much more to 
the joint squeeze delivered by exogenous shocks and Bhutto’s anti-private enter-
prise policies than to the inefficiencies of import-substituting industrialization in 
the preceding decades.
9 For an elaborate development of this argument for the whole of the South Asia region, including 
India, see Osmani (2009).
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In the case of Sri Lanka, two different aspects of the policy regime have gener-
ally been blamed for the growth debacle of the 1970s. One of them is the common 
theme of excessive reliance on import-substituting industrialization. The other is 
unique to Sri Lanka—viz. its policy of maintaining persistently high levels of 
welfare expenditure until the 1980s. Several commentators have argued that 
whatever contributions these welfare expenditures might have made towards 
human development in Sri Lanka, they entailed a trade-off with economic 
growth, and that the crisis of the 1970s was but an inevitable consequence of this 
anti-growth bias of the welfarist regime.
Neither of these lines of argument stands up to careful empirical scrutiny.10 As 
in the case of Pakistan, policy mistakes did aggravate the crisis, but the real problem 
did not lie either in the pursuit of import substitution or in the commitment to 
the welfare state. The problem lay in the creation of an overbearing state—in 
 particular, in excessive reliance on the public sector as the principal vehicle for 
driving growth. The Ten-Year Plan for 1959–1968, which launched Sri Lanka on 
the path to industrialization, was deeply influenced by the Nehru–Mahalanobis 
strategy prevailing in India at the time, but Sri Lanka went far ahead of India in its 
reliance on the public sector. In the event, the Ten-Year Plan never became fully 
operational, and prior to 1970 the scope of the public sector remained smaller 
than was originally envisaged. However, soon after the left-wing collation, led by 
Srimavo Bandaranaike, came to power in 1970, the overbearing state spread its 
tentacles to all aspects of the economy—industry, agriculture, trade, and key service 
sectors. Thus, the economy that evolved in the 1970s was characterized by complete 
dominance of the state, which induced widespread rigidities and inefficiency.11
It is thus evident that the genesis of the ‘dismal decade’ in South Asia was a 
complex phenomenon going far beyond trade strategy. In all the countries, a 
series of supply shocks played a major role in precipitating the crisis. Erroneous 
policies were certainly responsible for aggravating the crisis, but the real culpabil-
ity lay not so much with the policy of import substitution as with the excess of 
state intervention engulfing every sphere of the economy.
5. Attempted Transition to a Higher Growth Path
The dismal decade of South Asia came to an end towards the end of the 1970s. 
The first country to try to break out of the shackles was Sri Lanka, around 1977–
1978, followed by Pakistan and then Bangladesh and Nepal. The transition was 
marked by a decisive shift in policy regime in each of the countries. The new 
regimes had many common features across the countries, although the vigour 
10 For a detailed rebuttal of both these lines of argument, see Osmani (1994).
11 For evidence and further elaboration of these arguments see, among others, Athukorala and 
Jayasuriya (1994), Athukorala and Rajapathirana (2000), and Osmani (2009).
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and consistency with which they were implemented varied from country to country. 
On the whole, the new regimes entailed a significant softening of the administra-
tive grip on the economy, allowing a freer play of market forces both within the 
domestic sphere and in the conduct of external economic relations.12
5.1  The Reform Process
In Sri Lanka, the reform process started in 1977 when the right-wing United 
National Party (UNP), led by J.R. Jayawardene, returned to power with massive 
popular support. With the help of Bretton Woods institutions, the new govern-
ment embarked upon an ambitious reform programme. The list of reform 
included the replacement of quantitative restrictions by tariffs on most import 
items, across-the-board reduction in tariff rates, hefty devaluation of the currency 
against the dollar, removal of exchange control for current account transactions, 
withdrawal of state monopoly over import trade and distribution of essential 
commodities, elimination of price controls, rationalization of state-owned enter-
prises, and special incentives to exporters of manufactures. A radical change also 
occurred in social welfare policy with the abolition of direct consumer subsidies. 
The rice ration system was replaced by a system of food stamps targeted at low-
income groups.
In Pakistan, on his assumption of power in 1977, General Ziaul Haq initiated 
reforms with the avowed aims of reversing the statist strategy of the previous 
regime and restoring business confidence within the private sector. To this end, 
steps were taken to denationalize a few of the industries, to soften the grip of the 
investment licensing system and to encourage the private sector to enter the areas 
not reserved for the public sector.
In Bangladesh, a major thrust towards liberalization came with the launching 
of the New Industrial Policy (NIP) in 1982, which initiated a process of denation-
alization and stimulation of private enterprise. By 1985, only about 40 per cent of 
industrial assets remained in the public sector as compared with 90 per cent in 
the early 1970s. Nepal moved much more slowly than the others in the early 
1980s, relying mainly on a depreciation of the currency aimed at boosting exports.
These early reforms had very little impact on the real economy, however. There 
was indeed an economic upturn at that time, but in all cases it was engineered by 
an unprecedented expansion of demand that brought about higher growth 
through fuller utilization of the excess capacity that had emerged in the 1970s.
In Sri Lanka, the expansion of domestic demand came from two main sources. 
First, the government embarked upon an investment programme of unprece-
dented magnitude with two major components—one involving large-scale  irrigation 
12 The following discussion leaves out Bhutan, whose story has some unique features. That story is 
told briefly in a separate sub-section at the end of this section.
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and land development under the Mahaweli Development Project and the other 
involving an ambitious housing programme. Second, the investment effort was 
supported by an exceptionally generous flow of foreign assistance from Western 
donors who were keen to ensure the success of Sri Lanka’s  pioneering effort at 
economic liberalization. In the process, the budget deficit soared from about 8 
per cent of GDP during 1970–1977 to 19 per cent during 1978–1983.
In Pakistan and Nepal, too, the initial boost to domestic demand came from 
expansionary fiscal policy. The fiscal deficit increased from an average of 5.3 per 
cent of GDP in the 1970s to 7.1 per cent in the 1980s in Pakistan,13 and from 
3.1 per cent to 6.7 per cent in Nepal.14 Bangladesh was slightly different in the 
sense that credit policy was the principal vehicle for demand expansion. In order 
to ensure the success of the privatization programme that stemmed from the NIP 
launched in 1982, the potential buyers of state-owned enterprises were lured with 
cheap credit from the nationalized banking system, resulting in a credit boom.
It is arguable that some degree of demand expansion made sense in the 1980s 
for all these countries as it helped exploit the slack that had been generated by the 
crisis of the 1970s. The problem, however, was that, in all cases, the expansion of 
demand was carried to the extreme, thereby storing up macroeconomic imbal-
ances for the future, which led invariably to growth retardation, principally 
through fiscal squeeze and partly through appreciation of the real exchange rate 
that resulted from higher inflation.
Deep-rooted structural problems eventually began to outweigh the stimulus of 
demand expansion, resulting in the slowdown of growth. The emerging crisis 
prompted a series of structural adjustment programmes starting from the second 
half of the 1980s, which apart from trying to stabilize demand also aimed at 
implementing far-reaching market-oriented reforms in both domestic and 
external sectors.
5.2 Post-reform Growth Trajectories
While the nature of reforms was very similar in all the countries, the results were 
very different, mainly because of the different ways in which the political econ-
omy of the countries evolved in the subsequent period. The biggest problems 
were faced by Pakistan and Nepal; Sri Lanka somehow muddled through, and 
13 Three other factors also contributed: depreciation of currency, a surge in workers’ remittances, 
and a large inflow of Western aid, which poured in mainly to help Pakistan train and arm the Afghan 
mujahideen who were fighting against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Average annual foreign aid 
committed to Pakistan increased from US$1.45 billion during 1970–1978 to as much as US$2.29 billion 
during 1983–1988 (Ahmad and Laporte 1989).
14 At the same time, money supply also increased rapidly, the supply of broad money rising from 
16.2 per cent of GDP to 27.2 per cent. For more on the reforms in Nepal, see Osmani and Bajracharya 
(2008).
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Bangladesh was the only country that was able to enjoy sustained benefits from 
the reforms.
In Pakistan, the decade of the 1990s was marked by an intense power struggle 
among the major political parties on the one hand, and the military–bureaucratic 
nexus on the other, which resulted in the dismissal of four elected governments, 
culminating in yet another military coup in 1999. The fallout of this turmoil was a 
severe deterioration in economic performance—so much so that during the five-
year period 1997–2002, GDP growth plummeted to an average of barely 3 per cent, 
which was even lower than had been achieved in the ‘dismal decade’. There was 
a  brief turnaround after 2002–2003, but this too did not last long as it was 
stimulated by unsustainable fiscal expansion rather than long-overdue structural 
reforms (Hasan 2008). The history of growth in Pakistan is thus one of a series of 
booms and busts. Political uncertainty has played a huge part in causing these 
economic cycles, which in turn has had a deleterious long-term effect on the 
economy by causing a secular stagnation of investment. Since 1980, Pakistan’s 
investment ratio has been the lowest in the region; not surprisingly, its growth 
performance has also been the weakest.
In Nepal, too, the potential benefits of reforms were swamped by the fallout 
from political turmoil. For a while, the reforms instituted in the early 1990s did 
seem to yield some tangible results, but the growth rate slumped after 2000. This 
slump was caused by the political turmoil emanating especially from a severe 
Maoist insurgency and a protracted power struggle between politicians and the 
Royalty. Despite the economic progress made in the previous period, Nepal’s 
development was fragile and fraught with deficiencies. Most importantly, not all 
regions or groups were able to participate equally in growth and human develop-
ment. In particular, the Western and Far Western regions, Dalits (the lowest caste 
or ‘untouchables’) and indigenous peoples lagged behind badly. Growing inequal-
ity sowed the seeds of a Maoist insurgency, which started in 1996, and intensified 
after 2001, leading to a serious deterioration in security and disruption in devel-
opment and governance in large parts of Nepal. Furthermore, an increasingly 
competitive global environment, brought about by the phasing out of the quota 
that was guaranteed under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), resulted in a steady 
loss in the market share of Nepali exports. When the conflicts finally ended in 
2007, and a new political compact was reached around a new interim Constitution, 
it was hoped that the economy would finally turn a corner. However, a large peace 
dividend that many had hoped for failed to materialize, and the economy sput-
tered along at an average growth rate of 4.7 per cent during this period.15
Sri Lanka’s post-reform growth trajectory also went through ups and downs, 
but on the average, the economy kept growing at the moderate rate of around 
15 The opportunities and challenges emerging in the post-conflict era are insightfully analysed in 
Pant et al. (2017) and World Bank (2017).
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5 per cent during 1985 to 2005. Several structural bottlenecks were responsible for 
Sri Lanka’s failure to move on to an even higher growth path after the initial 
recovery. Some of these bottlenecks were legacies of the profligate macroeco-
nomic policy the country pursued after 1977.16 These included slow growth of 
public investment, high rates of inflation leading to the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and negative real interest rate. By the mid-2000s, a widespread dis-
enchantment had set in among Sri Lankans with the unfulfilled promises of the 
liberalized policy regime. A decisive shift in policy orientation came when the 
coalition government of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came to 
power in 2004, and it became intensified when Mahinda Rajapakse, the candidate 
of the left-leaning Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), won the Presidential elec-
tions of November 2005.
The new government’s development ideology and policy directions marked a 
deliberate attempt to move away from many of the fundamental tenets of the pre-
ceding regime.17 The government placed special emphasis on social development, 
distributive policies, extensive government intervention and ‘domestic’ economic 
activities of the rural populations. In the process of pursuing this agenda, the gov-
ernment reverted to the inward-looking protectionist development policy of the 
past. Restrictive trade policies created a strong anti-export bias, which was 
reflected in a dramatic decline in the trade-to-GDP ratio—from 89 per cent in 
2000 to 48 per cent in 2016. Overall growth performance did not, however, suffer 
in the short run. In addition to policy actions that boosted domestic demand, the 
end of the decades-long civil war in the North in 2009 provided a significant boost 
to the economy. The ensuing peace dividend, in combination with the domestic-
demand-oriented policy, has enabled the country to maintain a steady enough 
growth over a prolonged period. There is, however, no sign of the growth 
 acceleration that many expected the peace dividend to yield.
In Bangladesh, the eventual transition to a higher growth path coincided with 
its democratic transition at the outset of the 1990s. Improved performance of 
both agriculture and manufacturing contributed to the acceleration of growth. A 
combination of policy interventions and favourable external conditions helped to 
bring about this transformation.18
In agriculture, a major boost came from the liberalization of markets for 
agricultural inputs, especially elimination of non-tariff barriers to the importation 
of cheap irrigation equipment with effect from 1988. Growth in manufacturing 
was led by the export-oriented garments sector, which benefitted from a combin-
ation of policy reform and conjunctural factors. On the policy front, trade 
16 Kelegama (2008) provides a perceptive analysis of the legacies left by the fiscal profligacy of the 
1980s.
17 See World Bank (2016b) for detailed discussion of this policy shift and its implications.
18 For a fuller analysis of the growth acceleration in Bangladesh since the 1990s, see Osmani et al. 
(2006).
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liberalization played a key role. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Bangladesh embarked upon one of the most remarkable episodes of trade liberal-
ization in the contemporary world, slashing tariff rates much faster than most 
other developing countries in Asia and elsewhere (Mahmud 2004). Reduced pro-
tection, coupled with a variety of direct incentives offered to the export-oriented 
firms, resulted in a substantial reduction in anti-export bias within the existing 
incentive structure. To a significant extent, export growth was also helped by 
external factors such as the MFA, which ensured easy access of Bangladeshi gar-
ments to Western markets. A couple of other factors also helped—namely, 
stronger mobilization of domestic resources and increased flow of workers’ remit-
tances. All these have enabled Bangladesh to maintain a steady acceleration in 
GDP growth since around 1990. From an average of 3.8 per cent in the 1980s, the 
growth rate has accelerated steadily, reaching an average of 6.3 per cent during 
2010 to 2015. Such a sustained acceleration in growth over a quarter of a century 
makes Bangladesh an exceptional performer in the region—in sharp contrast to 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, all of which have struggled to sustain growth, let 
alone to accelerate it, during the same period.
Bangladesh’s relative success can be attributed to a couple of distinctive features 
of its development process. First, continuity in the practice of democratic politics—
which sets Bangladesh apart from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—has clearly 
helped by providing a relatively stable socio-political environment. Second, more 
than in any other country of the region, the NGO community of Bangladesh has 
played a very strong role in softening some of the constraints to growth and 
development. For example, they have softened the credit constraint faced by poor 
entrepreneurs by providing affordable microcredit, strengthened the female labour 
force through various programmes of women’s empowerment, and helped improve 
the level of human capital at the grassroots level through innovative initiatives for 
providing informal education and healthcare to the poor.19
5.3 The Story of Bhutan
The story of Bhutan is rather different from that of the other countries in the 
region; it does not fit the pattern described so far, if only because modernization 
of the Bhutanese economy is a much more recent phenomenon. Ever since the 
mid-1980s, the economic growth of Bhutan has been inextricably and almost 
exclusively linked to the development of hydropower. Apart from earning valuable 
exports revenue, hydropower has also contributed to GDP growth indirectly by 
boosting the construction sector through both backward and forward linkages 
19 In the process, the NGO community has also made a significant contribution towards poverty 
reduction and human development, as discussed in section 6 below.
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and by facilitating the growth of power-intensive industries. The combined 
contribution of the energy sector itself, and of energy-related activities such 
as construction and power-intensive industries, has enabled Bhutan to sustain a 
remarkably high growth rate of around 8 per cent over a period of three decades, 
despite slow growth in agriculture.
Hydropower also makes an overwhelming contribution to the public 
 exchequer, through both tax and non-tax revenue. Most of the government revenue 
earned from the sale of hydropower has been used to maintain high levels of 
social expenditure and to fund infrastructural development. At the same time, 
most of the earnings from electricity exports have been used to import consumer 
goods, including essential foodstuffs, from India. Without these imports, the 
social expenditure as well as construction and other activities spurred by hydro-
power development would have faced serious problems due to the wage goods 
constraint. The softening of the wage goods constraint has been one of the principal 
pathways through which hydropower has contributed to sustaining the growth 
process in Bhutan.20
Yet another distinctive feature of Bhutan is that for the past three and a half 
decades, the development strategy of Bhutan has been underpinned by an over-
arching philosophy of human well-being that goes under the rubric of the GNH 
approach to development. By deliberately juxtaposing itself against the traditional 
pre-occupation with GNP, this philosophy explicitly rejects the purely material-
istic approach to development and calls for a holistic approach to development 
embracing material, environmental, cultural, and spiritual goals. For operational 
purposes, the GNH approach has been defined in terms of four pillars, viz. 
(1) equitable development, ensuring equity between individuals as well as regions, 
(2) environmental sustainability, (3) cultural and spiritual upliftment and (4) good 
governance. Although there exists some uncertainty as to how exactly to translate 
these principles into actual policymaking, the government of Bhutan continues to 
make serious attempts to ensure that its development strategy conforms to these 
principles as closely as possible.21 The choices made by the government in pursuit 
of these goals invariably entailed trade-offs with the demands for material pro-
gress. So far, the government has managed the trade-offs without much sacrifice 
of material welfare, but they remain a concern for the future.22
6. Poverty Reduction and Human Development
The economic transformation of South Asia is reflected not only in rising per 
capita income but also in sharply falling poverty rates and all-round human 
20 For further development of these arguments, see Osmani et al. (2005, 2008).
21 For an attempt to operationalize the concept of GNH in terms of practical policymaking, see, 
among others, RGOB (1999).
22 Some of the policy choices are analysed in ADB (2013) and World Bank (2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
S.R. Osmani 547
development. As measured by the international poverty line, the extent of poverty 
was in the range of 44 to 62 per cent in the early 1990s—except in Sri Lanka, 
where it was less than 10 per cent. Since then, it has fallen drastically every-
where—to 15 per cent in Nepal, 13 per cent in Bangladesh, 6 per cent in Pakistan 
and only about 2 per cent in Bhutan and Sri Lanka.23
Long-term economic growth, and the accompanying structural transformation 
in occupational patterns, has played a major role in achieving this remarkable 
reduction of poverty across the region by opening up opportunities for gainful 
employment for increasing numbers of people.24 But other country-specific 
 factors have also contributed. In Bangladesh, a major contribution has come from 
the microfinance revolution, which has reached nearly two-thirds of the rural 
population. By providing affordable credit to poor self-employed people, microfi-
nance has enabled a significant number of them to climb out of poverty by seizing 
the opportunities opened up by the growth process.25 In Sri Lanka, the egalitarian 
policies pursued by the government since the middle of the 2000s has helped 
render the growth process distinctly pro-poor. In Nepal and Pakistan, the huge 
amount of remittances sent by overseas migrant workers has been a major driver 
of poverty reduction. In Bhutan, the egalitarian philosophy underlying the GNH 
approach has helped translate the riches of hydropower into higher living 
standards for the general population.
Impressive gains have been made in other dimensions of human development 
as well. Sri Lanka is well known for its stellar achievements in various dimensions 
of human development from the earliest stage of its development. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, when most developing countries were almost obsessively preoccupied 
with growth, Sri Lanka set up an elaborate welfare state, quite atypical of countries 
at comparable levels of income. As a consequence, the health and educational 
outcomes of the people of Sri Lanka surged ahead of the levels achieved not just 
in South Asia but in most other developing countries, and even some developed 
countries of the world. In the process, Sri Lanka became a role model for the 
human development paradigm.26 Since the early 1990s, other countries in the 
23 See figure 1 in Osmani (2018). The international poverty line has been used for the sake of 
comparability across countries. Estimates of poverty based on national poverty lines tend to be some-
what higher, but long-term trends are roughly similar.
24 For a detailed analysis of the processes of poverty reduction in the region, see, among others, 
Osmani et al. (2006), World Bank (2013), Osmani (2017), Sen and Ali (2017) and on Bangladesh; 
ADB (2014) and NSB (2014) on Bhutan; Uematsu et al. (2016) and World Bank (2016a) on Nepal; 
López-Cálix et al. (2014) on Pakistan; and Gunatilaka et al. (2009) and World Bank (2015b; 2016b) on 
Sri Lanka.
25 A recent carefully conducted econometric exercise has estimated that, in the absence of microfi-
nance rural poverty, would have been 46 per cent in 2010 instead of 33 per cent, the actual poverty 
rate. In other words, microfinance has helped make rural poverty 28.5 per cent lower than it would 
otherwise have been (Mahmud and Osmani 2016: chapter 7).
26 Some commentators have argued that the contribution of welfare expenditures to human devel-
opment in Sri Lanka has been vastly exaggerated and that the country’s unusually high level of human 
development owes more to favourable initial conditions than to policy—a view that has been hotly 
contested by others, and now stands discredited. For a comprehensive review of this debate, see 
Osmani (1994).
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region have also made impressive progress, though not quite achieving the levels 
of human development obtaining in Sri Lanka.
South Asia (including India) has historically been notorious for having an 
exceptionally high prevalence of malnutrition, even compared with regions such 
as Sub-Saharan Africa, which have been economically more backward in most 
respects than South Asia. In the mid-1990s, UNICEF coined the term ‘Asian 
Enigma’ to refer to this perverse scenario. Much has changed in the two decades 
since then. While the level of malnutrition still remains unacceptably high in all 
South Asian countries (with the exception of Sri Lanka), the speed of improve-
ment has been quite remarkable (Osmani 2018, figure 2). The sharpest decline 
has occurred in Bangladesh, where the prevalence of stunting has come down 
from around 69 per cent in 1995 to just 36 per cent in 2014. Nepal has also 
achieved a very rapid speed of improvement, followed closely by Bhutan. Sri 
Lanka, which had less than half the stunting rate of the other countries to begin 
with, has been able to reduce it further—to just 15 per cent by 2014. Pakistan is 
the sole exception to this pattern of sustained improvement. Some improvement 
did occur until the early 2000s, but there seems to have been a reversal since 
then. Poor progress in human development in Pakistan is underlined by low 
public spending on social sectors, which has actually declined as a share of GDP 
in recent years.
At the opposite end in the spectrum of progress in human development lies 
Bangladesh. Among the low- and lower-middle-income countries in the world, 
Bangladesh’s performance in health and education makes it a significant outlier—
with a much better performance than might be predicted on the basis of per capita 
income alone. What is more, Bangladesh has been able to achieve these results 
with a much lower public expenditure on health and education (as a percentage 
of GDP) than countries with comparable performance. This unique feature of 
Bangladesh’s achievement reflects to a large extent the sterling role that its NGO 
community has played in promoting social development, much more than in any 
other part of South Asia (Asadullah et al. 2014).
One aspect of the NGO movement in Bangladesh that is especially salient in 
this context is its singular focus on women’s empowerment. Since its very incep-
tion, the microfinance movement, led by the Grameen Bank, has targeted women 
as the main beneficiaries. BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), 
the largest development NGO in the world, has also kept women at the centre 
of its wide-ranging activities, involving microcredit, health, education, and entre-
preneurship development. Most other NGOs have similarly engaged in women-
focused activities. The Government of Bangladesh has also made a major 
contribution in this regard by giving special incentive to girls’ education through 
stipends—first at primary and subsequently at secondary level. All these have 
enabled Bangladesh to achieve gender parity in school much sooner than the rest 
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of the countries (other than Sri Lanka);27 and the advancement in girls’ education, 
coupled with the general empowerment of women, has in turn helped the country 
achieve exceptional performance in the fields of health and nutrition despite low 
public spending in these areas.
While the region as a whole can be proud of the overall progress in human 
development that has taken place in the last two to three decades, a number of 
concerns are beginning to appear on the horizon. As these economies move on 
to the next stage of development and brace themselves to face the challenges of 
global competition on the one hand and rapid technological change on the other, 
they will need to improve the skill-base of their population. While some improve-
ment has indeed occurred, it has been from a very low base, and the current level 
of human capital among the countries’ labour forces is still very low by 
 international standards. One indication of this is the low ratio of young people 
with access to tertiary education, which has been in the range of 10 to 18 per cent 
in recent years.
Another, related, concern is rising inequality in various dimensions. Income 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, is generally on an upward trend in 
most of the countries (Osmani  2018, figure 4). The upward-rising first half of 
Kuznets’ celebrated inverted U-shaped relation between growth and inequality is 
evident for all countries except Sri Lanka, where the second, downward-sloping, 
part has begun to emerge in recent years—thanks to the egalitarian policies 
pursued by the present regime.
There are signs of growing inequality also in educational and health outcomes. 
It was noted earlier that the current level of human capital is generally low across 
the region. What makes the situation more worrisome is that, for the countries 
for which information on the distribution of human capital is available, it is the 
children from richer families who are acquiring an increasing share of whatever 
human capital is being formed. For instance, the difference in access to tertiary 
education between the richest and the poorest quintiles of the population has 
widened considerably since the early 1990s in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan 
(Osmani  2018, table A3.) Similarly, the difference between the richest and the 
poorest quintiles in the prevalence of child malnutrition has also widened during 
the same period (Osmani 2018, table A4). If unchecked, this trend of increasing 
inequality in human capital is likely to perpetuate income inequality through the 
intergenerational transmission mechanism—as children from poorer families 
accumulate less human capital and earn less income than children from richer 
families, they would transmit the inequality to the next generation. In the 
27 Pakistan is the only country in the region (including India) that has yet to achieve gender parity 
in schooling; in fact, its gender parity index still hovers around just 50 per cent.
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process, not only would inequality be perpetuated, but persistent inequality may 
also weaken the foundations of long-term growth.28
There is a good deal of commonality in the experience across the region, 
especially in the trends since the 1990s—as seen in the significant reduction in 
poverty and the sharp improvement in various dimensions of human develop-
ment in most of the countries, accompanied, however, by rising inequality. The 
notable exception is Pakistan, where although poverty levels have declined, 
thanks largely to a spectacular growth in workers’ remittances, human develop-
ment has lagged behind badly. The contrast in this sphere between Pakistan on 
the one hand and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh on the other is quite stark. Sri Lanka 
has, of course, always been a leader in the field of human development in the 
region because of its singular emphasis on a welfare state since the early days, but 
in terms of rate of improvement, Bangladesh’s performance has been the most 
spectacular. Its achievement has been based on the twin foundations of an active 
government, supported by increasing availability of resources made possible by 
steady growth, and a uniquely active role of the NGO community. Pakistan, in 
contrast, has been hamstrung in both respects—public expenditure on human 
development has been thoroughly inadequate in the face of frequent collapses in 
economic growth, and NGO activism has been one of the weakest in the region.
7. Challenges Lying Ahead
South Asia has overcome many challenges in the last fifty years, and achieved 
significant improvement in the living standards of the people, defying the dire 
predictions of many. It could be argued, though, that perhaps the region was 
unable to realize its full potential, and there is also no doubt that many more chal-
lenges lie ahead. Many of these challenges are common, but some matter more for 
some countries than for others.
The situation is perhaps the most challenging in Pakistan, where political 
uncertainty, weak governance, widespread terrorism, a high fertility rate, and a 
generally conservative attitude towards female education and female labour force 
participation combine to create an onerous set of constraints. Especially discon-
certing is the fact that long-run growth potential is declining in Pakistan. It has 
been estimated that in the last fifty years Pakistan’s steady annual GDP growth 
rate has fallen from 6 per cent to about 4.5 per cent (Lopez-Calix et al.  2012), 
which is much lower than the 7 per cent rate that the government considers 
 necessary for gainfully absorbing a bulging young population (GOP 2011). This 
contrast between potential growth and warranted growth portends an ominous 
28 For a fuller analysis of the intergenerational transmission mechanism—in the specific context of 
Bangladesh—see Osmani (2017).
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future for Pakistan, regardless of the political regime that comes to prevail, unless 
necessary structural reforms are undertaken immediately to reverse the decline 
in potential growth.29
Sri Lanka started its journey with the most favourable initial conditions, which 
have helped the country to maintain a fair rate of economic and social advance-
ment despite prolonged and destructive ethnic conflicts, but for it to emerge 
fully from the legacies of the conflict and achieve its full potential still remains a 
huge challenge. A matter of concern here is the recent political backlash that 
has tilted the policy regime aggressively towards restrictive and inward-looking 
economic policies. It does not augur well that recent trade policy has rendered 
the country’s import regime one of the most complex and protectionist in the 
world and that the consequent anti-export bias of the trade regime has seen the 
trade ratio plummet from 89 per cent of GDP in 2000 to just 48 per cent in 2016. 
The future success of Sri Lanka’s economic performance will depend crucially on 
how well the politicians can combine the demands of populism with the needs of 
economic dynamism.
Nepal and Bhutan have found their own unique ways to overcome the inherent 
constraints of a landlocked economy that is dependent on a big neighbour. But 
excessive reliance on hydropower in Bhutan and on remittance in Nepal is creating 
a one-dimensional economy in each case, which is engendering a set of structural 
constraints that inhibit economic diversification and thereby limit the prospects 
of sustaining, let alone accelerating, the pace of socio-economic development.30
Bangladesh is perhaps the most favourably placed country within the region, 
and is most likely to be able to sustain a relatively rapid pace of socio-economic 
development in the coming decades. But in order to achieve its potential, the 
country will have to find ways of vastly improving its notoriously weak govern-
ance structure and lingering political uncertainty, which have led to stagnation in 
private investment in recent years.
In addition to these country-specific problems, the region as a whole also faces 
a set of common challenges: (a) a low skill-base, which is utterly inadequate in 
the face of the emerging challenges of global competition and technological 
upheaval; (b) rising inequality in multiple dimensions, which threatens to 
weaken the foundations of long-term growth, in addition to being unjust in 
itself; (c) excessive reliance on workers’ remittances, which could jeopardize the 
sustainability of the region’s economic achievements owing to growing uncer-
tainty in the oil economies of the Middle-East, the rise of nationalistic sentiments 
in several industrialized economies, and the emergences of new suppliers of 
labour such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; (d) the slow pace in creating enough 
high-quality jobs, which not only constrains growth but also renders growth less 
29 See, Burki and Hasan (2013) for an insightful discussion of the kind of reforms needed.
30 For a perceptive analysis of how excessive reliance on hydropower is creating serious structural 
























Table 21.2 Correlates of economic growth in South Asia
 Investment rate Trade ratio Foreign aid Foreign aid Remittances
1966–1970 2011–2015 1966–1970 2011–2015 1981–1985 2011–2015 1981–1985 2011–2015 1981–1985 2011–2015
Bangladesh 11.5 28.3 21.1 45.7 5.9 1.3 35.8 5.1 2.7 9.1
Bhutan na 57.4 na 101.0 11.7 7.7 24.1 12.6 na 0.8
Nepal 5.3 38.0 14.6 47.8 8.0 4.6 42.6 12.3 1.3 27.5
Pakistan 16.2 14.9 24.0 31.5 2.4 1.2 14.1 8.6 8.5 6.5
Sri Lanka 16.7 33.3 46.7 51.1 8.4 0.7 30.4 2.0 5.4 8.6
India 16.5 35.9 1.2 3.5 0.8 0.1 3.9 0.4 1.2 3.5
Source: Compiled by the author from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
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effective in reducing poverty (Nayar et al.  2012); and (e) rapid urbanization, 
whose unique challenges none of the countries has yet to come to terms with. 
Furthermore, the global problem of climate change will have far-reaching 
implications for the living standards of the region’s people, as might changes in 
global geopolitical alignments—with implications for trade flows and the flow 
of capital. The future trajectory of socio-economic development of the region will 
depend to a large extent on precisely how the political regimes respond to these 
emerging challenges.
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